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
I. BORZSÁK, J. HARMATTA, I. KAPITÁNYFY, Á. SZABÓ,
S. SZÁDECZKY-KARDOSS, CS. TÖTTÖSSY

REDIGIT

ZS. RITOÓK

TOMUS XXXIV

FASCICULI 1—4



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MOMIES DOREES : MATERIAUX POUR SERVIR A L'ETABLISSEMENT D'UN CORPUS

« Voici ma table et mon lit. Voici la tête de momie
qui m'inspira tant de fois des pensées salutaires,
et voici le livre où j'ai si souvent cherché les
images de Dieu ».

Anatole France, *Thaïs*

En Mars 1982, Mme Françoise Dunand présentait devant la Société Française d'Égyptologie, les résultats des fouilles effectuées par l'IFAO dans la nécropole de Douch à l'extrémité sud de l'oasis de Khargah. L'objet principal de cette communication était les têtes dorées retrouvées dans les tombes nouvellement fouillées. Il s'agit en effet de têtes de momies recouvertes de feuilles d'or, trouvées encore en place sur les épaules du mort ou séparément. Mme Dunand, dans son article publié postérieurement,¹ a souligné l'extrême rareté apparente de cette pratique² et nous avons voulu ici nuancer ce point de vue et montrer la nécessité de l'élaboration d'un corpus des momies dorées, qu'elles aient été retrouvées dans leur intégralité ou fragmentaires. Déjà J. L. de Cenival, Cl. Vandersleyen et J. Yoyotte ont augmenté cette étude de références qui ont été insérées dans son article par Mme Dunand³ et il nous a semblé indispensable d'ajouter plusieurs éléments à celui-ci, en le prenant pour base, car seul essai de collationnement existant en l'occurrence.

Nous ne cherchons pas ici à donner un corpus exhaustif, nous réservant, dans une publication ultérieure, d'étudier plus complètement le phénomène de la dorure

* Le texte, rédigé en 1983 et revu une dernière fois en 1987, était depuis lors en attente de publication. L'auteur, hormis quelques ouvrages indispensables, n'a pu remettre complètement à jour le corpus fourni mais il lui a néanmoins semblé utile de publier cette recherche en l'état, puisqu'aucun élément venant infirmer la liste ou les conclusions partielles de 1987, n'a été mis au jour.

¹ Cf. F. DUNAND, *Les « Têtes dorées » de la nécropole de Douch*, BSFE 93, 1982, pp. 26-46. Depuis ce premier article, l'auteur a signalé à nouveau la dorure corporelle des momies de Douch in F. DUNAND et R. LICHTENBERG, *Les Momies. Une voyage dans l'éternité*, Coll. *Découverts*, Gallimard, Paris, 1991, p. 36 et 87 (avec illustrations).

² Cf. F. DUNAND, *op. cit.*, p. 30 et pp. 36-37.

³ Ces additions aux quelques exemples trouvés par l'auteur de l'article sont les suivantes :

Une momie dans les collections du musée du Louvre (renseignements J.-L. de Cenival). Cf. F. DUNAND, *op. cit.*, p. 35 et p. 44, note 16. Cf. aussi notre momie n° 22.

Une momie d'enfant originaire d'Antinoé, retrouvée récemment au musée de Grenoble (renseignement J. Yoyotte). Cf. F. DUNAND, *op. cit.*, p. 35 et p. 44, note 16 bis. Cf. aussi notre momie n° 10.

Trois têtes dorées conservées au musée de l'Homme (renseignement J. Yoyotte). Cf. F. DUNAND, *op. cit.*, p. 45, note 20. Cf. aussi nos têtes n° 21, 22 et 23.

Une momie de femme au front doré (renseignement Cl. Vandersleyen) Cf. F. DUNAND, *op. cit.*, p. 45, note 20. Cf. aussi notre momie n° 6.

Un crâne doré provenant des fouilles Gayet à Antinoé, conservé au musée municipal de Lunéville (renseignement J. Yoyotte). Cf. F. DUNAND, *op. cit.*, p. 45, note 20. Cf. aussi notre tête n° 11.

Crânes et membres dorés conservés dans les musées tchécoslovaques (renseignement J. Yoyotte). Cf. F. DUNAND, *op. cit.*, p. 46, note additionnelle. Cf. aussi nos têtes n° 1 et 19, membres n° 8, 9 et 10.


corporelle, mais à attirer l'attention sur la fréquence de ce procédé, particulièrement à l'époque gréco-romaine. Nous laisserons donc de côté l'aspect technique que comporte cette pratique⁴ et nous contenterons, en conclusion, de donner des éléments en vue d'une interprétation qui ne saurait, dans l'immédiat, qu'être provisoire.

Il nous faut tout d'abord séparer le problème en trois manifestations distinctes :⁵

- objet épousant la forme de la partie du corps sur laquelle il est appliqué ou qu'il remplace,⁶
- dorure des doigts et des ongles,⁷

⁴ Cet aspect technique a son importance. Il est fait non seulement mention dans les rapports de fouilles de placages de feuilles d'or sur la momie même, mais aussi d'utilisation de peinture dorée (à base d'orpiment généralement) utilisée principalement pour les ongles des pieds et des mains : Cf. J.-C. Goyon, *Rituels funéraires de l'ancienne Égypte*, Coll. « Littératures anciennes du Proche-Orient », les Éditions du Cerf, 1972, p. 36 et p. 51, ou encore d'électrum. Cette distinction est très importante car elle est certainement la manifestation d'une différence sociale à travers une pratique funéraire courante qui, dans tous les cas, relève de la même symbolique. Cf. infra note 7.

⁵ F. DUNAND, *op. cit.*, p. 31 distingue deux types de dorure corporelle : la dorure partielle à laquelle elle rattache la pratique qui consiste à recouvrir certaines parties du corps d'objets d'or épousant leur forme et la dorure intégrale ou limitée à certains membres du corps (jambes, pieds, thorax ou tête). Nous avons préféré, nous rattachant aux pratiques bien attestées dans l'Égypte ancienne, distinguer trois phénomènes. Signalons dès à présent que cette technique de la dorure à la feuille semble avoir été le privilège d'un métier particulier. Plusieurs nécessaires de doreurs sont parvenus jusqu'à nous (un de ceux-ci est exposé dans les galeries publiques du Louvre). En outre, il existait des « chefs des fabricants de feuilles d'or » :

 *hry irw nbw p²K.*

sans doute chargés également de la corporation des doreurs. Cf. Ch. ZIVIE, *À propos de quelques reliefs du Nouvel Empire au Musée du Caire*, BIFAO 75, 1975, p. 304-306.

⁶ Cf. F. CAILLAUD, *Voyage à Méroé, au Fleuve Blanc au-delà de Fazogl...*, Paris, 1827, p. 12 et Pl. LXX. T. J. PETTIGREW, *A history of Egyptian Mummies...*, London, Longman, Rees Gormii, Brown, Green and Longman, 1834, p. 63 et Pl. VI, fig. 1. H. SCHÄFFER, *Ägyptische Goldschmiedarbeiten...*, Berlin, K. Curtius, 1910, *Mitteilungen aus der ägyptischen Sammlung* 1. Königlichen Museen zu Berlin, p. 71, n° 130-138, Pl. 18. F. DUNAND, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

⁷ Cette pratique est bien attestée dans l'Égypte pharaonique et on peut en trouver la justification et l'explication dans les textes des rituels funéraires. Il suffit de prendre pour exemple cette phrase extraite du *Rituel de l'embaumement* traduite par J. Cl. Goyon, *op. cit.*, p. 51 : « O Osiris N. ! Tu viens de recevoir tes doigtiers d'or et tes doigts sont en or pur, tes ongles en électrum ! » Et en note, J. Cl. Goyon précise : « De tels doigtiers avaient été placés aux mains et aux pieds du roi Toutankhamon. Toutefois, ces pièces d'orfèvrerie, d'un coût très élevé, étaient réservées aux rois et à quelques privilégiés, membres de la famille royale ou hauts dignitaires. Dans la pratique courante, surtout à l'époque où fut recopié le présent rituel, la peinture dorée remplaçait le métal précieux, ce qui prouve, si besoin était, l'ancienneté du texte original. » Cette pratique est très courante et nous n'en donnerons ici que quelques exemples, tous datés de l'époque gréco-romaine (classés par ordre chronologique des sources) : J. COPPIN, *Coll. Voyageurs Occidentaux en Égypte* 4, IFAO, Le Caire, 1971, p. 193. Chr. HERTZOG, *Essai de Mumiographie*, Gotha, 1718, p. 55. V. DEXON, *Voyage dans la Basse et la Haute Égypte, pendant les campagnes du général Bonaparte II*, Londres, 1803, p. 33. W. R. DAWSON, *Pettigrew's demonstrations upon mummies. A chapter in the history of Egyptology*, JEA 20, 1934, p. 176 et 177. G. KUENY et J. YOVORTE, *Grenoble, Musée des Beaux-Arts, Collection égyptienne, Inventaire des Collections publiques Françaises* 23, Paris, Éditions de la Réunion des Musées nationaux, 1979, p. 184. Momie n° 277 (donnée par erreur n° 227 in F. DUNAND, *op. cit.*, p. 31 et p. 44, note 10).



Planche I

- momies retrouvées intactes ou fragmentaires portant des traces de dorure intégrale ou partielle.

Ce n'est que la troisième manifestation, en cause dans l'article de Mme Dunand, que nous étudierons ici.

Dès le XIII^{ème} siècle, le médecin arabe de Bagdad, 'Abd Al-Laṭīf⁸, signale la fréquence de cette pratique sur les momies exhumées qu'il eut l'occasion d'examiner. Voici ce qu'il constate alors qu'il se trouve près des pyramides :⁹ « On trouve sur le front, les yeux et le nez de ces cadavres, des feuilles d'or qui sont comme une pellicule. De pareilles feuilles d'or se trouvent aussi sur les parties sexuelles des femmes : il y a même des cadavres recouverts entièrement de semblables feuilles de ce métal (. . .) Il paroît que l'usage de ces anciens temps étoit d'ensevelir un peu d'or avec les morts. Un des kadhis de Bousir, village voisin des lieux où l'on déposito les morts, m'a rapporté qu'ayant ouvert trois tombeaux, l'on avoit trouvé sur chaque cadavre une feuille d'or si mince que l'on n'avoit pu l'enlever, et que chacun de ces cadavres avoit aussi dans la bouche un petit lingot d'or ; qu'il avoit pris les trois lingots dont le poids étoit ensemble de neuf mithkals. Les histoires de ce genre sont en trop grand nombre pour trouver place dans ce livre. »

Les renseignements fournis par ce voyageur sont par ailleurs toujours trop précis pour permettre de mettre en doute ici son témoignage. Ces quelques phrases expliquent peut-être que nombre de ces momies aient disparues ou aient été irrémédiablement détériorées par les personnes désireuses, de tout temps, de s'emparer du métal précieux. Les membres de l'Expédition d'Égypte remarquèrent souvent la présence de traces de dorure sur les momies qu'ils eurent l'occasion d'examiner. Jomard se fait l'écho de ce genre de pratique dans la *Description de l'Égypte* :¹⁰ « On dorait très-fréquemment les ongles des pieds des momies, les bracelets, les lèvres sur la peau même, et le masque extérieur en toile. On a vu aussi des pieds dorés entièrement. Enfin on dorait quelquefois les parties sexuelles de l'homme et de la femme. »

Rouyer dans le même ouvrage précise :¹¹ « Quelques unes ont été dorées sur toute la surface du corps ; d'autres ne sont dorées que sur le visage, sur les parties naturelles, sur les mains et sur les pieds. Ces dorures sont communes à un assez grand nombre de momies, pour m'empêcher de partager l'opinion de quelques voyageurs qui ont pensé qu'elles décoroient seulement les corps des princes ou des personnages d'un rang très-distingué. Ces momies qui ont été préparées avec beau-

⁸ Sur 'Abd Al-Laṭīf (1162/1163 - 1231/1232) : cf. S. M. STERN in *Encyclopédie de l'Islam*, Nelle édition, Tome I, Leyde, E.-J. Brill, 1960, p. 76.

⁹ Cf. 'ABD AL-LATIF, *Relation de l'Égypte suivie de divers extraits d'écrivains orientaux, et d'un état des provinces et des villages de l'Égypte depuis le XIV^{ème} siècle le tout traduit et enrichi de notes historiques et critiques par M. Sylvestre de Sacy*, Paris, imprimerie impériale, 1810 Livre I^{er} chapitre IV, p. 199-200.

¹⁰ Cf. E. F. JOMARD, *Description des hypogées de la ville de Thèbes, Description de l'Égypte...*, Description I, 1809, p. 346.

¹¹ Cf. P. C. ROUYER, *Notice sur les embaumements des anciens Égyptiens, Description de l'Égypte...*, Mémoires I, 1809, p. 216.

coup de soin, sont inaltérables, tant qu'on les conserve dans un lieu sec ; mais développées et exposées à l'air, elles attirent promptement l'humidité, et au bout de quelques jours elles répandent une odeur désagréable. »

Ces divers témoignages nous livrent des remarques générales sur ces procédés et insistent sur la fréquence de cette pratique, fréquence à ce point considérable que Rouyer refuse de considérer la dorure des corps comme un privilège réservé à une classe particulière de la civilisation égyptienne ; nous sommes loin ici de la prétendue rareté de ce phénomène.

Ces constatations vont se multiplier tout au long du XIX^{ème} siècle et nous ne retiendrons ici que les plus significatives qui proviennent de voyageurs ou de fouilleurs constatant « *de visu* » le phénomène.

L'antiquaire Joseph Passalacqua¹² précise en 1826 que cette pratique n'est attestée que sur les momies d'époque gréco-romaine :¹³ « Il y en a dont les attitudes de leurs corps, les enveloppes de toile, les cartonnages et les cercueils mêmes, sont absolument analogues, et les mêmes que ceux des momies réellement égyptiennes, dont elles ne diffèrent que par cette seule inscription grecque, et quelquefois par une dorure 'au-dessous' des enveloppes, qu'on ne voit appliquée ainsi, que presque exclusivement sur de telles momies portant un nom grec. Cette particularité consiste tantôt dans une dorure directe 'sur la chair' des morts et principalement sur leur visage, ou par des petites plaques très-minces d'argent doré ou d'or pur, appliquées de même sur quelque partie du corps, mais le plus souvent formées en étuis cylindriques représentant des doigts, avec l'indication des ongles, et placées sur les dix doigts respectifs des mains de telles momies. »

Cette remarque concerne exclusivement les momies grecques qui, d'après l'auteur, sont les seules à subir ce traitement spécial, quoiqu'il remarque en note que :¹⁴ « Des petites plaques en or ou en argent se trouvent quelquefois sur les momies sans inscriptions. » Pettigrew renvoie par ailleurs à cet auteur pour affirmer à son tour l'origine grecque de ces momies.¹⁵

Le grand voyageur Frédéric Cailliaud possédait dans sa collection, une momie dorée sur toute la surface du corps, momie dont il donne une description détaillée

¹² Sur Passalacqua : cf. W. R. DAWSON, et E. P. UPHILL, *Who was who in Egyptology ?*, London, EES, 2^{ème} édition révisée, 1972, p. 222 - 223.

¹³ Cf. J. PASSALACQUA, *Catalogue raisonné et historique des Antiquités découvertes en Egypte par Mr. Josph. Passalacqua de Trieste*, Paris, Galerie d'Antiquités Egyptiennes, 1826. p. 185 - 186.

¹⁴ Cf. J. PASSALACQUA *op. cit.*, p. 185, note 3.

¹⁵ Cf. T. J. PETTIGREW, *A history of Egyptian mummies and an account of the worship and embalming of the sacred animals by the Egyptians, with remarks on the funeral ceremonies of different nations, and observations on the mummies of the Canary Islands, of the ancient Peruvians, Burman priests...*, London, Longman, Rees, Gormii, Brown, Green and Longman, 1834. p. 64 et note f.

Contrairement à ce que signale PETTIGREW, il ne semble pas que les numéros 1543 et 1588 qui désignent respectivement une momie à cartonnage doré et une statuette en basalte de Karnak, concernent des momies à cartonnage portant éventuellement des traces de dorure. Par contre, le numéro 1540, malgré une ambiguïté due à la construction de la phrase désigne peut-être un corps de ce type. Nous donnons ici le texte de cette notice inscrit à la page 102 du *Catalogue* de PASSALACQUA : « N° 1540 : Momie enveloppée dans un cartonnage, et dont le visage est doré. Parmi les ornements symboliques peints sur l'enveloppe, on distingue les sujets qui suivent : l'épervier à tête de béliet. Un épervier les ailes déployées. Isis et Nephtys ailées et placées en regard, séparées par une colonne d'hieroglyphes etc... Hauteur, 5 pieds 2 pouces. »



Planche II A



Planche II B

dans son *Voyage à Méroé*. . .¹⁶. Elle était contenue dans un sarcophage comportant des inscriptions grecques, traduites par Letronne, qui permettent de dater le personnage de l'époque de Trajan.

Quelques années plus tard, en 1829, Madden remarque également l'existence de cette pratique :¹⁷ « The hands of many (mummies) were dyed with the juice of the henna, as is the custom of the Arabs : the fingers, toes, lips and eyes of others were gilt. »

Le manuel de base pour la connaissance des momies et des différents procédés d'embaumement est l'ouvrage écrit en 1834 par le chirurgien Thomas Joseph Pettigrew¹⁸ qui rend compte des divers témoignages concernant cette pratique et que nous avons cité précédemment. L'auteur nous apprend qu'il possédait une momie d'époque gréco-romaine, portant des traces de dorure en plusieurs endroits du corps dont il donne des représentations et une description succincte.¹⁹ Cette momie faisait partie de la collection Salt et provenait peut-être de Thèbes.²⁰ Ce n'est pas la seule momie dorée que Pettigrew eut l'occasion d'étudier. On peut en compter trois possédant des traces de dorure parmi celles déroulées en public en 1836 et 1837.²¹ La première est celle d'un vieil homme qui semble avoir été complètement dorée²², la deuxième n'avait que les ongles des mains et des pieds dorés²³ et la troisième possédait des traces de dorure sur les ongles des pieds.²⁴ Pettigrew avait d'ailleurs remarqué, dans son ouvrage précédemment cité :²⁵ « The gilding of mummies has been most frequently observed on the nails of the fingers and toes, but it has also been seen on the eye-lids, on the lips, the face, on the sexual organs, and on the hands and feet. »

¹⁶ Cf. F. CAILLIAUD, *Voyage à Méroé, au fleuve blanc au delà de Fazoql, dans le midi du royaume de Sennar, à Syouah et dans cinq autres oasis fait dans les années 1819, 1820, 1821 et 1822*, Paris, 1823-1827. Volume 4, p. 1-21.

¹⁷ Cf. R. R. MADDEN, *Travels in Turkey, Egypt, Nubia and Palestine in 1824, 1825, 1826 et 1827*, London, H. Colburn, 1829. Volume 2, p. 90. Sur R. R. Madden : cf. W. R. DAWSON et E. UPHILL, *op. cit.*, p. 191.

¹⁸ Cf. T. J. PETTIGREW, *op. cit.* Sur Pettigrew : cf. W. R. DAWSON et E. UPHILL, *op. cit.*, p. 230-231 à la bibliographie duquel on ajoutera : M. M. PACK, *Wrapped for Eternity. The story of the Egyptian Mummy*, Mc Grawhill Book Company, 1974, p. 103-108.

¹⁹ Cf. T. J. PETTIGREW, *op. cit.*, p. 63. Pl. I et II.

²⁰ Sur la provenance de cette momie et son achat par Pettigrew : cf. W. R. DAWSON, *Pettigrew's demonstrations upon mummies. A chapter in the history of Egyptology*, JEA 20, 1934, p. 171-175 et T. J. PETTIGREW, *op. cit.*, p. XV-XVI. Le rapprochement entre l'introduction de l'ouvrage de Pettigrew et l'article de Dawson permet d'affirmer que cette momie provient de la troisième collection Salt car ce chirurgien n'en a déroulé que deux avant la rédaction de son livre, la première étant celle rapportée par Perry en 1740, de Saqqarah. La momie de Pettigrew fut donc achetée par celui-ci lors de la vente de la collection Salt en 1833 à Sotheby's. Pour Pettigrew, cette momie viendrait de Thèbes. cf. T. J. PETTIGREW, *op. cit.*, p. XV-XVI.

²¹ Sur ces représentations publiques : cf. W. R. DAWSON, JEA 20, 1934, p. 170-182. et M. M. PACK, *op. cit.*, p. 103-108.

²² Sur cette momie : cf. notre momie n° 27 et infra note 57.

²³ Cf. W. R. DAWSON, *op. cit.*, p. 176. Cette momie appartenait à un certain Mr. Jones de l'Amirauté. (peut-être Owen Jones : cf. W. R. DAWSON et E. UPHILL, *op. cit.*, p. 153.).

²⁴ Cf. W. R. DAWSON, *op. cit.*, p. 177. Cette momie appartenait au célèbre collectionneur Athanasi.

²⁵ Cf. T. J. PETTIGREW, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

Les expériences de ce chirurgien attirèrent l'attention des conservateurs du British Museum sur cette pratique et les conduisirent à réserver un paragraphe à ce procédé particulier dans le catalogue du musée datant de 1836 :²⁶ « It is a fact known from antient (*sic*) writers, that the Egyptians were well acquainted with the art of gilding (Herod. II. 182), which they used for ornamenting statues. But the only instance of gilding connected with funeral purposes, that we can find in the Greek writers, is that recorded by Herodotus (II. 129), where he says that the embalmed daughter of Mycerinus was placed in a wooden gilded cow : the cow was kept in an apartment of the Palace at Sais, where Herodotus saw it. But many mummies that have been examined, have been gilded either in part or entirely. Mr. Pettigrew's Greek-Egyptian mummy was probably, we may perhaps say certainly, gilded all over, and parts of the gilding still remain irregularly scattered on the feet, legs, arms, body and head. In other mummies the gilding has been observed on the nails of the fingers and toes ; on the eye-lids, lips, face and even on the sexual organs. »

Ce phénomène est donc bien connu au XIX^{ème} siècle et fréquemment observé par les voyageurs, savants et antiquaires ou collectionneurs. Il faudrait par la suite examiner tous les récits de voyages et tous les rapports de fouilles qui permettraient, sans doute, de retrouver nombre de traces de ces momies et de l'endroit où elles seraient actuellement conservées.²⁷

Cette recherche est en cours et nous en donnerons les résultats dans un article ultérieur. Nous citerons simplement ici deux exemples significatifs et importants qui nous fournissent l'indication primordiale d'un contexte précis où se rencontraient ces momies en grand nombre, et la trace de têtes dorées rapportées d'Égypte en 1882. Tout d'abord, citons les paroles de Raoul Lacour²⁸ qui visite en 1868 ou 1869, les grottes de Maabdah :²⁹ « Cependant, quoiqu'il n'y ait dans ces fosses communes ni sarcophage de pierre ni cercueil en bois, ces corps ne sont pas tous égaux devant

²⁶ Cf. British Museum, *Egyptian Antiquities*, The Library of Entertaining Knowledge, London, Charles Knight, 1832-1836. Tome 2, p. 114.

²⁷ Citons par exemple cet incident, apparemment sans importance, relaté par Victor Meignan in V. MEIGNAN, *Après bien d'autres, Souvenirs de la Haute Égypte et de la Nubie*, Paris, Renouard, 1873, p. 95-96. L'auteur se trouve alors dans une des nécropoles d'Abydos et raconte ce qui suit : « Déjà depuis quelque temps nous errions au hasard dans cette vieille nécropole où les bandelettes et les ossements se mêlaient aux poteries brisées et aux débris que l'on trouve toujours en si grand nombre sur l'emplacement des anciennes cités égyptiennes, lorsqu'un de mes compagnons s'écria : 'Une trouvaille ! Accourez !' Je partageai son enthousiasme, en voyant à terre deux momies humaines parfaitement conservées et dépouillées de leurs enveloppes. L'idée nous vint qu'elles devaient contenir quelques bijoux car leur peau était dorée, et les riches personnages seuls se donnaient un tel luxe après leur mort. » Ce luxe ne leur aura servi à rien car après les avoir éventrées, Meignan et ses compagnons les rejetèrent au désert.

²⁸ Cf. R. LACOUR, *L'Égypte d'Alexandrie à la Seconde Cataracte*, Paris, Hachette, 1871, p. 251-252. Le livre de Raoul Lacour ne possède pas de date d'édition. Néanmoins son ouvrage a été publié en 1871, après, comme nous l'apprend la préface de L. Filhos, la mort de l'auteur au combat pendant la guerre de 1870. Cette date est confirmée dans J. HILMY, *The Literature of Egypt and the Soudan, A Bibliography*, Volume I, Londres, Trübner and Co., 1886, p. 352. Le voyage de Lacour date de 1868-1869 : cf. L. A. CHRISTOPHE, *Abou Simbel et l'épopée de sa découverte*, P. F. Merckx, Bruxelles, 1965, p. 149.

²⁹ Sur ces grottes et le matériel qui y fut retrouvé cf. Th. ZIMMER, *Les grottes de Maabdah (Samoun)*, *Varia Aegyptiaca Supplement* 1, Van Siclen Books, San Antonio, 1987. Notons que Gustave Flaubert et Maxime du Camp rapportèrent eux aussi « des pieds et des mains humaines dorées » provenant de ce site.



Planche III



Planche IV

la mort : il y en a que l'on dorait sur la peau, d'autres auxquels on donnait pour compagnons dans ce voyage éternel les scarabées sacrés en porcelaine. »

Cette constatation est renforcée par le Comte Ludovic Lepic³⁰ qui, voyageant en Égypte en 1882, rapporte de son voyage plusieurs têtes et membres dorés provenant de ces mêmes grottes et relate son aventure en illustrant son récit de représentations de six têtes de ce type.³¹ Pour ce qui est des traces de momies dorées dans les fouilles³², signalons les diverses attestations à Antinoé durant les fouilles conduites par Albert Gayet qui découvrit plusieurs momies entières et fragmentaires de cette nature et qui, pour lui, sont essentiellement gréco-romaines :³³ « Deux types particu-

³⁰ Sur le vicomte puis comte Ludovic Lepic cf. ZIMMER *op. cit.*, 1987, p. 20, note 98 et *ibidem*. *Ludovic Napoléon Lepic, Peintre, archéologue et collectionneur (1833-1889)*. Dossiers archéologiques et culturels du Nord et du Pas de Calais 32, Berck, 1992, p. 30-35.

³¹ Cf. L. LEPIC, *La Dernière Égypte*, Charpentier, Paris, 1883, p. 153-154, et planche p. 143. L'édition que nous possédons et toutes celles que nous avons pu avoir entre les mains datent de 1884. Il semble néanmoins d'après I. HILMY, *op. cit.*, p. 374, et O. LORENZ, *op. cit.*, p. 142-143, que la première édition soit de 1883. Quant au voyage lui-même, il date 1882 et se déroule avant le bombardement d'Alexandrie par les anglais en juillet 1882 : cf. L. LEPIC, *op. cit.*, page de garde.

³² Maspero, dans une lettre envoyée à Jakob Krall et datée du 16 Décembre 1891 (Cf. J. KRALL, *Die etruskischen Mummienbinden des Agramer National Museums*, Denkschr. der K. Akad. der Wiss., phil.-hist. Cl. 41 n° 3, Wien, 1894, p. 10), signalait déjà qu'il avait pu constater la présence de momies de ce type dans les fouilles exécutées par lui à Saqqarah, Akhmim et Antinoé. « On a signalé un certain nombre de momies dorées. La seule qui ait été figurée à ma connaissance est celle qui fut ouverte par Pettigrew. Il l'a décrite, p. XVI, 65-66 de son ouvrage, *History of Egyptian Mummies* et représenté le corps entier sur la planche frontispice, la tête seule planche II du même ouvrage. La momie en question était d'époque gréco-romaine, comme toutes les autres momies du même genre qu'on a signalées. J'en ai trouvé une demi-douzaine environ dont deux à Saqqarah, une à Akhmim, le reste à Thèbes : toutes étaient gréco-romaines et l'or y était semé plutôt qu'étendu sur le corps comme dans la momie de Pettigrew. Pourtant une feuille d'or tapisse le plus souvent de façon continue le dessous du pied, sans doute pour donner au mort le moyen de vérifier la prédiction d'après laquelle il devait dans l'autre monde marcher sur un sol d'or. Au-delà de la période grecque, on employait le masque d'or comme sur la momie du Sérapeum qui est au Louvre, les feuilles d'or au lieu d'être collées sur la peau étaient répandues en petit nombre dans l'épaisseur des bandages. Malheureusement les arabes savent cela mieux que nous et il est rare qu'une momie passe par leurs mains sans perdre son masque et ses phylactères. » Peut-être est-ce à la plante des pieds d'une telle momie qu'il est fait allusion dans : ANONYME, *Documenti inediti per servire alla storia dei Musei d'Italia III*, Roma, Beneini, 1880, VIII Collezione Drovetti P. 235 n° 17 : « 17 Semelles d'une momie dorée ».

³³ L'article de Mme Dunand ne donne pour références aux têtes dorées d'Antinoé que celles qui lui ont été fournies par Mlle. F. von Känel. Nous rajoutons ici à celles-ci plusieurs autres passages tirés des écrits AL. GAYET, *Catalogue des objets recueillis à Antinoé pendant les fouilles de 1898 et exposés au Musée Guimet du 22 Mai au 30 Juin 1898 par Al. Gayet*, Ministère de l'Instruction Publique et des Beaux-Arts, Paris, E. Leroux, 1898, p. 64. *Antiquités Égyptiennes, Nécropole pharaonique de la XII^{ème} dynastie. . . . Nécropole romaine des premiers siècles de notre ère. . . dont la vente aux enchères publiques se fera dans la rotonde du rez-de-chaussée au Musée Guimet (Place d'Iéna) le Lundi 17 Juin 1901, à 2 heures*, Paris, E. Leroux, 1901. *Notice relative aux objets recueillis à Antinoé pendant les fouilles exécutées en 1902-1903 et exposées au Musée Guimet du 7 Juin au 7 Juillet 1903 par Al. Gayet*, Mission du Ministère de l'Instruction Publique et des Beaux-Arts, Paris, E. Leroux, 1903, p. 31. *Catalogue sommaire de la première exposition de la Société Française de Fouilles Archéologiques ayant eu lieu en Juin-Juillet 1905 au Petit Palais des Champs Élysées*, 2^{ème} édition, 1905, p. 11. E. AMELINEAU, *Musée de Châteaudun, Catalogue n° 1^{er}, La Collection égyptienne*, Châteaudun, Imprimerie de la Société Typographique, Librairie Guillaumin, 1908, p. 32.

Signalons également que les archives du laboratoire d'anthropologie du musée de l'Homme comprennent nombre de lettres de la main de Gayet, dont une particulièrement, contient la mention d'une momie dorée (notre momie n° 13). Cette lettre datée de 1910 est conservée sous le n° 1910-28. Le problème des momies et fragments de momies portant des traces de dorure trouvées par Gayet à Antinoé est double

liers d'ensevelissement sont à noter dans ces caveaux. Tantôt, le corps, non embaumé, a été plongé dans un bain de bitume. Des feuilles d'or, larges au maximum de quatre centimètres de côté, sont appliquées sur le front, les joues, les avant-bras, les mains, les genoux et les pieds. L'or est le plus souvent jaune pâle, quelquefois rougeâtre. Les yeux, les narines, la bouche, les oreilles et les organes sexuels sont semblablement dorés.³⁴ Et encore dans un ouvrage postérieur: «La coutume de dorer la face avait de même une origine rituelle, puisée à la religion pharaonique. 'Que ta face brille comme la lumière' disent les litanies; 'Que tes yeux voient la lumière'. Et pour répondre à cette autre formule, on insérait quelquefois des plaquettes de bitume, recouvertes d'une mince feuillure d'or, dans les orbites des défunts.»³⁵

Cette pratique est constatée enfin dans des fouilles beaucoup plus récentes par Bernard Bruyère à Deir el-Médinéh, dans une tombe gréco-romaine dégagée en 1935 et datant du II^{ème} ou du III^{ème} siècle de notre ère.³⁶ Outre la présence, parmi les dix corps retrouvés de quatre momies au visage doré³⁷ Bruyère fait plusieurs remarques à propos des coutumes funéraires de cette époque:³⁸ «La dorure appliquée sur le visage et sur certaines parties du corps (orteils, ongles des mains, poitrine) le remplacement des globes oculaires par une prothèse en cire ou en stuc doré représentant des yeux; l'apposition d'amulettes en cire dorée sur le front, la bouche, la poitrine et les pieds: le don d'une bague en cire ou en plâtre doré à l'annulaire de la main gauche sont constatés sur presque toutes les momies gréco-romaines. C'est la parure funéraire rituelle qui ne différencie ni les sexes ni les classes des morts.» Il semble, en effet, que cette pratique ait été assez courante à Deir el-Médinéh à cette époque.³⁹

et les renseignements donnés par cet auteur à prendre avec prudence. Gayet a repris dans ses diverses expositions dans les salles du musée Guimet, des objets présentés les années précédentes et il est souvent difficile de dire s'il s'agit des mêmes momies exposées plusieurs fois ou de différentes pièces, ces réutilisations n'étant pas précisées et les numéros de conservation inexistants. La seule affirmation possible, en l'occurrence, est que Gayet rapporta d'Egypte, plusieurs momies de ce type.

Par ailleurs, le problème de la dispersion des collections Gayet provenant d'Antinoë est lié à deux facteurs: l'abondance des dons et ventes effectués par celui-ci de son vivant, dont il ne reste souvent aucune trace et le problème des dispersions des collections des musées Guimet de Lyon et de Paris. Sur le problème de la dispersion après 1916 des collections rapportées par Gayet: Cf. *Lettre de Charles Boreux, datée du 5 Juillet 1920* conservée au département Afrique blanche du musée de l'Homme sous le numéro de dossier 21 05. Cf. également: P. QUARRÉ, *Le legs Gayet et la Collection d'antiquités égyptiennes du Musée de Dijon*, Mémoires de la Commission des Antiquités de la Côte d'or 22, 1949, p. 147 - 149. Nous remercions Michel Dewachter qui a attiré notre attention sur cet article ainsi que sur la petite publication d'Amelineau citée *supra* en nous signalant, par ailleurs, que ce catalogue avait été réimprimé en 1975 par la *Société Dunoise* (Vol. XIX, n° 269).

³⁴ Cf. AL. GAYET, *Notice... 1901 -1902*, Paris, 1902, p. 13 - 14.

³⁵ Cf. AL. GAYET, *Catalogue sommaire...*, Paris, 1905, p. 11.

³⁶ Sur cette tombe: cf. B. BRUYÈRE et A. BATAILLE, *Une tombe gréco-romaine de Deir el-Médinéh*, BIFAO 36, 1937, p. 146 - 174. *Une tombe gréco-romaine de Deir el-Médinéh*, BIFAO 38, 1939, p. 73 - 107.

³⁷ Cf. B. BRUYÈRE et A. BATAILLE, BIFAO 36, p. 158 et 160 et BIFAO 38 p. 76 et 80.

³⁸ Cf. B. BRUYÈRE et A. BATAILLE, BIFAO 38, p. 75.

³⁹ Cf. également notre tête dorée n° 1, p. 13. Il est étonnant que F. Dunand, *op. cit.*, p. 41., citant l'article de Bruyère en raison de la présence de lits «angarebs», démontés dans le puits de cette sépulture, ne mentionne pas la présence de momies dorées dans la même tombe, ce qui allait pourtant dans le sens de sa démonstration.



Planche V

On peut remarquer, d'après l'exposé de ces divers témoignages qui ne sont certainement ni les seuls ni les derniers, que l'existence de cette pratique sur une échelle assez importante n'est plus à mettre en doute.⁴⁰

Il est temps maintenant, cette étude historique étant achevée, de dresser la liste du matériel que nous sommes parvenus à rassembler après un premier dépouillement. Par commodité, nous le classerons en trois catégories : les momies intactes portant des traces de dorure, les têtes au visage doré⁴¹, et les membres divers conservés ou dont nous possédons la mention. Chacun de ces trois paragraphes sera ordonné comme suit :

objets dont la provenance est connue, classés par sites suivant le cours du Nil, du Sud au Nord, puis les Oasis,

objets dont la provenance est inconnue et le lieu de conservation connu,

objets dont la provenance et le lieu de conservation sont inconnus.

Les momies et têtes citées par Françoise Dunand dans son article seront précédées d'un astérisque (*) et les têtes dont l'existence est sujette à caution, d'un point d'interrogation (?).

Momies dorées :⁴²

- I Trouvée dans les fouilles de l'IFAO (B. Bruyère en 1935),
Jeune garçon ; traces de dorure sur le visage,
II^{ème}, III^{ème} siècle de notre ère,
Deir el-Médinéh (momie n° 6 de la « tombe gréco-romaine »),
Lieu de conservation actuel inconnu,
B. Bruyère, *BIFAO* 36, 1937, pp. 156-158 et Pl. VII.

⁴⁰ Mme Dunand a d'ailleurs signalé d'autres témoignages que nous n'avons pas jugé utile d'ajouter à notre développement, mais dont nous donnons ici les références, renvoyant le lecteur à l'article ci-dessus cité : H. MINUTOLI, *Reise zum Tempel des Jupiter Ammon in der Libyschen Wüste und nach Ober-Aegypten in den Jahren 1820 und 1821. Nach seinem Tagebuche herausgegeben, und mit Beilagen begleitet von E. J. Toelken. Mit einem Atlas*, Berlin, 1824, p. 298. G. E. SMITH et F. W. JONES, *The Archaeological Survey of Nubia, Report for 1907-1908. Volume II. Report on the Human Remains*, Le Caire, 1910, p. 201. H. SCHÄFER, *Aegyptische Goldschmiedarbeiten unter Mitwirkung von Georg Möller und Wilhelm Schubart hrsg von Heinrich Schäfer*, Berlin, K. Curtius, 1910. *Mitteilungen aus der ägyptischen Sammlung I. Königliche Museen zu Berlin*. (Attribué faussement par Mme Dunand à G. Möller qui n'est que l'auteur de l'article concerné.)

⁴¹ Nous classons ici volontairement les têtes dorées détachées du corps dans une autre catégorie que les membres divers car il ne serait pas étonnant que seule cette partie du mort ait été conservée, indépendamment du corps lui-même. Sur ce sujet : cf. E. LEBEVRE, *La tête comme relique*, *Sphinx* 5, 1902, p. 216-220. Si certaines de ces têtes ont certainement été arrachées par des voyageurs peu scrupuleux, il est néanmoins possible de les considérer indépendamment du reste du corps (cet article nous a été signalé par M. Dewachter).

⁴² Ne pouvant donner une fiche détaillée pour chaque momie étudiée, nous nous contenterons de fournir les renseignements indispensables pour une recherche éventuelle, comme suit :

ancien lieu de conservation voire date de l'acquisition ou de la trouvaille,
parties du corps portant des traces de dorure,
datation de la momie,
lieu de provenance,

- 2 Trouvée dans les fouilles de l'IFAO (B. Bruyère en 1935).
Petite fille : visage entièrement doré,
II^{ème}, III^{ème} siècle de notre ère,
— Deir el-Médinéh (momie n° 1 de la « tombe gréco-romaine »),
— Lieu de conservation actuel inconnu,
— B. Bruyère, *BIFAO* 36, 1937, pp. 159—160 et Pl. VII.
- 3 — Trouvée dans les fouilles de l'IFAO (B. Bruyère en 1935).
— Jeune homme : localisation des traces de dorure inconnue,
— II^{ème}, III^{ème} siècle de notre ère,
— Deir el-Médinéh (Cercueil n° 5 de la « tombe gréco-romaine »),
— Lieu de conservation actuel inconnu,
— Bruyère B., *BIFAO* 38, 1939, pp. 80—83. Les mentions de traces de dorure se trouvent p. 76. Cf. également fig. 2K in-texto.
- 4 Trouvée dans les fouilles de l'IFAO (B. Bruyère en 1935).
Vieillard : vagues traces d'or sur le visage, les mains et les pieds,
II^{ème}, III^{ème} siècle de notre ère,
Deir el-Médinéh (cercueil n° 2 de la « tombe gréco-romaine »),
Lieu de conservation actuel inconnu,
B. Bruyère, *BIFAO* 38, 1939 pp. 77—80. Fig. 2π in-texto.⁴³
- 5 Trouvée près du tombeau de l'épouse d'Amasis par les membres de l'expédition du Louxor en 1833
— Femme; ossements dorés,
XVII^{ème} dynastie
— Thèbes.
— lieu de conservation actuel inconnue
— J. P. Angelin, *Expédition du Louxor...* Thomine Paris, 1833. p. 119.
- (*) 6 — Trouvée durant les fouilles belges de 1971—1972,
Femme; front doré,
— Date inconnue,
— Thèbes (Asassif),
— Lieu de conservation actuel inconnu,
— F. Dunand, *op. cit.*, p. 44, note 20.

lieu de conservation,
bibliographie.

Signalons que, particulièrement pour les corps provenant des fouilles d'Albert Gayet à Antinoé, il peut y avoir répétition de la même momie sous deux numéros différents, mais seuls de nouveaux documents nous permettront peut-être de confirmer un rapprochement éventuel.

⁴³ Les deux dernières momies mentionnées sont celles de deux *néocores* de Sérapis. Néanmoins, il ne semble pas que la dorure corporelle ait été un privilège de cette fonction car Bruyère signale qu'il a constaté cette pratique sur nombre de momies grecques sans qu'il semble qu'elles aient appartenu à des possesseurs de ce titre : cf. B. BRUYÈRE, *BIFAO* 38, p. 75—77. Sur la datation de ces momies et des inscriptions les accompagnant, cf. B. BRUYÈRE et A. BATAILLE, *BIFAO* 36, p. 167.

- 7 Ancienement dans la collection Cailliaud,
Homme ; dorée sur toute sa surface,
«Gréco-romaine», sans doute du II^{ème} siècle ap. J.-C. d'après les
inscriptions grecques qui nous fournissent le nom du personnage :
«Petemenon dit Ammonius».
Thèbes.
Lieu de conservation actuel inconnu.
Anonyme, *Le Moniteur*, 23 décembre 1823; J. A. Letronne, *Observa-
tions critiques et archéologiques sur l'objet des représentations zodiac-
ales qui nous restent de l'Antiquité...*, Paris, Auguste Beulland et
C^{ie}, 1824, p. 15—16 (repris dans «*Euvres diverses*» II 1, p. 177 sq.);
F. Cailliaud, *Voyage à Méroé...*, volume 4, 1827, p. 1—21. T. J.
Pettigrew, *op. cit.*, p. 63; Anonyme, *Momie d'Egypte, exposée au
Salon de la Société Royale des Beaux Arts à Gand*, (pas de date, ni de
lieu d'édition p. 3, note 1).
- 8 — Exposée quelques années avant 1834 au Haymarket de Londres et
rapportée par le capitaine Jefferson.⁴⁴
Sans doute originellement dorée sur toute la surface du corps (seules
des petites traces étaient encore apparentes en 1834).
Date inconnue,
Thèbes,
Lieu de conservation actuel inconnu.
T. J. Pettigrew, *op. cit.*, p. 64.
- 9 — Exposée par Albert Gayet au musée Guimet en 1902, vitrine n° 23,
Enfant ; traces de dorure sur toute la surface du corps,
Peut-être romaine,
Antinoé,
Lieu de conservation actuel inconnu.
— Al Gayet, *Notice... 1901—1902*, 1902, p. 27.⁴⁵
- (*) 10 — Fouilles Gayet,
— Enfant ; visage plaqué d'or,
Date inconnue,
Antinoé,
— Musée de Grenoble,
— F. Dunand, *op. cit.*, p. 35 et p. 44, note 16 bis.

⁴⁴ Nous n'avons pu obtenir de renseignements plus précis sur ce capitaine Jefferson malgré les recherches bibliographiques entreprises.

⁴⁵ Cette momie est peut-être celle signalée à F. Dunand par J. Yoyotte comme venant d'être redécouverte à Grenoble et provenant des fouilles d'Antinoé (cf. notre momie n° 10). En effet, c'est la seule momie dorée d'enfant dont nous ayons mention chez Gayet.

- 11** Fouilles Gayet 1908 (?).
Jeune fille : dorée de la tête aux pieds,
Date inconnue.
Antinoé.
Musée des Beaux Arts de Dunkerque. Inv. n° 151.⁴⁶ (Planche I).
- (*) **12** Anciennement au musée Guimet de Lyon (Fouilles Gayet).
Momie dorée de la tête aux pieds,⁴⁷
Date inconnue.
Antinoé.
Lieu de conservation actuel inconnu.
F. Daumas. *La valeur de l'or dans la pensée égyptienne*, RHR 149.
1956. p. 1, note 3; F. Dunand, *op. cit.*, p. 35.
- 13** Donnée par Gayet au musée en 1910, parmi un lot qui porte le
n° 28 de cette année,
Femme : feuilles d'or appliquées.
Date inconnue.
Antinoé.
Lieu de conservation actuel inconnu (musée de l'Homme ?).
Archives du laboratoire d'anthropologie du musée de l'Homme.
Lettre du Museum datée du 21 Mars 1910 favorissant la liste des
objets donnés par Gayet d'après une lettre de celui-ci datée du 3
décembre 1909. Conservée sous le n° 1910 28.⁴⁸
- 14** Trouvées par Mohamed Effendi Châban en 1912.
Plusieurs momies entièrement dorées (une momie n'avait que les
oreilles dorées),
Ptolémaïques et romaines,⁴⁹
El-Kantarah.
Lieu de conservation actuel inconnu,
Mohamed Effendi Châban, *Fouilles exécutées près d'El-Kantarah*,
ASAE 12, 1912. p. 69–76. (momies dorées mentionnées pp. 70–72
et 74. momie aux oreilles dorées p. 74).

⁴⁶ Nous remercions ici Mme Palà, ancienne secrétaire de la Société Française d'Égyptologie qui nous a indiqué l'existence de cette momie. Nous remercions également Mr. Kuhn Münch, conservateur du musée des Beaux-Arts de Dunkerque qui nous a fourni tous les renseignements qu'il possédait sur cette momie et la photographie reproduite ici.

⁴⁷ D'après F. DAUMAS, RHR 149, p. 1, note 3, il s'agirait d'un enduit doré et non de feuilles d'or appliquées sur la peau. Cf. supra note 4.

⁴⁸ Nous remercions ici le personnel du laboratoire du musée de l'Homme et celui du département de l'Afrique blanche qui nous ont permis d'avoir accès à leurs archives et ont consacré une partie de leur temps à nous guider dans nos recherches.

⁴⁹ Ces momies sont bien datées grâce à certains de leurs sarcophages qui portaient des inscriptions. Il semblerait que la technique employée ici soit différente de celles envisagées jusqu'ici car il est fait mention de « stuc doré » recouvrant certaines momies.

- (*) 15 et 16 — Fouilles de la nécropole de Douch (IFAO, 1981),
 -- Têtes presque entièrement dorées,
 Époque romaine (entre II^{ème} et IV^{ème} siècle apr. J.-C.),
 Douch (Sud de l'Oasis de Khargah).
 F. Dunand, *op. cit.*, P. 29 et Pl. 5.⁵⁰
- (*) 17 — Fouilles de la nécropole de Douch (IFAO, 1981),
 Adolescente (?); traces de dorure sur le visage, surtout autour des yeux,
 Époque romaine (entre II^{ème} et IV^{ème} siècle apr. J.-C.),
 Douch (Sud de l'Oasis de Khargah).
 F. Dunand, *op. cit.*, p. 29.⁵¹
- (*) 18 — Date d'acquisition au British Museum inconnue.
 Traces de dorure, sans précision de localisation,
 Époque romaine (?),
 Provenance inconnue.
 British Museum. Inv. n° 6712,
 W. R. Dawson et P. H. K. Gray, *Catalogue of Egyptian Antiquities in the British Museum I, Mummies and Human remains*, London, 1968. Momie n° 61 p. 32 et Pl. XVIc. F. Dunand, *op. cit.*, p. 35—36 et p. 44. notes 17 et 18.
- (*) 19 — Acquis par le British Museum en 1898.
 Jeune enfant : traces de décoration en rectangles dorés sur toute la surface du corps.
 Époque romaine (?),
 Provenance inconnue,
 British Museum. Inv. n° 30362,
 British Museum, *A guide to the first second and third Egyptian Rooms*, 3^{ème} édition révisée et augmentée, British Museum, 1924 p. 121 et p. 137. Sir E. A. Wallis Budge, *The Mummy, A Handbook of Egyptian Funerary Archeology*, Cambridge, University Press, 1925, 2^{ème} édition p. 212—213. W. R. Dawson et P. H. K. Gray, *op. cit.*, Momie n° 71 p. 37—38 et Pl. XVIa et XXXVIIa, b. F. Dunand, *op. cit.*, pp. 35—36 et p. 44. notes 17 et 18; Carol Andrews, *Egyptian Mummies* British Museum, Londres, 1984. p. 24, fig. 22.

⁵⁰ Mme DUNAND, *op. cit.*, p. 29. ne précise pas si les deux têtes ici répertoriées sont celles d'hommes ou de femmes. Néanmoins, la légende de sa planche 5. p. 34. « Tête momifiée d'un des deux frères » (caveau D de la tombe 20) laisserait à penser qu'il s'agit de deux têtes d'hommes.

⁵¹ Toutes les momies provenant des fouilles récentes de la nécropole de Douch sont conservées actuellement sur le site même.

- (*) 20 Acquisée par le British Museum en 1898,
Enfant de sexe féminin ; traces de rectangles dorés sur la surface du corps,
Epoque romaine, (?)
Provenance inconnue,
British Museum. Inv. n° **30363**,
British Museum. *op. cit.*, p. 121 et p. 137; Sir E. A. Wallis Budge, *op. cit.*, p. 212—213; W. R. Dawson et P. H. K. Gray, *op. cit.*, Momie n° 72 p. 38 et Pl. XIXb; F. Dunand, *op. cit.*, pp. 35—36 et p. 44, notes 17 et 18.
- (*) 21 Acquisée par le British Museum en 1898,
Enfant de sexe masculin ; traces de rectangles dorés sur la peau.
Epoque romaine (?),
Provenance inconnue,
British Museum. Inv. n° **30364**,
British Museum. *op. cit.*, p. 121 et p. 137.
Sir E. A. Wallis Budge, *op. cit.*, p. 212—213; W. R. Dawson et P. H. K. Gray, *op. cit.*, Momie n° 73 p. 38 et Pl. XIXc; F. Dunand, *op. cit.*, pp. 35—36 et p. 44, notes 17 et 18.
- (*) 22 Date d'acquisition au musée du Louvre inconnue.
Traces de dorure (sans autres précisions).
Date inconnue,
Provenance inconnue,
Musée du Louvre,
F. Dunand, *op. cit.*, p. 35 et p. 44, note 16.
- 23 - Enregistrée sur le fichier du laboratoire d'anthropologie du musée de l'Homme en 1953 sous le n° 63,
Momie dont la face était dorée,
Date inconnue,
- Provenance inconnue,
- Musée de l'Homme, n° d'inventaire **MH. 23707**, Boîte n° 14 salle 2 du Laboratoire d'anthropologie.⁵²
- 24 - Rapportée par Michael Barić et donnée par son frère Elias au musée national croate d'Agram (Zagreb).⁵³

⁵² Il est curieux de noter que c'est le squelette même, ici, qui porte des traces de dorure et non la momie. En effet, cette momie fait partie de celles disséquées par les chercheurs du musée de l'Homme, ce qui explique que son squelette soit aussi bien nettoyé des matières bitumeuses. Nous pensons que l'or appliqué sur le bitume de la tête a traversé, en certains endroits, cette matière, pour se fixer sur l'os du crâne même.

⁵³ Sur M. V. Barić : cf. J. Krall, *op. cit.*, p. 4—5.

Momie de femme dorée sur les épaules et sur le front,
Epoque Ptolémaïque,⁵⁴
Provenance inconnue,
Musée de Zagreb,

J. V. Bojnicic, *Kroatische Rev.*, 1880. p. 130; Jakob Krall, *Die etruskischen Mumienbinden des Agramer Nationalmuseums*, Denkschr. der K. Akad. der Wiss., phil.-hist. Cl. 41 Nr 3, Wien, 1892. p. 1 70 et 10 planches. Mention des dorures p. 10 et 26; Klaus Parlasca, *Mumienporträts und verwandte Denkmäler*, Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner, 1966. p. 137, note 92.

- 25** Momie dorée sur la poitrine et le visage,
Epoque inconnue,
— Provenance inconnue,
— Linden-Museum de Stuttgart,
Hellmut Brunner, *Ägyptische Altertümer des Linden-Museums II*, Tribus 10, Stuttgart, 1961, p. 57.⁵⁵ Klaus Parlasca, *op. cit.*, p. 136. note 89.

- 26** Examinée par Ruffer au début du XX^{ème} siècle,
Enfant ; face dorée,
Période romaine,
Provenance inconnue,
Lieu de conservation actuel inconnu,
M. A. Ruffer, *Histological Studies on Egyptian Mummies*, MIE 7, Le Caire, 1914. p. 17.

- 27** Achetée par Pettigrew lors de la vente de la troisième collection Salt à Sotheby's,⁵⁶
Homme adulte ; nombreuses traces de dorure sur tout le corps,
Période « gréco-romaine »,
Provenance inconnue,⁵⁷
— Lieu de conservation actuel inconnu,
— T. J. Pettigrew, *op. cit.*, pp. 63—66. Pl. I et II.

⁵⁴ Les traces de dorure sur les épaules avaient disparu lorsque Krall examina la momie. Pour cet auteur (cf. J. KRALL, *op. cit.*, p. 4 - 5) cette momie daterait de la période Ptolémaïque et appartiendrait à un membre de la communauté étrusque d'Alexandrie. En effet, cette momie était enroulée dans des bandages couverts d'inscriptions étrusques d'ordre funéraire.

⁵⁵ Voici le texte de la notice de BRUNNER qui ne connaissant pas alors l'existence de cette pratique dans l'Egypte ancienne, pense que la momie examinée est fausse : « Eine solche Mumie befindet sich ebenfalls unter den Aegyptiaca des Linden-Museums, und zwar insofern eine besondere, als sie auf der Brust und im Gesicht deutlich Reste einer Vergoldung trägt. Da die Mumie ihrer Binden entkleidet ist, läßt sich nicht sagen, wer der Mann war und wann er gelebt hat. Bei der Vergoldung, zu der mir keine Parallele bekannt ist, besteht der Verdacht, daß sie in der Neuzeit aufgelegt worden ist, um den Handelswert des Stückes « zu erhöhen ».

⁵⁶ Cf. supra note 20.

⁵⁷ D'après PETTIGREW, *op. cit.*, p. XV - XVI, cette momie proviendrait de Thèbes.

- 28** — Anciennement collection Pettigrew puis collection Amherst,⁵⁸
 Vieil homme ; dorée sur toute la surface du corps.
 Période « gréco-romaine »,
 Provenance inconnue.
 Lieu de conservation actuel inconnu,
Morning Chronicle, May 30., 1836. p. 5; col. 5. *Gentleman's Magazine*, 1837. N. S. VI. p. 82; T. J. Pettigrew, *Account of the Unrolling of an Egyptian Mummy, with Incidental Notes on the Manners, Customs, and Religion of the Ancient Egyptians*, Magazine of Popular Science and Journal of Useful Arts II, 1836. pp. 17—40; W. R. Dawson, *JEA* 20, 1934. pp. 175—176; M. M. Pace, *Wrapped for Eternity, the Story of the Egyptian Mummy*, Mac Grawhill Book Company, 1974. p. 103—108.

Têtes dorées :

- (*) **1** — Donnée par l'intermédiaire de J. Černý au musée national de Prague en 1934,
 — Jeune mâle (?) ; traces d'or sur la face (coloration et non placage de feuilles d'or, semble-t-il)
 XVIII^{ème} ou XXI^{ème} dynastie (?),
 Deir el Médinéh.
 Hrdlička Museum of Man à Prague. Inv. n° **15/13**,
 E. Strouhal et L. Vyhnánek, *Egyptian Mummies in Czechoslovak Collections*, Národní Muzeum V Praze, Acta Musei Nationalis, Pragae, n° 1—4, 1980. Momie n° 31. pp. 75—76. Figs 41 et 42; F. Dunand, *op. cit.*, p. 46, note additionnelle.
- 2 à 7** — Trouvées dans les grottes aux crocodiles à Maabdah et exhumées par le comte Lepic,⁵⁹
 — Au moins six têtes emportées dont :
 Une tête d'homme avec cheveux, barbe, cils et sourcils,
 — Une autre tête d'homme.
 Une tête de femme, boucles blondes, dorée complètement, y compris la denture,
 — Date inconnue,
 — Maabdah,
 — Lieu de conservation actuel inconnu,
 — Ludovic Napoléon Lepic, *La Dernière Egypte*, Charpentier, Paris,

⁵⁸ Sur l'histoire de cette momie et de ses différents propriétaires : cf. W. R. Dawson, *Pettigrew's demonstrations upon mummies, A chapter in the history of Egyptology*, *JEA* 20, 1934. p. 175. Elle a été vendue par Sotheby's (vente de la collection Amherst) en 1921 et faisait partie du lot n° 352 qui, nous le précise M. Dewachter, fut alors acquis par Brunner.

⁵⁹ Sur le comte Lepic et sa collection : cf. *supra* note 30.

1883, p. 143 et pp. 153–154; Musée des Arts Décoratifs, *Catalogue l'Exposition Le Pic*, Paris, Typographie Morris Père et Fils, 1883; Th. Zimmer, *Les grottes des crocodiles de Maabdash (Samoun), Varia Aegyptiaca Supplement 1*, Van Sinclen Books, San Antonio, 1987 (avec illustrations).

- 8 — Anciennement conservée au Musée Guimet de Paris et exposée en 1898 sous le n° A7,
 – Tête d'homme dorée portant une pièce de monnaie dans la bouche, Antinoé, Nécropole A (égyptienne ?) de la numérotation Gayet, Date inconnue,
 Lieu de conservation actuel inconnu,
 Al Gayet, *Catalogue... 1898*, 1898, p. 64.

- 9 — Anciennement conservée au musée Guimet de Paris et exposée en 1898 sous le n° A8,
 Tête de femme dorée,
 Date inconnue,
 Antinoé, Nécropole A (égyptienne ?) de la numérotation Gayet,⁶⁰
 Lieu de conservation actuel inconnu,
 Al Gayet, *Catalogue... 1898*, 1898, p. 64.⁶¹

- 10 — Fouilles Gayet,
 Plusieurs têtes signalées portant des traces de dorure,
 Période romaine (?),
 Antinoé,
 – Lieu de conservation actuel inconnu,
 – Al Gayet, *Notice... 1901–1902*, 1902, p. 26. et p. 27.⁶²; Al. Gayet, *Notice... 1902–1903*, 1903, p. 31–32.⁶³

- (*) 11-12 — Fouilles Gayet,
 Têtes portant des traces de dorure,
 Date inconnue,
 Antinoé,
 Musée municipal au Château à Lunéville, Inv. Archéologie n°

⁶⁰ Les deux têtes citées ici appartiennent aux tombeaux que Gayet pensait d'inspiration égyptienne. Le lieu exact de leur découverte et leur contexte ne sont pas indiqués.

⁶¹ Cf. *supra* note 33.

⁶² Voici les textes attachés aux vitrines citées ici : « Têtes, bras, mains et pieds de momies nécropole romaine de la montagne — présentant des traces de dorure appliquées, ainsi qu'il a été exposé plus haut » (vitrine 21). « Têtes, pieds et mains de momies romaines portant des traces de dorure. Momie d'enfant romain, dorée sur différentes parties du corps » (vitrine 23).

⁶³ Nous donnons ici le texte de la *Notice* de GAYET : « Au-dessus, la tête de la défunte, préparée au bitume, et plaquée de feuilles de papier doré, montre que l'arrangement de la chevelure, composée de nattes, passant sur le front, a été scrupuleusement reproduit par le portrait. »

3/10—IX— 1906. (Planche II)

F. Dunand, *op. cit.*, p. 44, note 20.⁶⁴

- (?) 13 — Fouilles Gayet 1898,
 -- Tête dorée,
 Peut-être XII^{ème} dynastie,
 Antinoé,
 Lieu de conservation actuel inconnu. AL. GAYET, *Notice... 1899 1900*, 1900, p. 15—16
*Antiquités égyptiennes, Nécropole de la XII^{ème} dynastie (2500 ans avant notre ère). Sarcophage et mobilier...Nécropole romaine des premiers siècles de notre ère. Mobilier funéraire...dont la vente aux enchères publiques se fera dans la rotonde du rez-de-chaussée au Musée Guimet (Place d'Iéna), le lundi 17 Juin 1901 à 2 heures, Paris, E. Leroux, 1901, p. 6.*⁶⁵
- (*) 14 — Fouilles de la nécropole de Douch (IFAO, 1981),
 Tête plaquée de feuilles d'or,
 — Epoque romaine (entre II^{ème} et IV^{ème} siècle apr. J.-C.),
 -- Douch (Tombe 18).
 — F. Dunand, *op. cit.*, p. 29 et Pl. 1.
- (*) 15 — Fouilles de la nécropole de Douch (IFAO, 1981).
 Tête plaquée de feuilles d'or,
 Epoque romaine (entre II^{ème} et IV^{ème} siècle apr. J.-C.),
 Douch (Tombe 20, caveau D),
 F. Dunand, *op. cit.*, p. 29 et Pl. 3.

⁶⁴ Cette tête peut faire partie de celles décrites précédemment : cf. nos têtes répertoriées sous le n° 10 et supra notes 62 et 63.

⁶⁵ La phrase de Gayet est très ambiguë, aussi resterons-nous très prudent quant à l'existence supposée de cette tête et à sa datation possible. Voici ce que dit Gayet à son propos : « Le second sarcophage, verrouillé, est tombé en mille pièces lors des fouilles, et, du corps qu'il contenait (celui de la femme de Mer-Neth ?), un seul fragment en bon état a pu être rapporté, la tête au visage doré, placée dans la vitrine 27. » Il est difficile, d'autant plus que la liste en tête de la brochure de vente parle d'un « masque doré » dont il n'est fait mention nulle part ailleurs, de savoir s'il s'agit d'une tête dorée ou d'un masque en stuc doré.

Cette tombe a été découverte par Gayet en 1899. Elle date du Moyen Empire et est très précieuse car seule attestation de cette période sur ce site. Sur ces tombes et sur le matériel qu'elles contenaient, maintenant conservé au Musée de Bruxelles cf. AL. GAYET, *Notice... 1899 1900*, Paris, 1900, p. 14—20. *Notice... 1900 - 1901*, Paris, 1901, p. 13—14. *Antiquités égyptiennes, Nécropole pharaonique...*, Paris, 1901, p. 3—6. AL. GAYET, *Notice 1901 1902*, Paris, 1902, p. 11 et p. 26. *L'exploration des nécropoles gréco-byzantines d'Antinoé*, Annales du Musée Guimet 30, 2^{ème} et 3^{ème} parties, Paris, E. Leroux, 1902, p. 40—46. H. N. FOWLER, *Archaeological News...*, AJA 6 2^{ème} série, 1902, p. 59. J. CAPART, *Les Antiquités égyptiennes des Musées Royaux du Cinquantenaire à Bruxelles, Guide descriptif*, Vromant, Bruxelles, Novembre 1905; p. 47—50. FAROUK GOMAA, *Scheich Abada in «Nekropolen»*, Lexicon IV/3, 1980, p. 418.

- (*) 16 — Fouilles de la nécropole de Douch (IFAO, 1981),
Tête d'enfant dorée,
Epoque romaine (entre II^{ème} et IV^{ème} siècle apr. J.-C.),
Douch (caveau de la tombe 22),
F. Dunand, *op. cit.*, p. 29.
- (*) 17 — Fouilles de la nécropole de Douch (IFAO, 1981),
Tête d'adulte dorée,
Epoque romaine (entre II^{ème} et IV^{ème} siècle apr. J.-C.),
Douch (chambre funéraire de la tombe 22),
F. Dunand, *op. cit.*, p. 29.
- (*) 18 — Fouilles de la nécropole de Douch (IFAO, 1981),
Tête d'adulte dorée,
Epoque romaine (entre II^{ème} et IV^{ème} siècle apr. J.-C.),
— Douch (chambre funéraire de la tombe 22),
F. Dunand, *op. cit.*, p. 29.
- (*) 19 — Achetée par le comte Joseph Seilern durant son voyage autour du monde en 1929—1931,
Restes de feuilles d'or sur les joues, aux yeux et à la racine du nez,
Sans doute postérieure au Nouvel Empire et, d'après les procédés de momification, en aucun cas entre la XXI^{ème} et la XXV^{ème} dynastie,
Provenance inconnue,
Hrdlička Museum of Man à Prague. Inv. n° 1006.
E. Strouhal et L. Vyhnánek, *op. cit.*, Momie n° 49. p. 102. Figs 79 et 80; F. Dunand, *op. cit.*, p. 46, note additionnelle.⁶⁶
- 20 — Achetée par le professeur Henri Gastaut le 5 Avril 1968 à monsieur Lecorneur-Roudillon, Paris.⁶⁷
— Femme aux cheveux longs portant des traces de feuilles d'or sur la face,
— Date et provenance inconnues,
— Collection H. Gastaut à Marseille (Planche III),
— Léon Dérobert, H. Reichlen, Jean-Pierre Campana, *Le Monde étrange des momies*, Pygmalion, 1975. 2^{ème} jeu de planches après la p. 96.

⁶⁶ Cette momie est donnée comme portant le n° 41 dans F. DUNAND, *op. cit.*, p. 46, note additionnelle. Il faut rectifier et lui attribuer son vrai numéro de catalogue qui est le n° 49, le n° 41 étant porté par une momie ne possédant aucune trace de dorure.

⁶⁷ Nous remercions ici le Pr. Henri Gastaut, doyen honoraire de la faculté de médecine de Marseille et président honoraire de l'Université d'Aix-Marseille, qui nous a fourni les renseignements recueillis concernant cette tête de femme dorée faisant partie de sa collection, et nous a autorisé à en reproduire la photographie.

- (*) 21 Enregistrée sur le fichier du laboratoire d'anthropologie du musée de l'Homme en 1953 sous le n° 43.⁶⁸
 Traces de dorure sur la face,
 Date inconnue,
 Provenance inconnue,
 Musée de l'Homme, laboratoire d'anthropologie, armoire 17, porte 4, rayon 6. Inv. n° **MH 23663**,
 F. Dunand, *op. cit.*, p. 44, note 20.
- (*) 22 — Enregistrée sur le fichier du laboratoire d'anthropologie du musée de l'Homme en 1962 sous le n° 6,
 - Traces de dorure sur la face,
 - Date inconnue,
 Provenance inconnue,
 Musée de l'Homme, laboratoire d'anthropologie, armoire 17, porte 4, rayon 6. Inv. n° **MH 24604**,
 F. Dunand, *op. cit.*, p. 44, note 20.
- (*) 23 Enregistrée sur le fichier du laboratoire d'anthropologie du musée de l'Homme en 1960 sous le n° 6,
 Traces de dorure sur la face,
 Date et provenance inconnues,
 Musée de l'Homme, exposée en vitrine, salle des momies. Inv. n° **MH 24496**,⁶⁹
 F. Dunand, *op. cit.*, p. 44, note 20.
- 24 Date d'acquisition au British Museum inconnue.
 Partie de la face d'un crâne de momie dorée.
 — Date inconnue,
 --- Provenance inconnue,
 — British Museum. Inv. n° **24574**,
 — British Museum, *A Guide to the First and Second Egyptian Rooms*, British Museum, 1898. 1^{ère} édition p. 82; British Museum, 1904. 2^{ème} édition. p. 122.
- 25 — Donnée à la New York Historical Society par Robert L. Stuart le 10 Janvier 1861.
 Tête de momie, primitivement recouverte de feuilles d'or.
 Date inconnue.

⁶⁸ Les dates indiquées ici sont celles qui correspondent à l'année d'enregistrement des pièces et non à leur arrivée au musée.

⁶⁹ F. DEXAND, *op. cit.*, p. 44, note 20 n'a pas donné le numéro de cette pièce qui est inscrit sous la tête. Celle-ci est exposée dans les salles publiques du musée.

Provenance inconnue,

Lieu de conservation actuel inconnu,

Anonyme, *Catalogue of the Egyptian Antiquities of the New York Historical Society*, New York Historical Society, 1915. p. 98.

- 26** Se trouvait en vente à la Galerie Kamer-Langlois en 1967.⁷⁰
Tête d'homme aux cheveux courts portant des traces de feuilles d'or,
Date inconnue,
Provenance inconnue (Planche IV),
Lieu de conservation actuel inconnu.

Membres et autres parties du corps dorés :

- 1** — Rapportée par le comte Ludovic Lepic en 1882.⁷¹
Jambe arrachée de la momie dorée d'un homme,
Date inconnue,
Maabdah,
Lieu de conservation actuel inconnu,
Ludovic Lepic, *op. cit.*, p. 149 et 154.
- 2** Fouilles Gayet. Exposés entre 1898 et 1903 au musée Guimet de Paris,
Bras, jambes et mains portant des traces de dorure,
Date inconnue,
Antinoé,
Lieu de conservation actuel inconnu,
Al Gayet, *Catalogue... 1898*, p. 64;
Al Gayet, *Notice... 1901-1902, 1902*, p. 26 et 27.⁷²
- 3** Fouilles Gayet. Conservée au musée de Châteaudun en 1908,
Buste de femme doré,
Date inconnue,
Antinoé,
Musée de Châteaudun, Inv. n° 428 (Planche V),
E. Amelineau, *Musée de Châteaudun, Catalogue n° 1^{er} La Collection égyptienne*, Châteaudun, Imprimerie de la Société Typographique Librairie Guillaumin, 1908. p. 32.⁷³

⁷⁰ Renseignement et photographie fournis par le Pr. H. Gastaut.

⁷¹ Cf. supra note 30.

⁷² Cf. supra note 62.

⁷³ Cf. supra note 33.

- 4 — Se trouvaient anciennement dans la collection Abbott puis à la New-York Historical Society,
2 mains et 2 pieds appartenant à la même momie et portant des traces de dorure,
Date inconnue,
— Guizah,
Musée de Brooklyn (?),
— Anonyme, *Catalogue of a Collection of Egyptian Antiquities, the property of Henry Abbott M. D. now exhibiting at the Stuyvesant Institute*, New York. Watson. 1854. n° 218 à 221. p. 19.
- (*) 5 — Fouilles de la nécropole de Douch (IFAO, 1981).
— Deux mains dorées, une jambe et un pied portant des traces de dorure,
Epoque romaine (entre II^{ème} et IV^{ème} siècle apr. J.-C.),
Douch (Tombe 20, caveau D),
Dunand F., *op. cit.*, p. 29.
- (*) 6 — Fouilles de la nécropole de Douch (IFAO, 1981).
Un corps sans tête doré,
Epoque romaine (entre II^{ème} et IV^{ème} siècle apr. J.-C.),
Douch (Tombe 22),
F. Dunand, *op. cit.*, p. 29.
- (*) 7 — Fouilles de la nécropole de Douch (IFAO, 1981).
Un pied doré,
Epoque romaine (entre II^{ème} et IV^{ème} siècle apr. J.-C.),
— Douch (Caveau de la tombe 23),
— F. Dunand, *op. cit.*, p. 29.
- (*) 8 — Provient du vieux fonds de l'Hrdlička Museum,
— Main droite avec traces de dorure sur les deux faces,
— Date inconnue,
— Provenance inconnue,
— Hrdlička Museum of Man, Prague, Inv. n° 15/15,
— E. Strouhal et L. Vyhnánek, *op. cit.*, Momie n° 54. p. 109. Fig. 100; F. Dunand, *op. cit.*, p. 46, note additionnelle.
- (*) 9 — Provient de la collection J. Slovák de Kroměříž achetée par le Musée de la ville de Kroměříž en 1934. Transférée au Náprstek Museum de Prague le 1^{er} Janvier 1974,
Main gauche d'une femme adulte,
Date inconnue,
Provenance inconnue,
Náprstek Museum de Prague. Inv. n° P2906,

E. Strouhal et L. Vyhnanek, *op. cit.*, n° 80, p. 119 Figs 97 et 98;
F. Dunand, *op. cit.*, p. 46, note additionnelle.

- (*) 10 Rapportée par le premier propriétaire du château, le comte J. Seilern, et achetée lors de son tour du monde en 1929-1931.
Main droite de femme adulte avec traces de dorure en divers endroits.
Date inconnue,
Provenance inconnue,
Gastle Lešná, District Gottwalda. Inv. n° 1008,
E. Strouhal et L. Vynánek, *op. cit.*, n° 81, p. 119-121;
F. Dunand, *op. cit.*, p. 46, note additionnelle.
- 11 - Anciennement collection du Dr. John Lee,⁷⁴
Main de momie de femme aux doigts et ongles dorés,
Date inconnue,
Provenance inconnue,
Lieu de conservation actuel inconnu,
T. J. Pettigrew, *op. cit.*, p. 63.
- 12 Anciennement collection du Dr. John Lee. Conservée au Museum d'Hartwell House,
Main d'homme au bout des doigts et aux ongles dorés,
Date inconnue,
Provenance inconnue,
Lieu de conservation actuel inconnu,
J. Lee, *Catalogue of the Egyptian Antiquities in the Museum of Hartwell House*, 1858. n° 500, p. (70).

Nous venons donc de donner ce qui n'est, nous le précisons encore une fois, que le dépouillement du matériel de base pour l'étude du phénomène de la dorure corporelle, dépouillement qui ne peut en aucun cas être considéré comme exhaustif.⁷⁵ Signalons par ailleurs que le problème de la lacune archéologique conditionne cette étude et est ici très important, ce pour deux raisons :

⁷⁴ Sur J. Lee cf. W. R. Dawson et E. P. Uphill, *op. cit.*, Londres, 1972, p. 187.

⁷⁵ Pour établir notre bibliographie, nous nous sommes principalement servi des ouvrages suivant : A. B. GRANVILLE, *An essay on Egyptian Mummies, with observations on the art of embalming among the ancient Egyptians*, London, W. Nicol, 1825. T. J. PETTIGREW, *op. cit.* et surtout du remarquable ouvrage de W. R. DAWSON, *A Bibliography of works relating to Mummification in Egypt with excerpts, epitomes, critical and bibliographical notes*, MIF 13, Le Caire, 1929, qui a été complété par le dépouillement des catalogues et des rapports de fouilles postérieurs. Notons par ailleurs que certains auteurs ont constaté l'existence de cette pratique sur des momies animales : cf. par exemple *Description de l'Egypte* IV, p. 153 (momies de chacals d'Assiout) et G. LEGRAIN, *Rec. Trav.* 28, 1906, p. 146 (ossements d'animaux divers).

La recherche du matériel précieux, en l'occurrence des feuilles d'or, même si la quantité de métal est négligeable et sa récupération difficile, a dû conduire à détérioration de nombre de ces momies.⁷⁶

Beaucoup de momies, et peut-être particulièrement celles qui nous concernent ici, si l'on en croit G. G. Becker⁷⁷, ont été réduites en poussière à cause de vertus médicinales attribuées à la poudre de momie.⁷⁸

Dans notre conclusion, nous nous contenterons donc d'effectuer une synthèse des objets recensés en nous gardant bien de généraliser des remarques que le peu de matériel ici rassemblé rend sujettes à caution et nous évoquerons souvent simplement les directions qu'il serait souhaitable de suivre dans le cadre de cette étude.

Les âges et sexes des momies ou groupes de momies :

Sur les 28 momies complètes rassemblées nous connaissons le sexe de 14 d'entre elles, réparties comme suit : 8 enfants (dont 2 mâles et 2 femelles)⁷⁹ et 10 adultes (5 hommes et 5 femmes).⁸⁰

Sur les 25 têtes mentionnées, nous connaissons le sexe de 8 des momies auxquelles elles appartenaient : 1 tête d'enfant (sexe non connu), 4 têtes d'hommes et 3 têtes de femmes.⁸¹

⁷⁶ Cf. 'ABD AL-LATIF, *op. cit.*, p. 199 – 200. Même si ce n'est pas l'or lui-même qui attirait les voleurs, comme dans le cas évoqué par le médecin de Bagdad, cette parure inhabituelle a dû conduire à faire croire que toutes ces momies étaient plus richement dotées de bijoux et de scarabées (c'était le cas dans l'anecdote racontée par V. Meignan : cf. supra note 27). Cf. également : T. DZIERZYKIN-ROGALSKI et E. PROMINSKA, *Une momie d'homme trouvée au-dessus du temple de Mentouhotep à Deir el-Bahari en 1972*, Etudes et Travaux 9, Varsovie, 1976, p. 115 – 116 (référence fournie par M. Dewachter).

⁷⁷ Cf. G. G. BECKER, *Augusteum ou Descriptions des Monuments Antiques qui se trouvent à Dresde*, Leipzig, 1804, Volume 1 p. 26. Becker précise que les momies de la première catégorie d'Hérodote étaient plus recherchées pour la confection de la poudre de momie. Les momies ici évoquées, devaient être classées, du fait de leur traitement particulier, dans cette catégorie privilégiée même si ce n'était pas le cas.

⁷⁸ Cf. *Le Voyage en Egypte de Pierre Belon du Mans*, 1547, Coll. *Les Voyageurs Occidentaux en Egypte* 1, Le Caire, IFAO, 1970, 117a et 117b et notes de S. Sauneron. *Le Voyage en Egypte de George Christoff von Neitzschitz 1636*, Coll. *Les Voyageurs Occidentaux en Egypte* 13, Le Caire, IFAO, 1974, p. (319)230 et note 244 p. (320), par Oleg V. Volkoff, E. CHASSINAT, *Le Manuscrit magique copte n° 42573 du Caire*, Bibliothèque d'Etudes Ooptes 4, 1955 : p. 58, sq. (cette référence nous a été signalée par P. Barguet).

⁷⁹ Les huit enfants sont répartis comme suit :

Sexe inconnu : Momies n° 9, 10, 19, 26.

Sexe masculin : Momies n° 1, 21.

Sexe féminin : Momies n° 2, 20.

⁸⁰ Sexe masculin : Momies n° 3, 4, 7, 27, 28.

Sexe féminin : Momies n° 6, 11, 13, 17, 24.

⁸¹ Tête d'enfant : 16.

Têtes d'hommes : 1, (2 à 7), 8, 26.

Têtes de femmes : (2 à 7), 9, 20.

Sur les 11 membres rassemblés, 2 appartenaient à des hommes et 4 à des femmes.⁸²

Nous obtenons donc une population totale, tous âges confondus, de 13 hommes et de 14 femmes. Il semblerait donc, dans la limite des connaissances actuelles, que cette pratique ne soit pas réservée à l'un ou l'autre sexe. De même, tous les âges se trouvent représentés par ces momies, de l'enfance à la vieillesse. Ces résultats, issus de la synthèse d'un nombre d'éléments limités, ne peuvent en aucune façon avoir valeur statistique.

L'appartenance ethnique de ces momies :

Cette étude serait possible et souhaitable. Nous ne possédons ici aucun renseignement sur l'ethnie à laquelle appartiennent ces personnages. Une enquête anthropologique serait ici nécessaire car elle permettrait de préciser quelle partie de la population est concernée ou s'il n'existe aucune différence à cet égard.

Parties du corps le plus souvent dorées :

Ongles des mains et des pieds, doigts.⁸³

— Sexe des momies.⁸⁴

- Visage.⁸⁵

— Dorure entière ou en carrés.⁸⁶

Beaucoup de la dorure originelle ayant disparue et certains corps étant fragmentaires, il est impossible de tirer aucune conclusion de cette analyse si ce n'est que cette pratique relève d'une symbolique égyptienne et non d'un système de pensée étranger, nubien ou méditerranéen.

⁸² Membres appartenant à des individus de sexe masculin : **1, 12** ;
Membres appartenant à des individus de sexe féminin : **3, 9, 10, 11**.

⁸³ Cf. supra note 7.

⁸⁴ Cf. 'ABD AL-LATIF, *op. cit.*, p. 199-200. E. F. JOMARD, *Description des hypogées de la ville de Thèbes, Description de l'Égypte...*, Description 1, 1809, p. 346. P. C. ROUYER, *Notice sur les embaumements des anciens Égyptiens, Description de l'Égypte...*, Mémoires 1, 1809, p. 216. T. J. PETTIGREW, *op. cit.*, p. 63. British Museum, *Egyptian Antiquities*, The Library of Entertaining Knowledge, London, Charles Knight, 1836, Volume 2, p. 114. PRISE D'AVENNES, *Souvenirs d'Égypte 1. La grotte de Samoun*, Revue contemporaine Avril-Mai 1854. AL. GAYET, *Notice...* 1901-1902, Paris, 1902, p. 13-14.

⁸⁵ Toutes les momies répertoriées ici ont le visage doré.

⁸⁶ La dorure intégrale n'a jamais subsisté complètement, mais les traces éparses attestent généralement bien l'existence de cette pratique (cf. Momies n° **7, 8 (?)**, **9, 11, 12**). Notons également qu'il n'est pas étonnant de ne retrouver de la dorure qu'à la base du nez ou autour des yeux, voir autour et sur le sexe des momies, même si les corps étaient dorés dans leur intégralité : en effet ces diverses parties du corps comportent de nombreux renforcements naturels où l'or s'incrute et disparaît moins facilement que sur des surfaces plus planes, comme le thorax et les jambes. La dorure en carrés est attestée par les trois momies du British Museum, nos numéros **19, 20** et **21** et par MARIETTE BEY A., *Itinéraire de la Haute Égypte...*, Alexandrie, Mourès et C^{ie}, 1872, p. 142.

Contexte :

Ces momies étaient presque toutes enveloppées dans des bandelettes. On trouve parfois la présence d'un sarcophage⁸⁷, mais rarement d'un masque funéraire.⁸⁸ Il est difficile d'en tirer une quelconque conclusion vu le peu d'éléments retrouvés dans leur intégralité.

Le contexte dans lequel ces momies ont été trouvées est presque toujours inconnu. Seuls, la tombe découverte par B. Bruyère à Deir el-Médinéh, les momies d'El-Kantarrah, celles tout récemment exhumées de Douch et les corps trouvés dans les grottes de Maabdah nous fournissent quelques indications. Notons qu'il existe une différence fondamentale entre les trois premiers sites et le dernier. Les premiers sont constitués par des tombes construites comportant un appareil funéraire assez important :

Cave transformée en caveau avec la présence de sarcophages à Deir el-Médinéh.⁸⁹

Tombes-escaliers et enterrements sur lits à Douch.

Types d'enterrements allant de la fosse commune à la tombe construite en brique, présence de sarcophages à El-Kantarrah.

Les corps retrouvés à Maabdah, quant à eux, semblent avoir été totalement privés de ce genre d'équipement et en tout cas de lits ou de sarcophages si on s'en tient aux témoignages des voyageurs précédemment cités.⁹⁰ Il est difficile de savoir s'il s'agissait de corps déposés volontairement auprès des momies des crocodiles ou d'une sorte de dépôt qui, ne nécessitant aucun aménagement de la main de l'homme, était rendu pratique par sa vastitude même.

⁸⁷ Certaines des momies de Deir el-Médinéh étaient enfermées dans des sarcophages (cf. nos n° 2, 3 et 4). Cf. B. BRUYÈRE, *BIFAO* 36, p. 151–152 et Planches I et II. La momie de Cailliaud (notre n° 7) était déposée dans un cercueil. Sur ce cercueil : cf. F. CAILLIAUD, *Voyage à Méroé*... Volume 4, 1827, p. 1–21 et Planches LXVI à LXXI, ainsi que T. J. PETTIGREW, *op. cit.*, p. 117–120. Les momies d'El-Kantarrah reposaient dans des cercueils (14). La momie de Pettigrew (notre n° 28) était enfermée dans trois cercueils emboîtés (sur ces cercueils cf. J. LEE, *Catalogue of the Egyptian Antiquities in the Museum of Hartwell House*, W. M. Watts, 1858, Londres, n° 596, p. 89–91, où l'auteur renvoie par erreur à l'ouvrage de Pettigrew déjà cité, ouvrage publié en 1834 et qui ne pouvait donc faire mention de ces pièces étudiées en 1836. Cf. également S. SHARPE, *The Triple Mummy Case of Aroeri-Ao*, dans *Dr. Lee's Museum at Hartwell House*, published for the Syro-Egyptian Society of London, 1858, et W. R. DAWSON, *JEA* 20, 1934, p. 175.).

⁸⁸ Les quatre momies de Deir el-Médinéh en portaient. Cf. B. BRUYÈRE, *BIFAO* 36, p. 153–155 et Planches III à V. Notons que les six masques en cartonnage retrouvés dans cette tombe ont le visage doré. La momie de Cailliaud possédait un cartonnage ainsi que la momie de Pettigrew précédemment citée. Quelques momies d'El-Kantarrah portaient des masques. Cf. M. E. CHABAN, *ASAE* 12, 1912, p. 73. Une des têtes signalées sous notre numéro 10 possédait un masque en cartonnage : cf. supra note 63.

⁸⁹ Nous nous garderons bien de rapprocher l'enterrement sur lit d'un phénomène nubien pur et de lier celui-ci à la pratique de la dorure corporelle. En effet, cette pratique est bien attestée dès le Moyen-Empire en Egypte : cf. par exemple, AHMED KAMAY BEY, *Fouilles à Deir-el-Barsheh (Mars Avril 1900)*, *ASAE* 2, 1901, p. 34–35. J. GARSTANG, *Burial Customs*... London, A. Constable, 1907, p. 183 et Fig. 190 p. 152.

Notons que c'est par erreur que Mlle DUNAND, *op. cit.*, p. 41 signale que l'on ne trouvait pas d'enterrements sur lit à Antinoé. Sur ce sujet cf. AL. GAYET, *Notice*... 1902–1903, 1903, p. 10.

⁹⁰ Cf. supra note 29.

Répartition géographique :

Celle-ci est rapidement exposable grâce aux quelques momies dont nous connaissons l'origine et qui nous permettent de dresser cette carte provisoire :

Philae (île de Hesa).

Thèbes rive gauche (Deir el-Médinéh, Asassif).

Douch (oasis de Khargah).

Akhmîm.⁹¹

El-Maabdah.

Antinoé.

Saqqarah.⁹²

Guizah.

El-Kantarah.

Ce phénomène est donc constaté en Haute Egypte, dans les oasis et dans le delta oriental. Cette liste ne doit pas être considérée comme étant close, mais liée à de nouvelles découvertes bibliographiques ou archéologiques qui permettront peut-être de mieux cerner une réalité géographique dont le moins que l'on puisse dire, est qu'elle semble très vaste.

Datation :

Celle-ci est presque toujours impossible à donner précisément, car ces pièces ont souvent été découvertes en-dehors de leur contexte. Il semblerait que cette pratique remonte à l'Égypte pharaonique⁹³, mais il semble acquis que sa généralisation date d'un époque postérieure, ptolémaïque puis romaine et se perpétua jusqu'au III^{ème} — IV^{ème} siècle de notre ère.⁹⁴

Cette synthèse ayant été présentée, il ne nous reste qu'à préciser quelques éléments en rapport avec la symbolique de l'or et le milieu funéraire qui est ici l'objet de notre étude et à discerner quels sont les parallèles possibles avec les textes et le matériel funéraire connu. En ce qui concerne l'étude de la symbolique de l'or et des textes qui s'y rapportent, nous renverrons le lecteur à l'article de F. Daumas

⁹¹ Cf. supra note 32.

⁹² Cf. supra note 32.

⁹³ Cf. nos têtes n° 1 et 13 qui datent peut-être respectivement de la XXI^{ème} et de la XII^{ème} dynastie.

⁹⁴ Cf. les momies trouvées par Bruyère à Deir el-Médinéh qui sont datées assez précisément du III^{ème} voire du IV^{ème} siècle de notre ère par les inscriptions grecques qui les accompagnent : les momies retrouvées dans la nécropole de Douch datent de la même période. Ce sont les seules pièces approximativement datables avec la momie d'El-Kantarah qui reposait dans un cercueil inscrit (cf. notre n° 14), la momie de Cailliaud (N° 7) et celle de Pettigrew (n° 28) dont nous possédons encore les cercueils.

dans la *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions*.⁹⁵ Nous mentionnerons simplement deux exemples liés intimement au domaine funéraire et qu'il nous a semblé indispensable de relever dans un tel contexte. Tout d'abord, citons une représentation tirée de la tombe de Sennefer.⁹⁶ Le défunt porte sur ses épaules une plaque d'or qui montre que l'application de ce métal sur le corps du défunt n'était pas inconnue des représentations du Nouvel-Empire, mais il ne semble pas qu'il y ait, sur les momies concernées, d'exemples où seule cette partie du corps ait subi ce traitement.⁹⁷ On trouve également traces du rôle de l'or dans les coutumes funéraires dans le *Rituel de l'Embaumement*⁹⁸ ; on insiste alors sur le fait que le visage de l'Osiris reluira grâce à l'or dans la *Douat*⁹⁹ ; il est peut-être même fait mention de ce phénomène pour la peau du défunt¹⁰⁰ et de la vie nouvelle donnée par l'or.¹⁰¹ Le passage de ce *Rituel* le plus intéressant pour notre étude reste néanmoins celui-ci :¹⁰² « Ton cadavre durera éternellement, comme la pierre des montagnes. Tu apparaitras en (être d') or, et tu brilleras comme l'électrum, tes doigts resplendiront comme l'électrum. » Et plus loin, dans le même chapitre :¹⁰³ « Pour toi vient (ce qui t') appartient, étant sorti d'Osiris, l'émanation parfaite provenant de l'arbre-ârou ! Ton corps sera regaillardi par sa substance, en un travail excellent, dans la Douat. Ta carnation aura une couleur dorée grâce à l'orpiment pur, émanation de Rê, pour l'éternité ! Car, pour toi, il mettra de l'or sur tes chairs, une couleur parfaite sur les extrémités de tes membres. Quand il aura rendu ton teint florissant grâce à l'or, et rendu tes chairs inaltérables grâce à l'électrum, tu seras vivant (bis) pour toujours et à jamais, tu seras rajeuni (bis) pour toujours et à jamais ! »

Ce phénomène peut également être mis en rapport direct avec les substituts de la momie qui possèdent les mêmes caractéristiques que les pièces concernées ici : visage doré, voire mains, ou toute autre partie du corps laissée à nu. On trouve ce genre de décoration sur les sarcophages anthropomorphes,¹⁰⁴ sur les cartonnages de

⁹⁵ Cf. F. DAUMAS, *La valeur de l'or dans la pensée égyptienne*, RHR 149, 1956 p. 1 — 17.

⁹⁶ Cf. Ph. VIREY, *La tombe des vignes à Thèbes*, RT 22, 1900, p. 91 — 92, et F. DAUMAS, *op. cit.*, p. 12 — 13.

⁹⁷ Il semblerait bien que la pratique constatée ici doive être associée, plus au phénomène des objets épousant la forme d'une partie du corps et appliqués sur celle-ci, qu'à la dorure corporelle proprement dite.

⁹⁸ Cf. S. SAUNERON, *Rituel de l'Embaumement, Pap. Boulaq III, Pap. Louvre 5158*, S. A. E., Le Caire, 1952. (texte). J.-Cl. GOYON, *Rituels funéraires de l'Ancienne Egypte. Rituel de l'Embaumement*, Coll. *Littératures du Proche-Orient*, les Editions du Cerf, Paris, 1972, p. 17—84.

⁹⁹ Cf. J.-Cl. GOYON, *op. cit.*, p. 51 : lignes 20 à 23, et p. 63 : lignes 3 à 5.

¹⁰⁰ Cf. J.-Cl. GOYON, *op. cit.*, p. 63 : lignes 3 à 4 (La traduction est ici liée au verbe *hknh* qui est un *hapar* signifiant peut-être dans ce contexte : reluire).

¹⁰¹ Cf. J.-Cl. GOYON, *op. cit.*, p. 51, lignes 22 à 23 : « ... tu respireras grâce à l'or, tu sortiras grâce à l'électrum ».

¹⁰² Cf. J.-Cl. GOYON, *op. cit.*, p. 71 : lignes 6 à 9.

¹⁰³ Cf. J.-Cl. GOYON, *op. cit.*, p. 73 : lignes 2 à 14.

¹⁰⁴ Par commodité, nous avons pris la plupart de nos exemples dans les collections du British Museum, ce qui simplifiera la recherche du lecteur intéressé par ce phénomène. Sur les sarcophages anthropomorphes au visage doré cf. BRITISH MUSEUM, *A Guide to the First, Second and Third Egyptian Rooms*, 3^{ème} édition revue et augmentée, British Museum, 1924, n° **BM 6662** (XXII^{ème} dynastie) p. 86. **BM 48001** (XX^{ème} dynastie) p. 82—83. (sarcophage intérieur)... **BM 51101** (XX^{ème} dynastie ou XXI^{ème}) p. 99 et Pl. XIX. (sarcophage extérieur).

tête, sur les masques¹⁰⁵ et sur les oushebtis¹⁰⁶. Tous ces objets, typiquement funéraires, montrent l'utilisation de l'or dans ce milieu précis, et, leur rôle de substitut de la momie aidant, rendent moins étonnant le phénomène de la dorure corporelle et son absence apparente de mentions dans les textes égyptiens et dans les récits des auteurs grecs.¹⁰⁷ Précisons qu'il ne faut pas parler, en l'occurrence, de pratique substitutive visant à remplacer le masque funéraire ou le sarcophage car on peut trouver ces momies avec l'un ou l'autre de ces éléments ; il s'agit donc de démarches parallèles et non incompatibles, associant souvent or, électrum et orpiment.

Outre ce matériel, en contact direct avec le corps du défunt, il faut signaler aussi la dorure de la face et des mains que l'on remarque sur certaines statues du dieu funéraire Ptah-Sokar.¹⁰⁸ M. Raven, dans un article récent,¹⁰⁹ avait d'ailleurs rapproché cette pratique de tous les substituts de la momie précédemment cités et il nous a semblé logique d'y ajouter le phénomène de la dorure corporelle.

Ces diverses constatations étant faites, il est évident que nous avons affaire à une solarisation du mort dont les chairs sont alors semblables à celles des dieux¹¹⁰, solarisation liée ici, nous l'avons déjà souligné, à l'assurance de la résurrection du défunt.¹¹¹ La symbolique qui a présidé à l'utilisation de cette pratique est, sans conteste, d'origine égyptienne et bien connue dans la pensée de ce peuple par les divers exemples repris ici. Néanmoins, il nous est impossible, dans l'état actuel de nos connaissances, de préciser à qui était réservé cet usage et quelle était exactement sa fréquence. Nous avons vu que si elle n'était peut-être pas monnaie courante, elle n'était sans doute pas rare. Aucun élément ne permet donc de déterminer

¹⁰⁵ Cf. BRITISH MUSEUM, *op. cit.*, n° **BM 20744** (XX^{ème} ou XXI^{ème} dynastie) p. 83. **BM 6665** (XXI^{ème} ou XXII^{ème} dynastie) p. 86 et Pl. V. **BM 20745** (XXVI^{ème} dynastie) p. 122 et Pl. XX. **BM 29782** (aux environs de l'an 200 de notre ère) p. 125. Notons que l'on trouve des exemples de ces masques dorés ou peints en jaune à l'imitation du métal précieux dès le Moyen Empire. Cf. par exemple : J. GARSTANG, *op. cit.*, p. 88 (masque peint en jaune), p. 171 (masque peint en jaune), p. 174-176 (masque au visage doré mais peut-être plus tardif que le Moyen Empire). G. DARESSY, *Fouilles de Deir el Bircheh (Novembre-Décembre 1897)*, ASAE 1, 1899, p. 25. (masque au visage doré). Sur ce type de masques, on consultera avec profit l'ouvrage fort complet de K. PARLASCA, *Mummiënporträts und verwandte Denkmäler*, Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner, 1966, p. 134-137.

Signalons également la découverte récente de pièces qui se situent entre la technique que nous étudions ici et les masques dorés. Il s'agit en effet d'une seule feuille d'or qui a été moulée sur le visage du mort par simple déformation. Cet exemple, unique dans la civilisation égyptienne, relève sans doute de la même symbolique. Cf. FRANCIS ABD EL-MALEK GHATTAS, *Tell el-Balamoun 1978 (Fouilles de l'Université de Mansourah)*, ASAE 68, Le Caire, IFAO, 1982, p. 48 et Pl. III A et B.

¹⁰⁶ Cf. Par exemple THEODOR M. DAVIS, *The tomb of Louiya and Touiyou*, London, A Constable, 1907, p. 26-27 et Pl. XVIII.

¹⁰⁷ Il est en effet curieux qu'aucun auteur grec ayant visité l'Égypte ne fasse état de cette pratique sans doute déjà courante à l'époque où ils visitèrent la vallée du Nil.

¹⁰⁸ Cf. BRITISH MUSEUM, *A Guide to the First and Second Egyptian Rooms*, British Museum, 1898. **BM 9736** et **BM 9737** p. 86. Les figurines de Ptah-Sokar au visage doré ont toutes été recensées récemment par M. J. RAVEN, *Papyrus sheaths and Ptah-Sokar-Osiris Statues*, OMRO LIX-LX, 1978-1979, 1979, p. 266-271.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. M. J. RAVEN, *op. cit.*, p. 269.

¹¹⁰ Sur ce sujet cf. F. DAUMAS, *op. cit.*, p. 1-17.

¹¹¹ Cf. supra p. 14-15. Signalons ici que Monsieur P. Barguet nous a conseillé de rapprocher ce phénomène des masques en or retrouvés à Mycènes comprenant celui « d'Agamemnon » dont la symbolique ne nous est pas connue, mais dont l'usage funéraire est indéniable. Sur ces masques, cf. la bibliographie donnée in : P. DEMARGE, *Naissance de l'Art Grec*, Paris, Gallimard, 1974, p. 307-314.

si elle était le fait d'une ethnie particulière ou d'une classe sociale précise de la civilisation égyptienne et pas forcément, soulignons-le, l'apanage d'une classe privilégiée.¹¹²

La conférence de Mme Dunand a eu le mérite d'attirer l'attention sur le phénomène de la dorure corporelle.¹¹³ L'expérience acquise au cours de cette recherche nous a appris que ces momies n'ont jamais particulièrement attiré l'attention de leurs propriétaires ou des conservateurs. Aussi notre seul but est-il de susciter l'intérêt des chercheurs français et étrangers afin qu'ils nous signalent les pièces qu'ils pourraient connaître et qui nous auraient échappé. Loin de nous décevoir en démontrant la non-exhaustivité de notre corpus, ils nous permettront de mettre encore plus en évidence une pratique jusque là jamais étudiée, et sur laquelle il nous semble indispensable d'attirer l'attention, pour permettre peut-être un jour, de résoudre le problème de son origine et de son champ d'application.

¹¹² Seules deux des momies trouvées par B. Bruyère portent un titre bien précis qui est celui de *néocores* de Sérapis ; mais il ne semble pas possible, faute de renseignements plus précis, d'affirmer que cette pratique était réservée à cette fonction (cf. B. BRUYÈRE, *BIFAO* 38, p. 75). Si cette coutume était le privilège d'une fonction, d'un titre sacerdotal ou hiérarchique précis, il faut alors admettre que cet « honneur » s'étendait, au vu de la répartition des sexes constatée plus haut, à la famille du « privilégié ».

¹¹³ Notons que cette pratique semble être limitée à l'Égypte antique. Signalons simplement que la seule attestation extérieure à ce pays est assez récente. En effet, en 1959, le corps momifié du prédicateur chinois Ts'eu-hang mort cinq ans auparavant fut recouvert de laque, procédé assez courant dans ce pays, mais fut ensuite doré entièrement. Cf. P. DEMIEVILLE, *Momies d'Extrême-Orient*, *Journal des Savants*, Troisième Centenaire 1665 – 1965, Paris, Klincksieck, Janvier – Mars 1965, p. 157.

THE PISISTRATUS TRADITION AND THE CANONIZATION OF HOMER*

Of the ancient data on the text of Homer, it is probably the data regarding the so-called Pisistratean redaction that are the most hotly debated. Since J. L. Hug has called in question the statement in the sources that Pisistratus had been the first to commit to writing the Homeric poems and R. Payne Knight that it had been Pisistratus who gathered their scattered fragments,¹ many engaged in both defending and refuting the tradition.² I do not intend to resolve the debate. The sources, however, maintain or stress diverse things, they are of different epochs; it is, then,

* Lecture delivered in the Institute of Classical Studies of the University of London, 28th Oct. 1991, in the frame of a series of lectures on The Formation of the Classical Canon. I take this opportunity too to express my sincerest thanks for the kindness and hospitality of the organizers (P. E. Easterling, A. Griffith, N. Lowe) and for the remarks of the audience.

¹ J. L. HUG, Die Erfindung der Buchstabenschrift, ihr Zustand und frühester Gebrauch im Altertum. Mit Hinblick auf die neuesten Untersuchungen über Homer. Ulm 1801. 90–5; *Homericæ Ilias et Odyssea*. . . cum notis ac prolegomenis. . . opera et studio RICHARDI PAYNE KNIGHT, London 1808. 3–6; 34–8. Hug supposed that at least some parts of the epics certainly had been committed to writing before Pisistratus, while other parts had been handed down orally and Pisistratus' deed was to bring to end this scatteredness. Knight, on the other hand, considered improbable that a written text would have existed before Pisistratus, but impossible that the redaction would have been his merit. Hug's view appears again (proved of course in a different, up-to-day way) with A. DÍHLE, *Homerprobleme*, Opladen 1970. esp. 94–119, that of Payne Knight with G. S. KIRK, *The Songs of Homer*, Cambridge 1962. 100–1: Homer and the Oral Tradition, Cambridge 1976. 118–28, and others.

² I mention, without any pretension of fullness, only by way of example, a few names. In favour of the tradition: F. RITSCHL, *Die Alexandrinische Bibliothek unter den ersten Ptolemaern und die Sammlung der Homerischen Gedichte durch Pisistratus nach Anleitung eines Plautinischen Scholions*, Breslau 1838. = *Opuscula philologica*, Leipzig 1867. I. 1–73; K. LACHMANN, *Betrachtungen über Homers Ilias*, Berlin 1865. 31–4; 76 (from 1841). A counterblast: G. GROTE, *History of Greece*, II, London 1846. 203–16; K. LEHR, *Zu den homerischen Interpolationen*: *RhM* 17, 1862, 481 ff. = *De Aristarchi studiis Homericis*, Lipsiae 1865. 442–50. H. DÜTZER still stood up for the tradition, *Peisistratos und Homeros*: *Jhb. f. Philol.* 91, 1865. 729 ff., but in the mid-eighties even three scholars, otherwise usually far from being in concord with each other, impugned the trustworthiness of the tradition: U. v. WILAMOWITZ-MOELLENDORFF, *Homerische Untersuchungen*, Berlin 1884. 235–66; A. LUDWIG, *Aristarchs Homerische Textkritik*, II, Leipzig 1885. 388–404; H. FLACH, *Peisistratos und seine literarische Tätigkeit*, Tübingen 1885. Thus in Germany the controversy seemed to be settled and also in Britain and the U. S. only few believed the tradition to be true (among these were, at any rate G. Murray and W. Leaf). After the Second World War, however, the debate has been resumed. R. CARPENTER, *Folk-tale, Fiction and Saga in the Homeric Epics*, Berkeley Los Angeles 1946. 12, argued for the tradition relying also on M. Parry's investigations (but his often quoted dictum that, if we would not know about the Pisistratus tradition, we ought to invent it, echoes G. MURRAY: *The Rise of Greek Epic*, Oxford 1934. 304). A few years later R. MERKELBACH proved the trustworthiness of the tradition by analyzing the pertinent sources: *Die pisistratische Redaktion der homerischen Gedichte*: *RhM* 95, 1952, 23–47. J. A. DAVISON again considered it a mere fiction: *Peisistratos und Homer*: *TAPA* 86, 1955, 1–21; likewise F. KRAFFT, *Vergleichende Untersuchun-*

unavoidable to clarify their relation to each other in order to clarify the history of the tradition and its interrelation with the canonization or canonicity of Homer.

The sources which speak about the activity of Pisistratus regarding Homer, can be grouped in three. There are sources that ascribe interpolations to Pisistratus – interpolations that run from a few lines to a whole book – but do not speak about gathering of scattered lays or about committing them to writing.³ These sources apparently suppose a written text before Pisistratus, as the very expressions they use imply –one can insert something (ἐμποιεῖν, ἐμβάλλειν, τάττειν τι εἰς τι) only into a more or less fixed text—and as Plutarch's wording concerning an interpolation he attributed to Solon, others to Solon or Pisistratus shows: "According to the contention of several people Solon was supported also by the authority of Homer, as he interpolated a line into the Catalogue of the Ships and read it out in the course of the debate".⁴ Only a written text can be read out.

The question whether the great Alexandrian critics were familiar with the tradition of interpolations cannot be decided with full certainty. Several scholars since Lehrs have denied it,⁵ but they can hardly be right. For simple reasons of chronology it is rather improbable that the Alexandrians would have been ignorant of the charge made by the historians of Megara that the Athenians introduced interpolations.⁶ Strabon, further, who speaks about Il. 2, 558 as interpolated by Solon or Pisistratus, draws in this passage on Apollodorus, a pupil of Aristarchus.⁷ It is true, on the other hand, that Strabon says at the same time that the scholars (οἱ κριτικοί) rejected these lines because they clash with other parts of the poem,⁸ consequently it cannot be precluded that Aristarchus obelized the line for internal reasons. However it may be, it remains a fact that the tradition of interpolations found its way to the scholia, the tradition of the redaction did not.

gen zu Homer und Hesiod. Göttingen 1963. 12–20 and A. LESKY, RE Suppl. XI. 1968. 832–4 s. v. Homeros. D. L. PAGE, on the other hand, accepted the trustworthiness of the tradition: The Homeric Odyssey. Oxford 1955. 143–5 and so did C. H. WHITMAN, Homer and the Heroic Tradition. Cambridge Mass. 1958. 65–74; A. DÍHLE (above, n. 1); N. S. JENSEN, The Homeric Question and the Oral-Formulaic Theory. Copenhagen 1980; and A. ALONI ingeniously analyzed, how cleverly the Pisistratidae manipulated the tradition and the text: L'intelligenza di Ipparco. Osservazioni sulla politica dei Pisistratidi: QdS 19, 1984. 109–48; L'intelligenza di Ipparco. II. La presenza degli eroi attici in Omero e nella tradizione arcaiche: Graeco-Latina Mediolanensia. Quad. di Acme 5, 1985. 11. 27.

³ Dieuchidas FGrHist 485 F 6 (D. L. 1, 57); Hereas FGrHist 486 F 1 (Plut. Thes. 20, 2); Str. 9, 1, 10; Schol. T ad Il. 10; Eustath. II 785. 41. The Dieuchidas fragment is textually problematic, it speaks about Solon and Pisistratus in connection with Homer, but we do not know what exactly it wants to say. Strabon attributes the interpolation to Pisistratus or to Solon, only Solon is mentioned by Plut. Sol. 10, 2; D. L. 1, 48; Schol. A ad Il. 3, 230 speaks vaguely about "some" (τινές).

⁴ Plut. Sol. 10, 2.

⁵ LEHRN, Arist. 447.

⁶ Aristotle, too, mentions that the Athenians introduced Homer as evidence in connection with Salamis (Rhet. 1. 1375 b 30), though he does not speak of interpolations.

⁷ Str. 9, 1, 10. Strabon's source was Apollodorus (ED. SCHWARTZ, RE I, 1894. 2868 s. v. Apollodoros) who, in turn, was a pupil of Aristarchus, thus it cannot be precluded that τινές in Schol. A means Aristarchus. (Cf. also DÍHLE (n. 1, above) 97–102.

⁸ About the meaning of κριτικοί cf. R. PFEIFFER, History of Classical Scholarship. Oxford 1968. 157–9, who points out that earlier the Alexandrians had been called κριτικοί, later the Pergamene scholars applied this denomination to themselves. No doubt, Strabon means the Alexandrians here, as he does in 14, 2, 19.

There are, secondly, sources which talk about interpolations, and probably knew the tradition of the redaction too. The *Odyssey*-scholia take a passage in the *Nekyia* to be an interpolation by Onomacritus⁹ who was in turn, according to a tradition preserved by Tzetzes, a member of the commission entrusted by Pisistratus with the task of the redaction.¹⁰ If Onomacritus interpolated something, this must have happened in the course of his redactional activity and if he interpolated, he, too, must have worked with written texts. It is more difficult to decide if this branch of the tradition was known to the Alexandrians or not. No pre-Alexandrine source makes mention of such an editorial commission; no source, except the only scholium and Tzetzes, makes mention of any activity of Onomacritus regarding Homer; the Alexandrians probably did not know that the passage in question could be an Onomacritean interpolation;¹¹ other sources connect Onomacritus expressly with the Pisistratidae, indeed, Hipparchus, not with Pisistratus (and chronologically this is more probable);¹² in order to insert a few lines no commission is needed; there was a propensity in tradition to make Pisistratus similar to the Ptolemies.¹³ Thus the commission seems to be a hellenistic (2nd century) fiction. I have to add, however, one more remark. According to Herodotus, Onomacritus had been the *διαθέτης χρησμών τῶν Μουσαίου*.¹⁴ Cicero says Pisistratus *disposuisse dicitur* the Homeric poems.¹⁵ Cicero draws obviously on a Greek source, *disposuisse* is in Greek *διατεθῆναι* (Tzetzes uses, in fact, this word). Was Onomacritus really a *διαθέτης* of the Homeric poems too, did he establish the order of the songs which the rhapsodes had to follow, and consequently there had been really a confusion before him? Or was the capacity of the *διαθέτης* invented on the basis of Herodotus' remark and the confusion inferred from it? I do not want to decide the question. I only pose it.

A third group of sources, finally, says unequivocally that Pisistratus gathered, arranged, redacted the Homeric poems and he was the first to put them down in writing.¹⁶ These sources do not speak of interpolations. As for the supposed basis of

⁹ Schol. V ad Od. 11, 602–3; H ad 604. This can be understood as meaning that all three lines were interpolated by Onomacritus – so O. CARNUTH, *Aristonici Περὶ σημείων Ὀδυσσεύς reliquiae*, Lipsiae 1869, 110 and this view seems to be supported by the fact that in one manuscript all are obelized – and also that only 602–3 are Onomacritean, and 604 of different origin (= Hes. Th. 954 = fr. 25, 29 = 229, 9 M.-W.), the attribution to Onomacritus being perhaps wrong – so in his edition P. von der Mühl (apparatus ad loc.). However it may be, while the first two lines are to be found in all manuscripts of us, the third one is lacking in two manuscripts and a papyrus.

¹⁰ Tzetzes, *De com.* Pb I 22 p. 20, 26–7; Ma V 25 p. 30, 172–3; Mb I 33 p. 32, 31–2 Kaibel.

¹¹ LEHRIS, *Arist.* 448.

¹² Hdt. 7, 6; Tatian, *Adv. Gr.* 41 p. 42, 3; Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 1, 21 II 81, 3 St. (The date given in the two latter sources – Ol. 50. = 580 B. C. – is problematic.)

¹³ PFIEFFER (n. 8 above) 8; Zs. Rrrook, *Aristoteles und die nachklassische Pisisratos-Tradition*, in: J. WIESNER (ed.), *Aristoteles. Werk und Wirkung* (Moraux Festschrift), Berlin New York 1. 1985, 439–42.

¹⁴ Hdt. 7, 6.

¹⁵ Cic. *De or.* 3, 137.

¹⁶ Cic. *De or.* 3, 137; Jos. C. Ap. 1, 12 (does not mention any name); Iul. Afr. POxy III 412, 48–52 (speaks of Pisistratidae, not of Pisistratus); Ael. VH 13, 14; Liban. *Or.* 12, 54 II p. 29 and *Apol. Socr.* 73 V p. 54–5 Foerster; AP 11, 442, 3–4 (anonymous and of unknown age); Vita Hom. 4–5 p. 28, 16–24; 29, 24–33; Vita Hom. Hsch. (Suda) p. 34, 1–6 Wil.; Schol. Dion. Thr. 29, 16–30, 24 (Melampus or Diomedes); 179, 11–25 (Stephanos); 481, 17–21 Hilg. (Heliodorus); Tzetzes, *De com.* Pb I 22 p. 20, 22–29; Ma V 24–26 p. 29, 168–80, 176 Mb I 33–4 p. 32, 30–51 Kaibel; Eustath. II. 9, 1–4.

the redaction, these sources can be divided into three groups: those which suppose written antecedents (Cicero, the Hesychian Vita of Homer, Melampus/Diomedes, Tzetzes later), those which suppose oral antecedents (Josephus, Pausanias, Heliodorus, Stephanus, Tzetzes earlier), finally those which speak of the gathering of scattered poems, but do not reveal whether they are supposing written or unwritten antecedents (the anonymous epigramme, Aelian, two other biographies of Homer, Libanius).

G. F. Welcker and some scholars after him maintained that the starting point of the whole redaction tradition had been the anonymous epigramme.¹⁷ According to Welcker, committing to writing and the concern for performance in full merged into each other in the epigramme. Yet Welcker's argumentation is not watertight. The epigramme assumes that the poems had been scattered and that hardly was the idea of its author, as the word *σποράδην* describing the state of the songs in other sources too, occurs, as far as I can see, only in prose texts and never in poetic ones. It is, then, more probable that the epigramme borrowed it from some prose text of like content than vice versa.

H. Flach was the first to attribute the tradition to the Pergamene school, perhaps to Crates personally, who thereby tried to lessen the significance of the Alexandrian critics.¹⁸ Flach elaborated also the transmission of the tradition and though he overcomplicated the question, his main idea has been accepted. G. Kaibel, too, looked at Asclepiades of Myrlea as one of the key figures in the tradition¹⁹ and J. A. Davison sought likewise the Pergamenians and their rivalry with the Alexandrians in the background of the tradition.²⁰ According to Kaibel, on Asclepiades depends on the one hand Cicero, on the other, possibly through mediators, Proclus, on the latter, through further mediators the Dionysius Thrax scholia and on these Tzetzes who, nevertheless, probably used a fuller version of them than any known to us.

Kaibel concentrated his attention on the problem of tragedy and comedy; so his conception can be perhaps improved as for the text of Homer – a problem relatively unimportant for him. The earliest source, known to us, of the redaction tradition that assumes written sources is Cicero.²¹ If he borrowed from Asclepiades, the latter must have held the same opinion. This seems to be confirmed by the Hesychian Vita which likewise assumes written antecedents and very probably draws on Asclepiades.²² Asclepiades again, as is well known, maintained that

¹⁷ G. F. WELCKER, *Der epische Cyclos oder die homerischen Dichter*, Bonn 21865, I, 361. As for the age of the epigramme it can only be said that in the first half of the 1st century B. C. it was perhaps known. MERKELBACH at least (n. 2 above, 26) sees in the epigramme of Artemidorus (AP 9, 205) an echo of this epigramme, because this too speaks of bucolic poems sometime scattered (*σποράδες ποκά*). Artemidorus flourished not earlier than the seventies of the 1st century B. C. and hardly anybody doubts that at this time the Pisistratus tradition did exist. Artemidorus was only in far relation to the Alexandrian tradition, thus the epigramme cannot prove that the great Alexandrians accepted the idea of a redaction.

¹⁸ FLACH (n. 2 above) 2–15; 26.

¹⁹ G. KAIBEL, *Die Prolegomena Περί κωμωδίας*; AGG Phil.-hist. Kl. 2, 4, 1898, esp. 4–5; 25–7; 31.

²⁰ N. 2 above.

²¹ De or. 3, 137.

²² FLACH (n. 2 above) 11.

Orpheus of Croton belonged to the court of Pisistratus²³ and, according to Tzetzes, he belonged to the four who constituted the commission of Onomacritus.²⁴ If Tzetzes took his (later) information in the last analysis from Asclepiades, then Asclepiades appears to have held the view of written antecedents, compiled by the Onomacritus commission that consisted of four members. If Flach's surmise is right, the story of the Onomacritus commission could well have been a fiction created by the Pergamene school or by Crates himself in the 2nd century. At any rate, it must have existed then.

Heliodorus, the scholiast of Dionysius Thrax, first followed, later reviled by Tzetzes, assumed, on the other hand, unwritten antecedents and related the story of the commission of 72 members and the "Pisistratean" Zenodotus and Aristarchus.²⁵ Between these two extremes are the scholia attributed to Melampus or Diomedes, according to whom the commission of the 72 worked on the basis of written antecedents. The age of these traditions is difficult to define. There is no doubt that the story of the commission of the 72 was founded on the legend of the Septuaginta and, thus, is later than the Aristeas letter. Josephus, the earliest figure in the tradition of unwritten antecedents, does not mention any commission. Pausanias, the second earliest, speaks of Pisistratus' comrades,²⁶ but does not say anything more, thus we do not know what exactly he meant by it.

The Dionysius Thrax scholia known to us do not mention the Onomacritus commission. Tzetzes, nevertheless, who had previously professed the commission of the 72 and oral antecedents, refers to certain old books he had come across, from which he had taken his superior information which was in opposition to his earlier position. Even if we do not have to take this too seriously, Tzetzes must have come upon some source, previously unknown to him which introduced him to the story of the Onomacritus commission and accordingly changed his views. Two possibilities can be presumed: *a)* The text of Proclus contained both views (commission of four and commission of 72 members). It is rather improbable that Proclus would have mentioned the commission of the 72 without any critical remark, but it is possible that Tzetzes first only knew excerpts of the Dionysius scholia like those known to us, that did not contain criticism and he thus accepted the version of Heliodorus. Later he came to know a fuller excerpt and changed his views.²⁷ In this case the story of the commission of the 72 is pre-Proclean. *b)* Proclus related only the story of the commission of the four and this was modified later by somebody on the basis of the Septuaginta legend and Josephus. Tzetzes first knew this latter version and later, on the basis of another, unmodified Proclus excerpt the version of the Onomacritus commission. Both are possible, since, however, Tzetzes reviles only Heliodorus, we may surmise that even later he did not know any earlier

²³ Suda s. v.

²⁴ De com. Pb 22 p. 20, 29 Kaibel.

²⁵ So also Eustathius, though he does not mention any number: Il. 9, 3-4.

²⁶ Paus. 7, 26, 13.

²⁷ A middle position was taken up by him when writing the Pb version of his *Περὶ κωμῳδίας*: here he tells the story of the 72, as formerly and adds, without any comment, "some attribute the recension under Pisistratus to the Crotonian Orpheus" etc.

(pre-Proclean) representative of this view. The story is then post-Proclean and possibly it was invented by Heliodorus himself, as Wendland suspected.²⁸

The history of the tradition after the 1st century B. C. can be, then, summed up as follows: Asclepiades of Myrlea, probably borrowing from a Pergamene source of the 2nd century, assumed (knew of?) a commission of four members, one of whom had been Onomacritus, which had worked with written antecedents. That version was used by Cicero and survived in the Hesychian Vita and by Proclus. Proclus supposed a writing Homer,²⁹ consequently he must have supposed that the text once set down became confused and the commission of Pisistratus put it in order, as Cicero in fact says. This story was later embroidered by somebody (Heliodorus?) on the authority of Josephus and the Septuaginta legend into the commission of the 72 and the unwritten antecedents. Melampus/Diomedes tried to harmonize the two versions. Tzetzes sided first with the Heliodorus version, later he came to hear of the Onomacritus commission and, after some wavering, he rejected the tradition of the 72 and came down firmly on the side of the tradition of the four and, without emphasis, in favour of the tradition of the written antecedents.

It remains to ask what the tradition had been before Asclepiades. Another well-known tradition can present a basis, one that attributes things similar to those ascribed to Pisistratus to Lycurgus.³⁰ Ever since Wilamowitz this is usually taken for mere fiction, invented in order to eclipse the Pisistratus or Solon tradition.³¹ In order to see things distinctly, we have to clear first of all the tradition whose eclipse was intended.

The earliest mention of the Lycurgus tradition that is textually palpable for us can be read by Heraclides Lembus: "Lycurgus came to Samus and, after he had taken over the poems of Homer from the descendants of Creophylus, he was the first to bring them to the Peloponnese." The last passage of the sentence resembles a statement of the Pseudo-Platonic Hipparchus, according to which Hipparchus "was the first to bring the poems of Homer to this land" (namely to Athens).³² The similarity is so striking that it hardly can be doubted that one is an answer to the other: hence it could be presumed that the Lycurgus tradition was an attempt to overshadow the version expressed in the Hipparchus dialogue. The problem, however, cannot be settled in such a simple way.

²⁸ Aristeae ad Philocratem epistula, Lipsiae 1900, 89-90. Wendland surmised that Heliodorus invented this version on the basis of a Christian author, perhaps of Epiphanius. If his source was Epiphanius, I do not know, at any rate it was a late version, invented for a public (and by a scholar) to whom neither the name of Onomacritus, nor that of Aristarchus meant anything, but which (who) could have known at least about the latter that he had something to do with Homer, at least from Lucian (VH 2, 20), in Byzantium an always popular author.

²⁹ Vita Hom., p. 26, 26 Wil.

³⁰ Heracl. Lemb. Polit. 10 Ditts; Plut., Lyc. 4, 5-6; D. Chr. 2, 45; Ael. VH 13, 14; cf. Ephoros FGrHist 70 F 149; Str. 10 4, 19.

³¹ WILAMOWITZ (D. 2 above) 267-71; KRAFFT (D. 2 above) 19; etc.

³² Heracl.: Λυκούργος ἐν Σάμῳ ἐγένετο καὶ τὴν Ὅμηρου ποιήσιν παρὰ τῶν ἀπογόνων Κρεοφύλου λαβὼν πρῶτος διεκόμισεν εἰς Πελοπόννησον. Ps.-Plat. Hipp. 228 b: τὰ Ὅμηρου ἔπη πρῶτος ἐκόμισεν εἰς τὴν γῆν ταυτηνί.

To begin with, we cannot decide the relative chronology of the two sources with full certainty. Heraclides excerpted Aristotle, that is undisputed; the Hipparchus, however, has been put from the beginning of the 4th century till about 320 to several dates.³³

Heraclides, secondly, excerpted Aristotle, but on Aristotle drew also Plutarch and the latter speaks of gathering and putting down of the poems. The rather obvious idea, then, arises that Aristotle too had spoken about Lycurgus gathering and setting down the poems, but his text was abridged by Heraclides in a more drastic way. If again this is the case and if the Lycurgus tradition really was forged in order to overshadow the Pisistratus tradition, this supposes not only the existence of the version known from the Hipparchus dialogue, but also that of the Pisistratean redaction in its full form.

In the text of Plutarch, nevertheless, there is a curious jolt. The text says of the stay of Lycurgus in Ionia: "After he had come across the poems of Homer, probably in the form they were preserved by the descendants of Creophylus... he carefully put down and gathered them in order to bring them hither. There had been some hazy information about the epics among the Greeks, but only few possessed some portion of them, as the poems were spread only in scattered form, but they were made known first and most by Lycurgus."³⁴ If the poems were preserved by the descendants of Creophylus, why had Lycurgus to gather them? It seems, as if to the original version, reflected by Heraclides, which told only that Lycurgus had been the first to bring the poems to the Peloponnese, Plutarch (his source?) would have added that Lycurgus had been he who gathered and who put them down in writing, he and nobody else. That would be, accordingly, a later shift in the history of the tradition. This understanding seems to be supported by Ephorus, according to whom Lycurgus and Homer were contemporaries and Lycurgus met Homer himself. In this case gathering the poems makes no sense.³⁵ Nor is it mere chance perhaps that while Heraclides speaks of the Peloponnese, Plutarch and Dio Chrysostomus of Hellas, thus adding emphasis to the deed of Lycurgus.

Plutarch maintains that Lycurgus committed to writing the poems of Homer. That can mean undoubtedly that Plutarch in an age of literacy—found it self-evident that poems can be brought to somewhere only in a written form; nevertheless, it is perhaps more probable that he wanted to diminish the importance of another putting down, namely that done by Pisistratus. This would explain the somewhat polemic edge of Plutarch's last words: it was Lycurgus who first and most made Homer known, he and nobody else.

³³ Two opposite views: P. FRIEDLÄNDER, *Platon*, Berlin ²1957, II, 108–16; J. PAVLE, *Die pseudoplatonischen Zwillingsdialoge Minos und Hipparch*, Wien 1910.

³⁴ ... τοῖς Ὀμήρου ποιήμασιν ἐντυχὼν πρῶτον, ὥς ἔοικε παρὰ τοῖς ἐκγόνοις τοῖς Κρεοφύλου διατηρουμένοις... ἐγράψατο προθύμως καὶ συνήγαγεν ὥς δεῦρο κομιῶν. Ἦν γάρ τις ἤδη δόξα τῶν ἐπῶν ἀμαυρὰ παρὰ τοῖς Ἑλλήσιν, ἐκέκτιντο δ' οὐ πολλοὶ μέρη τινά, σποράδην τῆς ποιήσεως ὥς ἔτυχε διαφερομένης γνωρίμην δ' αὐτὴν πρῶτος καὶ μάλιστα ἐποίησε Λυκούργος.

³⁵ I do not want to enter upon the vexed and confused question of the Lycurgus chronology, so I speak in accordance with the traditional view.

Finally, we face not two, but three traditions. The introduction of the continuous recitation of Homer, ascribed by the dialogue to Hipparchus, is attributed by another source to Solon.³⁶ First we have to examine the relation of the latter two to each other.

It was observed long ago that, from the thirties of the 6th century on, evidence of the knowledge of the Iliad increases considerably in Attic vase painting and it has been surmised that this is due to the rhapsodic performances of the Iliad at the Panathenaea.³⁷ These performances must have been introduced, accordingly, by Pisistratus and/or his son(s). We have, then, good reasons to presume a tradition that ascribed at least the formation of the Panathenaea order and the introduction of the performances of Homer to the Pisistratidae.³⁸

One more piece of evidence, the Cynaethus tradition, can be perhaps adduced. According to the often quoted scholium to Pindar, Cynaethus who lived at the end of the 6th century, inserted many verses into the poems of Homer.³⁹ I do not want to enter upon the problems concerning Cynaethus and the Hymn to Apollo, whether the "many verses" were the second part of the Hymn, as Wade-Gery thought, or the Hymn is a unity, as Dornseiff maintained as early as 1938 (and as most scholars believe today) and its author was Cynaethus, as M. West argued or even that it was he who gave the Iliad and the Odyssey their definite forms, as Aloni recently suggested.⁴⁰ Let me only remark that, if at the end of the 6th century people noticed that somebody interpolated passages in the poem, they must have known some more or less fixed form of the epics and were struck by the divergence from this.⁴¹ This knowledge, however, obviously was not founded on reading of the texts, but on listening to performances. These, then, must have been based on a more or less fixed text at the end of the 6th century and on a not quite recent one, since it was rather well known to the audience. That supports the supposition that in the third quarter of the 6th century a standard text of Homer must have existed and it is rather obvious that it was the text of the performances in Athens.⁴² I should like to emphasise once more that by this I do not want to decide how old this text was, or whether it was written or not. I only wish to confirm the view that the perform-

³⁶ D. L. I, 57.

³⁷ K. F. JOHANSEN, *The Iliad in Early Greek Art*, Copenhagen 1967, 86-243, esp. 223-30; 239.

³⁸ I cannot agree with H. T. WADE-GERY who maintained that the Panathenaea law was due to Pericles (*The Poet of the Iliad*, Cambridge, 1952, 30-1; 77-8); nor do I consider too probable J. A. DAVISON's view that in the mid-5th century there had been a stop in the performances and Pericles inaugurated them again: *Notes on the Panathenaea*, JHS 78, 1978, 41, but here is no room for arguing, the less so, as I speak only of the existence of a tradition, not of its truth.

³⁹ Schol. Pind. N. 2, 1.

⁴⁰ H. T. WADE-GERY, *Cynaethos*. In: *Greek Poetry and Life. Essays presented to G. Murray*, Oxford 1936, 17-36; F. DORNSEIFF, *Archaische Mythenerzählung*, Leipzig-Berlin 1938 (at that time Dornseiff stood alone against the almost unanimous view of scholars that the Hymn consists of two independent parts); M. L. WEST, *Cynaethus' Hymn to Apollo*, CQ 25, 1975, 161-70; A. ALONI, *L'aedo e i tiranni*, Roma 1989, who gives a short survey of recent investigations.

⁴¹ Cf. also J. A. NOTOPOULOS, *The Homeric Hymns as Oral Poetry*, AJPh 82, 1962, 343-7.

⁴² If this is true, the opinion that the Panathenaea order fixed only the sequence of the themes so R. SEALY, *From Phemius to Ion*, REG 70, 1957, 349-51 seems to be rather improbable.

ances of Homer were introduced by the Pisistratidae and that to these a more or less fixed text served as a basis.

The Pisistratidae probably had a good reason to do so. The ancestors of the Athenian aristocracy played a remarkably negligible role in the epics, Pylos and Nestor on the other hand a very important one. The epics were important for the Pisistratidae not for aesthetic, but for political reasons. That has been argued recently, on different grounds, ingeniously, though not in all details quite convincingly by A. Aloni and H. Mühlestein.⁴³ If G. W. Most is right in saying that one factor in becoming an author canonic is politics,⁴⁴ the inserting of Homer into the feast order of the Panathenaea is certainly a case in point. Not, nevertheless, the first one. Cleisthenes brought recitations of Homer to an end in Sicily at the beginning of the 6th century for likewise political reasons,⁴⁵ and if he found necessary to do so, the epic must have had a considerable weight. That is shown also by the story about Solon (irrespective of the alleged interpolation) who used the Iliad in the dispute over Salamis.

That is easy to understand. Epic poetry probably had from its beginnings an important social role. The epic song preserved the fame of men.⁴⁶ Fame was the moral recognition on the side of the community that somebody had carried out some extraordinary deed in the interest of the community. Fame was incident to material appreciation (γέρας, τιμή). It was worthwhile risking and carrying out a heroic deed, because it was acknowledged on the side of the community both materially and morally, and it was worthwhile acknowledging it, giving a privileged state to somebody and even to his offspring, since he had merited it and was morally bound to merit it afterwards too. Fame was a moral regulator, hence the social role of the epic. How it changed in the course of time is another question. Epic, accordingly, simply as a repository of historical and geographical knowledge⁴⁷ and, being a collection of *paradeigmata*, of patterns of demeanour, almost as a conduct book, was looked at as an authority, indeed, it was by its very nature canonic. The Pisistratidae only made use of this specific in their own interest, they realized a possibility inherent in the genre.

The long and short of this is that the Pisistratidae established the continuous recitations of Homer at the Panathenaea for political reasons and, in so doing, took an important step in making Homer, perhaps more precisely the Iliad and the Odyssey, canonic. In the anti-tyrannic atmosphere of the 5th century, however, this

⁴³ ALONI, n. 2 above; H. MÜHLESTEIN, Der letzte Bearbeiter Homers ein Lykomide: ZPE 82, 1990, 4-12; Nestors Enkel Peisistratos: ZPE 87, 1991, 98.

⁴⁴ G. W. MOST, Canon Fathers: Literacy, Mortality, Power: Arion 29, 1990, Winter 35-60.

⁴⁵ Hdt. 5, 67.

⁴⁶ Important collections of materials concerning fame: G. STEINKOPF, Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des Ruhmes bei den Griechen. Diss. Halle 1937; M. GREINDL, Κλέος, κῦδος, εὐχος, τιμή, φάτις, δόξα. Eine bedeutungsgeschichtliche Untersuchung des epischen und lyrischen Sprachgebrauches. München 1938. Cf. also W. JAEGER, Paideia I. Berlin 1936, 23-88; Zs. RITTOOK, Dichterisches Selbstbewußtsein in der frühgriechischen Dichtung: Altertum 15, 1969, 4-10; Stages in the Development of Greek Epic: Acta Ant. Hung. 23, 1975, 134-5.

⁴⁷ This feature of epic poetry is rightly emphasized (perhaps even overemphasized) by E. HAVELOCK, Preface to Plato. Oxford 1963, 61-86.

tradition was changed by substituting Solon for the Pisistratidae or for Hipparchus. This could have been done especially easily, if Solon really had something to do with Homer, namely if he used him as an argument in an important debate. Thus the Pisistratide tradition lived only in the shadow of the Solon tradition. The orators spoke as regards the origin of the Panathenaea recitations cautiously about "the ancestors", either because they really did not know the truth or precisely because they knew it very well.⁴⁸ The author of the Hipparchus dialogue revived this tradition, opposing the Solon tradition and adding to the old tradition that Hipparchus was the first to bring Homer to Attica, enhancing his significance over that of Solon.

If we could be sure that the Hipparchus dialogue was written in the first half of the 4th century, possibly in the sixtieth, we could say that the Lycurgus tradition, or at least the variant of it known for us from Aristotle/Heraclides, rivals the Hipparchus tradition. If, on the contrary, the dialogue is later than Aristotle, it is the dialogue that argues against the Aristotelian version of the Lycurgus tradition and the latter is in so far independent of the Pisistratus tradition.

Whether the Lycurgus tradition has some bearing on the Solon tradition cannot be said. Nevertheless, in the 5th century only Herodotus speaks of Lycurgus as legislator, and Hellanicus expressly names somebody else as the lawgiver of Sparta.⁴⁹ In the eyes of the authors of the 4th century in turn Lycurgus is not simply a legislator, but the creator of the ideal Spartan system. If, then, in order to paint the merits of one, colours were borrowed from the other, it is much more probable that the deeds of Lycurgus were embellished on the basis of the Solon tradition than inversely. The sources, at any rate, know in the case of both of laws that are to be traced back to Homer.⁵⁰ It is, accordingly, possible that the Lycurgus tradition aimed at outdoing the Solon tradition and the Hipparchus dialogue opposes both, but it cannot be excluded either that the Lycurgus tradition was formed independently of both the others.

From all the above the following conclusions can be drawn: It is questionable that the tradition of the redaction was known in its full form in the 4th century; it is possible that between the Solon and the Lycurgus tradition and certain that between the Lycurgus and the Pisistratide tradition there was a rivalry, irrespective of which of them tried to outdo the other, and it seems that the two traditions were shaped in the course of this mutual debate.

For us, however, even the mere fact of the rivalry regarding Homer is of importance. It is not simply a petty manifestation of the tension between Athens and Sparta. From the second half of the 5th century increasing differences can be observed—in line with the military and political antagonisms—regarding the appreciation of the relative superiority of the culture of Athens and Sparta⁵¹ (though

⁴⁸ Isocr. 4, 159; Lyc. In Leocr. 26, 102.

⁴⁹ Hdt. 1, 65; FGrHist 4 F 116.

⁵⁰ Solon: Ath. 137 e; Lycurgus: Plut. Lyc. 4, 5; D. Chr. 2.44.

⁵¹ I recall only by way of illustration Pericles' Funeral Speech, the remarks on the alphabetic Spartans (VS 90, 2, 9–10; Isocr. 12, 209; etc.) or Plato's outburst on the deficiencies of Spartan culture: Lg 666 e.

the Spartan case was defended by non-Spartans, sometimes even by Athenians). Athens held herself to be the school of Hellas, the friends of Sparta emphasized the uniqueness of Sparta. "We are models for several others rather than imitate them" says Pericles in the famous Funeral Speech and that was related by the scholiast as well as by several modern commentators to Lycurgus, who took over his laws from the Cretans. Xenophon on the other hand emphasized that "Lycurgus did not imitate other states, he made his country extraordinarily happy just by taking a view opposite to that of most of them".⁵²

Both texts lay a special stress on the fact that Athens and Sparta respectively did not imitate others. Primarily a first inventor—a local god or hero—was conceived to have shown some custom, institution or cult to his people; each people then imitated its own local god or hero, whose glorification, accordingly, involved the enumeration what he had invented and shown to his people. So a certain topics of the first inventors developed. People attributed to each inventor as many inventions as possible, which did not cause trouble, even as local cults did not exclude each other. When, however, especially under the influence of the sophists, the process of invention was understood in a more rationalistic way and inventions had been put in historical order in accordance with a conception of the development of culture, the appreciation of invention, of a pattern shown, was linked with temporal precedence, whatever came earlier was looked on as more valuable, while imitation was considered as something secondary and inferior.⁵³ This was a step towards the appreciation of originality in the context of history and culture.

Granted, then, that the Solon and Lycurgus tradition developed independently and the Pisistratide tradition was independent of both, granted even that they did not undergo any alteration at the end of the 5th century or later, in the 4th century juxtaposing them had a new meaning, not inherent in the traditions themselves. Lycurgus lived prior to Hipparchus or to Solon and he had been the first to bring the Homeric poems to mainland Greece. After the sophists and the beginning of choronography that was an announcement of the pretension to priority, to not being an imitator.

If the Hipparchus is late, it is its author who replies to the Lycurgus tradition: Hipparchus was the first to bring Homer to Athens, just as Lycurgus to Sparta, but Hipparchus did even more, he instituted the continuous recitations of Homer in place of the confused and partial performances till then. That had not been done by Lycurgus. Hipparchus' merit is, consequently, not lesser to his. If, namely, invention is a human act, the contrivance or institution invented can be improved on and although somebody may be the first inventor of something, if somebody else improves on it, then he is not less worthy of praise.⁵⁴

The Lycurgus and Solon/Pisistratus debate is, then, a manifestation not only of the Sparta–Athens conflict, but also of a pattern of thought important to the age,

⁵² Thuc. 2, 37, 1; Xen. Rp. Lac. 1, 2.

⁵³ K. THRAEDE, *Das Lob des Erfinders. Bemerkungen zur Analyse der Heuremata-Kataloge*: RhM 105, 1962, 158–86 and RAC V, 1962, 1200–2; 1209 s. v. Erfinder.

⁵⁴ THRAEDE, RhM 105, 1962, 171; 181.

a manifestation of the opposition between inventor and imitator, which appears in the debates about the two states anyway. In this context Homer has no direct political bearing, he is an acknowledged authority whose first introduction is an argument, proving not the right to an island, nor the nobility of a family, but the value of a whole culture. This fact, in turn, proves his growing moral weight. Homer's canonicity has been confirmed in a cultural context.

Let me add some more short remarks. The dialogue ascribes the regulation of the recitations personally to Hipparchus and makes no mention of redaction. Later sources speak of the redaction, attribute it personally to Pisistratus and make no mention of recitations. Julius Africanus, finally, hinting apparently at the tradition of the redaction, attributes it to the Pisistratidae.⁵⁵ The differences between these versions are, nevertheless, not as great as they seem at first glance. According to the dialogue, Hipparchus arranged the performances that had been confused till then, by obliging the minstrels to perform the songs in succession, "as it is done today".⁵⁶ According to Cicero, Pisistratus arranged the books that had been confused till then, "as we have them today".⁵⁷ As if the earlier tradition, reflecting an age when texts had been presented in living performance and received aurally had been reinterpreted in an age when texts were committed to writing and received by reading, as if the arrangement of recitations had simply been replaced by the arrangement of books.^{57a} During this process, Pisistratus took the place of the more vague Pisistratidae and the less known Hipparchus (if Hipparchus was not only a specification made by the author of the dialogue instead of the more general Pisistratidae of the tradition).

The sources treated till now supposed written antecedents (if they spoke of antecedents at all). Another group of sources, in turn, maintains that Pisistratus was the first to put down the text of the epics. The first person known to us holding this opinion is Josephus, but it does not originate with him. Josephus says that he reproduces the view of others and Pausanias likewise claims—definitely not drawing on Josephus—that before Pisistratus the poems were scattered and preserved by memory. I do not want to discuss the problems of Josephus' text in detail, as I have done this elsewhere. I only wish to sum up some points.⁵⁸

Josephus' thesis on the unwritten Homer is embedded into a larger context. Greek culture is in general later than the oriental, Greek literacy is especially late and writing was learned from the oriental peoples. One proof of literacy being late is that before Draco there were no written laws in Greece and even Homer did not put down in writing his poems himself. The comparison of Greece and the East was old, but, while in the 5th century it focussed on the differences of customs and of moral values, from the 4th century on—as a consequence of the invention—imitation pattern—the age of institutions came into prominence with the older being

⁵⁵ POxy III 412, 48–50.

⁵⁶ Ps.-Plat. Hipp. 228 b:

⁵⁷ Cic. De or. 3, 137: "...ut nunc habemus."

^{57a} For a reinterpretation like this of the word rhapsodia cf. Diomedes GL I p. 484, 12–4 Keil.

⁵⁸ Cf. my paper Josephus and Homer: Acta Ant. Hung. 32, 1985–1988, 138–52. For all details and evidences I refer to this paper.

more precious. And since the importance of literacy increased from the 4th century and, especially for oriental peoples, legally regulated human life was inconceivable without it, literacy seemed to be a measure of culture. Josephus, then, applied the same pattern of thinking as those who had debated over the value of the activity of Lycurgus and of the Pisistratidae; he only applied the pattern at another level, at one of more interest and importance for the age.

For the early Christian apologets in this debate over the priority of the two cultures, Moses stood for the oriental culture and Homer for the Greek. The opposition Moses and Homer emerged obviously in the Jewish milieu, it is evident in Josephus too and, I think, Josephus borrowed his whole argumentation from a Jewish apologetic work whose learned author, led by the opposition of invention

imitation and by the comparison of oriental with Greek literacy and written laws, expounded his view on the illiterate Homer. We do not know if he had sources which supported this, but again a slight modification of the tradition would have been enough to come to this conclusion: if instead of *disposuisse*/διατεθῆναι συντεθῆναι was used (and Josephus, indeed, uses the word), the new conception was given, since the word itself associates writing.

However it may be, in this conception, or, more exactly, in this use of the conception of the unwritten Homer and Pisistratus as the first to commit him to writing, Homer is canonized again, in a curious way. Homer represents Greek culture in its entirety (and proves, of course, its lateness), so much so that he who expounded this view, contending that before Draco there was no literacy in Greek at all, forgot about Hesiod. By whom was he put down?

To sum up, then, the formation of the Panathenaea order can be considered as the oldest historically undoubtedly true element in the Pisistratus tradition. Probably to overshadow this in the 5th century the Solon tradition was developed: it had been Solon who introduced the continuous recitations of Homer. In the 4th century the Lycurgus tradition appears: Lycurgus had been the first to bring the Homeric poems to the Peloponnese. Others maintained that the Pisistratide Hipparchus had been the first to bring the Homeric poems to Attica and it had been he who introduced the continuous recitations of Homer. It seems undisputable that the Pisistratus tradition and the Lycurgus tradition debate each other in the terms of the idea of invention and imitation, but we cannot say which attempts to surpass the other and we do not know what place the Solon tradition has in this debate, hardly earlier than the 4th century. Likewise from the 4th century on the tradition of the interpolations is demonstrable, known in all probability to the Alexandrian scholars, known at any rate to the scholia to Homer. From some data we can infer that these interpolations were connected, at least according to some, with a redaction of the poems, but whether the Alexandrians had knowledge of this version, cannot be said beyond any doubt. Sometime between the beginning of the 3rd century and the beginning of the first the Pisistratide tradition was remodelled: the sources speak of the arrangement of texts written instead of texts performed, instead of the Pisistratidae of Pisistratus and his comrades (Onomacritus and his fellows): it had been Pisistratus who arranged the poems confused till then and established the order of the books used since that time. The connection with the

Panathenaea still remained. This stage can be presumed in the first half of the 1st century B. C. with Asclepiades of Myrlea, who was followed by Cicero and this can be assumed in the background of the anonymous epigramme. There was, on the other hand, a view, appearing at the latest in the first half of the 1st century A. D. which—in the spirit of the pattern invention—imitation and examining the relation of Greek and oriental culture with a probable apologetic purpose—starting from the earliest reliable datum on Greek literacy (Draco) denied that the Homeric poems had been set down by the poet himself and attributed the merit of committing them to writing to Pisistratus. This view seems to be argued against by the second shift of the Lycurgus tradition visible in Plutarch: Lycurgus not only brought the poems (preserved by the descendants of Creophylus) to the Peloponnese, it was he who gathered and committed them to writing for the first time. Aelian tried to harmonize all these. Probably from Asclepiades derived the knowledge of Proclus; from Proclus or an excerpt of him, from Josephus and from the Septuaginta tradition (to be found with Josephus too) Heliodorus moulded his version (followed by Tzetzes at first); Melampus/Diomedes tried to harmonize this version with that of Proclus; the Proclean version was accepted by Tzetzes later.

These data admit at least two ways of interpretation. One of them is the traditional: Pisistratus reorganized the Panathenaea. He and/or his son Hipparchus (the Pisistratidae) established the version of the Homer-text performed at the Panathenaea with the assistance of Onomacritus and perhaps of others. For that purpose they made use of written and/or unwritten (oral) tradition and were responsible for minor or major interpolations (which presupposes, at any rate, a text fixed to a greater or lesser extent). There is no denying, nevertheless, that there are only late sources for all this and it is legitimate to ask, why early sources do not speak of the redactionary activity of Hipparchus or Pisistratus and where the late sources have taken their knowledge from.

According to the other possible interpretation, the tradition does not rely on old sources lost to us, nor was it, however, simply invented, but developed in the course of a debate, first between those who appreciated the activity of the tyrants and those who refused to do so, then in the historicizing spirit of the pattern invention—imitation and according to changing views and outlooks of changing ages. In the course of a debate that was interesting because of the application of the pattern (Athens—Sparta, Greece—Orient), in the course of a debate in which the tradition was interpreted, one step further was always taken in order to outdo some other view or interpretation, until a completely new idea was arrived at. This was not a conscious falsification of sources, nor a distortion of their meaning, only outlooks, patterns of thinking were effective that determined the whole thought and under the effect of which scholars recognized (believed to recognize) in the sources just what they expressed in the interpretation of them.

I do not want to decide which is the right understanding and for my present aim this is rather indifferent. The silence of the early sources is not decisive: the problem of the text was till the 4th century of no importance. Only then the idea of the "good text" began to emerge, partly because of the practice of the actors, partly again for political reasons (with the Megarians). Previously nobody cared for

how the text of Homer had been established. From the 4th century it became a question and either old sources were dug up, or, if these were lacking, theories were built, perhaps even good ones. The process was, at any rate an organic part of the change of culture.

The canonization of Homer has gone in line and in interaction with this process. Epic poetry had been an authority, in a certain sense canonic, from its beginnings. So Solon could make use of it as a weighty argument in a political debate, the Pisistratidae in order to consolidate their political position. Solon's success increased the authority of Homer in the political sphere (which came in handy for the Pisistratidae); the increasing importance of Athens and of Athenian culture increased Homer's appreciation in a cultural respect. Thus Homer became an argument in the debate over the superiority of the cultures of Athens and Sparta and of that of Greece and the Orient. Accordingly, the Pisistratus and Lycurgus traditions have been remodelled, reinterpreted, or elements of them hitherto neglected were stressed. The change in communication, the growing importance of literacy interfered in this process, as did a possible redrawing of the portrait of Pisistratus to the pattern of the Ptolemies. Homer as opposed to Moses led, finally, to the parallelization of the Bible translated into Greek and Homer committed to writing. So Homer's canonicity was reinterpreted again, now in a Christian spirit.

It goes without saying that was not the only way in which Homer was canonized. Aeschylus' famous dictum on the slices from Homer's rich banquet can be understood perhaps as referring only to the rich content of epic poetry.⁵⁹ The no less famous dictum of the admirers of Homer on the poet who educated all of Greece proves his canonic place in education and morals, understood, of course, by Plato negatively: he is responsible for the bad education of all Greeks.⁶⁰ Aristotle canonizes him in aesthetics as superior to all other epic poets, being more dramatic than these and better in several respects.⁶¹ The Alexandrian critics only codified an appreciation long ago accepted when they esteemed him as the oldest and the best one.

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⁵⁹ Athen. 347 e. I speak again in accordance with the vulgate opinion, but the words can mean more: R. GORDJIANI, Aischylos und das frühgriechische Epos. In: E. G. SCHMIDT (ed.), Aischylos und Pindar. Berlin 1981. 128-34.

⁶⁰ Rp. 606 e.

⁶¹ Po. 1448 b 35-5; 1451 a 21-8; 1459 a 30-7; 1460 a 6-12; etc.

THE MUSICAL FRAGMENTS OF PHILOLAUS AND THE PYTHAGOREAN TRADITION*

The earliest Pythagorean author, from whom we have authentic fragments¹ is Philolaus. These bear evidence mainly to a kind of characteristically Pythagorean natural-philosophical interest; it is enough only to refer to the fact that in the fragments collected by Diels (A 9–29 and B 1–18) the word *cosmos* turns up 14 times and the word *harmonia* (or its derived forms) 20 times. In this context numbers naturally play a specific role. The following paragraph from B 11 may serve as a motto for dealing with them: ἴδοις δέ κα οὐ μόνον ἐν τοῖς δαιμονίοις καὶ θείοις πράγμασι τὰν τῷ ἀριθμῷ φύσιν καὶ τὰν δύναμιν ἰσχύουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρωπικοῖς ἔργοις καὶ λόγοις πᾶσι παντᾶ καὶ κατὰ τὰς δημιουργίας τὰς τεχνικὰς πάσας καὶ κατὰ τὰν μουσικάν.

The words δαιμονίοις καὶ θείοις πράγμασι refer to natural philosophy (the following passages belong here: 9–10, 16–19, 23, 27, 29, B 1–4, 6 first part, 7–8), to cosmology (B 17), and to the symbolism related to the Gods (A 14). The expression ἀνθρωπικοῖς ἔργοις καὶ λόγοις may be applied perhaps to the human surroundings, nature or the numerical symbolism sought in the soul and the truth (A 11–13, 15), while to the wider range of the δημιουργίας τὰς τεχνικὰς πάσας may belong the mathematical (A 13, 24, B 5, 9?), astronomical (A 16–17, 20–22), physiological-medical passages (A 27–28, B 13), those passages which have a philosophical wording, but are related to the more exact *technē*, as well as those passages about the mathematics of music (A 24–26, B 6 second and third parts), which are marked separately κατὰ τὰν μουσικάν, but which principally belong to this group. In relation to the scientific evaluation of the sphere of thoughts of Philolaus let us quote two passages:

I. Burkert says: “Philolaus, in his effort to express Pythagorean lore in the form of Ionian φυσιολογία made individual statements about the numerical struc-

* The English translation was supported by the Soros Foundation.

¹ A. ΒΟΕΚΚΗ published the Philolaus fragments in 1819 (*Philolaos des Pythagoreers Lehren*, Berlin) and by this raised the so-called Philolaus-question: which are the authentic fragments and which are not? H. THESLEFF (*An Introduction to the Pythagorean Texts of the Hellenistic Period* = Acta Academiae Aboensis, ser. A. XXIV, 3, 1961) gives a lot of information on the history of the question and the opinion of the different scholars (up to 1961). Since then Burkert has convincingly proved the authenticity of the most important fragments published in the Vorsokrätiker (see BURKERT, *Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreism*, Cambridge, Mass., 1972, 396–399 and hereinafter).

ture of ordinary music, showing a truly remarkable mixture of calculation and numerical symbolism, in which its 'sense' is more important than its accuracy."²

2. The thought of S. Bochner worth considering is as follows: "The Pythagorean assigning of integer numbers to basic notion like justice, soul, opportunity, etc., has blossomed out, in the sophisticated mathematical logic of today, into assigning integer numbers to formulas in a formal system (Gödel numbers). And the Pythagorean invention of an anti-earth because of some preconception of theirs about the mathematical nature of the number 10 has matured into the introduction of anti-particles for the sake of filling out some gap or gaps in the mathematical theory of particles."³

I wonder if 2500 years from now the theory of anti-particles will be considered an unscientific speculation? Instead of answering this let us turn to the analysis of the Philolaus-fragments.

One of the most frequently quoted Philolaus-fragments remained in Nicomachus: ἀρμονίας δὲ μέγεθος ἐστὶ συλλαβά καὶ δι' ὀξειᾶν· τὸ δὲ δι' ὀξειᾶν μεῖζον τᾶς συλλαβᾶς ἐπογδῶφ. ἔστι γὰρ ἀπὸ ὑπάτας ἐπὶ μέσσαν συλλαβά, ἀπὸ δὲ μέσσης ἐπὶ νεάταν δι' ὀξειᾶν, ἀπὸ δὲ νεάτας ἐς τρίταν συλλαβά, ἀπὸ δὲ τρίτας ἐς ὑπάταν δι' ὀξειᾶν· τὸ δ' ἐν μέσφ μέσσης καὶ τρίτας ἐπόγδοον· ἡ δὲ συλλαβὰ ἐπίτριτον. τὸ δὲ δι' ὀξειᾶν ἡμιόλιον, τὸ διὰ πασᾶν δὲ διπλόον. οὕτως ἀρμονία πέντε ἐπόγδοα καὶ δύο διέσεις, δι' ὀξειᾶν δὲ τρία ἐπόγδοα καὶ διέσεις, συλλαβὰ δὲ δύο ἐπόγδοα καὶ διέσεις (VS 44 B 6 = *Ench.* 9 p. 252.17–253.3).

What do these lines tell us about the mathematics of music in the Pythagoreans? First of all we learn the archaic names of the three main consonances: the octave was *harmonia*, the fourth *syllaba*, and the fifth *di' oxieian*.⁴ These names clearly refer to the instrument, the strings of the lyre. From Boeckh on,⁵ the origin of these terms has usually been explained by the *tetrachords*: the *syllaba* is the "holding together" (*syllambanein*) the first and last strings of the tetrachord, the *di' oxieian* is the interval between the two highest strings of two tetrachords separated by a whole tone and the *harmonia* is the interval originating from joining together two tetrachords (in accordance with the original meaning of the verb ἀρμόζω). This interpretation, however, raises the following problems:

1. It is entirely unlikely that musicians ever used such a four-stringed instrument as the tetrachord in practice, with a fourth interval as the total range of the instrument.

2. There is no data relating to the existence, in this period, of the theoretical method of the tetrachord-analysis. (The word *tetrachord* first appears in Archytas.)

² If the context of the Philolaus fragments is Ionian natural philosophy, is it worth "condemning" the author due to the lack of exact scientific method as BURKERT does in p. 371? Would we think of such in the case of Heraclitus?

³ See S. BOCHNER, *The Role of Mathematics in the Rise of Science*, Princeton N. J. 1966, 361.

⁴ The authenticity of the archaic names is supported by Theophrastus = Aelianus apud Porphyry (96.21) and Corp. Hippocr., *De victu* 1.8., Arist. Quint., *De mus.* 1.8, p. 15.9.

⁵ See e.g. БОЕКХ, *op. cit.* 68; Á. SZABÓ, *The Beginnings of Greek Mathematics*, Budapest/Dordrecht 1978, 109; Burkert, *op. cit.*, 390; Zs. RITÓK, *Források az ókori zeneesztétika történetéhez*, Budapest 1982, p. 496. n. 25 etc.

3. In the case of the *di' oxean*, the name is not very appropriate, as the "holding together" of the two *lowest* strings produces a fifth interval as well as the holding of the highest (*oxeia*) ones.

4. It is precisely the etymological explanation based on the tetrachord-analysis that causes innumerable speculative (pseudo)problems concerning why Philolaus mentioned *trite* instead of *paramese*.⁶

It is only coincidence, that Nicomachus, when, before quoting Philolaus, he clearly explains the origin of the terms, at first does not mention the *tetrachords* at all, although later he himself translates the explanation into the language of the tetrachord-analysis.⁷ Before quoting the Philolaus fragment he only says the following: "ὅτι δὲ τοῖς ὅρ' ἡμῶν δηλωθεῖσιν ἀκόλουθα καὶ οἱ παλαιότατοι ἀπεφαίνοντο, ἀρμονίαν μὲν καλοῦντες τὴν διὰ πασῶν. συλλαβὰν δὲ τὴν διὰ τεσσάρων (πρώτη γὰρ σύλληψις φθόγγων συμφώνων). δι' ὀξείαν δὲ τὴν διὰ πέντε (συνεχῆς γὰρ τῇ πρωτογενεῖ συμφωνία τῇ διὰ τεσσάρων ἔστιν ἢ διὰ πέντε ἐπὶ τὸ ὀξὺ προχωροῦσα). σύστημα δὲ ἀμφοτέρων συλλαβᾶς τε καὶ δι' ὀξείαν ἢ διὰ πασῶν (ἐξ αὐτοῦ τούτου ἀρμονία κληθεῖσα, ὅτι πρωτίστη ἐκ συμφωνιῶν συμφωνία ἡρμόσθη) δῆλον ποιεῖ Φιλόλαος ὁ Πυθαγόρου διάδοχος οὕτω πως ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ φυσικῷ λέγων. ἀρκεσθῆσόμεθα γὰρ ἐνὶ μάρτυρι διὰ τὴν ἔπειξιν, εἰ καὶ πολλοὶ περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τὰ ὅμοια πολλακῶς λέγουσιν.

So the *syllaba* is the "first holding together" of the consonant sounds (strings) on the lyre. This can be also achieved independently from the tetrachords, regardless of how many strings the instrument had or how it was tuned. If there was a fourth distance on it at all (and presumably there was more than one), obviously it was worth "holding together" (συλλαμβάνειν), so this is the *first*, that is the *smallest* "holding together" that "sounds good", as the fourth is the smallest consonance. It is highly possible that the fourth was not only used as a melodic step, but at an emphatic place of the melody two strings being a fourth apart were also "held together", that is — as it is said today — they may have used the fourth as a *chord* as opposed to the other non-consonant intervals. That is why this interval "held together" got a separate name later, with the development of music theory.

According to Nicomachus the *di' oxean* is the consonance, which in connection with the "first formed" consonance, the fourth, can be achieved as its continuation (συνεχῆς) advancing (προχωροῦσα) upwards (ἐπὶ τὸ ὀξὺ).⁸ This term reveals

⁶ BOECKH finds it unintelligible (p. 70) and in the opinion of P. TANNERY the author tries to archaize too much (*Mémoires Scientifiques* III p. 240). J. CHAILLEY (L'hexatonique grec d'après Nicomaque, *REG* 69 (1956) 73–100) presumes an incomplete *heptachord*, R. BRAGARD (L'harmonie des sphères selon Boèce, *Speculum* 4 (1929) 206–13) an incomplete *tetrachord*, BURKERT sees the traces of incomplete scales in it (391–4), etc. (Almost everybody touches on the question, which is in close connection with the problem-cycle of the seven-stringed lyre and the old Greek scales. In details see my paper: A mítikus héthúrú lant és a pythagoreus zenematematika, *Zenetudományi dolgozatok* Budapest 1986.)

⁷ Only *after* quoting Philolaus does Nicomachus try to compare the Philolaus text with the tetrachord system (p. 252,3–254,2). This does not contradict the above, as he lived at least half a millennium after Philolaus, and for him the tetrachord system could seem even more unavoidable. *Before* the quotation perhaps he summarizes the original Philolaus text.

⁸ Nicomachus, *Enchiridion* 9, p. 252,4–16.

⁹ It is not important whether it is πρωτογενῆς because going upwards on the scale this is the first (smallest) consonance or because of the lowest position.

a bit more on the instrument, due to the use of which these names were formed: The string following the higher of the strings forming the first "holding together" was a fifth away from the lower one. It shows only this much, and nothing more.

The name *harmonia* comes from either the "joining together" a fourth and a fifth (i.e. not necessarily two tetrachords), or simply from the fact that the octave, as the clearest concord, represents harmony in general. This abstract meaning can be revealed relatively early.¹⁰ The only fact related to this concerning the lyre behind the naming is that it had a further string, which was an octave away from the lowest sound of the *syllaba*. However, even this does not provide more information either on the number of the strings or on the distance of the sounds on the lyre. If, however, the concord names mentioned by Philolaus are older than the names of the strings (*hypate*, *mese*, etc.), these names could in theory have been formed either on a four-stringed lyre with an octave range, or on an instrument with strings more than four, and with a range greater than an octave. Our sources do not provide a sufficient answer to this question. Nevertheless, on the basis of mythological and literary references and art representations, it seems probable that the most frequently used lyre in the 7–6th c. B.C. was a seven-stringed instrument. What is certain is that Philolaus in the above quote had such an instrument in mind, and it is also clear that the interval between the first and the last strings was an octave.

On the one hand the names of the strings given by Philolaus mark their places exactly: the *hypate* is the "highest", the furthest from the hand of the player (today we would call it the lowest string), the *mese* is the middle (and that refers to an odd number of strings), the *trite* is the third from above, while the *nete* is the last (that is the highest). The name *trite* has the key-position, as this can only be interpreted as the *third* string. On the other hand, in the 7th line of the fragment Philolaus uses the name *diapason* instead of *harmonia*,¹¹ meaning that the total sound-distance of the instrument described by him is an octave. This, however, does not mean that other types of lyres were not used in his time.¹²

It is thus evident that even without reverting to the tetrachord-analysis of later music theory, the text is entirely clear, nor does it pose a problem why *trite* was the name of the mentioned string and not *paramese*. A difficulty only arises if we want to force the *three* above strings deriving from the name *trite* into the tetrachord-based system, at all costs.

¹⁰ On the meaning of *harmonia* see Heraclitus VS B 67, Empedocles = Aristotle, *De anima* 408 a13, Dicaearchus *frag.* 11. On the early octave meaning of *harmonia*: H. KOLLER, *Harmonie und Tetraktys, Museum Helveticum* 16 (1959). He calls attention to the Pythagorean principle that as the soul senses the octave directly, it is itself a *harmonia*. Nevertheless, on the one hand Koller does not believe that *harmonia* in general meaning existed first and then the octave became a *harmonia*, on the other hand he also interprets the octave-harmonia as the joining together of two tetrachords.

¹¹ It is possible that the terms *diatessaron* and *diapente* already existed at this time, but they are not mentioned in the Philolaus fragment.

¹² See e.g. L. DEUBNER, *Die viersaitige Leier, Mitteilungen des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts, Athenische Abteilung* 54, 1929, and id., *Terpandros und die sieben-saitige Leier, Philologische Wochenschrift* 50, 1930. C. SACHS, *The History of Musical Instruments*, New York 1940. O. GOMBOSI, *Tonarten und Stimmungen der antiken Musik*, Kopenhagen 1939, ch. IV.

The further lines of the fragment relate which numerical ratios the mentioned consonances correspond to. We should be aware of the fact that when talking about this the author does not need any verbal predicate, which would serve to describe this relationship ("corresponds", "is equivalent to", etc.), it is enough for him simply to state ἡ δὲ συλλαβὰ ἐπίτριτον. The concept behind this is that the Pythagoreans considered the intervals identical with the corresponding numerical ratios, so this relationship did not have to be explained.¹³

Philolaus compares the two consonances under the archaic names (fifth and fourth) in the second sentence. Here he does not use the names of the numerical ratios yet (*hemiolion*, *epitriton*), nor would the logic of his train of thought allow it. That is why it is remarkable that he calls here the interval derived from the difference of the fifth and the fourth *epogdoon* (and later everywhere else, too). This refers to the fact that the whole-tone probably had no archaic name of the same period as the *syllaba*, and the name *tonos* did not exist at the time.¹⁴ So the discovery that the whole-tone is the *epogdoon* numerical ratio can be dated approximately to the time before Philolaus.¹⁵

The definition of the distance between the *mese* and the *trite* says: τὸ δ' ἐν μέσῳ μέσσας καὶ τρίτας ἐπόγδοον and that of the fourth numerical ratio: ἡ δὲ συλλαβὰ ἐπίτριτον.

Why does Philolaus use *neutrum*? We can only suppose that the word *epogdoon* refers to an elliptical *diastema*. The use of *neutrum* is even more emphatic if we look at the articles of the consonances. The octave: τὸ διὰ πασῶν δὲ διπλόου. the fifth: τὸ δὲ δι' ὀξείων ἡμιόλιον. So behind the names formed with the *διὰ* preposition stands the *diastema* = 'interval' notion in all probability, and these names represent

¹³ See Porphyrios, *Kommentar zur Harmonielehre des Klaudios Ptolemaios*, hrsg. I. Düring, Göteborg 1932, p. 92.19–30, 94.26–27 and A. Riehmüller, *Logos und Diastema in der griechischen Musik*, Archiv für Musikwissenschaft 32, 1985.

¹⁴ The fact that Boethius uses the term *tonus* referring to Philolaus does not mean anything, because (i) Boethius does not quote, but interpret the text before him freely; (ii) even if he quotes, first he translates the Greek text into Latin; and (iii) presumably Boethius did not have the original Philolaus text in front of him, but the lost work of Nicomachus (see, C. Bower, Boethius and Nicomachus. An Essay Concerning the Sources of De Institutione Musica of Boethius, *Vivarium* 16, 1978). On the other hand, if the concept of *tonus* did not exist at the time of Philolaus, as a consequence perhaps the concept of *genus* was not formed yet either, or the *genus* that later got the *diatonic* name was called something else. All this naturally cannot be proved.

¹⁵ This means that Philolaus knew the experiments with the canon mentioned in point 4. in the Conclusion. The term *hyperoche* acquires its meaning in these experiments, as I have already referred to (see n. 13). Further, it can be read in Porphyry: ἀπὸ δὲ τούτου κινηθέντες τινὲς τῶν μετ' αὐτὸν [Ερατοσθένης] διάστημα ἐκάλεσαν εἶναι ὑπεροχὴν, ὡς Αἰλιανὸς ὁ Πλατωνικὸς καὶ Φιλόλαος δ' ἐπὶ πάντων διαστημάτων ταύτην εἰληφε τὴν προσηγορίαν (p. 91.11–13). So the Philolaus fragment also supports the hypothesis of Á. Szabó in connection with the canon-experiments. What is more, if we may believe Porphyry, Philolaus was able to create every interval as the "difference" between the *diastemata* (except the consonances chosen as a starting point, naturally). Out of this two things can be concluded: the first, which Á. Szabó explained: the method of *anthypharesis*, which had such great significance in later mathematics is rooted in the Pythagorean music-mathematics (see: Á. Szabó, Der Ursprung des Euklidischen Verfahrens und die Harmonielehre der Pythagoreer, *Mathematische Annalen* 150, 1963); the other one is a hypothesis: perhaps the *Sectio canonis* can be led back to the age of early Pythagoreanism, not only regarding its material and sources, but also its conception.

a later addition to the nomenclature. At the same time the old names of the octave and the fourth are feminine nouns (perhaps completed with the plural genitive of χορδή: ἡ ἁρμονία or ἡ συλλαβὴ τῶν χορδῶν. So in the 6th line the neutrum of the ἐπίτριτον is even more significant than the former example, while the neutrum of the ἡμιόλιον may be explained with the article of the τὸ δι' ὀξεῖαν, the neutrum beside the συλλαβὰ demands by all means the completion in thought of the elliptical structure with the διάστημα noun, as the ἐπίτριτον is an adjective.

The last lines of the fragment relate how many whole-tones and how many *dieses* the consonances consist of. What is a *diesis* for Philolaus?¹⁶ On the one hand the context itself (i.e. the discussion of the quantity relationships), on the other hand all that was said on the *epogdoon* and the fact that these lines follow immediately the definition of the numerical ratios of the consonances, all refer to the fact that the comparisons with the smaller intervals should be understood not only for musical intervals, but for the numerical ratios as well. So did Philolaus know the numbers of the *diesis*, too? (256:243) If he knew them, why did not he mention them, if he did not, then why not? In the following I am going to try to answer these questions, but first we have to examine the fragments that are preserved in Boethius (A 26 and B 6 third part): *Philolaus vero Pythagoricus alio modo tonum dividere temptavit, statuens scilicet primordium toni ab eo numero, qui primus cybum a primo impari, quod maxime apud Pythagoricos honorabile fuit, efficeret. Nam cum ternarius numerus primus sit impar, tres tertio atque id ter si duxeris, XXVII necessario exsurgent, qui ad XXVIII numerum tono distat, eandem, ternarii differentiam servans. Ternarius enim XXVIII summae octava pars est, quae eisdem addita primum a ternario cybum XX ac VII reddit. Ex hoc igitur Philolaus duas efficit partes, unam quae dimidio sit maior, eamque apotomen vocat, reliquam quae dimidio sit minor eamque rursus diesin dicit, quam posteri semitonium minus appellavere; harum vero differentiam comma. Ac primum diesin in XIII unitatibus constare arbitratur eo, quod haec inter CCLVI et CCXLIII pervisa sit differentia, quodque idem numerus, id est XIII, ex novenario, ternario atque unitate consistat, quae unitas puncti obtineat locum, ternarius vero primae imparis lineae, novenarius primi imparis quadrati. Ex his igitur causis cum XIII diesin ponat, quod semitonium nuncupatur, reliquam XXVII numeri partem, quae XIII unitatibus continetur, apotomen esse constituit. Sed quoniam inter XIII et XIII unitas differentiam facit, unitatem loco commatis censet esse ponendam. Totum vero tonum in XXVII unitatibus locat eo quod inter CCXVI ab CCXLIII qui inter se distant tono, XXVII sit differentia. Philolaus igitur haec (sc. diesin) atque his minora spatia talibus definitionibus includit: diesis, inquit, est spatium quo maior est sesquitertia proportio duobus tonis. Comma vero est spatium, quo maior est sesquioctava proportio duabus diesibus, id est duobus semitoniis minoribus. Schisma est dimidium commatis, diaschisma vero dimidium dieseos, id est semitonii minoris* (Boethius, *De inst. mus.* III.5 and III.8).

¹⁶ The etymology of the term *diesis* (δίημι = disperse, remove, separate) refers unambiguously to the fact that at the time of its birth not only the question of a sort of division of the octave arose, but that of the whole-tone, too.

"Entaché d'absurdités mathématiques et d'erreurs pratiquement énormes". Burkert quote the opinion of Tannery, only to enter into a debate with it later (Burkert, p. 386). He does defend not the mathematical absurdities in question, but the authenticity of the quoted fragments. The essence of the mathematical error briefly is that the concept of the intervals being considered as numerical ratios is replaced suddenly by a *linear* interval-interpretation, according to which e.g. the size of the *diesis* is just the number 13 deriving from the *difference* of its proportional numbers, that of the whole is 27 (as $9:8=243:216$ and $243 - 216 = 27$) etc. The author then decides the dimensions of the different intervals by simply adding and subtracting, then dividing these into parts. (In detail see below.) In the opinion of Tannery, Frank and others, this method is entirely irreconcilable with Pythagorean mathematics, i.e. with Philolaus. Moreover, similar calculations can be found in the Timaeus commentaries, in Plutarch and Adrastus as well, so the alleged Philolaus quotations by Boethius can be traced back to these. On the other hand, Burkert very convincingly calls attention to three factors:

1. Boethius draws in all probability on Nicomachus, who directly quotes in the B 6 frg. accepted as authentic. Nicomachus could have known the original work by Philolaus, so when Boethius refers to Philolaus with the mediation of Nicomachus, we should take it seriously¹⁷ (Burkert, p. 394).

2. The presumed mathematical error is not sufficient to ascertain the chronology (ibid., p. 397, n. 50).

3. From the Boethius text we know that Philolaus with the help of just this linear mathematical method allegedly divides the *comma* into further sub-parts, the *schisma* and the *diaschisma*. In this Philolaus stands entirely alone in ancient literature, here there is no conformity with the Timaeus commentaries, where the theorem known since Archytas has an emphasized role. The theorem says that the so-called *superpartient* ratios and thus the whole-tone cannot be divided into two equivalent parts, whereas Philolaus does divide the *comma* and the *diesis* into two. So the Philolaus fragments of Boethius cannot be derived from the Timaeus commentaries, the relationship may at most be the other way around. This leads Burkert to the conclusion that it is just these, seemingly archaic mathematic errors that prove the authenticity of the fragments.¹⁸

It seems that nobody tried to justify the so-called mathematical absurdities,¹⁹ although we may come to that along the path indicated by Burkert and by setting them into the Pythagorean tradition. It would be important to

¹⁷ This is not a sufficiently strong argument, because here Boethius does not refer directly to Nicomachus, and contrary to the opinion of Bower, it cannot be considered proved that Boethius got information only from Nicomachus (see BOWER *op. cit.* (1978) and my paper on the sources of Boethius: Translation or compilation. Contributions to the Analyse of the Sources of Boethius' *De institutione musica*, *Studia musicologica* 29 (1978) 5-33).

¹⁸ Burkert does not mention the reason for the "mathematical absurdities". He explains the *schisma* with the *genera*, see later and in n. 25.


¹⁹ On a mathematical error of a similar character see: C. A. BARBERA, Interpreting an Arithmetical Error in Boethius' *De institutione musica* (III.14-16.), *Archives internationales d'histoire des sciences* 31 (1981) 26-42.

give an explanation to the alleged absurdities, because Burkert, after proving their authenticity, lists them among the arguments supporting his opinion that we have to treat early Pythagorean science with an energetic scepticism (see Burkert, p. 399).

The text of the B 6 frg. quoted above, having given the ratios of the octave, the fifth, the fourth and the whole-tone, goes on as follows: οὕτως ἁρμονία πέντε ἐπόγδοα καὶ δύο διέσεις, δι' ὅξειαν δὲ τρία ἐπόγδοα καὶ διέσεις, συλλαβὰ δὲ δὴ ἐπόγδοα καὶ διέσεις. This conclusion, however, has no real background, as this does not result from the above in any way, and what is more, we do not even know what the *diesis* is. Therefore it is obvious to attach the Boethius passage here, together with Diels: *Diesis, inquit* (sc. Philolaus) *est spatium, quo maior est sesquitertia proportio duobus tonis*. This at least gives a subsequent explanation to the conclusion introduced with οὕτως, because if we know that (i) the whole-tone is 9:8, the fourth is 4:3, the fifth is 3:2, and that (ii) the octave = fifth + fourth, and finally that (iii) the fourth = 2 whole-tone + diesis, then the actual consequence is the last statement (with all the three part-statements) of the first paragraph of B 6. Thus Boethius, confirmed with the word *inquit* gives the logical link missing from the Nicomachus quotation: what is the *diesis* per definitionem?²⁰ It is the interval by which the fourth is bigger than two whole-tones. This is a new element which was not included in the presumed Pythagorean tradition up to this point. The musicians must have been well aware of the fact that the fourth is slightly bigger than two whole-tones, but the Pythagoreans (Philolaus?) asked how much bigger it was *numerically*, i.e. what the numbers of this interval were.

How can this proposition fit into the context of *canon-mathematics*? And let us deal beforehand with another question: where does the ominous number 27 come from?²¹

Let us recall the canon divided into 12 parts. Everything that Philolaus says in the B 6 can clearly be seen on the canon:



The octave (12–6) is actually the sum of the fourth (8–6) and the fifth (12–8). It can be well seen that the fifth (9–6) is an *epogdoon* bigger (9–8) than the fourth (8–6), and that the *epogdoon* is between the *hypate*²² (12) and the *mese* (9). But what

²⁰ In the Nicomachus fragment the relevant statement συλλαβὰ δὲ δὴ ἐπόγδοα καὶ διέσεις is on the third place, after the octave and the fifth, as the consequence of the preceding, so here it does not have a definition value.

²¹ Presumably Plato took the number 27 over from exactly this Pythagorean tradition. About the number 27 see Nicomachus, *Ench.* 11, p. 260, 11 17: καὶ προσεκθισόμεθα τὸν τοῦ Πυθαγορικοῦ λεγομένου κανόνος κατατομὴν ἀκριβῶς καὶ κατὰ τὸ βούλημα τοῦδε τοῦ διδασκάλου συντετελεσμένην, οὐχ ὡς Ἐρατοσθένης παρήκουσεν ἢ Θράσυλλος, ἀλλ' ὡς ὁ Λοκρὸς Τίμαιος, ὃ καὶ Πλάτων παρηκολούθησεν, ἕως τοῦ ἑπτακαϊικοσιπλασίου.

²² It is clear that in these experiments (i.e. in the age of canon-mathematics), the number ordered to the current position of the *hypogogous* corresponds to the simultaneously audible sound, so e.g. the

Point	Value
0	
6	162
8	216
9	243
B	256
A	288
12	324

lowest sound corresponded to the number 12. It only caused a problem later, when approx. in the time of Archytas acoustics started to develop, that the greater number should correspond to the *higher* sound. This change is well reflected in the *Sectio canonis*, which is based on different layers of sources and where both interpretations can be found. This fact once more underlines that the Pythagorean music-mathematics were developed due to a non-acoustic interest. (See the chapters on Archytas and on the *Sectio* in my dissertation mentioned in n. 34.)

²⁴ See *VS A 25*, and Burkert: "The basic flaw is that again difference takes the places of proportion: in place of the calculation of proportions, the idea of addible and subtractible lines takes the centre of attention. This impression is strengthened also by the separate report that Philolaus used the expression *ὑπεροχή* with relation to all intervals." (BURKERT, *op. cit.* p. 396 7.)

diastemata, made linear, or linearly measurable with the help of the canon. Obviously, Philolaus knew as well, that while on the canon divided into 12 parts the *epogdoon* in this sense consists of 1 unit, and on the “enlarged” canon of 27 units, i. e. its “linear” dimension is not constant, the ratio of the numbers making up its *horoi* is constant: $9:8 = 243:216$.²⁵ Although the linear method from a more strict mathematical point of view is incorrect, yet we cannot say that it is an irrational Pythagorean idea. We have already seen that Philolaus knew the numbers of the *diesis* and he was also aware that this was not exactly the half of the *epogdoon*. The greater part was called *apotome*. It is thus logical to ask about the difference between these two part-intervals, the *comma*, as well as to try to determine the numbers of the *apotome* and the *comma*. It is in later reports only that the *apotome* 2178:2048 and the *comma* 531441:524288 can be found. These numbers are not mentioned in the Philolaus fragments. If we consider that in this age the technique of counting was rather cumbersome and thus we presume that Philolaus could not yet determine these larger numbers, it becomes clear at once why he tried in another way, by the accepted scientific method of music-mathematics of his time, to divide the *epogdoon* into *diesis* and *apotome*, or to two *dieseis* and a *comma*, only to order numbers to these, too. Perhaps he got the number 27 in the above-mentioned way, and this was how the linear dimension of the *epogdoon* became 27 in the current division of the canon. As a logical result the *diesis* is exactly 13 units, the *apotome* 14 and the *comma* 1. It was probably an accidental coincidence which confirmed this result, that the difference between the lowest appropriate proportional numbers is also 13 ($256 - 243 = 13$). And we should not be surprised why they did not try to support the prominent role of the number 27 with these arguments, but with characteristically Pythagorean ones: *primus cybum a primo impari, quod maxime apud Pythagoricos honorabile fuit*. The Pythagoreans found a similar explanation to almost every number, but perhaps it is not unjust to suppose that we should look for the “scientific background” of the number 27 and of the mathematical “absurdities” of the Philolaus fragment in the method of canon-mathematics.

Schisma est dimidium commatis, diaschisma vero dimidium dieseos. This is all Boethius says, nothing more. How did Philolaus divide these intervals into two, when even the whole-tones could not be divided, and did these micro-intervals have

²⁵ Perhaps this is the key to understanding why it was the diatonic genus that became the real Pythagorean genus. The finding of the numbers of the *diesis* meant at the same time the first complete numerical division of the fourth. Practical musicians could obviously “divide” the fourth in several ways with intervals. Out of these the Pythagoreans canonized (in concrete and in abstract sense as well) exactly the one which was equivalent to that, whose numbers (i.e. the numerical ratios of the intervals in it) they could define in a theoretical way (or perhaps the one, which was very similar to this sounding). Perhaps the concept of the genus was also formed at that time, since after this—at least in theory—the difference between the fourth-divisions in the multicoloured musical practice can be grasped in a more exact way. Aristoxenus refers to the fact that behind the three main types of the *genera* there stood much more real tetrachord-divisions. (See: Aristox., p. 28.3–35.9; p. 34.3–4) After the definition of the numerical ratio of the *diesis*, one can start to look for the numbers of the other fourth-divisions. This will be performed by Archytas, separately from the canon, with much more developed mathematical background.

any role in the theory at all? They could hardly have had any practical significance since the *comma* can only be heard by the most eminent musicians. In the opinion of Burkert the *diaschisma* might correspond to the quarter-tone of the *enharmonic* genus, but this is fairly uncertain.²⁶ He himself has no proposition for the *schisma* either. Unfortunately, the taciturn clause of Boethius is not sufficient to form any hypothesis on these specific intervals. In any case it is certain that the problem of the *schisma* and the *diaschisma* does not affect either the question of authenticity or the interpretation of the above quoted fragment. Everything points to the fact that neither the later Pythagoreans, nor the other writers dealing with music theory, could do anything with these micro-intervals, as they do not appear anywhere else in the ancient literature. Perhaps only the famous Plato passage (*Pol.* 531a) refers to the continuity of the search after micro-intervals.

The last Philolaus fragment, which must be mentioned briefly due to its vague music-mathematical reference, can be found also in the work of Nicomachus (A 24);²⁷ τινὲς δὲ αὐτὴν [τὴν μεσότητα] ἀρμονικὴν καλεῖσθαι νομίζουσιν ἀκολουθῶς Φιλολάῳ ἀπὸ τοῦ παρέπεσθαι πάσῃ γεωμετρικῇ ἀρμονίᾳ. γεωμετρικὴν δὲ ἀρμονίαν φασι τὸν κύβον ἀπὸ τοῦ κατὰ τὰ τρία διαστήματα ἡρμόσθαι ἰσάκις· ἐν γὰρ παντὶ κύβῳ ἦδε ἡ μεσότης ἐνοπρίζεται. πλευραὶ μὲν γὰρ παντὸς κύβου εἰσὶν ἰβ, γωνίαι δὲ η, ἐπίπεδα δὲ ζ'. μεσότης ἄρα ὁ η τῶν ζ' καὶ τῶν ἰβ κατὰ τὴν ἀρμονικὴν.

Although the reference is rather vague and indirect (the opinion of some unknown individuals on the basis of Ph.) we may accept from it that Philolaus in some form also dealt with the theory of means (*mesotetes*). Unfortunately, nothing is known about the details, among others whether the notion of the geometrical mean existed in the time of Philolaus.

CONCLUSION

Ancient tradition unanimously attributes the discovery of the law of numerical ratios corresponding to musical intervals to Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans.²⁸ The question has often been raised whether this was really the case and if so, how they discovered it. On this literature adopts a rather sceptical point of view.²⁹ It is

²⁶ So the intervals of the enharmonic genus would be the *diaschisma*, and the *ditonus*. In the opinion of Burkert this also proves that Philolaus had already discussed all three *genera*. "This makes it seem that Philolaus dealt with all three genera, taking the usual, 'Aristoxenean' conception as his point of departure." Can we rightly speak of the "usual" genus-conception, if even to its name we only have such a definition, the anachronism of which is marked with quotation marks? (cf. BURKERT, *op. cit.* 397–8).

²⁷ Nicomachus, *De institutione arithmetica* 26., p. 135.10.

²⁸ See Xenocrates *frag.* 9. = Porph. 30.1–4 (Porphyry quotes Heraclides who refers to Xenocrates). He does not mention the way of the discovery. See BURKERT, *op. cit.* 1.3 n. 68; W. K. C. GUTHRIE, *A History of Greek Philosophy III*, Cambridge 1962, p. 222; Nicomachus, *Enchiridion* 6; Theon Smyrnaeus, *Expositio*, p. 56–8 (HILLER); Aristides Quint., *De mus.* 3.1; Gaudentius, *Isagoge* 11; Porph. *In Ptol. Harm.* 3; Iambl. *Vita Pyth.* 115–21; Macrobius, *Comm. in somn. Sc.* 2.1.8–25; Censorinus, *De die natali* 10; Chalcidius, *Comm. in Tim.* 45; Boethius, *De inst. mus.* 1.10; Cassiodorus, *Inst.* 5.1; Isidorus, *Etym.* 3.16.1.

²⁹ See E. FRANK, *Plato und die sogenannten Pythagoreer*, Halle/Saale 1923, p. 11 and 161, P. TANNERY, *op. cit.* p. 241, B. L. V. D. WAERDEN, *Die Harmonielehre der Pythagoreer*, *Hermes* 78, 1943, p. 172,

a fact that pre-Greek cultures also were aware of these laws,³⁰ and it is highly probable that the musicians before Pythagoras and craftsmen manufacturing the instruments had some knowledge of these rules as well.³¹ Further it is also a fact that the ancient reports on these discoveries mostly relate experiments that are physically impossible or lead to false results.³² If we add the non-negligible arguments of researchers who question the scientific activities of the Pythagoreans,³³ the laconism of the early reports and the unreliability of the later ones, little hope is left to say: it was really the Pythagoreans or Pythagoras himself who discovered that the intervals of the octave, fifth and fourth correspond exactly to the numerical ratios of 2:1, 3:2, and 4:3.

However different the evaluation of Pythagoreanism is, the existence of early mathematics of music cannot be denied, and within the context of contemporary classical studies we can still raise the following questions: *What did early Pythagorean music-mathematics include? What were its claims in its own era? Was it scientific or not?* In my PhD dissertation³⁴ I have tried to show that on the basis of the sources we have a picture of an intellectual environment, into which the operations on the *canon*, the search for numerical ratios of further intervals beyond the three basic consonances and the theory of

J. A. PHILIPP, *Pythagoras and Early Pythagoreanism* = Phoenix Journal of the Class. Ass. of Canada, Suppl. V.7, p. 125–6, F. LEVIN, *The Harmonics of Nicomachus and the Pythagorean Tradition* = American Class. Studies I, Pennsylvania 1975, p. 67–75, BURKERT, *op. cit.* p. 374–7. Anyhow the point of view of BURKERT is more shaded: “What distinguished the Pythagoreans was apparently not a special knowledge, inaccessible to others. Rather, something which may well have lost its interest for professional musicians came to be prized among them as a fundamental insight into the nature of reality” (p. 378). Whereas the following accept the tradition on the discovery: TH. HEATH, *Aristarchus of Samos*, Oxford 1913, p. 46, J. BURNET, *Early Greek Philosophy*, London 1892, p. 118, A. E. TAYLOR, *A Commentary on Plato's Timaeus*, Oxford 1928, p. 118, GUTHRIE, *op. cit.*, p. 220–9.

³⁰ The Pythagorean results were already known by the Babylonians as well. On this Iamblichus, in *Nicom. arithm.*, p. 118 (PISTELLI), and O. NEUGEBAUER, *The Exact Science in Antiquity*, New York 1957. On the oriental relations of the Pythagorean mathematics of music in general: H. G. FARMER, *The Music in Ancient Mesopotamia*, in: E. WELLESZ (ed.), *The New Oxford History of Music I*, Oxford 1957, p. 253–75, and R. P. WINNINGTON-INGRAM, *Ancient Greece*, art. in *New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians*.

³¹ See e.g. PHILIPP, *op. cit.* p. 125.

³² The legend on Pythagoras is well known: (the sources in n. 28): when passing by a forge, he heard the concords of hammers of 4:3, 3:2 and 2:1 weight ratios. On this already MERSENE pointed out that it was impossible (*Questions harmoniques*, Paris 1634). Then returning home he stretched strings by weights of the same ratios. However this experiment was refuted already by Ptolemy (see *Harm.* 8.). But the experiment attributed to Hippasus is correct: bronze discs of the same diameter and of a width ratio of 4:3 etc. really give the famous consonances. (See Aristoxenus *frg.* 90, and K. v. FRITZ, *The Discovery of Incommensurability by Hippasus of Metapontum*, *Annals of Mathematics* 46, 1945.) The acoustic experiment attributed to Lasus, a contemporary of Pythagoras is also false: the vibration of the air columns above the water of the appropriate ratio in dishes of the same sizes does not give the requested result. See Theon Smyrn., *Expositio*, p. 59.7 (HILLER). All this refers to the fact that these experiments were in connection not so much with the “discovery”, but they were rather found out to prove the already known acoustic laws, and some were even not performed.

³³ Here we must mention first of all the works of Frank, Heidel and Burkert. H. THESLEFF reviews the whole debate on Pythagoreanism to the slightest detail (see n. 1). See also L. RICHTER, *Zur Wissenschaftslehre von der Musik bei Platon und Aristoteles*, Berlin 1961.

³⁴ A. KÁRPÁTI, *A pythagoreus hagyomány és a görög zeneelmélet kezdetei* [The Pythagorean Tradition and the Beginnings of Greek Music Theory], PhD. diss. Budapest, 1990.

musical means fit in smoothly. Starting mainly from the research of Á. Szabó we can set up a working hypothesis, according to which Pythagorean music-mathematics before Philolaus, i.e. up to approx. 450 B. C., contained the following knowledge:

(1) They knew the numerical ratios corresponding at least to the four basic intervals (2:1, 3:2, 4:3, 9:8).

(2) They considered the *diastema* as an interval equivalent to the corresponding numerical ratio, while their interest lay not in the interval, but in the numerical ratio content of this notion.

(3) They used the *monochord* and later the *canon* divided into 12 parts.

(4) They performed the simplest so-called canon-operations: (3:2 “+” 4:3 = 2:1 and 3:2 “-” 4:3 = 9:8).

(5) The notion of *tetraktys* already existed (at least the two numerical ones: 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6, 8, 9, 12).

(6) They created the concept of the music of the spheres.

(7) The notion of at least two out of the three musical means (*mesotes*) probably existed already.

As we have seen all this (with the exception of the music of the spheres) can be verified by analysing the Philolaus fragments considered to be authentic. The concept of the *diastema*, the notable numerical ratios and the operations on the canon appear in his work as basic elements, on which further examinations can be based. Moreover, the Philolaus fragments considered as authentic enrich our picture of the history of Pythagorean music-mathematics with the following elements:

(8) The notions of practical instrumental music (*syllaba*, etc. and *hypate*, etc.) are linked with music-mathematics for the first time.

(9) The intervals called *epogdoon*, *diesis*, *apotome*, *comma*, *schisma*, *diaschisma* are defined.

(10) The proportional numbers of the *diesis* are calculated.

(11) A method is created, which by multiplying the numbers of the real canon, tries to solve the arising problems on an imaginary *theoretical* canon.

(12) The *linear method* (incorrect from a mathematical point of view) of the measurement of intervals develops.

Pécs

DIE ΠΑΙΔΙΣΚΟΙ IM SYSTEM DER SPARTANISCHEN ALTERSKLASSEN

Unter den Einrichtungen, mit denen der sagenhafte Gesetzgeber Lykurg das Leben der Spartiaten neu geordnet haben soll, beschreibt Plutarch in dessen Vita auch die genau geregelte Erziehung der Knaben, die ἀγωγή.¹ Nachdem die von den Phylenältesten für lebenswürdig befundenen Kleinkinder zunächst unter der Obhut einer Amme geblieben waren, erwartete die Jungen, »εὐθὺς ἐπταετείς γενομένους«,² die Eingliederung in Gruppen, in denen sie unter der Führung des tüchtigsten und der ständigen Anleitung und Überwachung der Erwachsenen ausgebildet wurden. »Γενόμενοι δὲ δωδεκαετείς«,³ verbrachten die jungen Leute nicht allein die Tage, sondern auch die Nächte gemeinsam. Von den Älteren interessierten sich jetzt Liebhaber für sie, ein Paidonomos hatte die Oberaufsicht über alle, und die einzelnen Banden wählten sich einen der εἰρένες als Anführer. Eirenen, erklärt Plutarch, nannten die Spartaner »τοὺς ἔτος ἤδη δεύτερον ἐκ παίδων γεγονότας, μελλείρενας δὲ τῶν παίδων τοὺς πρεσβυτάτους«, und der Eiren sei »εἴκοσιν ἔτη γεγονώς«, hatte also sein 20. Lebensjahr bereits hinter sich.⁴ Der Biograph läßt hier zwischen dem Ende des Knabenalters, im Laufe des 19. Lebensjahres, und dem Zeitpunkt, zu dem der junge Mann Eiren wurde, einen Abstand von ein bis zwei Jahren,⁵ über dessen Nutzung für die Erziehung oder überhaupt über spezielle Aufgaben des Spartiaten in dieser Zeit er uns nichts ausdrücklich mitteilt. An präzisen Hinweisen auf Altersstufen erwähnt Plutarch dann noch, daß »οἱ μὲν γε νεώτεροι τριάκοντ' ἔτων« sich nicht auf der Agora zeigten.⁶

¹ Plut. Lyk. 16, 1 ff. Über sie gibt jetzt R. ZOEPFFEL, Geschlechtsreife und Legitimation im Alten Griechenland, in: E. W. MÜLLER (Hrsg.), Geschlechtsreife und Legitimation zur Zeugung (Freiburg-München 1985) 350 ff. einen allgemeinen Überblick.

² Plut. Lyk. 16, 7.

³ Plut. Lyk. 16, 12.

⁴ Plut. Lyk. 17, 2 ff. Dazu, daß »εἴκοσιν ἔτη γεγονώς« sehr wahrscheinlich bedeutet, daß das 20. Lebensjahr bereits beendet ist, s. C. M. TAZELAAR, Παῖδες καὶ ἔφηβοι. Some Notes on the Spartan Stages of Youth, *Mnemosyne* (ser. 4) 20, 1967, 128. Vgl. K. M. T. CHRIMES, Ancient Sparta. A Re-examination of the Evidence (Manchester 1949) 89 f.

⁵ Gegen Vermutungen, daß Plutarch hier einem Irrtum unterlegen sei (G. BUSOLT — H. SWOBODA, Griechische Staatskunde, II: Darstellung einzelner Staaten und der zwischenstaatlichen Beziehungen (München 1926³) 696; vgl. W. DEN BOER, Laconian Studies (Amsterdam 1954) 256) oder mit dem zweiten Jahr sehr irreführend das direkt anschließende gemeint habe (CHRIMES [4] 89, DEN BOER 256, D. M. MacDOWELL, Spartan Law (Edinburgh 1986) 162 f.), hat sich völlig mit Recht TAZELAAR [4] 137 ff. ausgesprochen.

⁶ Plut. Lyk. 25, 1.

In Xenophons »Staat der Lakedaimonier« nimmt innerhalb der Schilderung der Maßnahmen, mit denen Lykurg die Grundlage für Spartas Größe schuf, das besondere Erziehungssystem ebenfalls einen herausgehobenen Platz ein.⁷ An Einzelheiten führt Xenophon, der in seinem Überblick im Gegensatz zu Plutarch keine absoluten Altersangaben bietet, zunächst vor allem solche an, die bei dem Chairo-neer für die Gruppe der 12 Jahre und älteren Knaben charakteristisch sind. Der Übergang in die nächste Altersgruppe wird von dem Athener als »ὅταν γε μὴν ἐκ παίδων εἰς τὸ μαιρακιοῦσθαι ἐκβαίνωσι«⁸ bezeichnet. Während bei den übrigen Griechen jetzt die Erziehung endete, habe der Gesetzgeber in Sparta auch hierin das Gegenteil angeordnet. Die in diesem Alter besonders energiegeladenen und zu Übermut neigenden Jünglinge bekamen jetzt die schwersten Aufgaben übertragen, deren Ausführung die Voraussetzung für eine weitere ehrenvolle Teilhabe am Leben im Kreise der Spartiaten war. Neben diesen Prüfungen, über die Xenophon bedauerlicherweise keine näheren Angaben macht, wurde von den jungen Männern eine besondere Zurückhaltung erwartet, auch in den Syssitien, an denen sie bereits teilnahmen. »Καὶ τῶν μὲν αὖ παιδίσκων (Hss.: παιδικῶν) οὕτως ἐπεμελήθη«, schließt das Kapitel.⁹ Die nächste Stufe umfaßte die ἡβῶντες, die sich in Kampfspielen übten und deren größtes Ziel es war, in das Elitekorps der 300 Reiter aufgenommen zu werden.¹⁰ Hatte der Spartiate »τὴν ἡβητικὴν ἡλικίαν« durchschritten, besaß er Zugang zu den höchsten Ämtern.¹¹ Die Unterteilung der Zeit vor dem Erreichen des vollen Mannesalters in drei Stufen bestätigt Xenophon noch an anderer Stelle, wenn er Agesilaos über Sphodrias, der eines versuchten Anschlags auf den Peiraieus angeklagt war, sagen läßt. »ὅστις μέντοι παῖς τε ὢν καὶ παιδίσκος καὶ ἡβῶν πάντα τὰ καλὰ ποιῶν διετέλεσε, χαλεπὸν εἶναι τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα ἀποκτινύ-
vαι«.¹²

Sind nun die Angaben Plutarchs und Xenophons über die Einteilungen in Altersklassen miteinander in Einklang zu bringen? Wenn wir die Gruppe der jüngsten der Heranwachsenden betrachten, die bereits gemeinsam erzogen wurden, der παῖδες, stimmen sowohl die Bezeichnung als auch die Beschreibung ihrer Ausbildung überein. Auf den 12. Geburtstag, der innerhalb der Knaben die jüngeren von den älteren schied, geht Xenophon, wie bereits bemerkt, nicht ein. Für das andere Ende der Leiter der Erziehungsstufen sind die Hinweise etwas weniger präzise. Trotzdem ergänzen sich die beiden Autoren zu einem einheitlichen Bild. Eine Schranke, die den jungen Mann von der Teilnahme am öffentlichen Geschäftsleben auf der Agora abhielt, fiel laut Plutarch mit der Vollendung des 30. Lebensjahres. Es liegt nahe, damit die Notiz Xenophons zu verbinden, daß nach dem Ende der »ἡβητικὴ ἡλικία« der Spartiate sich um die wichtigsten Magistraturen bewerben durfte. Dies wird gestützt dadurch, daß die »ἡβητικὴ ἡλικία« gleichzeitig als die Zeit

⁷ Xen. Lak. pol. 2, 1 ff.

⁸ Xen. Lak. pol. 3, 1.

⁹ Xen. Lak. pol. 3, 5.

¹⁰ Xen. Lak. pol. 4, 1 ff.

¹¹ Xen. Lak. pol. 4, 7.

¹² Xen. hell. 5, 4, 32, S. auch S. HODKINSON, Social Order and the Conflict of Values in Classical Sparta, Chiron 13, 1983, 249 f.

beschrieben wird, die für die Heranziehung zum Kriegsdienst besonders geeignet war,¹³ da wir wissen, daß die Wehrpflicht mit dem 21. Lebensjahr begann¹⁴ und die ersten zehn Jahrgänge häufig geschlossen zu den anstrengendsten Manövern im Feld verwandt wurden.¹⁵ Die Altersklasse der ἡβῶντες begann demnach mit Abschluß des 20. Jahres, worauf in den Angaben zum Dienstalster immer mit «ἀφ' ἡβης» Bezug genommen wird, und endete mit dem 30.¹⁶ Zumindest ihr erster Jahrgang, die Rekruten, wurde als Eirenen bezeichnet.¹⁷

Zwischen den beiden gut abgrenzbaren Stufen der παῖδες einerseits und der ἡβῶντες andererseits bleibt noch jener Zwischenraum von ein bis zwei Jahren, der bei Plutarch allein aus der Angabe folgt, daß ein Eiren, 20 Jahre alt, bereits über ein Jahr dem Knabenalter entwachsen war, der aber von Xenophon positiv als «τὸ μαιρακιοῦσθαι» bezeichnet wird und die Personen in dem entsprechenden Alter, auf die einschneidende Pflichten warteten, als παῖδες.¹⁸ In anderen Staaten endete um diese Zeit die Erziehung durch Knabenführer und Lehrer, der junge Mensch wurde etwa in Athen unter die Vollbürger aufgenommen und führte ab jetzt das unabhängige Leben eines Erwachsenen. Erst die Einführung der obligatorischen Ephebenerziehung nutzte dann gerade diese zwei Jahre vor dem Beginn des aktiven Felddienstes intensiv zur militärischen Ausbildung.¹⁹

¹³ Xen. Lak. pol. 4, 7.

¹⁴ Die Geronten wurden aus den «ὅπῃ ἐξήκοντ' ἔτη γεγονότων» gewählt (Plut. Lyk. 26, 1), davor lagen 40 Jahrgänge des Felddienstes (Xen. hell. 5, 4, 13).

¹⁵ S. z. B. Xen. hell. 2, 4, 32.3, 4, 23.4, 5, 14.5, 4, 40. TAZELAAR [4] 151.153 geht allerdings zu weit, wenn er diese Jahre als Zeit des aktiven Militärdienstes von denen danach abhebt. Denn die lakedaimonischen Aufgebote werden in den meisten Fällen deutlich mehr als nur die ersten zehn Jahrgänge umfaßt haben.

¹⁶ Vgl. A. BILLHEIMER, *Tὰ δέκα ἀφ' ἡβης*, TAPhA 77, 1946, 214 ff. H.-I. MARROU, *Les classes d'âge de la jeunesse spartiate*, REA 48, 1946, 218. TAZELAAR [4] 144.150. HODKINSON [12] 242. MACDOWELL [5] 166 f. DEN BOER [5] 260 Anm. 1 spricht sich gegen einen präzisen Gebrauch des Terminus «ἡβῶντες» mit Bezug auf die 20- bis 30jährigen bei Xenophon aus. Die Angabe Plutarchs darüber, daß von den unter dreißigjährigen Männern ein Fernbleiben von der Agora erwartet wurde, bezieht sich eindeutig auf Handelsgeschäfte und sagt als solche nichts über eventuell eingeschränkte politische Rechte aus (M. P. NILSSON, *Die Grundlagen des spartanischen Lebens*, Klio 12, 1912 (jetzt in: K. CHRIST (Hrsg.), *Sparta* (Darmstadt 1986) 104 ff.) 311. DEN BOER [5] 258. TAZELAAR [4] 141; vgl. BUSOLT — SWOBODA [5] 697). Mit Recht ist für die Zeit bis zum 30. Geburtstag auch das Fortbestehen der Wohn- und Schlafgemeinschaft (Plut. Lyk. 15, 4 ff.) angenommen worden (BUSOLT — SWOBODA [5] 697. TAZELAAR [4] 142). Doch ergänzt Xenophon dahingehend, daß, wie bei solch einer Lebensführung gar nicht anders zu erwarten, die jungen Männer sich noch nicht um herausgehobene Posten in der Staatsverwaltung bewerben durften, ganz ähnlich wie es auch für Athen galt (s. u. a. C. HIGNETT, *A History of the Athenian Constitution to the End of the Fifth Century B. C.* (Oxford 1952) 224, mit den Belegen).

¹⁷ Zu den Eirenen s. noch weiter unten.

¹⁸ Vgl. H. JEANMAIRE, *Couroi et courètes. Essai sur l'éducation spartiate et sur les rites d'adolescence dans l'antiquité hellénique* (Lille 1939) 507 f. HODKINSON [12] 242.249 f. TAZELAAR [4] 147 f. möchte mit C. G. COBBET, *Variae lectiones*, Mnemosyne 7, 1858, 320 «εἰς τὸ μαιρακιοῦσθαι» aus Xen. Lak. pol. 3, 1, eliminieren, weil er aus nicht ganz ersichtlichen Gründen meint, es könnte sich nur auf das von ihm postulierte an der körperlichen Entwicklung der Jugendlichen orientierte Stufensystem beziehen, das neben dem gesetzlichen bestanden habe (s. dazu unten). Nach jenem sei ein Übergang bei 14 Jahren erfolgt, worauf, wie er richtig feststellt, Xenophons Beschreibung nicht paßt, die er treffend auf die 19- und 20jährigen bezieht. MARROU [16] 217 f. hat vorsichtig vorgeschlagen, Kap. 3 Xenophons mit den über Zwölfjährigen Plutarchs zu verbinden, deren Aufgaben aber bereits in Kap. 2 erwähnt werden.

¹⁹ Das Datum der Einführung der Ephebie in Athen, für die die Belege erst während des 4. Jahrhunderts einsetzen, ist höchst umstritten. Eine eigene Bezeichnung des Zweijahresabschnitts von

Bevor versucht wird, den geheimnisvollen Tätigkeiten der παῖδισκοι vielleicht näher auf die Spur zu kommen, sind noch zwei als Herodot-²⁰ beziehungsweise Strabonglosse²¹ bekannte Scholien heranzuziehen und darauf hin zu prüfen, ob sie zu den mit Hilfe der ausführlichen Beschreibungen Plutarchs und Xenophons gewonnenen Ergebnissen passen. Die Auslegung und die Harmonisierung der beiden Glossen mit den Angaben vor allem Plutarchs ist Gegenstand einer langer Kontroverse in der Forschung gewesen, die hier nicht nochmals in extenso aufgerollt werden soll, da meines Erachtens die letzte Bearbeitung, von C. M. Tazelaar,²² die wesentlichen Punkte klar herausgehoben und richtig gedeutet hat und von ihr aus der Zugang zu weiterer Literatur, auch über die Beurteilung verstreuter Zeugnisse zu Altersklassen auf Inschriften des römischen Sparta und bei Lexikographen, die mit der Frage nach der Bedeutung der παῖδισκοι nicht unmittelbar zu tun haben, leicht möglich ist.

In ihrem Inhalt einander sehr ähnlich, überliefern die Scholien die Namen einer Reihe von Jahresklassen spartanischer παῖδες sowie die Mitteilung, daß die παῖδες im Alter von 14 bis 20 Jahren Epheben waren. Während aber in der Herodotglosse die Anordnung ist: Nennung der Altersklassen — Aussage über die Dauer der Ephebie, so daß sich die Ephebie an die in einzelne Jahre unterteilte Phase anschließen könnte, ist die Stellung der beiden Textteile in der Strabonglosse umgekehrt. Dies und dazu ihre Verbindung mittels μέν . . . δέ implizieren, daß es gerade das Ephebenalter war, welches sich nach der Ansicht der Quelle der Glosse in die danach erwähnten Jahre untergliederte.

der bürgerlichen Mündigkeit bis zur Pflicht der regulären Teilnahme an den Feldzügen und der Eid, den die angehenden Soldaten zu leisten hatten, reichten vielleicht in eine frühere Zeit zurück. Doch die Organisation des umfangreichen Trainingsprogrammes der Rekruten fällt nicht zuletzt wegen des Schweigens der doch recht zahlreichen literarischen Quellen des 5. und des beginnenden 4. Jahrhunderts wahrscheinlich erst in das 4. Jahrhundert (vgl. auch P. VIDAL-NAQUET, *Le chasseur noir. Formes de pensées et formes de société dans le monde grec* (Paris 1983²) 144 ff. et passim; für eine Präsentation der einzelnen Argumente pro und contra s. C. PELEKIDIS, *Histoire de l'éphébie attique des origines à 31 avant Jésus-Christ* (Paris 1962) 7 ff., der die Ephebie in der uns bekannten Form bereits für das 5. Jahrhundert als bestehend annehmen möchte). Xenophon wird es, als er seinen Traktat bald nach 400 niederschrieb (vgl. J. M. MOORE, *Aristotle and Xenophon on Democracy and Oligarchy* (London 1975) 71 f.), noch nicht bekannt gewesen sein. Wer die Identifizierung der παῖδισκοι mit den 18- und 19jährigen für gesichert hält, bekäme ein weiteres Argument für eine späte Ansetzung der voll ausgebildeten Ephebie in die Hand.

²⁰ H. STEIN, *Herodoti Historiae* II (Berlin 1871) 465: Εἰρήνην· παρὰ Λακεδαιμονίοις ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ ἐνιαυτῷ ὁ παῖς ῥωβίδας καλεῖται, τῷ δευτέρῳ προκομιζόμενος, τῷ τρίτῳ μικρίζόμενος, τῷ τετάρτῳ πρόπαις, τῷ πέμπτῳ παῖς, τῷ ἕκτῳ μελείρηνην· ἐφηβεύει δὲ παρ' αὐτοῖς ὁ παῖς ἀπὸ ἐτῶν δεκατεσσάρων μέχρι καὶ εἴκοσιν, βαρυτόνωος δὲ τὸ μελείρηνην, ὥσπερ πυθμὴν ἀπύθμην, αὐχὴν ὑφαύχην.

²¹ Sie wurde erstmals publiziert von A. DILLER, *A New Source on the Spartan Ephebia*, *AJPh* 62, 1941, 499 ff.: Τὰ εἰς ἡν λήγοντα σύνθετα, ὅτε ἀπὸ ῥητῶν τουτέστιν ἴδια λεγομένων τῶν εἰς ἡν ἐστί, βαρύνεται· ῥήν πολύρρηνην· ἑλλην φιλέλλην· πυθμὴν ἀπύθμην· αὐχὴν ἐριαύχην καὶ βυσσαύχην, ὁ τὸν αὐχένα συστέλλων εἰς ἑαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς ὠμούς ἀνέχων· εἰρήνην μελλείρηνην, παρὰ Λακεδαιμονίοις ὁ μέλλων εἰρήνην ἔσεσθαι, ἐφηβεύει μὲν γὰρ παρὰ Λακεδαιμονίοις ὁ παῖς ἐπ' ἐτῶν ἰδ' μέχρι κ'· καλεῖται δὲ τῷ μὲν πρώτῳ ἐνιαυτῷ ῥωβίδας, τῷ δὲ δευτέρῳ προκομιζόμενος, τῷ τρίτῳ μικρίζόμενος, τῷ δ' ἡρόπαις, τῷ ἑ παῖς, τῷ ζ' μελλείρηνην, τῷ ζ' εἰρήνην.

²² TAZELAAR [4] 127 ff.

Zu Recht wurde diese Ansicht in den neueren Untersuchungen übernommen und ausführlich begründet.²³ Nicht genügend hervorgehoben ist dabei vielleicht bisher, daß bei einer Voranstellung der Altersklassen vor die Ephebie unüberbrückbare Widersprüche zu Plutarch auftreten. Denn man ist dann gezwungen, die auf die Melleirenien folgende Eirenien in die Ephebie einzubeziehen, und rechtfertigt dies damit, daß der Biograph nur den Eiren 20jährig sein lasse, der Führer einer Knabenschar war, folglich nicht alle Eirenen genau 20 Jahre alt gewesen sein müßten, sondern es daneben auch noch jüngere gegeben haben könnte.²⁴ Aber abgesehen davon, daß die Ephebie sicher spätestens zusammen mit dem 20. Lebensjahre enden mußte, weil danach die ἀφ' ἧβης gezählten Jahrgänge der Wehrpflichtigen begannen, zu denen ebenfalls der Eiren Plutarchs gehörte,²⁵ scheint mir der Wortlaut in der Vita zwar die Deutung zuzulassen, daß ein Eiren auch älter als 20 Jahre sein konnte, doch nicht um gleich etliche Jahre jünger. Denn Plutarch, der offenbar über eine sich präzise äußernde Vorlage verfügte, hätte sich einer argen Irreführung seiner Leser schuldig gemacht, wenn er genaue Angaben über das Ende des Knabenalters, seine Bezeichnung, den Abstand zur Eirenien lieferte und im selben Atemzug einen der Eirenen als 20jährig bezeichnete, ohne hinzuzufügen, daß dieser zu den ältesten seiner Gruppe gehörte, da man an der Stelle eine absolute Zahlenangabe erwartet, die es erlaubt, die voranstehenden relativen Daten einzuordnen.²⁶ Schließlich, und das ist der gewichtigste Einwand, bezieht sich noch über einige Kapitel hin alles auf die Erziehung der παῖδες, die von den Eirenen beaufsichtigt wurden. Da Plutarch Eirenen von Knaben unterscheidet, hätte dies nur die Jungen unter 14 Jahren betroffen, während wir von der Ausbildung der Epheben kein Wort hörten — eine reichlich unwahrscheinliche Theorie.²⁷

Wird es als gesichert betrachtet, daß die Alterklassen solche innerhalb der Ephebie waren, während der auch nach Meinung der Glossen die jungen Spartiaten weiterhin παῖδες blieben, so besteht allein noch das Problem, warum diese Klassen angeblich im Alter von 14 Jahren einsetzten, jedoch Plutarch einen Einschnitt, der eine Ausweitung der gemeinsamen Erziehung markiert, bei 12 Jahren macht. Tazelaar²⁸ sieht die Ursache in einem Irrtum in den Glossen, der dadurch bedingt

²³ CHRIMES [4] 87 ff. A. M. WOODWARD, Rez.: K. M. T. CHRIMES, *Ancient Sparta*, Historia I, 1950, 617 ff. H. MICHELL, *Sparta* (Cambridge 1952) 169. DEN BOER [5] 249 ff. TAZELAAR [4] 130 ff. A. BRELICH, *Paides e Parthenoi I* (Roma 1969) 117 f. M. CLAUS, *Sparta. Eine Einführung in seine Geschichte und Zivilisation* (München 1983) 144 f. MACDOWELL [5] 162. P. CARTLEDGE, *Agasilaos and the Crisis of Sparta* (London 1987) 25. Vgl. DILLER [21] 500. Anders noch: NILSSON [16] 309 f. BUSOLT — SWOBODA [5] 695 f. (vor der Entdeckung der Strabonglosse). A. BILLHEIMER, *Age-Classes in Spartan Education*, TAPhA 78, 1947, 99 ff. MARROU [16] 222 ff. A. J. TOYNBEE, *Some Problems of Greek History* (London 1969) 318. Vgl. JEANMAIRE [18] 505 f.

²⁴ NILSSON [16] 310. BUSOLT — SWOBODA [5] 696. JEANMAIRE [18] 504. MARROU [16] 219. Vgl. DEN BOER [5] 257 f. TAZELAAR 136.142 f. 148 ff.

²⁵ Vgl. CHRIMES [4] 89 f. MACDOWELL [5] 162.

²⁶ Vgl. CHRIMES [4] 90. Die korrupte Herodotstelle 9, 85, 1 bereitet zu viele Probleme, als daß sie als sicherer Beleg dafür angeführt werden dürfte, daß Eirenen eine ganze Reihe von Jahrgängen Wehrfähiger umfaßten. Die eingehendste Erörterung findet sich bei DEN BOER [5] 288 ff.

²⁷ S. auch CHRIMES [4] 87 f. DEN BOER [5] 255.

²⁸ TAZELAAR [4] 135 ff., bes. 146 f. 152 f.

worden sei, daß in Sparta eine Einteilung nach Phasen des physischen Wachstums neben einer nach gesetzlichen Altersgrenzen bestand. Es gab eine physische Ephebie, die von 14 bis 20 dauerte und die in den Glossen erwähnt wird. Die Altersstufen beziehen sich dagegen, wie auch Plutarchs Einschnitt bei 12 Jahren, auf die gesetzliche Untergliederung. Der Knabe wurde während seines 13. Lebensjahres ῥωβίδας, entsprechend während des 18. μελλείρην, da es in der Praxis der Erziehung von Vorteil war, wenn die Jungen nicht immer einzeln in eine neue Klasse rückten, sondern alle gemeinsam einmal im Jahr.²⁹ Im Laufe ihres 19. Lebensjahres schieden die Heranwachsenden aus den Knaben aus, um mit Beginn ihres 21. als Eirenen wehrfähig zu werden. Das entspricht genau Plutarchs Angabe, daß ein Eiren bereits das zweite Jahr dem Knabenalter entwachsen war. Diese Zeit zwischen Melleirenien und Eirenien sei nach Tazelaar die gesetzliche Ephebie in Sparta gewesen, vergleichbar der attischen im gleichen Alter der Jünglinge.³⁰

Ich halte Tazelaars Zuordnung der Namen zu den einzelnen Jahrgängen für sehr gelungen, allein die Unterscheidung zweier verschiedener Klassifizierungen, die beide gleichzeitig in Sparta angewandt worden wären und eine etwas verwirrende Überschneidung der einzelnen Phasen in der Entwicklung der Jugendlichen ergeben hätten.³¹ möchte ich nicht übernehmen. Soweit ich sehe, ist der einzige Anlaß für ihre Postulierung die Angabe über die Dauer der Ephebie in den Glossen. Sie kam aber vielleicht deshalb zustande, weil der Autor, auf den die Scholien letztlich zurückgehen, eine Liste von Altersklassen fand, die ihre Angaben dadurch präzisierete, daß sie die Eirenien mit dem 21. Lebensjahr verband. Besaß er nicht Plutarchs Information über den zeitlichen Abstand zwischen den mit zusammengehörigen Namen bezeichneten Abschnitten der Melleirenien und der Eirenien, die, gerade weil sie so dem Augenschein zu widersprechen scheint, von dem Biographen hervorgehoben wird und für uns besonders wertvoll ist, dann rechnete jener Schriftsteller einfach Jahr um Jahr zurück und kam für den Beginn der Reihe automatisch auf das Alter von 14. Er erhielt damit einen Zeitraum, der, wie Tazelaar belegt, von antiken theoretischen Schriften über die Lebensalter als eine Einheit bestätigt wurde.³² Als für uns wichtig dürfen wir festhalten, daß die sechs Jahresklassen von ῥωβίδας bis zum μελλείρην gerade in jenen Zeitraum passen, der gemäß Plutarch im 13. Lebensjahr begann und ein bis zwei Jahre vor dem Alter von 20 mit der Melleirenien endete.

²⁹ TAZELAAR [4] 137.140. Vgl. A. J. TOYNBEE, *The Growth of Sparta*, JHS 33, 1913, 261. JEANMAIRE [18] 507.

³⁰ Darauf, daß die 18- und 19jährigen in Sparta offiziell Epheben genannt wurden, gibt es allerdings keinen Hinweis (TAZELAAR [4] 148, der (148 f.) in ihnen bereits eine Art Eirenen sieht; s. dazu aber oben zur Interpretation von Plut. *Lyk.* 17, 2 ff.). Ebenso ist fraglich, ob sie bereits regelmäßig zu Hilfsdiensten in der Armee herangezogen wurden und bereits volljährig waren, wie TAZELAAR 148.152 bzw. 145.152 in Anlehnung an die attischen Verhältnisse vermutet (s. gleich im Anschluß zu einer anderen Deutung dieses Lebensabschnitts).

³¹ Vgl. TAZELAAR [4] 150 f. Gegen diese Unterscheidung wendet sich auch MACDOWELL [5] 162.

³² TAZELAAR [4] 146 f. — Unbefriedigend sind die Erklärungsversuche zu der Diskrepanz zwischen Plutarch und den Glossen bei DEN BOER [5] 258 f. und bei MACDOWELL [5] 164.166, der zwei Altersgrenzen, eine bei 12 und eine bei 14 Jahren, bestehen läßt. Letztere hätte den Übergang zur Ephebie-Stufe der παιδίσκοι bedeutet.

Was machte der Spartiate aber danach, bis er Eiren wurde? Allein das, was Xenophon konkret darüber mitteilt, daß von den παιδίσκοι besondere Zurückhaltung in ihrem öffentlichen Auftreten erwartet wurde, scheint ihre Abtrennung als eigene Etappe der Erziehung noch nicht zu rechtfertigen. Das Wesentliche muß hinter den allgemeinen Wendungen »πλείστους μὲν πόνους αὐτοῖς ἐπέβαλε, πλείστην δὲ ἀσχολίαν ἐμηχανήσατο. ἐπιθεις δὲ καὶ εἴ τις ταῦτα φύγοι, μηδενὸς ἔτι τῶν καλῶν τυγχάνειν«³³ liegen. Wir werden uns wahrscheinlich damit abfinden müssen, daß uns der vollständige Einblick in die spartanische Gesellschaft auch in diesem Punkt versagt bleibt. Aber zumindest eine Einrichtung ist bekannt, die den jungen Männern Spartas ganz außerordentliche Leistungen abverlangte und deren zweifelhafter Ruf in der übrigen griechischen Welt den Bewunderern der lykurgischen Verfassung es geraten sein ließ, sie zu verschweigen oder nur am Rande zu erwähnen: die κρυπτεία.³⁴

Einige wenige antike Zeugnisse informieren über sie, im Detail nicht immer ganz widerspruchsfrei, aber in den Hauptzügen völlig übereinstimmend und einander ergänzend, einmal den einen Aspekt hervorhebend, einmal einen anderen.³⁵ Für eine bestimmte Zeit gingen die ihr Unterworfenen auf das Land, lebten dort auf sich allein gestellt und mit der strengen Auflage, sich vor dem Blicken aller Menschen verborgen zu halten. Nachts aber wurden sie aktiv und töteten die Heloten, denen sie begegneten. Die letztgenannte Komponente der Krypteia ist es, die bei Plutarch, wie er in einem der Behandlung der Heloten gewidmeten Kapitel auf sie zu sprechen kommt, den Wunsch erweckt, sie nicht unter die Erfindungen Lykurgs zu rechnen, obwohl er dann die Autorität des Aristoteles gegen sich weiß.³⁶ Sehr verständlich ist jedenfalls die Nichterwähnung der Krypteia unter den Aufgaben, die Lykurg den Heranwachsenden gestellt hatte. In dem Traktat Xenophons wird sie an gar keiner Stelle berücksichtigt.

Sofern die Quellen überhaupt das Alter derjenigen andeuten, auf die die Krypteia Anwendung fand, sprechen sie etwas vage von νέοι.³⁷ Einzig Iustin. in einem Abschnitt, von dem nicht völlig klar ist, ob er sich auf die Krypteia bezieht, da sie nicht namentlich genannt wird, und in dem im übrigen von einer gewissen Askese in der Lebensführung die Rede ist, sagt, daß den »pueros puberes«, also den gerade ausgewachsenen Knaben, den παιδίσκοι Xenophons, aufgetragen wurde, sich auf das Land zu begeben und nicht eher zurückzukehren, als bis sie »viri facti essent«.³⁸ Dabei werden wir nun sehr an die für viele Völker belegten Initiationsriten am Übergang vom Knaben- zum Mannesalter erinnert, unter die auch die spartani-

³³ Xen. Lak. pol. 3, 2 f.

³⁴ Vgl. JEANMAIRE [18] 552.

³⁵ Herakl. Pont. 2, 4 FGH II 210. Iust. 3, 3, 6 f. Pap. Brit. Mus. 187 (s. dazu P. GIRARD, Un texte inédit: Sur la cryptie des Lacédémoniens, REG 11, 1898, 31 ff.). Plat. leg. 633b f. mit einem Scholion: vgl. 760a ff. Plut. Lyk. 28, 1 ff. 12 f. Ag. et Kleom. 49, 4.

³⁶ Plut. Lyk. 28, 1 ff. 12 f.

³⁷ Schol. Plat. leg. 633b. Plut. Lyk. 28, 3.

³⁸ Iust. 3, 3, 6 ff.

sche Krypteia nach den eindrucksvollen Vergleichen von H. Jeanmaire einzureihen ist³⁹ und die eine der Voraussetzungen waren, weiterhin »τῶν καλῶν τυγχάνειν«.

Als Dauer der Krypteia nennt ein Scholiast zu Platons »Gesetzen« ein ganzes Jahr, ein Londoner Papyrus zwei Jahre und Iustin »primos annos«, die nicht im Wohlleben, sondern unter Mühen verbracht werden sollten. Ohne eine Harmonisierung der Angaben erzwingen zu wollen, sind aber hier vielleicht keine unüberwindlichen Widersprüche zu der Möglichkeit zu sehen, daß die 18- und 19jährigen Spartiaten, wenn sie aufgehört hatten, Melleiren zu sein, im Laufe von ein bis zwei Jahren, je nachdem, in welchem genauen Alter sie der jährliche Entlassungstermin traf, für längere Zeit zur Krypteia aufgefordert wurden, mit der sie nach einem uralten Ritual sich vom Knaben zum Manne wandelten.⁴⁰ Die schon häufig konstatierte Verwandtschaft der Krypteia mit der Ephebie der gleichaltrigen Athener hat kürzlich P. Vidal-Naquet nochmals sehr tiefsinnig beschrieben.⁴¹

Angesichts der Spärlichkeit der antiken Nachrichten bleibt den vorgestellten Thesen sicher ein Grad von Hypothetischem eigen. Sie sind als Vorschlag zu werten, drei zunächst isolierte Angaben, den Zwischenraum zwischen Melleiren und Eirenie laut Plutarch, die nach Xenophon eigenständige Stufe der παιδίσκοι innerhalb der spartanischen Jugenderziehung und die Institution der Krypteia miteinander zu verbinden, um sie auf diese Weise in ihrer Funktion, den Spartiaten an einer entscheidenden Stelle seiner Entwicklung auf das Leben unter den ὁμοῖοι vorzubereiten, mit konkreterem Sinn zu erfüllen.

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³⁹ H. JEANMAIRE, *La cryptie lacédémonienne*, REG 26, 1913, 137 ff. (in der späteren Monographie »Couroi et courètes« [18] 507 ff. 550 ff. verlegt er die Krypteia in eine etwas spätere Altersstufe und möchte für die παιδίσκοι einen anderen Übergangsritus rekonstruieren, für den er in Plutarchs Beschreibung einiges Durcheinander postuliert und auf den sich Iustin bezöge – vgl. dazu aber auch BREICH [23] 116). Vgl. u. a. noch CLAUS [23] 149 f. VIDAL-NAQUET [19] 162 ff. Die Krypteia legen auch GIRARD [35] 36 f. und TOYNBEE [29] 261 in die Zeit vor dem 20. Geburtstag, die bei ihnen allerdings der Melleiren entspricht. CARTLEDGE [23] 30 erwähnt, daß Xenophon verschwiegen, daß die παιδίσκοι der Krypteia unterworfen waren.

⁴⁰ Plat. leg. 760a ff. beschreibt die Institution der ἀγρονόμοι, für die er 763b f. auch die Bezeichnung κρυπτοί erwägt und die für jeweils zwei Jahre aus den 25- bis 30jährigen gewählt werden sollen. Jedoch dürfen daraus schwerlich präzise Eigenheiten der spartanischen Krypteia erschlossen werden.

Wie aus Plut. Lyk. 28, 3 hervorgeht, fand in historischer Zeit der Initiationsritus der Krypteia nicht mehr auf alle Jugendlichen Anwendung, zumindest die Tötung der Heloten wurde nur den tapfersten aufgetragen, die sich damit besondere Auszeichnung erwerben konnten (wofür es nach BREICH [23] 156 f. gerade auch Parallelen bei anderen Völkern gibt; vgl. auch MICHELL [23] 162 ff.).

⁴¹ VIDAL-NAQUET [19] 162 ff. 201 f.

LIBATIONS ET SACRIFICES DANS LA TRAGÉDIE GRECQUE

La présence de cérémonies religieuses dans la tragédie grecque, que ces cérémonies soient évoquées seulement par le discours ou qu'elles soient présentées comme spectacle, ne paraîtra pas étonnante si l'on replace ce phénomène dans l'histoire de ce genre littéraire et dans les conditions de la représentation de chacune des tragédies. Le genre tragique est issu du sacré et la tragédie est représentée dans un espace et dans un temps sacrés.

Sans vouloir entrer dans le détail de théories hypothétiques sur l'origine de la tragédie, notamment sur celle qui s'appuie sur l'étymologie du nom même de la tragédie et suppose que la tragédie ou chant du bouc est issue de la cérémonie du sacrifice d'un bouc à Dionysos donné pour prix au vainqueur¹, on rappellera que la tragédie, suivant Aristote dans sa *Poétique*², a pris son origine dans le dithyrambe, chant religieux en l'honneur de Dionysos. « La tragédie, dit-il, est issue des auteurs de dithyrambes ». Il est vrai qu'il ne serait pas raisonnable de mettre directement en rapport avec cette origine culturelle la présence de rites religieux dans les tragédies conservées, étant donné l'évolution considérable du genre depuis ses origines. « La tragédie, dit Aristote dans le même passage, a subi de nombreux changements avant de se fixer ». Mieux vaudrait insister sur l'influence d'un genre littéraire plus ancien, celui de l'épopée, représentée non seulement par l'*Iliade* et l'*Odyssée* mais par les poèmes épiques perdus traitant des différents cycles auxquels la tragédie a emprunté ses sujets mythiques. La présence de cérémonies religieuses y était naturelle, dans la mesure où elles font partie inhérente de la vie d'une communauté. L'*Iliade* et l'*Odyssée* mentionnent ainsi, parfois de façon fort développée, des prières, des libations et des sacrifices à diverses divinités, ou des rites relatifs à l'enterrement des morts³. Que la tragédie offre à son tour des récits ou des scènes de prières, de libations ou de sacrifices aux dieux, ou de rites culturels en l'honneur des morts, n'a donc rien d'étonnant. Les rites sont, du reste, si nécessaires à une communauté que tout ce qui les entrave compromet son existence; c'est du moins

¹ Voir dernièrement l'article de W. BURKERT, « Greek Tragedy and Sacrificial Ritual », *Greek Roman and Byzantine Studies* 7, 1966, p. 87 - 121.

² Aristote, *Poétique* 1449a.

³ Evoquons ici simplement, pour exemple, les descriptions les plus importantes de sacrifices et de banquets sacrificiels chez Homère, les sacrifices d'Agamemnon à Zeus aux chants I, v. 438 - 469 et II, v. 400 - 432 de l'*Iliade*, et les sacrifices du pieux Nestor à Poséidon et à Athéna au chant III, v. 430 - 473 de l'*Odyssée*; voir W. AREND, *Die typischen Szenen bei Homer*, Berlin, 1933, p. 64 - 78 (Opfer und Mahl).

ainsi qu'Ulysse, au début du *Philoctète* de Sophocle, justifie l'abandon de Philoctète : les cris de douleur dus à sa blessure au pied perturbaient le déroulement normal des cérémonies religieuses faites par l'armée, libations et sacrifices⁴.

Mais la tragédie est un genre littéraire qui est marqué, plus que l'épopée, par le sceau du sacré : non seulement par son origine, mais aussi par les conditions matérielles de la représentation, elle est liée à la religion. Alors que l'aède récitant un poème épique, au temps d'Homère, chante les exploits des héros devant un public aristocratique limité dans le contexte du banquet, fête que l'on hésitera certes à qualifier de profane, mais qui n'est pas attachée à une divinité particulière, les concours tragiques, en revanche, ont lieu, à l'époque classique, devant le public des citoyens dans un temps et dans un lieu sacrés. Ils se déroulent dans un temps sacré car les représentations s'insèrent dans des fêtes en l'honneur de Dionysos. Ils ont lieu dans un espace sacré, car le théâtre d'Athènes, adossé au flanc sud-est de l'Acropole, se situe à l'intérieur du sanctuaire de Dionysos.

L'espace de la représentation étant un espace sacré, il ne devait pas paraître étonnant que l'espace représenté dans la fiction tragique puisse être lui-même un espace sacré où des rites religieux pouvaient être accomplis. C'est ainsi que des sanctuaires consacrés à des divinités pouvaient être représentés et cela depuis le début jusqu'à la fin de la production théâtrale des trois grands tragiques : dans la pièce la plus récente des trois grands tragiques, l'*Œdipe à Colone* de Sophocle, représentée après la mort du poète, Œdipe aveugle et exilé parvient, guidé par Antigone, au modeste sanctuaire des Euménides à Colone, dème de l'Attique ; et lorsque Œdipe interroge un homme du pays sur le lieu où il arrive, celui-ci lui répond : « ce lieu tout entier est sacré (ἱρός) »⁵. Chez Euripide, des sanctuaires plus prestigieux sont représentés : dans les *Suppliantes* le lieu de la tragédie est le sanctuaire de Déméter à Eleusis ; et dans l'*Ion* le sanctuaire d'Apollon à Delphes ; et pour camper le décor, le sanctuaire est matérialisé par la présence, en fond de scène, de la façade du temple qui n'est autre que la façade de la *skéné*. Quand Euripide représente le sanctuaire de Delphes dans sa tragédie de l'*Ion*, il n'innovait pas. Déjà Eschyle avait placé le début des *Euménides* à Delphes et le temple d'Apollon constituait le décor en fond de scène. La description de la mise en scène est si précise que les peintres de vases s'en sont inspirés dans l'Antiquité⁶ et que tout récemment un érudit moderne Jean Bousquet, lors d'une communication à l'Association des Etudes grecques en France, a pu alléguer le texte d'Eschyle pour confirmer une nouvelle localisation qu'il propose de l'*omphalos* dans le temple.

Il n'est donc pas étonnant dans ces conditions que les rites religieux puissent prendre une place importante dans la tragédie grecque. Les grands rites de la religion grecque, si l'on veut bien se référer non pas à notre découpage conceptuel moderne, mais à celui que l'on trouve dans le texte de la tragédie grecque, sont au nombre de trois. Cette division tripartite est clairement indiquée dans les *Suppliantes* d'Eschyle où Danaos, père des Danaïdes qui fuient le mariage des Egyptiades,

⁴ Sophocle, *Philoctète*, v. 8–9.

⁵ Sophocle, *Œdipe à Colone*, v. 54.

⁶ Voir en particulier le cratère apulien à volutes du musée de Naples (2081); vers 370–380.

recommande à ses filles de remercier les Argiens qui les ont accueillies et sauvées, comme s'il s'agissait des dieux olympiens : « Mes filles, dit Danaos, il faut qu'aux Argiens vous offriez prières, sacrifices et libations, comme à des dieux de l'Olympe »⁷. Les trois verbes sur le même plan εὐχέσθαι, θύειν, λαίβειν reliés par τε indiquent les trois grands rites de la religion grecque : la prière qui est de l'ordre de la parole, la libation et le sacrifice qui sont de l'ordre de l'acte. Nous ferons porter notre étude sur les deux rites de la libation et du sacrifice. Par libation, il faut entendre l'offrande à un dieu ou à un mort d'un liquide ou de plusieurs liquides que l'on verse et qui est bu par la terre. Par sacrifice, il faut entendre l'offrande à un dieu d'une victime animale que l'on égorge et découpe rituellement et dont une part est brûlée et part en fumée pour le dieu tandis que le reste est mangé par les hommes dans un banquet sacrificiel. Je laisserai de côté ici les sacrifices non sanglants qui ne tiennent pas une grande place dans la tragédie grecque⁸.

On étudiera les libations et les sacrifices dans la tragédie grecque sous trois perspectives : tout d'abord ce sont des témoignages littéraires qu'il convient de comparer aux documents littéraires plus anciens que donne l'épopée et éventuellement aux documents iconographiques, pour dégager les permanences et éventuellement les innovations, bien que le domaine rituel soit, par la nature des choses, relativement stable. Ensuite, ces cérémonies religieuses constituent pour l'homme de théâtre des ressources dramaturgiques ou dramatiques qu'il utilise notamment pour leur côté spectaculaire tout en étant obligé de tenir compte des contraintes inhérentes au spectacle. Enfin, ces cérémonies sont par excellence le lieu du tragique, quand elles sont perverties et que le rite, qui est, par essence, ordre immuable et violence contrôlée, débouche sur un désordre sauvage ou sert, par métaphore ironique, à qualifier un comportement sauvage.

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Grâce aux évocations de la libation et du sacrifice contenues dans la tragédie grecque, il est possible de mesurer quelles sont les permanences et les innovations dans la représentation littéraire de ces deux rituels depuis Homère jusqu'à la tragédie grecque.

L'essentiel de la cérémonie, libation ou sacrifice, fait preuve d'une grande stabilité, aussi bien dans sa nature que dans son déroulement rituel. Pour s'en tenir au sacrifice, la situation fondamentale qui en définit la nature est la même. Elle est inscrite dans la syntaxe même du grec. Le sacrificiant (sujet) sacrifie une victime animale (complément d'objet direct) à une divinité (datif de destination). On comparera par exemple chez Homère le sacrifice d'Agamemnon à Zeus (*Il.* II, v. 401 sq.) et la description la plus détaillée d'un sacrifice dans la tragédie grecque, le sacrifice d'Égisthe dans l'*Electre* d'Euripide (v. 786 sq.). Mais, avant de sacrifier la

⁷ Eschyle, *Suppliants*, v. 980-983.

⁸ Pour un sacrifice non sanglant, voir par exemple l'*Electre* de Sophocle : la sortie de Clytemnestre est justifiée par son désir de faire un sacrifice non sanglant à Apollon ; voir l'indication « régressive » aux v. 630-631 avec le verbe *thusai*. La cérémonie se déroule dans l'espace visible.

victime, le sacrifiant dans une prière s'adresse au dieu pour formuler sa demande. Pour conserver les mêmes exemples, chez Homère, Agamemnon adresse une prière à Zeus avant l'égorgement de la victime (*Il.* II, v. 411–418; cf. ἔσφαζαν au v. 422) et chez Euripide, Egisthe adresse une prière aux nymphes, également avant l'égorgement (v. 804–808; cf. 813 κάσφαξ'). Aussi, à en juger par les témoignages homériques ou tragiques, le sacrifice est un rite qui s'explique dans le cadre de l'échange entre dieux et hommes suivant la loi du don et du contre-don. La place de la prière qui donne son sens au sacrifice ne doit donc pas être négligée. Une analyse plus fine montrerait la relation étroite entre la prière et un autre rite préparatoire qui précède l'égorgement, le jet de grains d'orge. Chez Homère, elle s'effectue très précisément entre le moment où l'on prend l'orge dans la corbeille et où on le lance (cf. *Il.* II, v. 410 οὐλοχύτας ἀνέλοντο et v. 421 οὐλοχύτας προβάλλοντο). Dans la description de l'*Electre* d'Euripide, elle est également mise en rapport avec le moment où Egisthe prend l'orge et la jette, mais il semble que la prière soit prononcée en même temps qu'il jette l'orge sur l'autel (v. 803 sq. λαβὼν δὲ πρόχυτας... ἔβαλλε βωμούς, τοιάδ' ἐννέπων ἔπη).

Les ressemblances dans le rituel entre Homère et la tragédie s'avèrent même plus précises que l'interprétation traditionnelle des textes ne le laisse entendre, quand on compare attentivement les textes homériques et tragiques qui sont comparables. Je prendrai l'exemple du geste rituel qui dans la séquence temporelle de la cérémonie fait suite exactement à la prière et au jet de l'orge que nous venons de voir, aussi bien chez Homère que dans la tragédie, et précède immédiatement le moment de l'égorgement de la victime. Dans plusieurs descriptions du sacrifice chez Homère (*Iliade* I, 459 et II, 422), on rencontre le vers formulaire suivant : αὐέρυσαν μὲν πρῶτα καὶ ἔσφαζαν καὶ ἔδειραν. Avant d'égorger la victime, on relèverait son museau. C'est, du moins, l'interprétation traditionnelle du verbe αὐέρυσαν. P. Mazon traduit par «on relève les mufles, on égorge, on dépèce». Pourtant dans le passage correspondant du sacrifice décrit dans l'*Electre* d'Euripide (v. 813 sq.), il est dit qu'Egisthe «égorgea la génisse après que (les serviteurs) l'eurent soulevée avec leurs mains sur leur épaule» κάσφαξ' ἐπ' ὤμων μόσχον ὥς ἦραν χεροῖν / δμῶες. Le texte tragique indique sans ambiguïté possible que ce n'est pas le museau qui est soulevé, mais que c'est le corps tout entier de la victime qui est soulevé de terre. Toutes les discussions qui ont pu avoir lieu sur l'invraisemblance d'une telle opération sont réduites à néant depuis que l'iconographie est venue confirmer ce geste rituel. Une amphore à figure noire des environs de 550 avant J.-C. retrouvée récemment dans les réserves du musée de Viterbe et publiée par Jean-Louis Durand dans le *Bolletino d'Arte* de 1985⁹, offre sur une de ses faces le spectacle d'un bœuf entièrement soulevé par plusieurs hommes sur leur épaule au moment où le sacrifiant va procéder à l'égorgement. Cette concordance parfaite entre le témoignage tragique et le témoignage iconographique nous invite à revenir sur l'interprétation du verbe αὐέρυσαν dans le passage correspondant d'Homère. P. Chantraine qui explique le verbe αὐερύω comme une forme éolienne remontant à ἀν-*Φερύω* donne,

⁹ G. BARBIERI – J.-L. DURAND, «On il bue a spalla», *Bolletino d'Arte*, LXX, ser VI, p. 1–16.

comme Mazon, le sens de « tirer la tête en arrière, égorger ». Ce sens est issu directement de la scholie homérique AD à ce passage qui déclare : « ils tiraient en arrière le cou de la victime sacrifiée pour tendre vers le ciel aux dieux auxquels ils sacrifiaient ». Mais on peut objecter tout d'abord que le contexte syntaxique ne cadre pas avec l'interprétation traditionnelle. Le parallélisme entre les trois verbes dans le vers formulaire d'Homère indique déjà qu'il faut sous-entendre comme complément après αἰέρουσαν le même qu'après les deux autres verbes ἔσφαζαν καὶ ἔδειραν, c'est-à-dire la victime, et non le cou de la victime ; et comme le préverbe ἀνα- signifie d'abord « en haut », il paraît naturel de penser que le verbe signifie « tirer en haut la victime », la « soulever ». On soulève la victime avant de l'égorger. Cette nouvelle interprétation du vers formulaire homérique ne serait pas assurée, malgré le parallélisme avec le témoignage tragique et le témoignage iconographique, s'il n'y avait pas un passage parallèle chez Homère même qui vient la confirmer. Les grandes descriptions de sacrifices chez Homère sont remarquablement parallèles, et la fréquence des vers formulaires qui s'y retrouvent soulignent la fixité du déroulement du rite ; mais la fixité du même rite n'exclut pas certaines variantes légères dans l'expression. Dans la description du sacrifice de Nestor en *Odyssée* III 453 - 454, ce rite qui précède immédiatement l'égorgement est indiqué dans une variante beaucoup plus explicite οἱ μὲν ἔπειτ' ἀνελόντες ἀπὸ χθονὸς εὐρυοδείης / ἔσχον ἀτὰρ σφάζεν Πεισίστρατος, « et eux soulevant la victime de la terre aux larges routes, la maintinrent ; alors Pisisstrate l'égorgea ». Le sens de « en haut » que nous donnons à ἀνα- dans αἰέρουσαν se retrouve ici dans ἀνελόντες. Ainsi donc, la comparaison attentive entre le rituel du sacrifice dans la tragédie et chez Homère éclaire l'interprétation textuelle et montre la permanence du rite.

Mais, en dépit de ressemblances remarquables, des modifications se sont produites entre Homère et la tragédie grecque dans le sacrifice. S'il y a des modifications que l'on peut saisir à coup sûr par la comparaison des témoignages littéraires, c'est bien des modifications de vocabulaire. La plus importante d'entre elles est bien connue. Alors que l'on trouve chez Homère pour désigner le sacrifice le vocabulaire du « faire », les verbes ἔρδειν, ῥέζειν (cf. par exemple *Il.* II, v. 400), on rencontre régulièrement dans la tragédie et dans le reste de la littérature de l'époque classique le verbe θύειν (cf. par exemple Eur. *El.*, v. 782 ; cf. 785 et 795) qui n'était jamais employé chez Homère à propos des sacrifices sanglants, mais s'appliquait, conformément à son sens étymologique (racine **dhu* — que l'on trouve aussi dans le latin *fumus*), aux offrandes non sanglantes que l'on fait fumer¹⁰. Cette rupture dans l'usage du vocabulaire du sacrifice que l'on constate entre l'époque homérique et l'époque archaïque et classique est d'autant plus étonnante que le vocabulaire change alors que le rite qu'il désigne est resté identique. A cette modification notable du vocabulaire s'ajoute une innovation également importante dans le rite. Dans la description du sacrifice classique dont l'*Electre* d'Euripide est le principal témoignage, l'ouverture de la victime donne lieu à la prévision de l'avenir par l'inspection des viscères et Euripide en tire un effet dramatique, car Egisthe,

¹⁰ Voir J. CASABONA, *Recherches sur le vocabulaire des sacrifices en grec des origines à la fin de l'époque classique*, Aix-en-Provence, 1966, p. 38 sqq.

observant le foie, la veine porte et les canaux biliaires, prévoit de funestes attaques contre lui (v. 829 : κακὰς . . . προβολάς). En revanche, dans les sacrifices homériques dont les différentes étapes sont pourtant bien marquées, il n'est jamais question de l'observation des viscères. Il semble donc que cet « art de l'observation des victimes », cette « hiéroskopie » n'était pas encore connue en Grèce au temps d'Homère. Malgré le silence des descriptions homériques aussi bien dans l'*Iliade* que dans l'*Odyssée*, certains historiens modernes des religions¹¹ soutiennent pourtant que la hiéroskopie devait être déjà connue ; car il est question déjà dans l'*Iliade* de devins θυοσκόοι¹², dans lesquels ils voient des devins qui observent les victimes sacrifiées. Mais cette interprétation oublie que les mots de la familles de θύειν ne s'appliquent pas encore chez Homère au sacrifice d'une victime animale. Il doit donc s'agir, conformément à l'usage de θύειν chez Homère, de devins qui tirent l'avenir de la flamme ou de la fumée provenant de la combustion des offrandes¹³. La hiéroskopie semble donc bien être une innovation rituelle qui a été introduite en Grèce entre Homère et la tragédie grecque.

Le témoignage de la tragédie, comparé à celui d'Homère, permet donc de mesurer la permanence et l'évolution, tant dans la langue que dans la pratique, des principaux rites de la religion grecque. Mais la présence du rite du sacrifice et des libations dans la tragédie grecque se justifie d'abord par son utilisation dramatique et spectaculaire. C'est ce que nous allons voir dans une seconde partie.

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Les cérémonies religieuses ont été utilisées par les tragiques soit pour justifier l'entrée ou la sortie des personnages, soit même pour construire des scènes spectaculaires. Ces deux points qui relèvent de la dimension théâtrale du texte tragique peuvent être illustrés en partant d'exemples pris dans le rituel religieux de la libation ou du sacrifice.

Voyons tout d'abord l'utilisation que les auteurs tragiques ont pu faire des rites pour justifier l'entrée ou la sortie des personnages. Les indications dramaturgiques ne sont pas également réparties tout au long d'une pièce. Il est naturel d'observer une concentration particulière dans les débuts d'une scène, quand un nouveau personnage arrive, et aussi à la fin d'une scène quand un personnage repart. Il est nécessaire en effet pour l'auteur d'indiquer non seulement l'entrée ou la sortie du personnage, mais aussi de justifier sa présence ou son départ. Or, de façon assez curieuse, les cérémonies religieuses servent assez souvent de justification à l'entrée ou à la sortie d'un personnage.

Il s'agit parfois de justifications ponctuelles qui n'ont qu'un lien assez lâche avec le sujet de la tragédie. Dans la tragédie la plus récente, l'*Œdipe à Colone* de Sophocle représentée après la mort du poète en 401, Créon, après avoir enlevé les filles d'Œdipe, Ismène et Antigone, veut entraîner Œdipe contre son gré pour le ramener à Thèbes ; mais le Chœur, composé de vieillards de Colone, appelle au

¹¹ Voir, par exemple, W. BURKERT, *Greek Religion*, Oxford, 1985, p. 113 et note 30.

¹² *Iliade* XXIV, 221; *Odyssée* XXI, 145; XXII, 318 et 321.

secours le roi d'Athènes. Thésée, qui arrive aussitôt à la course, comme par enchantement, en s'écriant: «Qu'est-ce que cet appel? Qu'est-il arrivé? Quelle épouvante vous a donc fait arrêter le sacrifice que, devant son autel, j'offrais au dieu marin, protecteur de ce territoire de Colone? Dites-moi je veux tout savoir pourquoi j'ai dû bondir ici plus rapidement que mes jambes ne l'eussent souhaité»¹⁴.

Cette entrée de Thésée comporte des indications scéniques sur la manière dont il entre — il entre précipitamment, ce qui ne convient guère à la dignité royale —, et sur les raisons d'une arrivée aussi rapide — il se trouvait dans les parages en train de faire un sacrifice à Poséidon le dieu protecteur de Colone. Et comme il s'agit d'un sacrifice solennel où le roi était entouré de tout son peuple, cela permettra à Thésée d'envoyer tout ce monde dans une sorte de mobilisation générale à la recherche des deux jeunes filles enlevées¹⁵. Un tel sacrifice est, sans aucun doute, une facilité pour justifier l'arrivée si rapide et si opportune du roi. Mais il n'est pas seulement introduit pour la commodité de l'agencement des scènes¹⁶: il sert également à caractériser le personnage, à souligner la piété du roi athénien, en ménageant un contraste avec la violence sacrilège de Créon qui a arraché des suppliants.

Dans cet exemple, l'utilisation dramaturgique du rituel pour justifier l'entrée ou la sortie d'un personnage reste ponctuelle. Mais il est une tragédie où les nécessités du rituel sont régulièrement invoquées à cet effet. Il s'agit de la pièce la plus ancienne que nous ayons conservée, les *Perses* d'Eschyle. Et dans ce cas, c'est le rituel des libations qui est utilisé pour justifier la sortie ou l'entrée d'un personnage, en l'occurrence de la reine des Perses.

Pour bien comprendre le mécanisme de ces entrées et des sorties de la reine Atossa, il faut d'abord rappeler un fait essentiel, trop souvent méconnu, sur l'évolution de l'organisation matérielle du théâtre à Athènes, évolution qui ressort de l'analyse des pièces elles-mêmes. Il convient de distinguer deux époques, l'une ancienne, correspondant aux pièces les plus anciennes d'Eschyle (les *Perses* 472, les *Sept contre Thèbes* 468, les *Suppliants* vers 463) où le bâtiment de scène, la *skênê*, n'existait pas encore en fond de théâtre et où par conséquent il ne pouvait pas exister encore de palais royal visible d'où pouvaient sortir des personnages: seules existaient, pour l'entrée et la sortie des personnages, les deux *parodoi* de droite et de gauche. Ce n'est qu'à partir de l'*Orestie* (458) que le palais fera, au moins dans les pièces conservées, son entrée¹⁷.

Aussi, dans les *Perses*, quand la reine Atossa, venant du palais, arrive pour la première fois dans l'espace visible, elle pénètre par l'une des *parodoi*, car le palais, en l'absence de *skênê*, est situé hors de l'espace visible. Elle fait une entrée très

¹³ Voir J. CASABONA, *Recherches*..., 118 sq. Mais J. Casabona qui s'attache uniquement à l'étude du sens ne signale pas les conséquences qui en résultent pour l'histoire de la hiéroskopie en Grèce.

¹⁴ Sophocle, *Œdipe à Colone*, v. 887-890.

¹⁵ Sophocle, *Œdipe à Colone*, v. 897 sqq.

¹⁶ L'autel où Thésée faisait son sacrifice servira aussi à justifier l'arrivée de Polynice qui est venu s'y réfugier en suppliant (cf. 1158 sqq.).

¹⁷ Sur l'absence de *skênê* dans les pièces anciennes d'Eschyle, voir en premier lieu WILAMOWITZ, *Kleine Schriften*, I, 1886, p. 148 sqq. et, plus récemment, O. TAPLIN, *The Stagecraft of Aeschylus*, Oxford, 1977, p. 452-459 (Appendix C: The Skene in Aeschylus).

remarquée sur un char, revêtue d'une robe scintillante d'or¹⁸. Tout cela symbolise la puissance royale et la richesse perse ; mais si la reine vient trouver les conseillers qui sont réunis auprès de la tombe du Roi défunt Darius située dans l'espace visible, c'est pour leur raconter le rêve effrayant qu'elle vient d'avoir lors de la nuit qui s'achève. Elle a vu son fils Xerxès, qui est parti à la conquête de la Grèce, tomber du char tiré par Europe et Asie et déchirer ses vêtements à la vue de son père. Les conseillers vont donc jouer le rôle d'interprètes de son rêve et lui recommander, entre autres choses, de faire des libations à son mari défunt Darius qu'elle a vu en rêve (v. 219 sqq.) : « En second lieu, disent-ils, il te faut verser des libations pour la terre ainsi que pour les défunts. Et avec une douce bienveillance, fais cette demande à ton époux Darius que tu dis avoir vu au cours de la nuit : qu'il t'envoie des faveurs à toi et à ton enfant en les faisant surgir de la terre et que ce qui est opposé à ces faveurs soit retenu par la terre et disparaisse dans l'ombre ». La reine, en réponse, promet de veiller à l'accomplissement de ce rite quand elle retournera dans son palais : « Je réglerai tout ainsi que tu désires, en ce qui concerne les dieux et nos morts »¹⁹.

C'est une façon pour Eschyle de préparer sa sortie qui ne se produira que bien plus tard. C'est seulement après avoir entendu le long récit du messager annonçant à la fois le désastre de l'expédition en Grèce et le salut de son fils qu'elle sortira ; et quand elle sort à la fin du premier épisode, elle ne manque pas de justifier son départ, et aussi d'annoncer son retour, par la nécessité d'accomplir le rite des libations : « Quant à vous avez interprété ce rêve trop légèrement. Cependant, puisque c'est en ce sens que votre avis s'est prononcé, je veux d'abord adresser des prières aux dieux ; ensuite, pour la terre et pour les morts, je vais aller chercher dans mon palais de quoi faire la libation »²⁰.

Et lorsqu'elle revient au début du deuxième épisode, Eschyle accumule dans la bouche de la reine, avec une insistance toute didactique, les indications dramaturgiques qui montrent la reine revenant avec les libations, mais cette entrée, bien qu'attendue, est surprenante, car cette fois elle est à pied et vêtue d'une robe de deuil. Voici ces indications dramaturgiques dans la bouche d'Atossa : « C'est pourquoi ce trajet qui ramène du palais en sens inverse je l'ai accompli sans char et sans la parure précédente, apportant pour le père de mon fils des libations bienveillantes qui sont un apaisement pour les morts, le lait blanc agréable à boire d'une génisse pure, la goutte de la butineuse, miel lumineux, avec l'eau qui coule d'une source vierge, et cette boisson éclatante non mélangée provenant d'une mère sauvage, d'une vigne antique ; et voici le fruit odorant de l'olivier blond qui sans cesse avec ses feuilles s'épanouit, ainsi que des fleurs tressées, filles de la terre fertile »²¹.

Ainsi la nécessité d'aller chercher les libations et des offrandes dans le palais justifie à la fois le départ et le retour de la reine. Mais la longueur du développement

¹⁸ C'est une indication dramaturgique régressive (c'est-à-dire située dans le texte après le passage sur lequel elle porte) qui permet de reconstituer la mise en scène de cette entrée d'Atossa : voir v. 607 sq.

¹⁹ Eschyle, *Perses*, v. 228 – 230.

²⁰ Eschyle, *Perses*, v. 520 sqq.

²¹ Eschyle, *Perses*, v. 607 sqq.

sur les divers liquides de la libation et sur les diverses offrandes que la reine porte avec elle ou plus exactement que portent des servantes qui l'accompagnent ne se justifierait guère s'il devait servir à justifier simplement le retour de la reine²². Il s'agit en fait pour Eschyle de préparer la cérémonie religieuse qui va se dérouler devant les spectateurs dans ce que l'on peut appeler une scène de libation. Ainsi, nous découvrons une nouvelle face de l'utilisation des rites par l'auteur de théâtre: non plus un simple moyen de justifier l'agencement de scènes par l'arrivée ou la sortie des personnages, mais une véritable exploitation spectaculaire des cérémonies rituelles. Le rite devient spectacle.

Toutefois, alors que, jusqu'à présent, nous avons envisagé sur le même plan les libations et le sacrifice, comme des rites en actes, distincts de la prière, rite de parole, il convient d'établir une nouvelle distinction, quand on envisage ces deux rites fondamentaux de la religion grecque, du point de vue de leur potentialité spectaculaire, par suite des contraintes inhérentes à la représentation. En dépit des ressemblances que peuvent présenter libation et sacrifice, dans la mesure où l'on voit dans les deux cas l'écoulement d'un liquide, une différence radicale sépare les deux cérémonies dans une perspective théâtrale: alors que l'auteur de théâtre peut représenter devant les spectateurs le versement des liquides libatoires, il ne peut pas représenter, par une sorte de tabou, qui n'est jamais formulé, mais jamais transgressé, le versement du sang, que cela soit le versement du sang dans un égorgement rituel ou dans un meurtre. L'acte rituel de l'égorgement d'une victime sacrifiée n'est pas plus représentable dans l'espace visible que l'acte barbare d'un meurtre. J'allais dire encore moins. Car il y a probablement une exception pour le meurtre, dans la mesure où le suicide d'Ajax, par une audace extrême de Sophocle, se passe dans l'espace visible.²³ Mais il n'y a aucun exemple de l'égorgement d'une bête sacrifiée. On pourrait comparer cet interdit avec celui qui a été remarqué à propos de l'iconographie du sacrifice. Les peintres de vase ne représentent jamais le moment exact où le sacrificateur enfonce le couteau dans la gorge de la victime animale et où le sang coule. Toutefois la logique du langage iconographique n'est pas exactement la même que celle du texte théâtral, car les peintres de vase ont pu représenter le sang qui coule d'une gorge humaine lors d'un sacrifice,²⁴ alors qu'une telle représentation n'est pas attestée dans l'espace visible de la tragédie. Et pourtant les sacrifices s'opèrent souvent dans le temps de la tragédie; mais ils s'effectuent dans l'espace extrascénique, dans l'espace virtuel des *paradoi*. Et quand l'auteur veut donner au sacrifice une dimension spectaculaire, il est obligé de le faire par le truchement du récit d'un messager ou d'un personnage faisant fonction de messager: à travers ce récit l'auteur peut recréer un spectacle dans le spectacle, mais il ne s'agit que d'un spectacle au deuxième degré.

²² La reine ne consacre pas moins de huit vers (v. 611 – 618) à l'énumération des libations et des offrandes: lait, miel, eau, vin (cf. *Odyssée* XI, v. 27 sq.), olives, fleurs tressées.

²³ Toutefois, bien que le suicide d'Ajax ait lieu dans l'espace visible, la chute du héros sur son épée (dont la garde était plantée dans le sol) devait être dissimulée par un buisson; cf. l'indication dramaturgique « régressive » v. 891: c'est derrière un buisson que Tecmesse a découvert le corps d'Ajax.

²⁴ Voir le célèbre vase du sacrifice de Polyxène (amphore « tyrrhénienne » à figures noires, Londres, British Museum 97.7 – 27.2, 570 – 560 av. J. C.; BEAZLEY, A.B.V. « The Tyrrhenian Group », N° 27).

Si l'on s'en tient donc au spectacle vu et non raconté, les ressources que les auteurs tragiques ont pu puiser dans les cérémonies rituelles se résument donc aux scènes de libation, ou aux sacrifices non sanglants. Des trois auteurs tragiques, celui qui a utilisé le plus cette possibilité de spectacle est incontestablement Eschyle. Les spectateurs assistent à une scène de libations non seulement dans sa tragédie la plus ancienne, dans les *Perses* de 472, mais aussi dans la pièce centrale de sa trilogie la plus récente, dans les *Choéphores* de 458, tragédie dont le titre désigne justement «celles qui portent les libations». Ces deux scènes de libations, où les spectateurs voient respectivement la reine Atossa dans les *Perses* et Electre dans les *Choéphores* verser des libations mériteraient d'être comparées en détail. Elles sont fondamentalement analogues, puisque elles sont faites dans les deux cas à un mort dont le tertre funéraire est situé dans l'espace visible par un personnage assisté du chœur. Dans les *Perses*, la reine Atossa fait des libations sur la tombe de son mari, le roi Darius, assistée des conseillers du roi; dans les *Choéphores*, Electre fait des libations sur la tombe de son père Agamemnon, assistée du chœur des captives. La seule grande différence dans l'organisation scénique, mais qui n'a pas d'incidence sur la scène de libation proprement dite, est que le palais royal qui dans les *Perses* se trouve, comme nous l'avons vu, dans l'espace extrascénique au delà d'une des deux *parodoi*, apparaît dans les *Choéphores* en fond de scène. Palais royal et tombe royale qui se trouvaient séparés dans la pièce la plus ancienne de 472, par suite des contraintes de l'organisation scénique (absence de *skénè*), sont concentrés en un même lieu dans la production la plus récente d'Eschyle de 458. Les deux scènes sont comparables non seulement par la mise en scène et les personnages, mais aussi par le déroulement du rite. Le personnage joué par un acteur verse les libations tandis que le chœur accompagne le rite d'un hymne chanté où les cris se mêlent aux prières. La ressemblance entre les deux scènes se vérifie même dans le vocabulaire. Les libations, une fois versées, sont bues par la terre. Or le même adjectif composé γάποτος «bu par la terre» est employé dans les deux scènes pour qualifier les libations.²⁵ Le rapprochement est d'autant plus notable que cet adjectif n'est pas employé en dehors de ces deux tragédies. Mais ces ressemblances manifestes dans le spectacle se doublent de ressemblances plus secrètes dans la trame dramatique. Dans les deux tragédies, la scène de la libation est, en fait, la conséquence d'un même événement, d'un rêve effrayant qu'a eu une reine dans la nuit précédant le drame. En effet, la reine Clytemnestre dans les *Choéphores*, comme la reine Atossa dans les *Perses*, a eu une vision effrayante et après l'avis donné par des interprètes des songes, exactement comme dans les *Perses*, elle a envoyé les captives du palais porter des libations sur la tombe de son mari Agamemnon, comme Atossa va faire des libations sur la tombe de son mari Darius; et dans les deux tragédies, les libations faites sur le tombeau du mari mort doivent détourner, en tant que rite apotropaïque, les malheurs redoutés après le rêve prémonitoire. On pourrait même ajouter que le rêve concerne un fils absent dont le retour se produit au cours de la tragédie, Xerxès dans les *Perses*, Oreste dans les *Choéphores*. Ainsi, malgré la différence des sujets, sujet contemporain dans un cas, sujet mythique dans l'autre,

²⁵ *Perses*, v. 621; *Choéphores*, v. 164.

la séquence dramatique du rêve et de la scène des libations met en jeu dans les deux tragédies, à l'intérieur d'une famille royale, les relations entre une femme, son mari mort et son fils. Cette structure profonde étant dégagée, les différences éclatent par delà les ressemblances entre une tragédie, celle des *Perses*, où les relations entre les membres de la famille sont naturelles, et l'autre, celle des *Choéphores* où les relations sont totalement perverses. Alors que l'une des deux femmes, Atossa, a été l'épouse fidèle, l'autre, Clytemnestre, a été la meurtrière de son mari. Alors que l'une veut, par ses libations, faire revenir le mort, l'autre veut le maintenir à l'écart en calmant son courroux. Et alors que l'une est une mère qui craint pour son fils absent et attend son retour, l'autre craint le retour de son fils. Aussi l'accomplissement du rite prend-il une signification totalement différente dans chacune des deux tragédies : à l'utilisation normale du rite dans les *Perses* s'oppose son utilisation impie dans les *Choéphores* ; mais comme Clytemnestre, la femme impie, n'a pas eu le courage de procéder elle-même à ses libations, les femmes qu'elle a déléguées pour les accomplir, c'est-à-dire le chœur des captives et Electre, vont inverser par leur prière la finalité de la cérémonie et rétablir la normalité d'un rite pervers. On constate donc comment Eschyle a repris dans deux de ses tragédies une scène de libations qui présente, en dépit de la différence radicale des sujets, de grandes analogies dans la séquence dramatique des événements (rêve — libations), dans les personnages mis en jeu et dans le spectacle. Même des différences évidentes s'estompent si l'on procède à une comparaison approfondie : le rite des libations accompagné des prières chantées du chœur, on le sait, est plus spectaculaire dans les *Perses* que dans les *Choéphores*, puisqu'il provoque la résurrection momentanée du mort dans les *Perses*, alors que, dans les *Choéphores*, le mort reste dans sa tombe. La scène des *Perses* où le chœur évoque par ses lamentations et par ses cris le roi défunt fut fort appréciée des spectateurs. Aristophane, dans ses *Grenouilles* (v. 1028 sq.), fait dire, en effet, à Dionysos s'adressant à Eschyle : « Je fus ravi, en tout cas, quand tu entonnas ta lamentation au sujet du feu roi Darius. Le chœur aussitôt se mit à battre des mains, comme cela, et à crier : Iau ! Oh ! ». Toutefois les libations et la prière chantée du chœur ne restent pas, pour autant, sans effet dans les *Choéphores*. Au moment même où Electre dit que les libations ont été bues par la terre, elle découvre le premier indice du retour d'Oreste, la boucle de cheveux : Eschyle a manifestement placé la scène de la reconnaissance comme une suite logique de la scène des libations. Ainsi à la séquence dramatique des *Perses*, rêve — libations — apparition du père mort, correspond dans les *Choéphores* la séquence rêve — libations — apparition du fils du mort. La résurrection du père est remplacée par l'apparition du fils qui est sa réincarnation. On a affaire manifestement dans les *Choéphores* à une scène de libation qui reprend et renouvelle l'ancienne scène des *Perses*. C'est vraisemblablement le succès de la première scène auprès des spectateurs qui a amené Eschyle à rivaliser avec lui-même. Ce ne serait pas, du reste, le seul exemple dans la tragédie grecque où un auteur s'efforce de rivaliser avec lui-même en reprenant une scène qu'il jugeait particulièrement réussie.

Qu'Eschyle, en écrivant sa scène des libations dans les *Choéphores* ait songé à sa scène des libations dans les *Perses* est donc vraisemblable. Ce qu'il y a de sûr, c'est que ses successeurs Sophocle et Euripide, quand ils ont repris dans leur *Electre* le

sujet traité par Eschyle dans ses *Choéphores*, n'ont pu ignorer la scène des libations qu'ils trouvaient chez leur prédécesseur. Il convient donc d'examiner le parti qu'ils en ont tiré. Dans l'*Electre* de Sophocle, on retrouve la même liaison entre le rêve et la cérémonie des libations et, comme chez Eschyle, Clytemnestre qui vient d'avoir dans la nuit précédant le drame un rêve effrayant délègue sa fille pour aller porter sur le tombeau de son mari des libations, avec cette différence que Sophocle a remplacé dans cette tâche Electre par sa sœur Chrysothémis. Mais la différence essentielle vient de ce que le côté spectaculaire de la scène n'est plus exploité. Cela tient en grande partie à une modification importante dans la mise en scène de l'*Electre* de Sophocle par rapport aux *Choéphores* d'Eschyle. Alors qu'Eschyle dans les *Choéphores* avait situé dans l'espace visible à la fois le palais royal et la tombe royale, Sophocle, dans son *Electre*, n'a conservé que le palais et a éloigné la tombe d'Agamemnon dans l'espace extrascénique, à un endroit que l'on atteint par une des *paradoi*. Dès lors, le rite de la libation ne peut plus être un spectacle directement vu par les spectateurs. Du reste, chez Sophocle, la libation n'aura pas lieu, car Electre conseillera à Chrysothémis de ne pas exécuter la mission que lui a confiée sa mère : « Il n'est ni permis ni sacré d'apporter de la part d'une femme ennemie... des libations à notre père » dit Electre à Chrysothémis qui se rangera à son avis.²⁶ Dans l'*Electre* d'Euripide, les innovations sont encore plus importantes dans la mesure où le palais et la tombe ont disparu de l'espace visible. On sait, en effet, que le palais est remplacé par une chaumière où vit Electre officiellement mariée à un pauvre laboureur. Dès lors, il n'est plus question du rêve de Clytemnestre et par conséquent du rite apotropaïque des libations. L'évolution est donc assez claire d'Eschyle à Euripide : d'une scène spectaculaire chez Eschyle où, à la suite d'un rêve, le spectateur assiste à une cérémonie des libations provoquée par Clytemnestre mais pervertie par Electre, on passe chez Sophocle, à la suite d'un rêve analogue, à une cérémonie des libations qui devrait s'effectuer dans l'espace extrascénique et qui est en définitive avortée à la suite du conseil d'Electre. Enfin, dans l'*Electre* d'Euripide, tout a disparu, le rêve et la cérémonie de la libation. On constate donc une régression de l'utilisation du spectacle du rite de la libation dans les tragédies grecques consacrées au mythe de la vengeance d'Oreste.²⁷

Néanmoins, alors qu'Euripide avait totalement négligé la potentialité spectaculaire offerte par une scène de libation dans son *Electre*, il l'a brillamment exploitée dans une pièce à peu près contemporaine. La *parodos* de son *Iphigénie en Tauride* représente son héroïne, Iphigénie, en train de verser des libations à un mort, son frère Oreste, alors que le chœur accompagne le versement libatoire de ses chants. Cette scène rappelle immédiatement la *parodos* des *Choéphores* d'Eschyle où Electre

²⁶ Sophocle, *Electre*, v. 433 sq.

²⁷ Toutefois dans son *Oreste* de 408 (v. 96 – 125), Euripide reprendra le thème de la libation au mort en opérant une série de transpositions : les libations sont envoyées par Hélène et elles sont destinées à Clytemnestre. Hélène, comme la Clytemnestre d'Eschyle ou de Sophocle, remet à sa fille le soin d'accomplir les rites. C'est en effet Hermione qui portera les libations, après le refus d'Electre. Comme chez Sophocle, le tombeau est dans l'espace virtuel, ce qui exclut toute scène de libations dans l'espace visible. De plus, la séquence rêve – libations a disparu.

accompagnée du chœur fait dans l'espace visible des libations au mort.²⁸ Il y a donc continuité, avec une sorte de commutation des personnages : Euripide remplace ici Electre par sa sœur Iphigénie, un peu comme Sophocle avait remplacé, dans sa scène avortée des libations, Electre par sa sœur Chrysothémis. Mais ce qui me paraît montrer qu'Euripide s'est bien souvenu d'Eschyle, c'est que cette scène des libations s'inscrit dans une séquence dramatique rêve -- libation à un mort -- apparition, c'est-à-dire dans une séquence analogue à celle qui a été dégagée chez Eschyle, aussi bien dans les *Perses* que dans les *Choéphores*. En effet, dans *Iphigénie en Tauride*, la libation au mort est la conséquence d'un rêve qu'Iphigénie a eu dans la nuit précédant le drame et la libation sera suivie de l'apparition d'Oreste, ce qui donne lieu, comme dans les *Choéphores*, à une scène de reconnaissance entre la sœur et le frère. Mais la situation est renouvelée parce que le rite de la libation s'effectue dans un monde d'apparences. La libation est effectuée par une sœur que l'on croit morte sur un frère qu'elle croit mort, parce qu'elle a été égarée par sa vision nocturne. Le rite théâtralement demeure, mais religieusement il paraît vide. Ce paradoxe est perceptible jusque dans la mise en scène : Euripide a représenté dans l'espace visible une libation à un mort en l'absence d'un tombeau, ce qui, évidemment, aurait été impensable au temps d'Eschyle.

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Il reste à aborder dans une troisième partie l'utilisation tragique des rites, particulièrement du rite du sacrifice.²⁹ On a vu que le rite du sacrifice n'était pas représenté dans l'espace visible par suite d'un tabou qui interdisait que l'on assiste à un égorgement, mais qu'il était l'objet d'un récit. Dès lors, le mode de présentation rejoint celui de l'épopée. On peut dire que le messenger de tragédie est l'héritier direct de l'aède. C'est surtout dans les récits de messagers ou de personnages faisant fonction de messenger que la dimension épique s'insère dans la tragédie. On serait donc en droit de comparer les récits de sacrifice dans l'épopée et dans la tragédie grecque. Mais une différence importante sépare les deux genres. Alors que le récit épique présente la plupart du temps des sacrifices qui se déroulent rituellement de bout en bout, le récit tragique présente, lui, des sacrifices qui sont pervertis. On peut distinguer deux catégories de sacrifices pervertis : d'une part les sacrifices qui commencent rituellement et se terminent tragiquement ; d'autre part les sacrifices qui

²⁸ Elle rappelle aussi la scène de libations dans les *Perses* par l'évocation des liquides libatoires, eau, lait, vin et miel. Comparer *Iphigénie en Tauride*, v. 162 – 166 et *Perses*, v. 609 – 615. On observe la présence du même substantif *pégè*, mais Eschyle employait le terme à propos de l'eau, alors qu'Euripide l'a transposé au lait. La destination des libations est formulée en des termes comparables : ἀπὲρ νεκροῖσι μελικτήρια (*Perses*, v. 610), et ἃ νεκροῖς θελκτήρια κεῖται. (*Iphigénie en Tauride*, v. 166). Pour le sens comparable de ces termes, voir Eschyle, *Euménides*, v. 886.

²⁹ Voir en particulier F. I. ZEITLIN, «The Motif of the Corrupted Sacrifice in Aeschylus' *Oresteia*», *Taphu*, 96, 1965, p. 463 – 508; *Id.*, «Postscript to Sacrificial Imagery in the *Oresteia* (Ag. 1235 – 37)», *Taphu*, 97, 1966, p. 645 – 653; P. VIDAL-NAQUET, «Chasse et sacrifice dans l'*Orestie* d'Eschyle» dans *Mythe et tragédie en Grèce ancienne*, Paris, 1972, p. 133 – 154; H. P. FOLEY, *Ritual Irony. Poetry and Sacrifice in Euripides*, Cornell University Press, 1985; E. A. M. O'CONNOR-VISSER, *Aspects of human sacrifice in the tragedies of Euripides*, Amsterdam, 1987.

sont d'emblée pervertis dans la mesure où une victime humaine remplace une victime animale.

C'est à partir de Sophocle que l'on rencontre la première catégorie ; car dans le théâtre conservé d'Eschyle, il n'y a pas de récit d'un sacrifice commencé normalement qui tournerait au tragique. La pièce conservée la plus ancienne qui nous présente ce type de sacrifice est les *Trachiniennes* de Sophocle. On se souvient de la situation. Héraclès avant de revenir chez lui à Trachis, après une longue absence, fait un sacrifice solennel à Zeus, son père, entouré de son armée en reconnaissance pour sa victoire sur son ennemi Eurytos ; mais il avait auparavant envoyé à sa femme Déjanire, par l'intermédiaire de son héraut Lichas, une très belle captive Iole, la fille d'Eurytos, qui déclenche la jalousie de Déjanire. Voulant reconquérir l'amour de son mari, Déjanire lui envoie, par l'intermédiaire de Lichas, un habit pour la cérémonie du sacrifice qu'elle a enduit d'un *pharmakon* qu'elle croit être un philtre d'amour mais qui est, en réalité, un poison d'une rare violence. Le déroulement du sacrifice, qui par suite de l'effet du poison, tourne à la folie d'Héraclès puis au meurtre de Lichas par Héraclès, est raconté à Déjanire par Hyllos son fils dans un récit qui sonne comme un acte d'accusation.³⁰ Après une première phase où le sacrifice débute normalement dans le recueillement et dans la joie, le poison qui imbibé la tunique, chauffé par la flamme du sacrifice nourrie par le sang et la graisse des victimes, fait son effet progressivement ; c'est d'abord une douleur muette. Puis le cri d'Héraclès qui interpelle Lichas marque la rupture avec le silence du sacrifice normal. Emporté par sa colère contre Lichas et par la douleur, le sacrifiant tue son fidèle héraut Lichas. L'accomplissement d'un meurtre humain, au cours d'un sacrifice d'une victime animale, voilà ce qui constitue l'essence de ce premier type de sacrifice pervers. Et l'auteur tragique tire des effets pathétiques de l'opposition et de l'analogie entre sacrifice animal et meurtre humain. L'opposition est claire entre, d'un côté, l'ordre et le recueillement du sacrifice rituel, et de l'autre, le désordre et la monstruosité du meurtre humain. Le tragique naît de la brusque irruption du sauvage dans la cérémonie religieuse qui est, pour les Grecs, le symbole même de la civilisation, assurant la cohérence et la sauvegarde de la communauté humaine par une relation régulière entre les hommes et les dieux. L'irruption du sauvage, qui s'opère par l'intermédiaire du poison, du double poison issu d'êtres sauvages, le Centaure Nessos et l'hydre de Lerne, se manifeste sous forme d'une maladie sauvage rongéant le corps d'Héraclès et égarant son esprit et le transforme lui-même en meurtrier d'un innocent. Le déchaînement de la force sauvage est manifeste dans la façon dont il accomplit le meurtre : « Il saisit Lichas par le pied, à l'endroit où joue l'articulation, il le lance sur un rocher qui émerge de la mer et fait jaillir ainsi la blanche moelle à travers les cheveux, cervelle et sang se répandant ensemble » (v. 779—782). Il y a vraisemblablement ici un souvenir de l'épopée, de la façon dont le Cyclope, dans l'*Odyssée*, s'y prend pour tuer les compagnons d'Ulysse en leur fracassant la cervelle contre le sol (*Od.* IX, 290). En tous les cas, la comparaison possible entre le comportement d'Héraclès et celui du Cyclope qui est un monstre

³⁰ Sophocle, *Trachiniennes*, v. 749 sqq.

parangon du sauvage fait mieux prendre conscience du déchaînement de la sauvagerie : le tueur de monstres est devenu un monstre. Sans doute, on n'atteint pas chez Sophocle le même degré de sauvagerie que chez Homère car le Cyclope, après avoir tué les compagnons d'Ulysse les dévore comme un lion ; mais dans le récit tragique, la sauvagerie est d'autant plus saisissante qu'elle émerge dans le cadre de la piété. Alors que le Cyclope, avant son meurtre, proclamait haut et fort son impiété, Héraclès, lui, avait l'esprit pieux quand il commençait son sacrifice. Tout en jouant, de toute évidence, sur ce contraste entre le religieux et le sauvage, l'auteur tragique semble en même temps jouer sur une analogie entre le sacrifice et le meurtre. Est-il arbitraire de comparer l'évocation du sang et de la graisse des victimes sur l'autel du sacrifice (v. 766) et celle du sang et de la moelle blanche sur l'ilôt où s'est écrasé le crâne de la victime innocente qu'est Lichas (v. 780 – 782)? Ce n'est pas, en tous les cas, le seul passage de la tragédie grecque où l'on rencontrera une analogie entre sacrifice rituel et meurtre humain. Voilà donc un premier exemple de sacrifice qui commence normalement et se termine tragiquement par un meurtre accompli par le sacrifiant en proie à la douleur et au délire. Et ce n'est probablement pas un hasard si dans la tragédie d'Euripide consacrée à Héraclès, comme dans celle de Sophocle, la folie meurtrière du héros se déroule au cours d'un sacrifice.

Mais dans le théâtre d'Euripide la tragédie qui accorde la plus grande place à ce type de sacrifice perversi est tirée d'un autre cycle mythique, celui de la vengeance d'Oreste. C'est en effet dans l'*Electre* d'Euripide que le récit du sacrifice sanglant au cours duquel s'effectue un meurtre est le plus développé. Alors que dans les *Choéphores* d'Eschyle qui traite déjà de la même séquence du mythe, le meurtre d'Egisthe s'effectuait avec une rapidité étonnante et ne donnait lieu à aucun long commentaire, dans l'*Electre* d'Euripide il faut un long récit de plus de cent vers (v. 774 – 858) pour que le messager rapporte à Electre le meurtre d'Egisthe exécuté par Oreste au cours d'un sacrifice qu'Egisthe avait organisé en l'honneur des nymphes. Il s'agit toujours de la même catégorie de sacrifice perversi, puisqu'un sacrifice commencé normalement s'achève par un meurtre. Mais, à la différence des deux sacrifices perversis précédemment vus, ce n'est plus le sacrifiant qui est le meurtrier ; il devient la victime du meurtre. Dès lors, le renversement de la situation dans le cadre du sacrifice est encore plus grand, puisque le sacrifiant qui verse le sang de la victime animale devient la victime dont le sang est versé par le meurtrier. En quelque sorte, le sacrifiant dans le cadre d'un sacrifice rituel devient le sacrifié dans le cadre d'un sacrifice sauvage. L'auteur tragique peut dès lors mieux exploiter les effets de renversement, puisque le même couteau sert à fendre, mais ce qui est fendu c'est d'abord la poitrine de la victime animale et ensuite le dos du sacrifiant : identité de l'instrument qui fend, mais inversion de la partie fendue (poitrine/dos), voilà qui symbolise à la fois la continuité et la rupture entre le sacrifice et le meurtre.³¹

³¹ Euripide, *Electre*, v. 835 sqq. Euripide a mis en parallèle dans cette tragédie deux sacrifices perversis où le sacrificateur devient victime du sacrifice. Clytemnestre qui va faire un sacrifice pour la naissance supposée de l'enfant d'Electre va tomber elle aussi sous le couteau du sacrifice. Euripide établit formellement une analogie entre ces deux sacrifices inversés (v. 1142 – 1144).

Alors que dans cette première catégorie de sacrifices tragiques, le meurtre et le sacrifice restent distincts, dans la seconde catégorie, meurtre et sacrifice se confondent puisque la victime animale est remplacée par une victime humaine. Le meurtre est donc rituel. Ce type de sacrifice humain n'est pas une innovation de la tragédie grecque. Le sacrifice d'Iphigénie accompli par son père Agamemnon pour mettre fin aux vents contraires qui empêchaient l'expédition de la flotte danaënnne pour Troie était attesté déjà dans l'épopée. Il en est question dans le *Catalogue des femmes* hésiodique, avec cette réserve que la fille d'Agamemnon sacrifiée s'appelle Iphimédè, et dans le poème du cycle les *Chants cypriens* de Stasinos, où elle est appelée Iphigénie. Mais dans ces deux versions anciennes, la fille de l'Atride était sauvée par la déesse Artémis. Au contraire, chez Pindare (*Pythique* XI, v. 22 sqq.), la jeune fille est égorgée dans un véritable sacrifice humain. C'est cette dernière version qui a été retenue par Eschyle dans son *Agamemnon* : et bien qu'il s'agisse d'un meurtre rituel, l'évocation du sacrifice par le chœur dans la *parodos* fait ressortir tout ce qu'il y a d'horrible, les appels vains à la pitié de son père, la victime soulevée par les serviteurs sur l'autel, le bâillon qui l'empêche de lancer des imprécations, les regards implorants qu'elle lance à chacun des acteurs du sacrifice, le rappel du passé heureux où elle participait aux rites dans le palais paternel.³² Le rituel n'efface pas la barbarie ; au contraire, la comparaison de la victime humaine avec une chèvre ne fait que faire ressortir le décalage monstrueux entre le sacrifice animal et le sacrifice humain. C'est le même caractère odieux du sacrifice humain que le peintre de vase a voulu rendre dans le sacrifice de Polyxène, sacrifice qui joue un rôle analogue à celui d'Iphigénie, dans la mesure où il nécessaire au retour de la flotte comme celui d'Iphigénie avait été nécessaire à son départ. Le rite est analogue : la jeune fille, fortement maintenue par les assistants, est soulevée au-dessus de l'autel ou du tertre de la tombe ; ce qui souligne le caractère barbare est le sang qui coule de sa gorge ; car dans les sacrifices normaux les peintres de vase se gardent bien de représenter le moment de l'égorgement avec le sang qui coule du cou de l'animal. Ces deux sacrifices humains, avec d'autres, ont été repris par Euripide qui en fit, on le sait, un thème de prédilection. Sans vouloir nous appesantir sur tout le renouvellement qu'implique la transformation des victimes contraintes en victimes volontaires, on notera qu'Euripide s'est efforcé d'effacer dans la mesure du possible ce que le sacrifice humain pouvait avoir de monstrueux ; dans le récit du sacrifice de Polyxène fait à sa mère Hécube, non seulement la vaillance de la jeune fille qui s'offre volontairement à la mort efface l'horreur, mais aussi sa beauté et sa grâce, évoquées avant et après l'égorgement, atténuent la vision du sang qui coule : dans le cas d'Iphigénie, qui termine la série des sacrifices humains traités par Euripide, il pouvait plus facilement encore éliminer l'horreur en revenant à la version épique où une biche a été miraculeusement substituée à la jeune fille, aussi bien dans son *Iphigénie en Tauride* que dans son *Iphigénie à Aulis*. De la sorte, le sacrifice humain devient l'envers de la première catégorie de sacrifices tragiques dont il a été question, celle où le sacrifice animal débouchait sur un meurtre ; en effet, dans le récit de l'*Iphigénie à Aulis*, le sacrifice commencé comme un meurtre redevient un

³² Eschyle, *Agamemnon*, v. 228 sqq.

sacrifice normal. Ce n'est plus le rituel qui bascule dans le monstrueux, mais le monstrueux qui s'efface brusquement pour faire place au rituel.

Malgré la différence qu'il peut y avoir entre ces deux catégories de sacrifices, il reste que la liaison entre meurtre humain et sacrifice reste constante chez les tragiques grecs. Même lorsqu'ils évoquent des meurtres humains qui n'ont pas lieu au cours d'un sacrifice, ils ont tendance à établir des équivalences métaphoriques entre le meurtre et le sacrifice, pour mieux faire ressortir la monstrosité et l'impiété de ces meurtres. C'est le cas en particulier dans l'*Orestie* d'Eschyle. Je n'insisterai pas sur ce dernier point car il a été traité en détail dans un article d'une Américaine Froma I. Zeitlin intitulé « Le motif du sacrifice corrompu dans l'*Orestie* d'Eschyle » paru en 1965 dans le bulletin de l'Association américaine de philologie.³³ Ce que je soulignerai simplement ici c'est que non seulement le vocabulaire du sacrifice, mais aussi celui des libations est employé de façon métaphorique pour désigner un meurtre impie. Je mentionnerai pour cela le passage le plus important, celui où Clytemnestre, après avoir accompli le meurtre d'Agamemnon à l'intérieur du palais représenté par la *skéné*, sort et se glorifie avec une audace inouïe du meurtre qu'elle a accompli (v. 1384 sqq.) : « Je le frappe deux fois, et en deux gémisséments il laissa aller son corps sur place : et une fois qu'il est tombé, je donne en plus un troisième coup, offrande votive au Zeus (mss. à Hadès) souterrain des morts, sauveur ». Depuis longtemps, on a remarqué que ce troisième coup donné est assimilé par Clytemnestre à la troisième libation de vin qui inaugure le banquet et qui est destinée à Zeus sauveur, alors que les deux premières sont destinées respectivement à Zeus Olympien et aux héros. Le rapprochement est d'autant plus justifié que l'on possède un fragment d'Eschyle consacré à une véritable troisième libation dont la formulation est remarquablement proche : « et en troisième lieu une libation votive à Zeus sauveur » τρίτον Διὸς σωτήρος εὐκταίαν Λίβα (Frag. 55 Nauck). La libation rituelle du vin devient ici une libation de sang ; et le Zeus sauveur des vivants devient l'Hadès des morts. Ce tableau sinistre s'oppose au tableau idyllique, évoqué au début de la tragédie, où Iphigénie dans les banquets organisés par son père chantait le péan après la troisième libation. Et je serais tenté de voir dans ce chant de victoire de Clytemnestre après le meurtre d'Agamemnon comparé à une triple libation l'équivalent du péan dans le rite de la triple libation qui inaugure le banquet.

Ce bref essai sur les rites de la libation et du sacrifice dans la tragédie grecque, tout en montrant la continuité malgré quelques innovations dans le rite depuis Homère jusqu'à la tragédie, a volontairement insisté sur les ressources nouvelles que les auteurs tragiques ont su trouver par rapport à Homère dans ces rites en les utilisant, dans les conditions nouvelles de la représentation, à des fins dramaturgiques dans le cas des libations et des sacrifices, à des fins spectaculaires dans le cas des libations et à des fins tragiques dans le cas des sacrifices.

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³³ F. I. ZEITLIN, « The Motif of the Corrupted Sacrifice in Aeschylus' *Orestia* », *Tapha*, 96, 1965, p. 463-508 ; cf. aussi Id., « Postscript to Sacrificial Imagery in the *Oresteia* (Ag. 1235-37) », *Tapha*, 97, 1966, p. 645-653.

DIE POETIK UND PHYSIK DES ARISTOTELES

Es wurde schon früher gezeigt (z. B. Gladigow, Vernant usw.), daß die griechischen Dramatiker die zeitgenössische Philosophie nicht nur kannten, sondern auch unter ihrem Einfluß standen. In den Dramen von Aischylos ist der Pythagoreismus nachzuweisen, und das Wesentliche des dramatischen Konfliktes bei Sophokles ist eine Situation, wo man für und gegen zwei unterschiedliche Lösungen argumentieren kann (z. B. Antigone und Kreon), wie es auch in den zeitgenössischen *Dissoi logoi* zu beobachten ist.

Wenn die Dramatiker sich von den philosophischen Lehren ihrer Zeit nicht unabhängig machen konnten, dann ist es weniger wahrscheinlich, daß Aristoteles, der Philosoph, indem er von der poetischen Kunst der Dramatiker schrieb, die Philosophie, genauer gesagt, seine eigene Philosophie vergessen konnte.

Diese Gedanken vorausschickend, möchte ich die Aufmerksamkeit auf einige interessante Eigentümlichkeiten der Aristotelischen Theorie des Dramas lenken.

Aspekte der Aristotelischen Theorie und Terminologie

Aristoteles sagt, daß eine Handlung dem Drama zugrunde liegt, die einen Umschlag vom Unglück zum Glück oder vom Glück zum Unglück zu Folge hat.¹ Diese Forderung, die auch zur Grundlage einer Definition des Dramas dienen könnte, bestimmt die optimale Länge der Theaterstücke: sie müssen die Länge haben, die dem Vollzug des genannten Umschlages genügt. Der Umfang einer Tragödie ist also nicht von anderen Erwägungen,² sondern von diesem Umschlag (der eine Art Bewegung ist) abhängig.

Ferner muß die Handlung, die dem Drama zugrunde liegt, eine Einheit bilden. Es ist eben diese Einheit, die das Drama vom Epos unterscheidet. Die Epen beschreiben eine verzweigte, vielfältige Handlung.³ Das Drama muß die „Darstellung einer ganzen und in sich abgeschlossenen Handlung“⁴ bieten. Diese Forderung bedeutet, daß das Drama Anfang, Mitte und Ende hat.⁵

¹ Aristoteles: Poetik, 1451 a 13-15: ... εἰς εὐτυχίαν ἐκ δυστυχίας ἢ ἐξ εὐτυχίας εἰς δυστυχίαν μεταβάλλειν...

² a. a. O. 1451 a 5-15.

³ a. a. O. 1451 b 16-35.

⁴ a. a. O. 1450 b 24: τελείας καὶ ὅλης πράξεως... μίμησιν; die deutsche Übersetzung von W. SCHÖNHERR, Leipzig, 1979, Verlag Philipp Reclam, 31.

⁵ a. a. O. 1450 b 26.

Die *dramatis personae*, wenigstens die Haupthelden des Dramas, werden am Anfang und am Ende der Handlung durch *gegensätzliche* Eigenschaften charakterisiert. Diese Feststellung wird einerseits mittelbar auch durch die oben erwähnte Behauptung unterstützt, die besagt, daß das Drama den Umschlag vom Glück zum Unglück und vom Unglück zum Glück darstellt; andererseits wird sie unmittelbar durch die Worte des Aristoteles bewiesen, der, als er die Peripetie erörtert, schreibt, daß sie der Umschwung ins Gegenteil (ἐναντίον) ist.⁶

Ein wesentliches Merkmal dieses Umschlags ist, daß er durch eine Serie von Handlungen entsteht, die eine geschlossene Einheit bilden. Die Einheit der Handlung wird durch die Worte Aristoteles' mittelbar gesichert, die er über Anfang, Mitte und Ende der Fabel sprach, und unmittelbar durch das ganze achte Kapitel, besonders durch seine Einführungs- und Schlußworte.⁷

Der Anfang des Dramas ist nämlich das, was nicht notwendig einem anderen folgt (μὴ ἐξ ἀνάγκης μετ' ἄλλο ἐστί). Hier fängt also die Fabel an, zu ihrem Verständnis brauchen wir nicht, oder nicht notwendigerweise, die Kenntnis der vorausgegangenen Ereignisse. Vom Blickwinkel des Verständnisses und Verlaufes der Handlung aus, können die früheren Geschehnisse außer acht gelassen werden, sie bilden keinen organischen Teil des Dramas.⁸

Mitte ist, „selber Folge des Vorangegangenen ist und zugleich ein anderes als Folge nach sich zieht.“⁹

Ende ist, „was selbst entweder einem anderen notwendig folgen oder beim gewöhnlichen Lauf der Dinge nach einem anderen vorhanden sein muß; auf das Ende folgt nichts anderes.“¹⁰

Ein anderes wesentliches Merkmal der Handlung ist die Kontinuität. Die Kontinuität bedeutet, daß man keinen Teil der einheitlichen und ganzen Handlung weglassen oder umsetzen kann, ohne das Ganze zu zerstören (διαφθείρεσθαι καὶ κινεῖσθαι τὸ ὅλον).¹¹

Die jetzt zitierte Beschreibung muß als Kontinuität gewertet werden, weil Aristoteles drei unterschiedliche Arten der Beziehungen kennt: das Nacheinander (ἐφεξῆς), die Berührung (ἀφή) und die Kontinuität (συνέχεια).¹²

Wenn wir die Reihenfolge der Körper verändern, die hintereinander stehen oder miteinander nur in Berührung stehen, oder wenn wir einen Körper aus der

⁶ a. a. O. 1452 a 22–23: εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον . . . μεταβολή.

⁷ W. SCHÖNHERR, 33: „Die Fabel aber ist nicht, wie manche meinen, dadurch einheitlich (εἰς), daß sie sich um *eine* Person als Helden gruppiert. Denn diesem einen können viele Erlebnisse zustoßen, von denen selbst einige zusammen noch keine Einheit bilden. . . . Wie in den anderen nachahmenden Künsten die dargestellte Handlung Einheitlichkeit hat, so muß auch die Fabel der Tragödie, da sie die Nachahmung einer Handlung ist, eine Nachahmung einer *einheitlichen* und in sich vollständigen Begebenheit bieten. Ihre Teile müssen einen derartig geschlossenen Zusammenhang haben, daß bei Umsetzen oder Wegnehmen eines ihrer Teile das Ganze in Unordnung gerät.“

⁸ a. a. o. 1450 b 27–28.

⁹ a. a. O. 31–32: ὁ καὶ αὐτὸ μετ' ἄλλο καὶ μετ' ἐκεῖνο ἕτερον.

¹⁰ a. a. O. 29–30: μετ' ἄλλο πέφυκεν εἶναι . . . ἢ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἢ ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο ἄλλο οὐδέν.

¹¹ a. a. O. 1451 a 30–35.

¹² Aristoteles: Physika 226 b 35–227 a 28.

Gesamtheit der sich so verhaltenden Körper herausnehmen, dann geht das Ganze nicht zugrunde. Demgegenüber bedeutet die Umsetzung eines Teiles des kontinuierlichen Körpers das Ende des Ganzen. Die Definition der Kontinuität besagt nämlich, daß die Grenzen ihrer Teile eine und dieselben sind.¹³ Sollten die Teile umgesetzt oder herausgenommen werden, würden eben die gemeinsamen Grenzen der Teile verschwinden.

Unsere Folgerung wird durch die Worte Aristoteles' unterstützt, der in einem anderen Zusammenhang schreibt, daß die „Handlung gemäß der obigen Definition innerlich zusammenhängend und einheitlich ist“.¹⁴ In der Übersetzung steht das Wort „zusammenhängend“ für das griechische *συνεχής*, das der gewöhnliche Termin für die *Kontinuität* ist.

Im Laufe der Darlegungen, die bis jetzt zitiert wurden, gebraucht Aristoteles oft die Termini *μεταβάλλειν* und *μεταβολή*.¹⁵ Dieser Terminus spielt eine wichtige Rolle in Aristoteles' Physik, wo er sich auf eine Art der Bewegung, auf die Veränderung bezieht.¹⁶

Wenn wir bedenken, daß das Glück oder das Unglück die Eigenschaften eines Subjekts sind, die seine Qualitäten beschreiben, dann müssen wir gemäß der Aristotelischen Theorie der Physik, die besagt, daß Bewegung nur in den Kategorien der Substanz, der Quantität, der Qualität und des Ortes möglich ist¹⁷ bestätigen, daß die dem Drama zugrunde liegende Veränderung (*metabole*) letzten Endes eine sich in der Kategorie der Qualität vollziehende Bewegung ist. Die Bewegung in der Kategorie der Qualität, wie auch die anderen Arten der Bewegung, sind auf die Ortsveränderung als Grundform aller Bewegungen zurückzuführen, wie Aristoteles behauptet.¹⁸

Kann man die Verbindungen zwischen Ästhetik und Physik im jetzt dargelegten Sinne nachweisen? Wenn wir die Texte gründlicher ins Auge fassen, dann sieht es so aus, daß die Antwort *ja* sein muß.

Vor allem darf der Umstand unserer Aufmerksamkeit nicht entgehen, daß die physische Bewegung, wie auch die Handlung in einem Drama, von einem Gegensatz (*ἐναντίον*) zu einem anderen Gegensatz fortschreitet.¹⁹ Eine Bewegung in der Qualität ist diejenige, die von der Gesundheit zur Krankheit, wie auch diejenige, die von der Krankheit zur Gesundheit fortschreitet. Die Bewegung vollzieht sich zwischen zwei Termini, von einem Glied zu dem anderen eines Gegensatzpaares.²⁰ Aristoteles kennzeichnet die zwei Endpunkte der physischen Bewegung ebenso mit dem Wort

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¹³ Aristoteles: Physika 227 a 10–15.

¹⁴ Aristoteles: Poetik 1452 a 14–16: λέγω δὲ ἀπλὴν μὲν πρᾶξιν ἢς γινομένης ὥσπερ ὥρισται συνεχοῦς καὶ μᾶς ...

¹⁵ Z. B. 1452 a 22–23: ... τὸ ἐναντίον τῶν πραττομένων μεταβολή ... Ferner auch: Aristoteles Poetik, Einleitung ... Kommentar von A. Gudemas, Berlin–Leipzig 1934, 220.

¹⁶ Z. B.: Aristoteles: Physik 235 b 6: Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ μεταβάλλον ἐκ τινος εἰς τι μεταβάλλει ...; vgl.: Poetik, 1451 a 13–15: ... εἰς εὐτυχίαν ἐκ δυστυχίας ἢ ἐξ εὐτυχίας εἰς δυστυχίαν μεταβάλλειν ...

¹⁷ Physika 261 a 27–36: De generatione et corruptione 315 a 28, usw.

¹⁸ Physika 243 a 11, 260 a 23.

¹⁹ Physika 229 a 28–29: Λέιπεται δ' ἢ εἰς ἐναντία, καὶ ἢ εἰς ἐναντία ἐξ ἐναντίων; vgl. Poetik 1452 a 22–23: εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον ... μεταβολή.

²⁰ Physika 229 b 30 und ff. Z.

ἐναντίον, wie es auch im Falle des Dramas zu beobachten ist. Über die Endpunkte der physischen Bewegung sagt der Text, daß sie gegensätzlich sind.²¹ Auf ähnliche Weise sind auch die Bewegungen von oben nach unten, von unten nach oben, von rechts nach links, von links nach rechts gegensätzlich: die ersteren der Höhe, die letzteren der Breite nach.²²

Zwischen den zwei Endpunkten ist etwas in der Mitte zu finden. Die Veränderung erreicht zuerst die Mitte als einen Gegensatz,²³ wie die weiße Farbe zuerst grau und erst dann schwarz wird. Die Wendung ὅσοις τῶν ἐναντίων ἔστι μεταξύ legt nahe, daß eine Mitte dieser Art nicht im Falle aller Bewegungen zu beobachten ist.

Diese erwähnte Mitte (τὸ μεταξύ) mancher Bewegungen ist parallel zu der *peripetie* oder *anagnorisis*, die in einer Gruppe der Dramen vorhanden sind.²⁴ Die genannten zwei Elementen sind in den sogenannten „verflochtenen“ Dramen zu finden, sie fehlen aber in den pathetischen, ethischen Dramen ebenso wie auch in der vierten Art der Dramen. Wenn wir A. Gudeman Glauben schenken dürfen, dann muß ein Wendepunkt auch in den drei letztgenannten Arten vorhanden sein, seine Natur unterscheidet sich aber von der der *Peripetie* und *anagnorisis*.²⁵

Aristoteles hat also Recht, wenn er behauptet, daß ein Drama Anfang, Mitte und Ende haben muß. Alle Bewegungen müssen nämlich Anfang und Ende haben (diese bedeuten die genannten Gegensätze: ἐναντία), die durch eine Mitte (μέσον) zusammengebunden sind. Die zwei Begriffe, τὸ μέσον und τὸ μεταξύ (das der *Peripetie* und *anagnorisis* entspricht), sind voneinander zu unterscheiden. Das μεταξύ ist nämlich ebenso nur in manchen Arten der Bewegung vorhanden, wie auch nur in manchen Dramen. (Ein bekanntes Beispiel für die Veränderung, die kein μεταξύ hat, ist die Entstehung und das Vergehen.)

Die physische Bewegung und die Handlung des Dramas sind nicht nur in dem Sinne ähnlich, daß sie von einem Gegensatz zu anderem Gegensatz über eine Mitte vorwärtsschreiten, sondern auch in dem Sinne, daß die physische Bewegung eine in sich geschlossene Einheit bildet, die mit dem Vorausgegangenen und der Fortsetzung nicht organisch verbunden ist. Wenn wir die physische Bewegung (oder die Handlung des Dramas) untersuchen und verstehen wollen, brauchen wir keine Kenntnisse über die früheren und späteren Zustände (oder Ereignisse) zu haben.

Die am Anfang und Ende geschlossene Einheit der physischen Bewegung wird durch die Begriffe *Aktualität* und *Potentialität* gesichert.

Mit Hilfe dieser Begriffe definiert Aristoteles die Bewegung: sie ist die kontinuierliche Aktualisierung oder Realisierung einer Potentialität. In diesem Sinne ist die Bewegung mit der Veränderung der Dinge, die sich verändern können, identisch.²⁶

Mit anderen Worten bedeutet das, daß die Untersuchung der Bewegung durch unser oben erwähntes Beispiel veranschaulicht von der langen Periode der Gesund-

²¹ a. a. O. 229 b 35: Ἀμα δὲ καὶ ἀλλήλαις ἐναντίαι αὐται.

²² a. a. O. 229 b 7–9.

²³ a. a. O. 229 b 15–21: Τὰς δὲ εἰς τὸ μεταξύ κινήσεις, ὅσοις τῶν ἐναντίων ἔστι μεταξύ, ὡς εἰς ἐναντία πῶς θετέον. . .

²⁴ Vgl. was im Kapitel XVIII der Poetik über die vier Arten der Dramen geschrieben wurde.

²⁵ A. GUDEMAN: a. a. O. 316–317.

²⁶ Physika 201 a 10 ff.

heit vor der Krankheit absehen kann, weil sie vom Blickwinkel des Krankheitsprozesses (das ist vom Blickwinkel der untersuchten Bewegung) irrelevant ist. Die Bewegung selbst fängt an, wenn sich die potentielle Krankheit zu verwirklichen beginnt, und endet, wenn die Krankheit die vollkommene Aktualität erreicht und die Gesundheit restlos aufhört.²⁷

Der Prozeß der Aktualisierung der potentiellen Eigenschaft oder des potentiellen Zustandes ist die Bewegung, wie der Aktualisierungsprozeß des möglichen Unglücks auch im Drama mit der dramatischen Handlung identisch ist. Der Aktualisierungsprozeß ist wahrscheinlich von den früheren Ereignissen und Zuständen nicht vollkommen unabhängig, der Bewegungsprozeß selbst kann aber von den früheren und späteren Phasen abstrahiert, an sich untersucht und verstanden werden. In diesem Sinne ist die Aktualisierung einer Möglichkeit, die sowohl die Bewegung als auch die dramatische Handlung sein kann, eine geschlossene und unabhängige Einheit.

Die Handlung als eine Art Bewegung. Die Folgen der Theorie

Es ist allgemein bekannt, daß Aristoteles, als er mit den Aporien Zenons polemisierte, eine Theorie der physischen Bewegung ausarbeitete, die verlangt, daß der Weg, die mit ihm parallele Bewegung und die für die Bewegung notwendige Zeit auf die gleiche Weise kontinuierlich sind. Die Definition der Kontinuität bedeutet, daß alle Punkte des Weges und der mit ihm parallel verlaufenden Zeit, das ist das *Hier* und *Jetzt*, den gemachten Weg und die vergangene Zeit schließen, gleichzeitig aber die nächste Phase beginnen. Das *Jetzt* beendet die Vergangenheit, aber gleichzeitig beginnt die Zukunft. Der sich bewegende Körper, wenn er sich *hier* aufhält, befindet sich gleichzeitig in der zurückgelegten und in der noch zurückzulegenden Strecke.

Mit dem Weg und mit der Zeit ist selbst die Bewegung in demselben Sinne kontinuierlich.

Aufgrund dieser Erwägungen behauptet Aristoteles, daß die zu derselben Spezies gehörende Bewegung einheitlich ist, sich in derselben Zeit vollzieht, kontinuierlich ist, das heißt, sie wird durch Unbeweglichkeit nicht unterbrochen.²⁸

Die Physik von Aristoteles sagt ausdrücklich, daß die Bewegungen unter einer Kategorie zu einem Genus gehören. Alle Veränderungen in der Qualität gehören also zu einem Genus, und in diesem Genus gelten alle Veränderungen, die zu einem *eidos* gehören, als eine Bewegung (eine Bewegung in der Art).

Die Handlung eines Dramas gehört zum *eidos* der Veränderung im Glück bzw. Unglück. Sie ist ein *genos* der Qualitätsveränderungen, folglich sind alle Charakteristika des *genos* auch im Falle des *eidos* notwendigerweise gültig: Die Handlung eines Dramas stellt sich als eine Qualitätsveränderung dar, sie läßt sich als eine *alloiosis* beschreiben.

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²⁷ a. a. O. 201 a 10–201 b 6.

²⁸ a. a. O. 228 b 1 ff.

Kurz können wir das Gesagte auf die folgende Weise zusammenfassen: Die Handlung des Dramas läßt sich als eine in der Physik bekannte Bewegung, die unter dem Namen Qualitätsveränderung (*alloiosis*) bekannt ist, qualifizieren. Die Handlung ist die künstliche Darstellung der speziellen Bewegung vom Glück zum Unglück oder vom Unglück zum Glück.

Diese Bewegung wird durch diejenigen Merkmale charakterisiert, die auch die physischen Bewegungen charakterisieren (sie vollzieht sich zwischen zwei Gegensätzen über eine Mitte, sie bildet eine geschlossene, kontinuierliche Einheit, die ohne die Kenntnisse der früheren und späteren Ereignisse restlos zu deuten ist). Es liegt auf der Hand, anzunehmen, daß all diese Feststellungen der Physik eine Bedeutung im Hinblick auf die Handlung haben, obwohl Aristoteles sie in Lehrsätzen nicht darlegt. Die Verwendung der gemeinsamen Terminologie sowohl in der Physik als auch in der Poetik erlaubt uns aber, einen gemeinsamen theoretischen Hintergrund in den genannten zwei Büchern nachzuweisen oder wenigstens vorauszusetzen.

In diesem Zusammenhang ist es sehr wichtig, was Aristoteles im vierten Kapitel des fünften Buches der Physik sagt. Hier behauptet er, daß etwas, was sich bewegt, existieren muß, es muß aber auch etwas anderes existieren, worin sich die Bewegung vollzieht (das kann der Ort, die Qualität usw. sein), und die Bewegung muß in einer gewissen Zeit stattfinden.²⁹ Er setzt sofort hinzu, daß die Einheit der Bewegung die Einheit des sich bewegenden Subjekts verlangt, die Einheit der Zeit in der Bewegung (das heißt: die Ununterbrochenheit der Bewegungszeit) und die Einheit dessen, worin sich die Bewegung stattfindet.

Aristoteles verlangt nicht ausdrücklich die Gültigkeit all dieser Arten der Einheit in der Poetik, gibt aber Hinweise, die einem aufmerksamen Leser, der seine Physik kennt, mehr als genügen.

Wie wir oben gesehen haben, betonte Aristoteles in Kapitel 8³⁰ die Einheitlichkeit der Handlung. Diese Forderung ist so augenfällig im Text beinhaltet, daß ihre Gültigkeit weder in der Antike noch in der modernen Zeit bestritten wurde.³¹

Diese Forderung wurde mit einer anderen Maxime in Kapitel 5 ergänzt: Die Tragödie versucht, die im Spiel dargestellte Handlung möglichst innerhalb eines Sonnenumlaufes zu entwickeln.³²

Einheit der Handlung, Einheit der Zeit zogen notwendigerweise auch die Einheit des Ortes nach sich. Aristoteles hat diese Maxime, im Gegensatz zu den jetzt

²⁹ a. a. O. 227 b 24–35.

³⁰ 1451 a 32: μιᾷς τε εἶναι καὶ ταύτης ὅλης.

³¹ Hier möchte ich mich nur auf einen Kommentar berufen: S. HALLIWELL: *The Poetics of Aristotle*. Translation and Commentary, London, 1987, 103: „In chapter 8 a unified plot is said to portray a *single* action . . . ” 104: „If we ask, then, whether a plot-structure portrays ‘one thing’ or more than one, the answer must be: both, depending on how these terms are interpreted. Aristotle regards true artistic unity as yielding an essentially single object (in poetry’s case, a single action) for our contemplation, but at the same time residing in a complete cohesion of several parts.” Und S. 105 eine für uns wichtige Äußerung, deren philosophischen Hintergrund ich in dieser Arbeit aufzuzeigen versuche: „The reason for this clearly lies at a very deep level in the philosopher’s outlook”.

³² 1449 b 13: πειράται ὑπὸ μίαν περίοδον ἡλίου εἶναι. S. H. BUTCHER: *Aristotle’s Theory of Poetry and Fine Art*, New York, 1951, 291–297.

erwähnten zwei anderen Einheiten, nicht formuliert, sie entstammt dem Kommentar von Castelvetro.³³ Die Aristotelische Theorie der Bewegung setzte voraus, daß das sich bewegende Subjekt eine einheitliche, ununterbrochene, kontinuierliche Bewegung in einer ununterbrochenen, kontinuierlichen Zeitspanne auf einer ununterbrochenen, kontinuierlichen Bahn vollzieht. Die „ununterbrochene, kontinuierliche Bahn“ heißt mit anderen Worten die „Einheit des Ortes“.

Zusammenfassend können wir sagen, daß

1. Aristoteles die dramatische Handlung analog zu der physischen Bewegung verstand.

2. Später haben die Literaturtheoretiker (Scaliger, Castelvetro usw.) die diesbezüglichen Aristotelischen Hinweise systematisch ausgebaut. Ihre Theorie (die Einheit der Handlung, der Zeit und des Ortes) ist zwar in der Poetik in der bekannten Form nicht wörtlich nachzuweisen, sie liegt aber im Keime vor und ist mit der Aristotelischen Philosophie kompatibel.

³³ BUTCHER: a. a. O. 291: The formal recognition of the *Unity of Place* dates from Castelvetro's first edition of *Poetics* in 1570. L. Castelvetro: *Poetica d'Aristotele vulgarizzata e sposta*, ed. W. ROMANI, I. Roma-Bari, 1978, 148-149: Aristotele parla specialmente dello spazio che può al più occupare la tragedia, che è un giro del sole, là dove lo spazio dell'azione dell'epopea non è determinato . . . la tragedia, la quale conviene avere per soggetto un'azione avvenuta in picciolo spazio di luogo e in picciolo spazio di tempo, cioè in quel luogo e in quel tempo dove e quando i rappresentatori dimorano occupati in operazione, e non altrove né in altro tempo.

IUDICIUM DOCTI INDOCTIQUE

However easy it is for the reader to lose his way in the long catalogues of the *Brutus*, Cicero keeps on making him bear in mind that what he tries to present is a survey of the development of a genre. True, it may at times be better to call it a prehistory of eloquence. Despite the copious parallels between the history of Roman oratory and that of Greek sculpture, painting and oratory, he never throws doubts on the fact that there is some difference between, say, Cato and Lysias.¹ But, there can be no doubt, after a certain point, namely, Crassus' and Antonius' emergence, that the art of public speaking in the strict sense of the word had been established in Rome.² The idea of progress was indispensable for Cicero. For one thing, he wanted to show Brutus (and perhaps all the younger generation) that what he had achieved rested on imitating and surpassing the exemplars he used to listen to in his youth in the forum.³ After such a long time it might have seemed somewhat strange even to Cicero himself that those were the speakers he had once admired so devotedly, but he did not abandon them.⁴ And now in the second half of the fifties, it was his turn. He had some earnest but insignificant followers,⁵ but there were more orators who adopted other ways of addressing an audience and others who were trying to outdo him by openly rejecting his standards of excellence.⁶ This alone must have been an unpleasant experience for Cicero; he found it unjustifiable: they had no idea whatsoever what the tradition of Roman oratory was, how it evolved

¹ See his final remarks on Cato's characteristics (*nondum esse satis politum hunc oratorem*, Br. 69) and his reply to Atticus' dissent (*Equidem in quibusdam risum vix tenebam, cum Attico Lysiae Catonem nostrum comparabas*, Br. 293; *etsi tu melius existumare videris de ea, si quam nunc habemus, facultate, tamen adulescentes quid in Latinis potius imitemur non habebamus*, Br. 298) and a more general statement in the *Or.* (in *Bruto*, multum tribuerim Latinis, vel ut hortarer alios vel quod amarem meos, *Or.* 23).

² in his *primum cum Graecorum gloria Latine dicendi copiam aequatam*, Br. 138.

³ *Reliqui qui tum principes numerabantur in magistratibus erant cotidieque fere a nobis in contionibus audiebantur*, Br. 305; *Duo tum excellebant oratores qui me imitandi cupiditate incitarent, Cotta et Hortensius*, Br. 317; cf. also Br. 122; 298 (note 1); 302 and 307.

⁴ He says of one of Curio's orations: *Nobis quidem pueris haec omnium optima putabatur, quae iam vix comparet in hac turba novorum voluminum*, Br. 122, but observe that, despite the acknowledged inferiority of his Roman predecessors and Cato, he responds to Atticus: *Nec in hoc εἰρωνα με δuxeris esse, quod eam orationem mihi magistrum fuisse dixerim*, Br. 298.

⁵ Quintilian (XII 11, 6) mentions Pansa, Hirtius, Dolabella (cf. *Ad fam.* IX 16, 7; IX 18; VII 33) and Caelius (cf. *Pro Caelio* 4) though the last one turned out to be a less "satisfactory pupil" (A. D. LEEMAN: *Orationis ratio*, p. 136–8, Amsterdam 1963).

⁶ While Calpidius, Caesar, Cato, Brutus and Asinius Pollio can be named as belonging to the first mentioned, Calvus with his followers and some other Atticists whom we can identify only by the Greek ideals they followed can be related to those I have mentioned second.

from its origins to its height and who had contributed to its development.⁷ They caused him, however, discomfort as well. The ideals they resorted to were partly shared by Cicero too, and the standards they required were partly used by him to judge a speech and measure progress in oratory. Cicero had to see his rivals criticize him for what he considered to be his main achievement. He thought his speeches could compete with the Attic models whose exemplariness he had never doubted, and his critics found his style not Attic enough.⁸ This led him to give an account of his view of what was truly Attic, that is, perfect oratory and how this differs from his opponents' conception of it. In outline, this can already be found in *De oratore* and a summary can also be read in the *Brutus*, but is given its full shape in the *Orator*.⁹ What we have in the *Brutus* is partly another aspect of the debate: the clash of two different conceptions of how to judge a speech. For the orators who held different views on the highest standard of Attic eloquence to that of Cicero (and even to those of one another¹⁰) had one thing in common.¹¹ For them, it is this standard embodied in Attic oratory by which any piece of oratory must be measured. Practical influence and popularity can be taken into account only in the second place and this kind of success or failure cannot alter its artistic value.¹² Cicero, of course, had to challenge this way of judging a speech, which was very likely directed against his practice.

In this paper I would like to show how many alternatives he had in reconciling the verdict of experts and that of laymen and how he still decided to forge a *new*

⁷ *ea in nostris inscitia est, quod hi ipsi, qui in Graecis antiquitate delectantur eaque subtilitate, quam Atticam appellant, hanc in Catone ne noverunt quidem. Br. 67.* Even Brutus' historical knowledge is deficient but he shows willingness to learn (*video mihi multa legenda iam te auctore quae antea contemnebam, Br. 123*); see also 133 and 161.

⁸ *parum antiquus (Atticus: Corr. Ursinus; Tac. Dial. 18; see also Q. XII 10, 12 ff and his own reports (Br. 82–7; 289f; Or. 23ff; 89).* Some of his non-Attic features are admitted even by Quintilian (X 1, 107); cf. M. WINTERBOTTOM: Cicero and the Silver Age, in: *Eloquence et rhétorique chez Cicéron, Entretiens sur l'Antiquité Classique, Tome XXVIII, 258ff (Vandoeuvres—Genève 1981).* On the orators thinking that they were more authentic and faithful followers of the Attic examples see F. BLASS: *Die griechische Beredsamkeit in dem Zeitraum von Alexander bis Augustus (Berlin 1865);* LEEMAN (1963) 138–67, whose judgements can be contrasted with the sober assessment of G. KENNEDY: *The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World (Princeton 1972);* T. GELZER: *Klassizismus, Attizismus und Asianismus, in: Le classicisme à Rome, Entr. Tome XXV, 1–55 (Vandoeuvres—Genève 1978)* and G. W. BOWERSOCK: *Historical Problems in Late Republican and Augustan Classicism, ib. 57–78.*

⁹ In the *Br.* cf. A. DOUGLAS' introduction in his edition (Oxford 1966).

¹⁰ Apart from the followers of Lysias and Hyperides (*Br. 67–8; Or. 29*) there were imitators of Thucydides (*Or. 30*) and of Xenophon (*Or. 32*) as well; see also *De opt. gen. or. 15.*

¹¹ This does not mean that they formed a single coterie or movement. Yet it is reasonable to suppose something common shared by all of them if Cicero treats them as like-minded.

¹² This view is a slightly softened version of what Cicero makes them hold. For it is very unlikely that an orator's *aim* is to please only the experts (this is what Cicero sometimes suggests; cf. *Br. 283–4*) and he does not abandon speaking before a lay audience. In Calvus' case the evidence seems to exclude any assumption of abandoning oral delivery. Neither have we any indication of their paying special care to the written form of speeches, that is, the obvious means of communicating with the experts. But if we withhold all consent to what Cicero says, then we have to explain a more difficult question: what was the point for Cicero in disputing statements that had been never made? Cf. KENNEDY (1972) 242 and A. DOUGLAS: *Intellectual Background of Cicero's Rhetorica, ANRW 1973(3), 95–138.* About Calvus' *vis* in delivery see A. DOUGLAS: *M. Calidius and the Atticists, CQ 1955 (49), 241ff.*

answer. First, I will place the problem in the context of the *Brutus*. Why and how did it emerge in this work (Ch. I)? Then, I will give a short analysis of Cicero's answer (Ch. II). In order to make its novelty more evident, I will try to sketch the history of the problem in poetry with a side-glimpse to other arts (Ch. III) and in rhetoric (Ch. IV). Finally, a more detailed interpretation of Cicero's solution will be given, in which I will argue that his theory is not so inconsistent and not so banal as had been claimed (Ch. V).

1. THE DIFFERING JUDGEMENTS ON ROMAN ORATORS OF PREVIOUS GENERATIONS BY THE EXPERTS AND BY THE LAY AUDIENCE

In writing about authors who had lived before his time, Cicero had to face the difficulty of deciding between different possible evaluations of orators. He could get information on their speeches in two ways. Either from the written texts if they had survived or from contemporaries' judgements and the accounts of them maintained by historical works or oral tradition. Having both the speech and the record of its reception, he must obviously have felt the temptation of comparing his opinion to the elders'. How did Cicero do it? He showed not much concern for discovering whether these speeches deserved or not their praise or disapproval. A pure historical interest in elucidating their characteristics from their historical circumstances, of course, would have been very alien to him, but it is worth noticing that there are two cases where some historical sensitivity of his can be observed.¹³ His main concern was to bring to light every oratorical virtue of the previous times that could serve as an example for any would-be orator any time, and could be praised even by the standard he demanded from an orator. So the problem came up when his judgement of a written speech was unlike, or more precisely, more unfavourable than that of the contemporaries.¹⁴

P. Rutilius Rufus acquainted Cicero with a story about Serv. Galba and Laelius.¹⁵ In defense of *publicani* after his rather unsuccessful speech, Scipio's friend realized that he was incapable of producing such powerful and vehement oration as his defendants' case needed. He turned to Galba, of whose gift for arousing compassionate emotions he was well aware, and thought highly of. After one day of vigorous preparations and meditations, Galba stood before the judges, and delivering an irresistible speech, won them over. In Cicero's time, on the other hand, both Galba's and Laelius' works were available. Reading them, Cicero, like Brutus or perhaps anyone who had some education in rhetoric, was puzzled by how Galba managed to become a more efficient and popular orator than Laelius or even Scipio.

¹³ In connection with Cato (*ad nostrorum temporum rationem vetus*, Br. 69) and of Curio (Br. 122, see note 4); cf. DOUGLAS' introduction (xl-xli) (1966).

¹⁴ C. Fannius is the only exception (99-100) whose reputation was inferior to his written speeches.

¹⁵ *me ex P. Rutilio Rufo audivisse* (85), though G. L. HENDRICKSON: 'The Memoirs of Rutilius Rufus', CPh XXV111 (1933) 153ff thinks of a written source.

Theoretically there were several ways of explaining this disparity.¹⁶ The most unpleasant thing for Cicero would have been to admit, that from the point of view of a sort of eternity and by the measure of sound cultivated taste, the emotional type of speaking which Galba pursued was of lower value than Laelius' ideal of elaborate und emotional style. But if we do not assume, and perhaps we should not, that Cicero distorted the most important details of the story, even Laelius himself seems to have acknowledged his own limitations, without any contempt for a type of oratory which appealed to passions.¹⁷ It is not, however, completely unreasonable to expect Cicero to make concessions that speeches with emotional impacts on the audience must be judged in a different way. Later, in the *Orator*, he did not try to challenge Aischines' criticism of certain phrases of Demosthenes but pointed out another way of accepting them. They should not be seen out of the emotional context that the orator carefully created or independently of the state of emotion that he established in his audience.¹⁸

In Galba's case, however, he did not choose this line of defence. Neither did he use as a recourse the unsophisticated and unpolished taste of contemporary listeners and readers. Admitting this, though, he should not have given up his support for the paramount importance of the vehement style. He simply should have drawn a sharp distinction between its ideal form and Galba's realization of it. If we consider that all this happened at the beginnings of the genre, it would have been very natural for him, we might think, to do this. Moreover, it can be inferred from some of his expressions that, in his judgement, the audience of that age had to improve in some respects.¹⁹ Following this course of argument, we could also recall that Laelius' style did not depend so much on the audience. All these factors could have explained credibly why the appraisal of the two orators had been reversed. Galba's popularity among his coevals could easily have been made intelligible, posterity's favour of Laelius' more appealing written speeches might have been justified and the primacy of the emotional style would not have been in danger.

Cicero, however, had a different kind of solution in mind. There is no need to assume an unrefined audience for Galba's text. The discrepancy must be sought between Galba's oral production and the written version of it.²⁰ For there is one

¹⁶ DOUGLAS (1966) (xvi and 74–80) gives a different interpretation to the one below. As it will be seen, I think Cicero's solution, though not identical, is not inconsistent with the argumentation in chapters 183–200.

¹⁷ *se arbitrari causam illam a Ser. Galba, quod is in dicendo ardentior acriorque esset, gravius et vehementius posse defendi*. Br. 86. There is only a slight resentment, if any, in Laelius, as DOUGLAS (1966) citing H. HILL: *The Roman Middle Class* (Oxford 1952) suggests, p. 75, but see A. D. LEEMAN–H. P. PINKSTER: *M. T. Cicero: De oratore libri III*, 2. Band (Heidelberg 1985) p. 148. The contrast, however, is evident with Galba's own defence narrated by Rutilius, though Rutilius' criticism is seen as inappropriate by Antonius (*De or.* 1, 227–8).

¹⁸ *Facile est enim verbum aliquod ardens, ut ita dicam notare, idque restinctis iam animorum incendiis irridere. Itaque se purgare iocatur Demosthenes; negat in eo positas esse fortunas Graeciae hocine an illo verbo usus sit, huc an illuc manum porrexerit*. Or. 22.

¹⁹ *nondum tritis nostrorum hominum auribus nec erudita civitate*. Br. 124.

²⁰ *videmus alios ... nihil scripsisse ... quod melius putent dicere se posse quam scribere, quod peringeniosis hominibus neque satis doctis plerumque contingit, ut ipsi Galbae*. Br. 91–2.

more thing not to forget, says Cicero: putting down a speech solitarily requires a totally different gift than delivering it before a responsive crowd.²¹ The more the speaker relies on making contact with the audience, especially arousing its emotions for his success, the more obvious it becomes. So, the reason why he put Galba behind Laelius, notwithstanding his appeal to his public is that he lacked the ability to revive the situation in which he had addressed the audience and the emotions he had then excited.

Cicero's argument is convincing. It also has the advantage of being impossible even for Cicero's contemporaries to verify.²² Apart from saving Galba's fame as a great speaker, what he gained by adopting this line of reasoning was that he managed to save the sound judgement of Galba's audience. This is a crucial point. The natural correctness of the judgement of the lay audience will serve as a starting point in Cicero's most comprehensive analysis, in the excursus of *Brutus* 183–200. Cicero's and the experts' opinion of the written versions, on the other hand, of course, did not change. And this verdict did not agree with the popular one. But the two kinds of judgement are based not on the same achievements. The problem, as treated in *Brutus* 86–94, is not solved but temporarily evaded.²³ Cicero put off his theoretical answer, probably because he was writing about speakers he had not listened to personally. But there were orators who thought it inevitable, or at least, natural that one cannot get the approval of both connoisseurs and laymen at the same time. He did not wait till his opponents' turn came in the course of his historical account of orators. After a long preparation made in a casual way²⁴ he set forth his own theory in connection with orators who had lived long before the problem emerged.

II. THE EXCURSUS IN *BRUTUS* 183–200: CICERO'S MAIN POINT

The suitable moment to do this was presented by Atticus. Mildly surprised by an expression²⁵ which is at first sight no more than a common way of gradation (*Cotta et Sulpicius cum meo iudicio tum omnium facile primas*

²¹ *cum otiosus stilum prehenderat motusque omnis animi tamquam ventus hominem defecerat, flaccescebat oratio. Br. 93.*

²² What if it had turned out that Galba's speeches had been put down more or less in the same way as they had been heard?

²³ A same sort of double assessment can be observed concerning Ti. Gracchus and C. Carbo: *Sed fuit uterque summus orator. Atque hoc memoria patrum teste dicimus. Nam et Carbonis et Gracchi habemus orationes nondum satis splendidae verbis, sed acutae prudentiaeque plenissimas. Br. 103–4.* but their comparative evaluation did not require an explanation or reversing. So, a slight hint at the possibility of progress (*nondum satis splendidae*) was sufficient to make the discrepancy intelligible.

²⁴ Cicero seizes every opportunity to illustrate the point he is going to make: in order to judge an orator one should begin with observing his power to be effective but there are different levels as to how success is achieved: *L. Cassius multum potuit non eloquentia, sed dicendo tamen. 97; Catulus . . . erat talis, ut cum quosdam audires qui tum erant praestantes, videretur esse inferior, cum autem ipsum audires sine comparatione, non modo contentus esses, sed melius non quaereres. 134; cf. also 122 (C. Curio); 127 (C. Galba); 173 (L. Philippus); 220 (C. Curio); 227 (P. Antistius); 234 (Cn. Lentulus), the last three examples taking up the same motive.*

²⁵ Cicero never conceals that his friend has a different opinion on Roman oratory; apart from this passage, see 292–7.

tulerunt). Atticus interrupts him: (is it only a simple figure of speech²⁶ that you said now and) do you think it is a general rule that the judgement of an expert and that of the masses are in agreement or (Cotta and Sulpicius are a special case and you put a strong emphasis on it by using this figure and so) it is conceivable that the two kinds of judgement can be at odds with each other? *Semperne in oratore probando aut improbando vulgi iudicium cum intelligentium iudicio congruit, an alii probantur a multitudine, alii autem ab iis, qui intelligunt?*²⁷

Cicero states as firmly as possible that these two should always be in harmony (and thus admits that his figure was only an ornament, though on another level we can see that it was more than a flourish: it served as a provocation to elicit his theory). The consensus is ensured by the fact that the judgement of the experts always *follows* the verdict of the lay-audience. If the masses are pleased by an orator, the expert has to assent to the production: *necesse est, qui ita dicat ut a multitudine probetur, eundem doctis probari*. And if the orator fails to satisfy his audience, the expert has no choice but to form an unfavourable judgement on him, too: *illud quod populo non probatur, ne intellegenti quidem auditori probari potest*.²⁸

It has been stated that even the question Cicero had to answer had been never been put before, or at least, not in the field of oratory.²⁹ His solution was certainly original, though, we are told, not a successful one – just have a look at some awkward repetitions and inconsistencies in his exposition.³⁰ As to the statement about the novelty, I would not like to dispute its correctness. I do challenge, on the other hand, the opinion that what explains some undeniably conflicting or paradoxical expressions and remarks of his is his failure to give a plausible clarification of what happens or should happen in a rhetorical discourse between the orator and his twofold audience.

It cannot be disputed that, despite Cicero's definite first sentences mentioned above, the way of establishing his position is not explicit in every respect. In order to make his point, he picks up tenets and doctrines as if they were obviously and unanimously accepted and even the modern reader tends to take them for granted. So we have to make explicit his silently held assumptions and to detect not only what he says but what he suggests by these implications and what lies behind his options as well. Besides, we will meet instances where Cicero overreaches himself in stressing his own opinion.

What is then the most striking peculiarity of Cicero's standpoint? Undoubtedly, it is the strong emphasis on the totally different ways of how the lay-audience and connoisseurs make judgements which necessarily have to coincide. What happens to the lay-audience is something primary and what happens to the experts is

²⁶ The idea itself has already occurred in 143 (*Huic* <sc. Antonio> *alii parem esse dicebant, alii anteponebant L. Crassum. Illud quidem certe omnes ita iudicabant, neminem esse, qui horum altero utro patrono cuiusquam ingenium requireret.*)

²⁷ *Br.* 183.

²⁸ 199.

²⁹ First observed by W. KROLL: *Zum Verständnis der römischen Literatur*. 119f (Stuttgart 1924).

³⁰ DOUGLAS (1966) xvi, 142, 192; DOUGLAS (1973) 121–2.

something secondary.³¹ The latter are not subject to the effect the orator with his speech brings about in the audience (*quod orator dicendo efficit*),³² even though their judgement completely depends on it. They do not take part in the communication between the speaker and the lay-audience; they only, so to speak, overhear their dialogue.

III. THE DIFFERING JUDGEMENTS ON ARTISTS BY EXPERTS AND THE LAY-AUDIENCE. A TYPOLOGY

But before taking a step forward, it is worth having a glance at the history of the problem seen in a wider context. For one thing, divergence of opinions of the educated and of the unlearned or not properly educated, of course, had emerged in several areas much earlier. It was a common feature of a society divided between the élite and the masses. The problem was felt, though not brought to light, even to oratory. So an account of it will make more conspicuous the novelty and the exact nature of what faced Cicero.

Secondly, we must be aware that Cicero was familiar with a great variety of possible answers formulated in other contexts. He shaped his own by comparing and contrasting it with them. So it seems to be reasonable here to give a conspectus of other alternatives. It will not be a history but a historical typology. In order to give a concise description, however, patterns which did not influence Cicero will also be included.

I will focus mainly on two things. Firstly, by what criteria were people thought to belong to the connoisseurs, the initiated, experts, etc. on the one hand, and to the inexpert, uninitiated, laymen, etc. on the other? Secondly, how can the two kinds of judgement be reconciled with each other, or if not, why not?

III. 1. *Patterns of the few connoisseurs*

In the oral period of Greek literature, the competence of listeners appears not to have been questioned for reasons which derive from the essence of any oral discourse.³³ The composer of a spoken piece of poetry assumes an audience that is not divided, or rather, cannot be divided. For a tale-singer must be seen as a sort of mouthpiece, who owes his existence to the need of the whole community to maintain and give a full shape to their common past and tell the world how they think it works. From a sociological angle this community is certainly not identical

³¹ The second event is said to depend *necessarily* on the first one, even though Cicero turns to factual argumentation as well (*quis unquam ex his excellere iudicatus est vulgi iudicio, qui non idem a doctis probaretur?* 189); similarly in 186 and 194–8.

³² 184.

³³ W. RÖSLER: Die Entdeckung der Fiktionalität in der Antike, *Poetica* 12 (1980) 283–319; B. GENTILI: Poesia e pubblico nella Grecia antica, 3–40 and 203ff (Roma–Bari 1984).

with the whole society, but there is no hint that those who do belong to the community cannot be taken automatically as a part of the poet's proper audience. It makes no difference that the poet sees his pursuit as a result of art, something to be learnt or requiring divine help.³⁴ Nor does the poet's claim to be original lead to voicing the postulate that it is essential for the audience, too, to have a special gift or training to be able to appreciate his originality.³⁵ In addition, this novelty must be a "considerable departure from the tradition of the genre",³⁶ however vague this idea of degree may be. In any case this conscious innovation seems to be unthinkable without writing down a composition: it needs a "fixed" state of tradition in regard to which it can be taken as a novelty. I will concentrate on the questions of what and where, that is, in which genre changing traditions was thought to require a corresponding competence in their audience by the artists.

III. 1.A. The enigmatic type of discourse

Pindar, the first poet having such claims,³⁷ sees the novelty of his poetry lying in the fact that it can discern and show the glory of the heroes of the mythical past in the deeds of the heroes of his own age.³⁸ Both share the same κλέος, and his contemporaries who achieved an outstanding accomplishment are related to their kindred both by a resemblance in action and by descent.³⁹ So in contrast to the epics, Pindar turns to and praises his heroes in the second person by a type of αἶνος-poetry which does not cut its ties with the occasion and the particular circumstances it emerges from. The audience for whom the praise of a hero explicitly and directly is meant is called κῶμος whose members (ἑταῖροι) along with the poet himself are bound together by affection (φιλότης) and inborn nobility or goodness (cf. ἀγαθός).⁴⁰ This kind of praise-poetry can be understood only by them: only they can be wise or expert (σοφός) and just by virtue of their position and the endowments mentioned above. As other expressions deriving from the word αἶνιγμα show, poetical works composed in the mode of αἶνος split their audience into two parts. The initiated, the ideal one, can decode it properly; but for those lacking the abilities required its meaning remains hidden or becomes misunderstood.⁴¹

³⁴ Od. 8, 481 and 488; Od. 22, 347–8.

³⁵ Od. 1, 351–2.

³⁶ W. J. VERDENIUS: The principles of Greek literary criticism, *Mnem.* 36 (1983) 23; see also H. MAEHLER: Die Auffassung des Dichterberufs im frühen Griechentum bis zur Zeit Pindars, 73ff and 93ff (Göttingen 1963) and B. SNELL: Dichtung und Gesellschaft 130ff (Berlin 1965).

³⁷ The idea is not fully developed in Theognis 681–2 (ταῦτά μοι ἡνίχθω κεκρυμμένα τοῖς ἀγαθοῖσιν/γινώσκοι δ' ἂν τις καὶ κακόν, ἂν σοφὸς ᾖ); we can find a similar attitude in Bacchylides as well (φρονέοντι συνετὰ γάρυω, 3, 85); see G. NAGY: The Best of the Achaeans 241 (Baltimore 1979).

³⁸ For the relevant passages see G. NAGY (1979) 239ff and G. NAGY: Early Greek views of poets and poetry, in: The Cambridge History of Literary Criticism. Vol. 1, 1–77, esp. 10–12 (Cambridge 1989).

³⁹ The linking expressions are listed by G. NAGY (1989), I. c.

⁴⁰ E.g. O. 6, 98 (φιλοφροσύνας ... κῶμον); O. 9, 4 (κωμάζοντι φίλοις ... σὺν ἑταίροις) and P. 2, 96 (ἄδόντα δ' εἶη με τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ὁμιλεῖν); see more in NAGY (1979) 241–2.

⁴¹ ὥκα βέλη / ... φωνᾶντα συνετοῖσιν, O. 2, 85–6; ἐγγυάσσομαι / ὕμνιν, ὦ Μοῖσαι, ... στρατὸν / μῆδ' ἀπειράτον καλῶν / ἀκροάσοφον δέ, O. 11, 18ff; ἐν τε σοφοῖς / δαιδαλέαν φόρμιγγα βαστάζων

The emphasis on the exclusion of certain parts of an assumed whole community or possible audience is the characteristic feature of this pattern. It can be conceived as a means by which the poet can deliberately choose or create his own ideal audience and also as an expression and elaboration of a traditional way of communication among aristocratic circles in that Pindar transformed tactfulness and discretion in behaviour and social interaction into a mode of discourse in poetry.⁴² The chosen few for whom it was originally intended were isolated from the many by a mixture of their common social background, religious experience, moral values, etiquette and rules of communication.⁴³

III. 1.B. Expertise based on philosophical insights

There has been much debate about Pindar's social status and who made up his audience. It is not certain whether he was supported by ordinary aristocratic circles or only by those belonging to the "breeding grounds of tyrants", but he can hardly be seen as a praiser and critic of the evolving polis-society.⁴⁴ From the next period when the *poleis* were at the peak of their development, there is no sign of a kind of poetry that would deliberately turn away from the *demos* and try to speak exclusively to an audience of the chosen few. The leading genre, the drama, is naturally to be thought of as called into existence by the whole community to express its undivided character. The poets, admittedly, did not always meet the expectations of their public and we have some critical remarks from playwrights on the behaviour of the audience. These, however, do not question fundamentally the existing mode of communication between them, so they will be discussed in the frame of another pattern.

But we know of somebody who considered the interaction between the dramatist, more precisely, any poet and his audience so degenerate that it cannot be improved: it was Plato, himself, supposedly, beginning his career as a dramatist.⁴⁵ Undoubtedly, his main concern was to deny that poets and performers owe their knowledge to an art in proper sense, and the critique of the audience was a kind of preliminary or supplementary investigation to this.⁴⁶ In other words, though he attached more importance to "worshipping the Muses" the most appropriate way (as he defines the genre of his philosophical dialogue),⁴⁷ as a first step towards

πολίταις ἡσυχία / θιγόμεν <sc. εὐχεται>, P. 4, 295ff: <ἔγει> ... σοφίαν δ' ἐν μυχοῖσι Πιερίδων, P. 6, 49; ἐσσί γάρ ὦν σοφός, I. 2, 12; εἰ δὲ λόγων συνέμεν κορύφαν, Ἴερην, ὀρθάν ἐπίστα, μανθάνων οἶσθα προτέρων, P. 3, 80; cf. SNELL (1965) 132; VERDENIUS (1983) 23; NAGY (1979) 238–9 and T. COLE: The Origins of Rhetoric in Ancient Greece, 52 (Baltimore 1991).

⁴² COLE (1991) 51ff.

⁴³ COLE (1991) 164.

⁴⁴ NAGY (1989) 15.

⁴⁵ Diog. L. 3, 5.

⁴⁶ See P. VICAIRE: Recherches sur les mots désignant la poésie et le poète dans l'œuvre de Platon, 164–7 (Paris 1964).

⁴⁷ *Lach.* 188D; *Crat.* 406A; *Phaidr.* 61A; *Resp.* 499D and 548B; *Phil.* 67B.

pursuing this or as a result of this he regards it expedient to make clear how to judge others aiming at the same object in a different way.

Since in Plato's opinion all kinds of literature and art can be subsumed under the heading of *mimesis*,⁴⁸ the precondition of a correct judgement is a true apprehension of reality, with the help of which the accuracy of a representation (ὁρθότης) can be assessed.⁴⁹ Secondly, possessing moral goodness, one is capable of deciding the usefulness of a work (ὠφέλεια).⁵⁰ (The case of permitted lies proves that these two aspects are not identical, even though Plato emphasizes that the ideas of True and of Good cannot be separated.)⁵¹ In the third place, Plato refers to a kind of true and genuine pleasure that adds somehow to the contemplation of the image a work of art can create (χάρις, ἡδονή).⁵²

Plato drew a line between the right judges and those who are incapable of judging correctly as clearly as Pindar did.⁵³ Both of them thought that these two groups had nothing in common at all and could not be in accord with each other. The judgement of the masses is entirely irrelevant, indeed, can be dangerous. Besides, Plato also considered the help of the gods and a certain natural gift indispensable for a listener or a spectator to be able to judge a piece of mimesis.⁵⁴ His idea of wisdom, however, is completely different: this derives from philosophical insights for the most part unbound to any particular occasion or social group. And in contrast to Pindar's conception in which wisdom cannot be detached from poetry, in Plato's view the expert is interested in works of art inasmuch as they can help him acquire a more perfect idea of reality.⁵⁵

From Plato on, the idea that expertise in the arts requires philosophical knowledge and education became a commonplace and sometimes lost its original weight in several aesthetics, but the stress was mainly laid on the side of the poet and not on that of the recipient.⁵⁶

III. I.C. Technical or professional expertise

In poetry a third pattern was formulated in purely technical terms by the Alexandrian poets. True, the origin of this may go back to Plato's time and in the case of sculpture, painting and music it was expressed much earlier. Moreover,

⁴⁸ *Resp.* 393C: 601 —6 and *Leg.* 668B.

⁴⁹ *Leg.* 668B.

⁵⁰ 668B.

⁵¹ 668D.

⁵² 669A.

⁵³ His distinction in 667B — 669B is an elaboration of an early one in 658E — 659A where he opposes <μοῦσα καλλίστη> . . . ἥτις τοὺς βελτίστους καὶ ἱκανῶς πεπαιδευμένους τέρπει, μάλιστα δὲ ἥτις ἓνα τὸν ἀρετῇ τε καὶ παιδείᾳ διαφέροντα to the judge in the theatre ἐκκληττόμενον ὑπὸ θορύβου τῶν πολλῶν καὶ τῆς αὐτοῦ ἀπαιδευσίας. A similar differentiation can be found in *Philebus* 51B' (ἀληθεὺς ἡδοναί — οὐ καθαραὶ ἡδοναί).

⁵⁴ See VICAIRE (1964) 164.

⁵⁵ W. J. VERDENIUS: *Mimesis: Plato's doctrine of aesthetic imitation* (Leiden 1949).

⁵⁶ Hor. AP 310. Plutarch's *De aud. poet.* may be an exception.

because of the scarcity of information on the meaning of "expertise" the Alexandrian poets demanded from their readers, we shall have to consult later poets influenced by them in order to have a more detailed notion of it. But since some of the Alexandrians clearly opposed Plato's aesthetic judgement, and their Roman followers, referring to poetical competency, always hinted at these poets as their forerunners to whom they owe this idea, it seems more justifiable to link this pattern more closely with Alexandrian poetry.

It possibly, then, has its roots in the poetry of Antimachus of Colophon, who was apparently a forerunner of the Hellenistic age in several aspects.⁵⁷ All our evidence is connected with an anecdote about him and Plato. The two versions by Cicero and Plutarch⁵⁸ tell us that Plato preferred him to Niceratus, by whom he had been beaten in a poetical competition with the unanimous approval of the audience. The crucial question, of course, is by what kind of standard Plato made his decision and favoured Antimachus. This question, however, cannot be answered unambiguously. First, the generic rules of the anecdote do not allow us to trace the facts, because they exempt the story-teller from clinging to historical truth. Secondly, we have several reasons for assuming a moral or ideological basis on which Plato's judgement may have been founded but we also have some in support of an interpretation supposing a mere aesthetic motive.⁵⁹

None the less, it is remarkable that, in Cicero's testimony, Antimachus' conflict with his public and Plato's approach to poetry can be seen as an anticipation of or a parallel to the Hellenistic poets' contempt for the vulgar public. He uses the anecdote to compare the different positions an expert occupies when a speech and a poem recited. He contends that in contrast to an orator, a poet can be content only with the experts' approval, however few they are.⁶⁰ He does not mention any philosophical or moral considerations or any kind of wider grounds other than poetical excellence Plato might have based his judgement on. And if we take into account that he also introduces a musical comparison, focusing exclusively on technical expertise,⁶¹ it is obvious that what he has in view is purely Plato's understanding in aesthetic matters.

Of course, it can be imagined that Cicero simply misrepresented Plato's motives. He even had some reason for doing so: in choosing Antimachus as a typical example of a poet whom the masses do not understand and only the connoisseurs can enjoy, he could have been arguing against the neoteric poets through their own principle. For Catullus, on the contrary, considered Antimachus as popular and not

⁵⁷ R. PFEIFFER: *History of Classical Scholarship* (Oxford 1968) 93–5; W. WIMMEL: *Kallimachos in Rom* (Hermes Einzelschriften 16, Wiesbaden 1960) 93–8.

⁵⁸ Cic. *Br.* 191 and Plut. *Lys.* 18, 8.

⁵⁹ We also know that Plato ordered Heraclides Ponticus to collect Antimachus' poems (fr. 91. VOSS ap. Procl. in *Plat. Tim.* 1, 21C). About the arguments, see B. WYSS: *Antimachi Colophonii Reliquiae* (Berlin 1936), introduction; PFEIFFER (1968) 93 and V. J. MATTHEWS: *The parentage of the horse Arion: A reason for Plato liking Antimachus?*, *Eranos* 85 (1987) 1–7.

⁶⁰ *poema enim reconditum paucorum adprobationem, oratio popularis adsensum vulgi debet movere*, 191.

⁶¹ *tibicen Antigenidas dixerit discipulo sane frigenti ad populum: 'mihi cane et Musis'*, 187.

subtle enough for the experts.⁶² In such a context, then, Cicero might have easily been silent about Plato's, supposed, moral motives and made use of him simply as an authority without any closer specification.⁶³

The gap between the artist and the lay audience, on the other hand, is well attested in other arts from the beginning of the fourth century. Our sources are mainly anecdotal stories told in a similar way and on a similar level to that of the Antimachus-story. Their historical truthfulness is very low. Mostly they mirror the way the lay audience thought about the arts in both their content and the clichés by which they are told, but sometimes they probably preserve some technical terms of professional criticism.⁶⁴

In fine arts, for example, *diligentia* (ἀκρίβεια) might have meant "precision in the application of small details—proportions, measurements, or fine points in naturalistic representation in a work of art".⁶⁵ In accounts belonging to this pattern spectators are also required to have the same ability as artists, in order to be able to understand and enjoy all the nuances of the work created with "accuracy". It is no accident then that such a spectator can only be an other artist. Nicophanes <placet> *diligentia quam intelligent soli artifices*.⁶⁶ Admiring Zeuxis' picture showing a female Centaur, the common people pay attention only to the novelty of the subject but not to the precise artistic technique by which she is depicted.⁶⁷

We can observe a similar adaptation of the term *sollertia*, meaning artistic skill, into an expression denoting recipient or judging ability.⁶⁸

What the rules of art dictate can be completely unlike what the audience expects and praises in music as well. In Cicero's musical example Antigenidas' pupil should play only for his master and the Muses,⁶⁹ and another flute-player called Hippomachus says that popularity itself can indicate artistic deficiency.⁷⁰

Yet the most significant representatives of this pattern are the Alexandrian poets, and above all, Callimachus. Although he has only two poems (*Ep.* VII and XXVIII Pf.) and two lines from a third one (*Aetia* I. fr. 17–8 Pf.) that can be interpreted as imposing upon the reader the condition of being initiated in poetry as well, these statements reinforced by his techniques of composition play an

⁶² *at populus tumido gaudeat Antimacho*, 95, 9. Antimachus' poetry was judged differently by the Alexandrians: favourably by Asclepiades Samius (*A. P.* 9, 63); Posidippus (*A. P.* 12, 168) and see also Q. X 1, 52 and Antipater Thes. (*A. P.* 7, 409); unfavourably by Callimachus (398 Pf), see also Prop. 2, 34, 43; Porphyrio in *Hor.* AP 146; (Acro) in *Hor.* AP 136; 137 and 146; Schol. Rec. B in *Hor.* AP 136.

⁶³ See D. VESSEY: The Reputation of Antimachus of Colophon. H 99 (1971) 1–10; WIMMEL (1960) 96–8; MATTHEWS (1987).

⁶⁴ J. J. POLLITT: The Ancient View of Greek Art (1974) 12–30.

⁶⁵ POLLITT (1974) 124–5 and 354.

⁶⁶ Plin. *Nat. hist.* XXV 137.

⁶⁷ Lucian. *Zeuxis* 5 and 7: Lucian refers to the story to illustrate his own problem (οὗτοι γὰρ ἡμῶν τὸν πηλὸν τῆς τέχνης ἐπαινοῦσι, τῶν δὲ αὐτῶν εἰ καλῶς ἔχει καὶ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην, οὐ πολὺν ποιοῦνται λόγον, ἀλλὰ παρευδοκίμει τὴν ἀκρίβειαν τῶν ἔργων ἢ τῆς ὑποθέσεως καινοτομία).

⁶⁸ Dion. Hal. *Dem.* 50, also comparing oratory to the fine arts.

⁶⁹ See note 61; cf. also *Tusc. disp.* 5, 104.

⁷⁰ Ael. *Var. hist.* 14, 8.

essential role in his poetics.⁷¹ But what exactly is required from an expert reader, we are not told (probably because it is encoded in the poems themselves), so for an explicit answer we have to turn to what Roman poets could have thought of while speaking about the *lector doctus*.

First of all, to be an expert means to be erudite and be familiar with the whole of previous literature, including authors of less importance as well.⁷² This is a precondition for grasping a text lexically, let alone, appreciating the techniques of allusion and imitation.⁷³ Further, a learned reader should be capable of studious, devoted reading and rereading in order to discover those structural, prosodic or whatever characteristics of a poem which are contrived with such sophistication that they cannot be perceived at a single hearing.⁷⁴ And we have some contexts in which an expert is required to have the wit and brightness to catch and take pleasure in enigma and *recondite innuendo*.⁷⁵

All these essentials call for only an ability to judge in literary matters and have nothing to do with one's moral conduct, philosophical training, religious conviction or social status. Nevertheless, in this paradigm, too, those uninitiated in the art of poetry are excluded from being the poet's audience.

III. 2. Patterns showing the lay audience as the genuine public

III. 2.A. The principle of judging in poetical and musical competitions

Placing the three previous patterns in a social context, it is noteworthy that they all occur in the period preceding and following the polis-society. And the origin of the opposite view can be traced back to a conviction which brought into being and kept alive all the institutions of the Athenian democracy. This is a belief in the superiority of the collective decision making of a whole community to that of a certain group of it, however better, wiser, nobler its members individually might be.⁷⁶ This principle applied to judging works of art is witnessed to by Aristotle. In fact, he argues for settling political questions in a democratic way by pointing out

⁷¹ σικχαίνω πάντα τὰ δημόσια. *Ep.* XXVIII Pf; for an interpretation of this poem as an announcement of his preference for a new, that is, unlike dramatic performances or epic recitations, way of addressing his audience, see R. THOMAS: *New Comedy, Callimachus and Roman Poetry*, HStPh 83 (1979) 180–95. THOMAS links this epigram with *Ep.* LIX and XLVIII as well. In the other epigram I mentioned, Callimachus also contrasts ephemeral success on stage to σοφίη to which a καθαρή ὁδός leads and lasts forever. In *Aetia* I fr. 17–8 Pf. σοφίη is attached to τέχνη perhaps reminiscent of Ar. *Ran.* 766 (779; 785); cf. R. PFEIFFER: *Callimachus*, Vol. I. 4 (2nd ed., Oxford 1985).

⁷² E.g. Hor. *Ep.* II 2, 102–5.

⁷³ E.g. Ov. *Tr.* I 5, 57–8; *Cat.* 95.

⁷⁴ E.g. Hor. *A. P.* 438ff; *Ep.* II 1, 22ff; *Sat.* I 10, 72ff.

⁷⁵ E.g. Hor. *Sat.* II 1, 75ff.

⁷⁶ Cf. J. OBER: *Mass and elite in democratic Athens: rhetoric, ideology, and the power of the people* (Princeton 1989) 187–9, where he gives a list of passages expressing this view.

that this method is borne out by judgements in musical and poetical competitions. Those good at an art (σπουδαῖοι) one by one might hold a more correct opinion on a more solid basis than the laymen (οἱ πολλοί), still in a large group of people of ordinary but manifold abilities all their mediocre or fairly good faculties come together and so their perception becomes more sensitive and profound: “πολλῶν γὰρ ὄντων ἕκαστον μῶριον ἔχειν ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως, καὶ γίνεσθαι συνελθόντας ὥσπερ ἓνα ἄνθρωπον τὸ πλῆθος πολύποδα καὶ πολύχειρα καὶ πολλὰς ἔχοντ’ αἰσθήσεις, ὅτω καὶ περὶ τὰ ἥθη καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν”.⁷⁷

As regards the way and the viewpoints from which a judgement is made, in this pattern there is no fundamental difference between the experts and the lay audience. Both of them use their senses and mental abilities in the same way; “ἄλλοι γὰρ ἄλλο τι μῶριον, πάντα δὲ πάντες”.⁷⁸ What makes a difference is only the number of contributions to the basis on which a final decision is founded.

III. 2.B. The conflicts between tragedians and their public

Aristotle's argument, which is by no means his last word on this topic,⁷⁹ can be regarded as a traditionally accepted way of justifying the actual practice in theatrical competitions.⁸⁰ The judging system was devised so as to preserve the preponderance of the whole *polis*' opinion by giving no possibility to anybody to have a greater voice on the grounds of his supposed excellence. The judges were decided on by lot, and the *demos* never found their verdicts unsatisfactory.⁸¹

From the dramatists' point of view, on the other hand, one competitor always had to lose, and there was always a justified or unjustified reason for the loser to be at variance with his judges. We know about three tragedians (Aeschylus, Euripides and Agathon) who left Athens probably partly because they felt a mutual dissatisfaction with the Athenian public. We have no solid evidence of their motives: all we know comes from biographers and other later sources. But it seems certain that

⁷⁷ *Ar. Pol.* 1281b4–7; similarly in 1286a30 (κρίνει ἄμεινον ὄχλος πολλὰ ἢ εἷς ὅστισούν); and see also 1287b26 and 1292a11.

⁷⁸ 1281b9–10.

⁷⁹ Aristotle differentiated the γνώριμοι (σπουδαῖοι) from the οἱ πολλοί (οὐ σπουδαῖοι) on four grounds: their wealth, nobility, virtue and education (*Pol.* 1291b14–30). In respect of education this distinction can be narrowed further. Professional artists (βάντιστοι) are contrasted to free men who have a knowledge that is elementary but not thorough knowledge, just enough to enjoy and judge pieces of art. From this perspective, universal education is superior to specific training in virtue of its wider outlook and aiming at self-improvement, not serving others (*Pol.* 1282a1–b1; 1340b36–39). There is another way of narrowing this down: his remarks in the *Poetics* on the audience's ἀσθένεια (P. 1453a34) making the tragedians prefer happy endings is paradoxical evidence that the spectators, in general, are apt to react in such a way that a tragedian could compose a tragedy properly; cf. S. HALLIWELL: *Poetics* of Aristotle (London 1987) 169. Nevertheless, we can meet views not compatible with the above; see below.

⁸⁰ See A. PICKARD-CAMBRIDGE: *The Dramatic Festivals of Athens* (2nd ed., Oxford 1988) 97ff and 276ff.

⁸¹ The only exception is perhaps a later construction (Ael. *Var. Hist.* 11, 13 about Aristophanes' *Clouds*); PICKARD-CAMBRIDGE (1988) l.c.

their critical or sceptical remarks on the competence of the theatrical audience, which may shed some light on the reasons for their leaving, did not go beyond a certain point. They did not question the principle that a tragedy was for a whole community consisting mainly of laymen. This is corroborated by what we know about their working outside Athens: they did not try to find a different kind of discourse or transform the way of communication involved in a theatrical production. For this reason I deal with these utterances in this pattern.

The biographers of Aeschylus and Euripides, confirmed by other later testimony, assert that their motives were the failure and unpopularity they could not bear. Although the authenticity of these kinds of writings is very doubtful,⁸² the assumption of artistic grounds on the part of Aeschylus can be backed up by his "fading wisdom" witnessed by Aristophanes, seen as a result of a change in taste which was not favourable for his elevated and dignified style.⁸³

As to Euripides' decision, those are probably right who say that his relative unpopularity compared to that of Sophocles should not be overemphasized.⁸⁴ On the other hand, just as in the case of Aeschylus, there is no reason to deny the possibility that he accepted Archelaus' invitation because of his tense relationship with the Athenian public, or at least, because new circumstances might have appeared more attractive to him.

With all this, the plays themselves we may think of as written for a non-Athenian public give no signs of being composed for a different *type* of audience. Their choice of subject matter, imagery, style, etc. were adapted to the Sicilian and Macedonian settings and public for whom they were originally meant, but it would be idle to suppose another kind of tragedy for a particular kind of audience. Even the court of the Macedonian tyrant which became a gathering point for artists unpopular with the masses⁸⁵ cannot be simply considered as an audience of a few intellectuals by whose inspiration and expectations the characteristics of e.g. the *Bacchae* can be explained.⁸⁶

In contrast to his elder contemporaries, Agathon seems to have had no reason for complaining about his lack of success, and yet he was the less satisfied with the applause of the theatre and he also left for Macedonia.⁸⁷ Certainly, it is tempting to think of some political necessity compelling him to take his leave. Aristotle, discussing greatness of soul (μεγαλοψυχία) and its manifestations, mentions Agathon's brave opposing and disdaining of the people's verdict when he praised the eminence of Antiphon's unsuccessful apology.⁸⁸ But his preference for aristocratic values in

⁸² In the case of the tragedians see C. S. HERRINGTON: Aeschylus in Sicily, JHS 87 (1967) and P. T. STEVENS: Euripides and the Athenians, JHS 76 (1956).

⁸³ Ar. *Ran.* 807; 1058 and cf. also Dion. Hal. *Dem.* 34 p. 213. 12 U. R.

⁸⁴ STEVENS (1956) and W. SCHMID: Geschichte der griechischen Literatur (München 1936) 164 and 189.

⁸⁵ Zeuxis, Timotheus, Choirilus, Agathon.

⁸⁶ W. RIDGEWAY: Euripides in Macedonia, CQ 20 (1926) 1–19.

⁸⁷ The testimonies are collected by P. LÉVEQUE: Agathon (Paris 1955) 67; for his explanation see below.

⁸⁸ *Eud. E.* 1232b7.

politics may well be brought together with his openly stressed contempt for his audience. However adequately they fit together, they were not deep enough to change his attitude toward poetry and to offer an alternative way of communication between the poet and a public chosen by himself.

This argument is based on the portrait Plato gives of him in the *Symposium*. One day after his unexampled début, having won the first prize at first, he thought scorn of the ovation with which the audience received him: “νοῦν ἔχοντι ὀλίγοι ἔμφορον πολλῶν ἀφρόνων φοβερότεροι”.⁸⁹ He says all this in the company of connoisseurs and among them Socrates, supposing that everything that is approved by common people is suspect for them. Therefore he should give evidence of his contempt for the favour gained from the masses, even though what is at stake is his own glory, in order to be esteemed by the wise, especially Socrates. Socrates, however, considers himself a part of the masses in the theatre and thanks to Phaedrus' interruption, Agathon is able to escape from an unpleasant self-examination carried out with Socrates' help.

As portrayed by Plato, Agathon has a concern only for one thing: his own self. Narcissism can be satisfied only in one way, by flattering those who are willing to flatter one in response, that is, the masses. Agathon, indeed, continued to be a popular playwright and his declaration that he cared only for the opinion of the wise proved to be light and ungrounded in view of his practice. But what about his leaving Athens? Although he could have been forced to do so by purely political circumstances, it can be conceived as a result of his discontent with the usual way of gaining favour and as an attempt to succeed in a new and fresh atmosphere.⁹⁰ Like Aeschylus and Euripides, he changed his audience but not his attitude. And unlike Plato, he remained a dramatist in mutual dependence on his audience. His scornful words about them, therefore, ought to be seen no more than as a reversed statement of what he actually was engaging in but not satisfied with.

III. 2.C. The conflict between Aristophanes and his public

The rules of comedy allowed an author to make one of his characters play the role of the poet himself or make the chorus express his views mostly in the prologue or parabasis. One of the themes occurring most often was, obviously, his relationship with the public. I would like to show that while speaking about these thorny matters, Aristophanes, almost the only comedian whose utterances concerning this problem survived,⁹¹ never doubts fundamentally that a comedy should be intended for and judged by the audience consisting of ordinary people. What he says is

⁸⁹ *Symp.* 194.

⁹⁰ See LÉVÉQUE (1955) 67ff.

⁹¹ A fragment of Cratinus may be an exception (χαίρ' ὦ μέγ' ἀχρειόγελος ὄμιλε, ταῖς ἐπιβδαῖς, τῆς ἡμετέρας σοφίας κριτῆς ἄριστε πάντων, *Crat. Inc. fab. fr.* 51). On the question from a social point of view, see Zs. RITÓK: Aristophanes und die Krise der Kultur, in: *Studien zur Geschichte und Philosophie des Altertums*, Hrsg. J. HARMATTA (Budapest 1968) 45–50.

weakened by the tone in which it is said; all the same, these words reveal the comedian's inability to carry on without the whole Athenian polis (even though he never ceases to emphasize the merits of poetry that cannot be set aside or substituted for) and so formulates a pattern in which there is no place for anybody but a lay audience.

For the first time Aristophanes had to face a charge made by people representing the whole polis' opinion,⁹² he had to give an answer to the question why earlier he did not dare to put on stage the plays he had written in his own name.⁹³ He points out the extensive experience required for directing which he lacked at that time, comparing himself to an apprentice learning the elements of navigation.⁹⁴ And the art of comedy is a more difficult business because of having to turn to a capricious audience.⁹⁵ This sounds not very polite, but the interesting thing about it is that Aristophanes does not intend to reproach them by speaking in such a straightforward manner. Their fickleness is simply a fact a playwright should accept and adjust to, and not a symptom of the unreliability of their judgements. Those who fail to take into account or comply with it will inevitably be unsuccessful. That is why Aristophanes can make fun of his predecessors' blunders, suggesting his own superiority as a genuine and by now mature comedian.⁹⁶

He did not, however, manage to escape from losing the audience's favour. Then he had to give an account of the failure in the parabasis of the next play. Actually, this he did twice: in the second version of the failed *Clouds*, which was probably not given a performance,⁹⁷ and in the *Wasps*, no doubt performed one year later. These explanations are unlike each other because of the different mood and tone in which they are uttered. They reflect the author's changing, though never ceasing, confidence in coming to terms with his public. Even in the parabasis of the *Wasps*, where in his embitterment he comes nearest to preferring an audience of connoisseurs to the traditional one, this idea in the end proves to be a less desirable alternative.

In the *Clouds* he openly expresses his bafflement about how such an expert audience, (ὡς ὑμᾶς ἡγούμενος εἶναι θεατὰς δεξιούς’').⁹⁸ was able to favour other less worthy plays and failed to recognize the outstanding merits of the work he elaborated as carefully as possible. He rebukes and pays compliment at once, softening each sharpness. The ambiguity is reinforced by an obviously too forceful and thus empty figure of speech: he corroborates his certainty of the audience's just privilege

⁹² ὅμων . . . πολλοὺς αὐτῷ <sc. to Aristophanes> προσιόντας, *Equ.* 512; in the *Ach.* he had to answer only Cleon's charges.

⁹³ οὐχὶ πάλαι χορὸν αἰτοίη καθ' ἑαυτόν, 513.

⁹⁴ 514 7.

⁹⁵ ἐπετείους τὴν φύσιν ὄντας, 518; cf. R. HARRIOTT: *Aristophanes: Poet and Dramatist* (London and Sydney 1986) 64ff.

⁹⁶ 518 550.

⁹⁷ See K. DOVER's introduction to his edition of the play (Oxford 1968.)

⁹⁸ 521; DOVER (1968) stresses that σοφός and δεξιός are never negative in this play (416 and 428); see also VERDENIUS (1983) 23 4; R. HARRIOTT: *Aristophanes' Audience and the Plays of Euripides*, *BICS* 9 (1962) 1ff.

to judge his new play firstly by swearing on his poetical success. His explanation adds to its humour: he stresses their wisdom and expertise, though it is hard to imagine where it might have been performed outside Athens.⁹⁹ The humour, however, never turns to irony, nor the reproach to contempt. He does not give up the hope of regaining the Athenians' favour he has lost: he should not leave those having good taste in the lurch.¹⁰⁰ He also has proof and guarantee of the spectators being properly skilled: his previous successes;¹⁰¹ and he is convinced that they can appreciate all the novelties in inventing comic situations and plots which best testify to a poet's abilities.¹⁰² All the same, the times when he was talking about the writers' necessity to conform to the audience in every respect are most emphatically over.

In the *Wasps* there is one thing which remained: his open and straightforward way of expressing his dissatisfaction. He is not willing to find fault with himself and blames the audience for their inability to grasp the excellence of his comedy.¹⁰³ His humour is not as vigorous, and speaking about the experts he bears in mind others than those sitting in the rows of the theatre.¹⁰⁴ Yet to address these more responsive spectators, whose identity is not defined exactly, and to turn away from the old bad ones does not appear to Aristophanes as an ideal option to be reached. He blackmails the audience with this alternative, but his threatening finally turns to summoning other poets (the experts mentioned above?) to help him in making the audience inclined to conservatism more receptive to his novelties.¹⁰⁵ So, in the model this parabasis suggests the poet can call for a corresponding competence on the part of the recipients, however few they are, but in its optimal form the audience ought to represent and comprise the whole community without any restrictions.

Finally, we have a more general picture of the judging of a theatrical audience from a more detached point of view in the *Frogs*. He describes four levels on which a drama can be seen and evaluated. It is judged from the ordinary people's angle, from the artists' point of view, from that of the god of the genre, Dionysus, and finally, it can be seen from the perspective of the goddesses of poetry, the Muses. We are assured of everybody's expertise and apart from the Muses who do not take part in the plot personally, everybody's competence proves to be ridiculous.¹⁰⁶

The Athenians' aptitude for artistic judgement is teased by Xanthias¹⁰⁷ and strongly doubted by Aeschylus.¹⁰⁸ Dionysus, on the other hand, is called upon to be

⁹⁹ About the oath-form, see DOVER (1968) ad loc.

¹⁰⁰ ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὥς ὑμῶν ποθ' ἐκὼν προδώσω τοὺς δεξιούς, 527.

¹⁰¹ 528–33.

¹⁰² 547–8.

¹⁰³ 1016ff and 1045–7.

¹⁰⁴ τοῦτο μὲν οὖν ἔσθ' ὑμῖν αἰσχρὸν τοῖς μὴ γνοῦσιν παραχρῆμα, / ὁ δὲ ποιητὴς οὐδὲν χεῖρων παρὰ τοῖσι σοφοῖς γενομίσται, / εἰ παρελαύνων τοὺς ἀντιπάλους τὴν ἐπίνοιαν ξυνέτριψεν., 1048–50; cf. also *Eccles.* 1155–6.

¹⁰⁵ 1051–9.

¹⁰⁶ Of the Muses: ὦ Διὸς ἐννέα παρθέναι ἀγναὶ / Μοῦσαι, λεπτολόγους ξυνετὰς φρένας αἶ καθορᾶτε / ἀνδρῶν γνωμοτύπων, *Ran.* 875–7.

¹⁰⁷ Εἴπω τι τῶν εἰωθότων ὃ δέσποτα, / ἐφ' οἷς αἰεὶ γελῶσιν οἱ θεῶμενοι; 1–2.

¹⁰⁸ λῆρὸν τε τᾶλλ' ἤγειτο τοῦ γυνῶναι πέρι / φύσεις ποιητῶν, 809–10.

an arbiter by the Athenians as the only one whose judgements in poetical competitions seem to be indisputable,¹⁰⁹ and the chorus tries to calm Euripides and Aeschylus by affirming that the audience is wise enough to understand their artistry.¹¹⁰ At the end of the play, however, Pluto asks Aeschylus to educate the citizens, because many of them are in need of it.¹¹¹ The two playwrights making their agon have a diametrically opposed opinion on each other's production and judging ability. Dionysus' aptitude is not questioned by any character in the play, but as it becomes one of the main sources of the jokes, the spectators obviously are in no doubt that sometimes the opposite is true.¹¹²

This relativism of faculties is in favour of the simple audience. If the artists themselves are liable to make erroneous judgements in poetical matters, and if even the god of the drama is incapable of decisions of absolute credit, no one can claim to be the only authority to form opinion about poetry. The masses should laugh at themselves, too, but do not need accept a forum of higher professionalism. The lay audience, assuming that simply by learning through experience anybody can gain the ability to make skillful judgements on any question, sees its power in its uncorrupted naturality and all embracing totality. So, paradoxically, by virtue of being inexpert they feel entitled to treat themselves as genuinely expert.¹¹³

III. 3. *Patterns of compromise between the few experts and the lay audience*

Between opinions completely excluding those who have not been initiated into a special kind of knowledge and opinions denying any possibility of a more subtle interpretation than that of the masses, there can be found numerous statements in a middle position. Here the fact that there are different ways and levels in grasping a work of art is accepted. The enjoyment of the laymen is probably inferior in some way to the pleasure of the experts, but not entirely irrelevant.

III. 3.A. The "correspondence" theory

Having given instruction about musical education in the *Politics*, Aristotle contrasts one part of the musical audience called πεπαιδευμένοι with the other one called φορτικός.¹¹⁴ This is another kind of narrowing of the distinction made between the γνώριμοι and οἱ πολλοί in regard to their educational level. While the

¹⁰⁹ ὅτι τῆς τέχνης ἔμπειρος ἦν, 811.

¹¹⁰ 1109–18, esp. 1118 (πάντ' ἐπέξιτον θεατῶν γ' οὐνεχ' ὥς ὄντων σοφῶν).

¹¹¹ παίδευσον / τοὺς ἀνοήτους, πολλοὶ δ' εἰσὶν, 1502–3.

¹¹² Observe the non-artistic basis he makes his judgement on (αἰρήσομαι γὰρ ὅνπερ ἡ ψυχὴ θέλει, 1468) or his famous σταθμός (1381); cf. A. ROEMER: Ueber den litterarisch-aesthetischen Bildungsstand des attischen Theaterpublikums, *ABAW* 22 (1905) 63ff.

¹¹³ In Rome, Terence also intends his plays for the whole public (*Andr.* pr. 1–3; 27; *Hec.* 47; *Heaut.* 20–1) and appeals to their intelligence in aesthetic matters (*Heaut.* 11–26; *Eun.* 24; *Ad.* 4–5; 12–4; *Hec.* 31–2) but they are *not* opposed to an expert audience.

¹¹⁴ *Pol.* 1342a18.

vulgar audience expects entertainment and relaxation after work, the educated improve their characters and take intellectual pleasure by listening to music. Since music can comprise several types of tune, each fulfilling different kinds of function, it can please everybody in accordance with his own nature.¹¹⁵ Aristotle takes it as obvious that a piece of music performed in a competition before a heterogeneous audience should heed this diversity and interweave all types of tunes.¹¹⁶ It must be added that all this can refer only to musical performances in a theatre, because in music played with the aim of education only ethical tunes are allowed and these cannot delight the common people.¹¹⁷

So, according to this pattern in a work of art there are, or can be, different qualities which impress the different kinds of audience in different ways. In this mixture the elements do not exclude each other and inasmuch as every part of the audience takes pleasure in them, there is no need to put the question necessarily implied in this pattern as to whose pleasure and judgement is more adequate and competent. Since a certain aspect of a work corresponds to a certain part of the audience, we can call this "correspondence theory".

III. 3.B. The theory of complement

A fair number of the anecdotal stories offers a slightly different solution to bridge, or at least, narrow the gap between the artists and the inexperts. The latter, with their natural and inartificial way of perceiving things, can *complement* or control the sophisticated and subtle artistry that tends to lose touch with nature. They can be termed theories of complement.

Apelles and Protogenes can display their mastery in a single line, but it needs their eyes to recognize it.¹¹⁸ All the same, Apelles has his mistakes checked by the laymen, because he finds them more accurate judges than himself, even if not in every respect.¹¹⁹ The same people who give advice to Polyclitus on how he should paint a picture acknowledge how ridiculous the result is, especially if it is compared to the painting Polyclitus made without any advice.¹²⁰

Regarding the fine arts (sometimes music and poetry as well), Cicero, too, maintains a similar view. The experts have a much more refined sensual perception

¹¹⁵ αἱ ψυχαὶ παρεστραμμέναι τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἔξεως, I. c.

¹¹⁶ 1342a¹ b: esp.: διὸ ταῖς μὲν τοιαύταις ἁρμονίαις <σ. πρακτικαῖς καὶ ἐνθουσιαστικαῖς> ...

** θετέον τοὺς τὴν [θεατρικὴν] μουσικὴν μεταχειριζομένους ἀγωνιστάς (ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ θεατὴς διττός, ὁ μὲν ἐλεύθερος καὶ πεπαιδευμένος, ὁ δὲ φορτικός ἐκ βαναύσων καὶ θητῶν καὶ ἄλλων τοιούτων συγκείμενος, ἀποδοτέον ἀγῶνας καὶ θεωρίας καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις πρὸς ἀνάπαυσιν: ...) πρὸς δὲ παιδεῖαν ... τοῖς ἡθικοῖς τῶν μελῶν χρηστέον καὶ ταῖς ἁρμονίαις ταῖς τοιαύταις, 1342a16-29.

¹¹⁷ 1337b30-5 and 1339a15-27.

¹¹⁸ *ferunt artificem protinus contemplatum subtilitatem dixisse Apellen venisse*, Plin. *Nat. hist.* XXXV, 82.

¹¹⁹ *ipse post tabulam latens vitia quae notarentur auscullabat vulgum diligentiorē iudicem quam se praeferens*, Plin. *Nat. hist.* XXXV, 85.

¹²⁰ Ael. *Var. hist.* 14, 8.

than the inexperts: it is more reliable, faster and can observe more details, especially faults.¹²¹ Still, an artist should take notice of what the unskilled say, because his faculties are relatively better though far from being perfect, and can always be improved by what any other person, particularly with a different outlook, can perceive.¹²²

IV. THE DIFFERING JUDGEMENTS ON GREEK ORATORS BY EXPERTS AND BY THE LAY AUDIENCE

IV. 1. *Practical oratory*

One of the most important stimuli that made Greek oratory develop was the tension between the equal rights to take part in collective decision making and the skills that played a crucial role in preparing such decisions being available only to a small segment of the society.¹²³ In political and juridical debates, the demos expected its orators to produce speeches as useful, artistically elaborate and entertaining as possible, and at the same time never ceased to be suspicious of and hostile to speakers belonging to élite groups and trained in the costly art of speaking. From the opposite point of view, the orators were forced to invent and develop two seemingly contradictory pairs of *topoi* which, as a matter of fact, complement each other. Firstly, the orator tries to hide or diminish his skills at speaking in order to escape distrust in himself¹²⁴ and at once openly offers his faculties in the interests

¹²¹ A. MICHEL: *Rhétorique et philosophie chez Cicéron* (Paris 1966) 349 thinks that here Cicero works out the Stoic conception of *κοινὰ ἔννοια* (SVF II 473 p. 154) given to every human being by nature, though improvable by education and training. Lucullus indicates in advance (*Ac.* 2, 10) that he recounts Antiochus' views: *quorum* (sc. *sensuum*) *clara iudicia et certa sunt*. . . *Adhibita vero exercitatione et arte, ut oculi pictura teneantur, aures cantibus, quis est quin cernat quanta vis sit in sensibus? Quam multa vident pictores in umbris et in eminentia, quae nos non videmus! Quam multa, quae nos fugiunt in cantu, exaudiunt in eo genere exercitati, qui primo inflatu tibicinis Antiopam esse aiunt aut Andromacham, cum id nos ne suspicemur quidem!* *Ac.* 2, 19–22. (The same idea in connection with literature occurs in *Ad. fam.* 9, 16) M. PORLENZ in *Gött. gel. Anz.* 188 (1926) 288–9 and A. S. PEASE: M. Tulli Ciceronis de natura deorum libri III (1958) II, 927 derive a similar passage in *De nat. de.* 2, 145–6 from Panaetius: *Primum enim oculi in his artibus quarum iudicium est oculorum, in pictis, fictis, caelastique formis, in corporum etiam motione atque gestu multa cernunt subtilius* (sc. *quam bestiae*), *colorum etiam et figurarum venustatem atque ordinem et, ut ita dicam, decentiam oculi indicant. . . Auriumque item est admirabile quoddam artificiosumque iudicium, quo indicatur et in vocis et in tibiarum nervorumque cantibus varietas sonorum, intervalla, distinctio, et vocis genera permulta, canorum, fuscum, leve, asperum, grave, acutum, flexibile, durum, quae hominum solum auribus indicantur.* On recognizing faults: *quae autem parva videntur esse delicta neque a multis intellegi possunt, ab iis diligentius declinandum. Ut in fidibus aut tibiis, quamevis paulum discrepent, tamen id a sciente animadverti solet. . . in fidibus musicorum aures vel minima sentiunt.* *De off.* 1, 145. On judgements of different level: *delectentur imperiti laudentque ea, quae laudanda non sint, ob eam, credo, causam, quod insit in eis aliquid prohi, quod capiat ignaros, qui quid in unaque re viti sit, nequeant indicare. Itaque, cum sunt docti a peritis, desistunt facile sententia.* *De off.* 3, 15; cf. also *De opt. gen. or.* 11–3.

¹²² *pictores et ii qui signa fabricantur, et vere etiam poetae suum quisque opus a vulgo considerari vult, ut, si quid reprehensum sit a pluribus, id corrigatur, iique et secum et ab aliis, quid in eo peccatum sit, exquirunt.* *De off.* 1, 147.

¹²³ See ROEMER (1905) 17 and 39–40; OBER (1989) 187–90.

¹²⁴ OBER (1989) 175.

of a case he thinks to have proved to be useful for the polis.¹²⁵ Secondly, he seeks to convince that all what his adversary says is not based on facts but only seems to be persuasive through his finesse in order to show oratory up for how dangerous it is:¹²⁶ he simultaneously speaks about his adversary's uneducated manner to make the audience be aware of their own acuteness.¹²⁷

Therefore, the orators avoided speaking on expertise in judging a speech except for that of the lay audience. Sometimes they flattered, sometimes they reproached them for being keen on it, depending on whose oratorical skill had impressed them.¹²⁸ But there is no hint whatsoever that a speech can be judged by those other than those to whom it was actually directed. The two forms or aspects of a speech which was delivered orally and then published were not stated as belonging to each other. The question of how the experts listen to or should listen to a speech did not arise. We first meet this problem in the written *logoi* of Isocrates, which were not made to be delivered in actual situations.¹²⁹ It would have been too much for the *demos* to allow these teachers of rhetoric and trained speakers to appear even among the audience. They knew about them and permitted them to train others provided no one broke the illusion of the ordinary people's complete control of decision making.¹³⁰

IV. 2.A. The philosophical tradition of rhetoric. Plato

In the philosophical tradition of rhetoric,¹³¹ however, a notion of learned or educated listener was formulated. Plato's critique of rhetoric was in a way very like his critique of poetry. He also saw it as a corrupted form of grasping truth, particularly, truth concerning justice and putting it across to others.¹³² Since the same was his concern, he aimed to offer an alternative of genuine rhetoric. So, although he had a definite opinion about what generally a crowd expected of an orator, he did not focus on a criticism of the vulgar behaviour and judgement of the audience.¹³³ In the *Phaedrus*, Socrates confesses with irony that he admires men taking pleasure in orators¹³⁴ but he concentrates on what the speaker himself pursues, and demonstrates that his business is not an art, being unable to improve

¹²⁵ Dem. 18. 172; 18. 320; Aisch. 3, 260.

¹²⁶ Dem. 18. 280; 51, 20; Lys. 18, 16; 27, 4–6; 28, 11.

¹²⁷ Dem. 18. 128; 18. 242; 22, 78; Aisch. 3, 117; 1, 166; 3, 241; Lys. 20, 12.

¹²⁸ Dem. 58. 41; 58. 61; Hyp. 4, 36; Aisch. 3, 168; 3, 228; and cf. Thuc. 3, 38, 6–7 on the *demos'* rhetorical sophistication.

¹²⁹ He complains about incorrent reading of his works (διαποϋντες οὐκ ὀρθῶς καὶ κατακνίζοντες καὶ πάντα τρόπον διαφθείροντες, *Panath.* 17). The only exceptions might be Thucydides' (8, 68, 1–2) and Agathon's (see note 88) judgements on Antiphon's apology, but they are likely to be motivated by moral standards as well.

¹³⁰ See OBER (1989) 9 and 178.

¹³¹ Cf. Cic. *De inv.* 2, 8ff.

¹³² *Gorg.* 463D and 6503E ff.

¹³³ *Gorg.* 453A; 501D ff and *Phaedr.* 271C–2B.

¹³⁴ *Phaedr.* 234D; 236D; cf. also *Ap.* 17A.

his audience's soul.¹³⁵ He presents a sort of expert reading of Lysias' speech but his intention is to lay its unskillfulness bare: there is no corresponding mastery on the part of the so-called artist.¹³⁶

Such a negative result would have only led to a turning away from rhetoric. The alternative way of discourse Plato proposed, however, raised the question of the listeners' competence. It requires him to be able to take part in a dialogue and so to give up his position of listening only and expecting his beliefs to be confirmed and justified by the speaker. Such a dialogue, of course, is very far from what would have taken place in actually existing rhetorical situations. Yet, apart from orations which might be subsumed under the heading of epideictic oratory,¹³⁷ Plato composed a speech fitting or created by circumstances which were traditionally thought to demand a rhetorical response. The *Apology* contains several elements of a usual defence but Socrates tries to get in an unusual kind of contact with his judges and audience. They are compelled to face an analysis of their own convictions in order to weight the strength of Socrates' truth. He refrains from resorting to emotions that might suggest remorse, confirm the final correctness of their opinion and perhaps save his own life.¹³⁸ To use a symbolic expression, his speech is accessible only to those who are able to grasp the meaning of the oracle about his knowledge. So later on this apology became not only a model for orators in a similar situation and having a kind of philosophical attitude to their being charged¹³⁹ but an example of what a *doctus* or *docendus* listener is like as well. True, Socrates' addressing such an audience was not praised by every rhetorician, yet the position of a learned public had been shown.¹⁴⁰

IV. 2.B. The philosophical tradition of rhetoric. Aristotle

The sense of an expert audience in rhetoric implying an approach to a piece of oratory from a philosophical point of view was maintained by Aristotle and established more firmly by the Stoics.¹⁴¹

Aristotle tends to specify this meaning as a kind of knowledge and adroitness in dialectics. Though he considers it as a necessary wrong, he seems to accept the

¹³⁵ *Phaedr.* 270B; *Gorg.* 464Bff.

¹³⁶ 264BC; cf. COLE (1991) 6.

¹³⁷ E.g. the funeral speech in *Menex.* or speeches about Love in *Simp.* and *Phaedr.*

¹³⁸ *Ap.* 29Aff and 34Cff and *Xen. Mem.* 4, 4, 4; cf. COLE (1991) 9.

¹³⁹ About Rutilius Rufus: *Imitatus est homo Romanus et consularis veterem illum Socraten*, Cic. *De or.* 1, 231; see also Q. XI 1, 12.

¹⁴⁰ Quintilian is very pleased to be able to justify his definition of an orator by referring to Socrates' apology as an authoritative example (XI 1, 9). Seneca, on the other hand, has a low opinion of it (*Contr.* 3, pr. 8). Cicero's judgement of its oratorical exemplariness is not unambiguous (*De or.* 1, 231; but see *Tusc. disp.* 2, 3 for a solely philosophical assessment). Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*Dem.* 23) is not impressed by it either.

¹⁴¹ I will not discuss this, though, because they say nothing about the audience's abilities directly. The Stoics' preference of logical devices in persuasion, or their placing *συνομιλία* among the virtues of style are rules for the orator. There are some passages, however, in Quintilian which perhaps mirror what kind of audience reaction or expectation is implied in such an approach to oratory. In VIII 3, 2 he

fact that in the present state of the systems of government political and juridical decisions are made not solely by means of common sense and logic.¹⁴² He finds emotional and ethical devices a place of equal importance to the rational ones among the possible ways of demonstration. Still, in cases, where he can, he recalls orators damaging the logical structure of their speech by embellishing their style with too much care or playing upon passions unharnessed, and immediately rebukes them for this method.¹⁴³ With all of this, he never objects to the fact that the judges and the audience are simple, ordinary people.¹⁴⁴ An orator placing what he says in a more universal context will be much less popular among the uneducated listeners than the one who keeps within what strictly belongs to the matters in question, but this is not a ground for regarding the unpopular speaker as superior.¹⁴⁵ Aristotle's conclusion is that a speaker should take into account and be suitable to the mental capacity of his audience. Despite all his moderately scornful remarks on the mean and single-minded audience, he thinks it natural that an oration is addressed only to them. Speaking on the different kinds of audiences, he distinguishes between the ἄγροϊκος and the πεπαιδευμένος audience, but this is not more than an always changing factor the orator has to take into consideration. For these two opposites are not identical with two positions from which one and the same speech can be viewed and judged differently, but only two loose categories pointing to the fact that people's mental capacities are different.

Aristotle, to reiterate, keeps the notion of an expert listener or reader and associates him with the dialectician, but never thinks of him as an ultimate addressee or a person who can judge a speech more properly by measuring it by other standards.

V. THE EXCURSUS IN *BRUTUS* 183–200: AN INTERPRETATION

If we compare now the Atticist conception of the genuine rhetorical audience that Cicero tried to challenge with the notions of the expert audience we met in previous rhetorical writings, it seems to be of an entirely new appearance. Cicero's opponents set up higher standards than the estimation of the lay audience but showed no inclination to demand philosophical excellence of a speech.

On the other hand, they might have been inspired in a way by the Alexandrian

contrasts the first two virtues of style (*emendate et lucide dicere*) to the third one (*ornate*) as if they were meant for two kinds of audience (*in ceteris* (sc. *virtutibus*) *iudicium doctorum, in hoc vero etiam popularem laudem petit*); in XII 10, 49–57 his notion of the experts wavers between an *artis artifex* who prefers a more unimpassioned style and a *sapiens* who would rule out all emotional devices that go beyond logical argumentation.

¹⁴² 1354a; 1404a; 1408a.

¹⁴³ 1403b; 1404a.

¹⁴⁴ ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις ἀκροαταῖς οἱ οὐ δύνανται διὰ πολλῶν συνορᾶν οὐδὲ λογίζεσθαι πόρρωθεν, 1357a3–4; ἀπλοῦς εἶναι ὑπόκειται ὁ κριτής, 1357a12; διὰ τὴν φορτικότητα τῶν ἀκροατῶν, 1395b2; πρὸς φαῦλον γὰρ ἀκροατὴν καὶ τὰ ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος ἀκούοντα, 1415b5–6; διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ μοχθηρίαν, 1419a18; also 1404a8.

¹⁴⁵ 1395b.

ideal of technical perfection (the type I have treated in III.1.C).¹⁴⁶ But since they seem to have *spoken* and written traditional types of practical oratory, that is, forensic and deliberative speeches, it is very unlikely that they regarded the connoisseurs trained in rhetoric as their only audience and simply ignored the lay audience, as Cicero sometimes suggests. They probably “only” did not make the artistic or aesthetical value of a speech depend on its practical efficiency.¹⁴⁷ They might not have despised the masses as Callimachus did, when they did not put the right to make a final verdict into the hands of the inexperts; a speech elaborated with full artistry must not be seen as inferior if it was in the main not favoured by people not taught in the art of rhetoric.

Such a view may be easily seen as doubting or attacking a popular and successful type of oratory. It can even be imagined that it was mainly directed against Cicero personally, without being strictly observed in their own practice by those who directed it against him. But for almost 8 years Cicero seems not to have answered this criticism,¹⁴⁸ and when he did, he spoke in a more general way. The question of the audience’s competence became an important issue again and this time on a more basic level.

V. 1

At the time of writing the *Brutus* external circumstances supported or allowed a type of oratory deserving the name in which political effect and public success do or cannot play the main role. Brutus disregards or leaves behind *fructus* and *gloria* attached to speaking. He finds pleasure only in the study of oratory, because that is what can lead to *prudentia*.¹⁴⁹ This approach to oratory implies indifference towards those from whom only *fructus* and *gloria* come, in other words, towards the philosophically untrained audience. Brutus’ attitude can be explained by both the actual political situation and his philosophical convictions, but was clearly not acceptable for Cicero: it diminishes the importance of the lay audience.¹⁵⁰ (That is

¹⁴⁶ Cf. KROLL (1924) 119; but it is worth mentioning that the chief mark of their manner of style seems to be a restraining attitude from certain elements of language (see, for example, what Cicero says about Calvus: *nimum tamen inquirens in se atque ipse sese observans metuensque, ne vitiosum conligeret*, *Br.* 283) and not to apply those ones which demand erudite explanation. Such attempts in oratory, on the other hand, can be observed as early as Livius’ time (*neque id novum vitium est, cum iam apud Titum Livium inveniam, fuisse praeceptorem aliquem, qui discipulos obscurare, quae dicerent, iuberet, Graeco verbo utens* σκότησον. *Q. VIII* 2, 18; see also 18–14, too).

¹⁴⁷ For their supposed original aim, see KENNEDY (1972) 242 and DOUGLAS (1973) 122. KROLL (1924) 119 and A. GUILLEMIN: *Le public et la vie littéraire à Rome au temps de la république*, *REL* 12 (1934), 59, who do not seem to see any distortion in what Cicero says on them.

¹⁴⁸ Or at least not to the main figure, Calvus who, in all likelihood, died in about 54 or shortly afterwards, cf. BOWERSOCK (1978).

¹⁴⁹ *dicendi autem me non tam fructus et gloria quam studium ipsum exercitatioque delectat*, *Br.* 23.

¹⁵⁰ Cicero’s consent (*praeclare . . . dicis*) refers only to the laborious undertaking to become an orator. It demands *prudentia* as well and *eloquentem neminem video factum esse victoria* (24), but says nothing, as K. HELDMANN: *Antike Theorien über Entwicklung und Verfall der Redekunst* (München 1987) 212 argues, which would approve exercise as an end itself; cf. WINTERBOTTOM (1981) 255, who focuses on *De or.*

why he also writes the *Paradoxa* some months later, where he shows Brutus how the seemingly unplausible statements of the Stoics can be made to seem probable for ordinary people.¹⁵¹)

Furthermore, there must have been a growing possibility or need for an orator to accept the fact that he should address his speech to one man having full power. If he did not choose to be silent, he had to consent that his oration would not be even heard by the public; due to the limitations on freedom of speech he had to find a medium between open debate and servile advising. For the time being, Cicero appears to have opposed this idea,¹⁵² but the *Pro Marcello* and the *Pro Deiotaro* show that later such an option was not entirely repugnant to his conception of oratory.¹⁵³ Perhaps the preference of the simple style may be regarded as a first step in that direction,¹⁵⁴ but there must have been several grades of compromise. And one of them, figurative speech, even had a tradition of how to address a superior one-person audience.¹⁵⁵ In other words, we should not be surprised if in such circumstances, we met a theory which emphasizes the necessity of the enigmatic type of discourse (the kind I treated in III. 1.A) and requires of the audience an aptitude for understanding ambiguity or hidden meaning.

Cicero, however, definitely asserted the primacy of a lay audience and refused to accept any "pattern of the few". He put the question on a theoretical level and in technical terms but his answer was influenced by his realization of the indispensable role the lay audience had in helping the orator to create his speech; he also conveyed a lesson for a contemporary orator on how to orientate himself in the present situation.

So, more was at stake than his controversy with the Atticists, though he remained within the inner limits of rhetoric.¹⁵⁶ As mentioned before, he even threw in the question while speaking about others than the Atticists. It seems appropriate, then, to move back to the question in its original form.

¹⁵¹ *Quae . . . ab ipsis etiam παράδοξα appellantur, tentare volui, possentne proferri in lucem, et ita dici, ut probarentur, an alia quaedam esset erudita, alia popularis oratio. Par. 4: cf. also 1–3.*

¹⁵² I do not think that between about October 47 and April 46 there was a real opportunity for him personally to be active in politics, cf. E. A. ROBINSON, *HStCPH* 60 (1951) 137–46. Until he was pardoned by Caesar and obtained permission to return to Rome, it is even more fair to say that he was compelled to accept silence. And in 47–6 it was he who resisted Caesar's regime with more determination than Brutus. About his philosophy as a means to engage indirectly in politics, see H. STRASBURGER: *Ciceros philosophisches Spätwerk als Aufruf gegen die Herrschaft Caesar* (Hildesheim 1990). There are some signs, however, which indicate that he was nearly as divided in mind as Brutus. In about mid April, after Thapsus he writes: *animus meus, qui dubiis rebus forsitan fuerit infirmior, desperatis confirmatus est multum. Ad fam. 5, 21, 3.* But before meeting Caesar, he immediately tries to find a *modus vivendi* and dicendi (*Ut enim olim arbitrabar esse meum libere loqui, cuius opera esset in civitate libertas, sic ea nunc amissa nihil loqui quod offendant aut illius aut eorum qui ab illo diliguntur voluntatem. Ad fam. 9, 16, 3.*) and we are informed that in July he abandoned his plans for a public speech (*Mihi enim indicatum est, si modo hoc Caesar aut patietur aut volet, deponere illam iam personam in qua me saepe illi ipsi probari. Ad fam. 7, 33, 2).*

¹⁵³ C.F. R. G. M. NISBET: *The Speeches*, in: Cicero, edited by T. A. DOREY (London 1965) 46.

¹⁵⁴ DOUGLAS (1966) xiv–xv.

¹⁵⁵ Cf. Dem. *De eloc.* 287–9.

¹⁵⁶ Observe the returning motive of forgetting about the present disturbance (II: 250).

V. 2

The first difficulty which emerged from his assertion was to define the position of the experts. For Cicero can hardly be thought to have given up the standard of technical perfection. As has been shown, apart from the "expert", meaning "dialectician", the connoisseurs had not turned up among the audience in Greek rhetorics.¹⁵⁷ Cicero had to turn to descriptions in the fine arts, music or poetry. He knew several patterns answering this dilemma.

In the excursus in question he takes counterexamples to oratory from music and poetry.¹⁵⁸ In both cases he writes about "expertise" in technical terms and considers the expert audience as the sole genuine one. This passage clearly relates music and poetry to "the pattern of the few" mentioned in III. 1.C.

But he was familiar with other patterns which might easily have offered him a solution. Why did not he take over a pattern presenting a compromise between the experts and the inexperts, the theories of "correspondence" and "complement"? He would have maintained a certain role for the lay audience in this way, too. One should recall that this kind of explanation is to be found in somewhat later times.

Aelius Aristides argues against those who suppose incompatibility between the rules of the art (ὁρθότης) and its effectiveness among the masses.¹⁵⁹ In his opinion, while the lay audience instinctively, though vaguely or imperfectly, is capable of recognizing what is correct and wrong in a speech, connoisseurs can perceive, describe and explain all the characteristics with certainty. In exceptional cases their judgements are not in harmony, but owing to the power of nature this happens rarely.¹⁶⁰

Dionysius of Halicarnassus expresses the view that in an artistically perfect speech there are features pleasing the experts and other parts giving pleasure only to the masses. A perfect orator should aim at practical efficiency and satisfy the connoisseurs as well, though the two things mostly take place in different ways.¹⁶¹

What Cicero says, however, suggests that the lay audience is the primary audience and the experts are secondary. But what does this mean exactly? Is it

¹⁵⁷ See Ch. IV.

¹⁵⁸ 187 (Antigenidas) and 187 (Antimachus).

¹⁵⁹ τοὺς ἀκροατὰς αἰτιώμενοι καὶ λέγοντες ὡς ἅρα τοῦτου χάριν ἐκβαίνουσι τοῦ ῥυθμοῦ καὶ τῆς ὁρθότητος, ἵν' ὥς πλείστοις ἀρέσαι δυνηθῶσι, 401 p. 543 -4, Or. 34 = L. Dind.

¹⁶⁰ κὰν τοῖς ὀλίγοις κὰν τοῖς πολλοῖς εὐδοκιμεῖν ἀνάγκη τὰ βελτίω, (410 p. 560), because τὸ τῶν λόγων κάλλος μετὰ τῆς ἀπάσης φύσεως καὶ τοῦτ' ἔχει, κηλεῖν τοὺς ἀκούοντας (408 p. 555). And on the way the lay audience is strengthened in its indistinct but correct sentiment: καὶ τοῖς ὀρίστοις ἔπessθαι τοὺς πολλοὺς καὶ καθ' αὐτοὺς εὐθὺς μοῖρα τινὶ θεῖα τὰ κράτιστα θαυμάζειν, 410 p. 561.

¹⁶¹ He sees Demosthenes' excellence in his ability to mix two different types of style, the simple one meant for the less educated audience and the elevated one pleasing the experts: Οἱ συνιόντες εἰς τὰς ἐκκλησίας καὶ τὰ δικαστήρια καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους συλλόγους, ἐνθα πολιτικῶν δεῖ λόγων . . . οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ γεωργίας, οἱ δ' ἀπὸ θαλαττουργίας, οἱ δ' ἀπὸ τῶν βαναύσων τέχνων συνερρηκότες, οἷς ἀπλούστερον καὶ κοινότερον διαλεγόμενους μᾶλλον ἂν τις ἀρέσαι, . . . οἱ δὲ πολιτικοὶ τε καὶ ἀπ' ἀγορᾶς καὶ διὰ τῆς ἐγκυκλίου παιδείας ἐληλυθότες, οἷς . . . δεῖ τὴν ἐγκατάσκευον καὶ περιττὴν καὶ ξένην διάλεκτον τοῦτοις προσφέρειν. *Dem.* 15, 2. A similar possibility of satisfying two different *parts* of those listening with two different and independent oratorical means is suggested by Quintilian in VIII 3, 2 and XII 10, 72.

identical with saying that an orator should strive towards practical success, whatever means he makes use of to achieve it? There is a striking peculiarity in Cicero's choice of words when he speaks about this "practical efficiency" or "success". He never uses the word which would express only the fact of success being achieved. That word is "persuasion". Instead, he prefers *probare*, *adprobatio*, *adsensus* depending on what the orator managed to "bring about with his speech" (*dicendo effirere*),¹⁶² or, in other words, how he fulfilled his tasks, which then involves the theory of the three (four)¹⁶³ tasks.¹⁶⁴ Why is this avoidance of a single word so significant, if we know from the young Cicero himself that tasks are means to achieve an aim and the aim of an orator is persuasion?¹⁶⁵ I think Cicero refrains from using this word in this context in order to emphasize what a rhetorical discourse requires from the audience. To be an audience of an oration means to be able to be persuaded *in a special way*. Only that kind of audience elicits a genuine oratorical response which is capable of following argumentation, with the individual emotionally identifying himself with others and perceiving and enjoying stylistic subtleties.

True, this is not said explicitly here but it is a precondition implied in the theory of the three oratorical tasks. And there is one more reason for thinking that Cicero assumes a certain amount of sophistication even in the lay audience. In the *Orator* he will uniquely stress the audience's role in forming oratory: *Semper oratorum eloquentiae moderatrix fuit auditorum prudentia. Omnes enim qui probari volunt voluntatem eorum qui audiunt intuentur ad eamque et ad eorum arbitrium et nutum totos se fingunt et accommodant*.¹⁶⁶ This, which I consider particularly relevant to the theory in *Brutus* 183–200, states more than the traditional requirement that a speaker should conform to his audience's character and mental capacity. As regards Athens, the only place where true oratory developed, it expresses the need for an audience's aptitude for stimulating oratorical virtues: *Quorum* <sc. *Atheniensium*> *semper fuit prudens sincerumque iudicium, nihil ut possent nisi incorruptum audire et elegans. Eorum religioni cum serviret orator, nullum verbum insolens, nullum odiosum ponere audebat*.¹⁶⁷

Further, in *Brutus* 183–200 we can observe a sign of Cicero taking a step towards that idea. Throughout this passage he never thinks of the lay audience as if they were deficient in some way. In contrast to the philosophical tradition of rhetoric (and also some of his own expressions elsewhere)¹⁶⁸ he does not speak about their mental capacity or inclination towards emotions and acoustic pleasure in a derogatory or scornful manner.

¹⁶² *Br.* 184.

¹⁶³ See E. FANTHAM: The Ciceronian *conciliare* and the Aristotelian ἡρεσς, *Phoenix* 27 (1973) 262–75.

¹⁶⁴ 185.

¹⁶⁵ *De inv.* 1, 6.

¹⁶⁶ *Or.* 24.

¹⁶⁷ *Or.* 25.

¹⁶⁸ See note 198 below.

The audience, therefore, should be sophisticated to a certain amount¹⁶⁹ but it does not mean that they can be regarded as experts. This is a point in which Cicero's theory differs from the patterns I linked with drama (III. 2.A, B and C) and the *topoi* I mentioned in connection with Greek oratorical practice (IV. 1). The lay audience does not occupy the place of the experts. The difference between them never becomes relative; it remains, because it rests on the difference in their outlook. The lay audience is thought to be, simply, people taking, so to speak, full possession of their natural abilities. On the other hand, audiences which cannot produce orators or make them perfect, therefore, are somehow below what nature has bestowed on human beings.¹⁷⁰

In the case of prose rhythm, Cicero has already spoken about this aptitude to elicit rhetorical response as a natural ability. The audience looks forward to rhythm and so prompts orators to speak rhythmically.¹⁷¹ This idea, however, based on the *sensus communes* can be extended only to the questions of sense perception and, as we have seen in the fine arts (see n. 121), involves the possibility of different degrees of skill and sophistication in perception. This can be one of the reasons why Cicero's general theory, in which he tries to point to the most fundamental difference between the lay audience and the experts, looks for a solution in a direction other than the patterns I have considered as finding compromise between the two kinds of audience (III. 3.A, B and C).

V. 3

Since the audience expects the orator to persuade them by skilful means, what the expert has to do is not only to set down the simple fact that the public has been persuaded.¹⁷² Of course, efficiency must be the starting-point from which his evaluation begins but he also has to be familiar with all methods an orator can apply.¹⁷³

¹⁶⁹ Cf. COLE (1991) 6.

¹⁷⁰ Note what he says on the Asian audience (*Or.* 24ff) and his rivals (!): *Quod qui non sentiunt, quas auris habeant aut quid in his hominis simile sit nescio, Or.* 168; cf. also 172: 177 and 178. Strictly speaking, the only audience in the history of Roman oratory that can make an orator perfect is Cicero's audience or that of his age. Consequently, it can be said that the whole theory expressed in 188–200 is true only of the special case in which Cicero was working. However it can be also said that apart from this fortunate period, not every precondition had been given for oratory in the strict sense of the word. Cicero was certainly lucky to be able look on the *volgus* he addressed without any contempt but I think it is his main theoretical merit that he tried to free the word from its derogative undertones. Admittedly, he was not entirely consistent in doing so in the historical accounts, and there are passages (136 and 2241ff) where *popularis, vulgaris* or *imperitus* does not mean simply "lay" but "imperfect" as well. (Despite these inconsistencies, which are normally unconscious owing to a loose usage of words, in the case of Varro I will try to give another explanation; see below.)

¹⁷¹ *illi veteres . . . in illa infantia illud, quod aures hominum flagitabant, tenebant tamen. De or.* 3, 198.

¹⁷² True, in *Br.* 200 by emphasizing the outside position of the expert, he suggests misleadingly as if one glimpse were enough (*uno adspectu et praeteriens . . . iudicat*); cf. W. KROLL's commentary ad loc. (6th ed., Berlin 1966).

¹⁷³ *quod dicendi genus optimum sit intellegit, Br.* 199.

Thirdly, he should envisage which strategy and means might be or might have been of most use in a certain case.¹⁷⁴ He should measure the speech actually spoken by the possible, that is, the perfect one.

V. 4

There are certain instances, however, where the judgements of the lay audience and the experts are not in accord. In conceding this possibility, Cicero clearly comes nearer to his opponents' standpoint than he did in explaining Galba's double assessment. But he points out that this divergence is always a matter of degree and not a result of substantial disagreement. Since an expert can have a picture of the ideal, his verdict is always relative to the absolute standard. A lay audience, on the other hand, has some expectations of a speech but no clear idea with which it could be compared, and so makes a simple and noncomparative judgement.¹⁷⁵ These two cannot be contradictory in their quality but differ in degree.¹⁷⁶

Here I would like to call attention to two points where Cicero's usage of some words might seem to be misleading. First, he refers to both kinds of judgement with the same words as *iudicium*, *probatio*; if, however, we look at what he actually says about the process of judging they are very unlike each other. The audience listens to a speech in order to make a decision in an issue open to debate. A judgement of the speech can follow this decision, or may be implied in it, but never becomes the end of listening. In contrast to this, the expert observes a speech in order to judge it without any concern for deciding on the issue in question. His aim is to investigate how it works as a means and not use it as a means. Still, there is no reason why he should not have used the same word for both kinds of judgement in that both of them contain a statement of value.

The second, apparent, contradiction proceeds from changing the contexts of words of assessment. Cicero, indeed, says that even a bad orator can be successful, and that is clearly inconsistent with his assertion that a successful orator as such must be good.¹⁷⁷ But the word "bad" (*malus, mediocris, non probandus*) comes from the judgement of the expert and means "being much below the ideal, wanting perfection" but not "having bad qualities, being corrupted". This can be seen from what he says next: an orator is bad not because he obtains favour in an improper way but because he should have many more of the merits by which he would be able to be efficient to some extent: *volgus etiam non probandum oratorem probat, sed probat sine comparatione; cum a mediocri aut etiam malo delectatur, eo est contentus; esse melius non sentit, illud quod est qualecumque est*

¹⁷⁴ *Quibus virtutibus oratoris horum quidque efficiatur aut quibus vitiis orator aut non adsequatur haec aut etiam in his labatur et cadat, artifex aliquis iudicabit.* 185.

¹⁷⁵ 198.

¹⁷⁶ 198.

¹⁷⁷ See DOUGLAS (1966) ad loc.

*probat. Tenet enim aures vel mediocris orator, sit modo aliquid in eo.*¹⁷⁸ For all that, it is undeniable that here Cicero's style tends towards oxymorons and by trying to make his point nearly goes beyond it.

V. 5

I started my analysis stating, what Cicero seems to suggest, that an expert judging a speech does not take part in the communication between the orator and the masses. This communication is a special kind of persuading or winning over an audience, in which a speaker should make use of as many devices as the human mind is complex in order to gain their favour. Thus, in Cicero's opinion, practical efficiency and aesthetic value are not two alternatives between which an orator should find the best medium or which he has to reconcile each other. Practical efficiency is the *raison d'être* of an oration on which its aesthetic value depends, or which, seen from the results, it makes possible. This clear-cut hierarchy of these principles, as far as I know, is unique in ancient aesthetic and rhetorical theories and seems to be an invention of Cicero's.

But step forward from the orator's standpoint. He tries to bring about as favourable a reception as possible for his speech. Using a Ciceronian image, he keeps the ideal of the perfect orator in mind and he tries to win over his audience by imitating this ideal. A lay audience, however, is capable only of judgements that are not related to the absolute standard. An orator, therefore, counts on somebody else as well who observes whether he managed to meet his ideal. He assumes that his speech, that is, his communication with the experts is or can be overheard by the experts; indeed, in a sense the latter are the genuine listeners.

In order to show that this is implied in what Cicero says, I would like to draw attention to a simile he uses three times (twice in our passage) while describing the intricate relationship between the three sides. *Ut enim ex nervorum sono in fidibus quam scienter ei pulsati sint intellegi solet, sic ex animorum motu cernitur quid tractandis his perficiat orator.*¹⁷⁹

In the context all of them are meant to convey the orators' dependence on their actual audiences. Cicero sticks to this image so firmly that he even slides into some clumsiness when he develops it into intricate details.¹⁸⁰ I suspect that he had another reason for adhering to it. This comparison might have reminded him of the feeling an orator, but to a certain extent every performer can feel when he grips and takes hold of the audience's attention. An orator in particular should have power over the listeners, because he should conceal his intentions from them in order to win them over. He looks on them as not equal partners:¹⁸¹ they are, indeed, in a way

¹⁷⁸ 199; Quintilian (XII 10, 75) does, indeed, have to explain how the lay audience can be influenced by corrupted fashions of speaking.

¹⁷⁹ 199; cf. *Br.* 192 and *De or.* 2, 338–9.

¹⁸⁰ KROLL (1966) ad loc.

¹⁸¹ D. A. RUSSELL: *Criticism in Antiquity*, (London 1980) 4.

like musical instruments. To continue this image, we can identify the listeners to this "music": they are the connoisseurs. Although they are excluded from the primary rhetorical discourse, they are supposed to take part in it on another level. This is explicitly stated by Cicero: *ego huic Bruto dicenti, ut solet, apud multitudinem: 'mihi cane et populo, mi Brute', dixerim, ut qui audient quid efficiatur, ego cur id efficiatur intellegam.*¹⁸²

V. 6

A difficult point has not been touched so far. I have not emphasized that the experts, having an idea of the requirements of a given case, of perfection and observing the efficiency of the speech, could not say anything about it if they do not listen to it. This becomes a problem, not so much for how it is possible, as whether this is not the main point where the experts differ from the laymen, the former perceiving a speech in a much subtler, deeper and more precise way than the latter.

The question turns up most naturally in relation to the most delicate features of a speech: rhythms and euphony. Cicero, indeed, deals with it in the *De oratore* and the *Orator*. Still, another aspect is met in the *Brutus* as well.

First, however, let us return to the question in *compositio*. In both works he contends that rhythm and euphony satisfy natural human expectation ("natural" in the sense mentioned above),¹⁸³ consequently a lay audience, simply by using its natural abilities, is capable of sensing and enjoying them.¹⁸⁴ This means that Cicero tries to exclude the possibility of the experts' more sensitive perception.

His argumentation, however, is not completely convincing, especially in the *De oratore*. To begin with, he takes the example of the fine arts in which, he says, the lay perception is correct and accurate—an example that is clearly inconsistent beyond a point with his own other statements.¹⁸⁵ Then he points to what happens if an actor makes a mistake in poetical metres or accents. The strong disapproval proves that the public, though being unskilled in such matters, is able to feel every subtlety and does not tolerate faults. Since metres and prose rhythms have a common origin in regular repetitions of determinate sequences,¹⁸⁶ the listeners certainly notice every mistake. Why do not they express their dissatisfaction? Because they are content with a minimum level of rhythmicity.¹⁸⁷

This assumption of this "silent concession", however, does not fit completely with his own other statements. Cicero probably was led to it, because he wanted to go as far as possible in comparing prose rhythm and poetical metres. If he had stressed the freer and looser character of prose rhythm,¹⁸⁸ he could have easily

¹⁸² *Br.* 187.

¹⁸³ Chapter V. 2.

¹⁸⁴ *De or.* 3, 195ff; cf. also *De or.* 1, 12; 1, 54; 1, 108; 2, 72; 2, 159; 2, 178—216; 3, 150 1; 3, 223; *Br.* 114; 124; *Or.* 117; *Top.* 73 and D. M. SCHENKEVELD: *Iudicia volgī, Rhetorica* 6 (1988).

¹⁸⁵ Cf. note 121.

¹⁸⁶ *distinctio et aequalium et saepe variorum intervallorum percussio numerum conficit, De or.* 3, 186.

¹⁸⁷ See note 171.

¹⁸⁸ <poetae> in numeris . . . quasi necessitati parere coguntur, *Or.* 202.

admitted that sometimes mistakes or deficient patterns were more difficult to recognize, and as he did in the *Orator*, he could have put more emphasis on the recognition and effect of those that were faultless. Nevertheless, even the assuming of this capacity seems to some scholars to be wishful thinking.¹⁸⁹ Since we have no evidence of what took place in the listeners themselves, the question, of course, cannot be resolved, and we can only observe how persistently Cicero held the view that all his artistry passed to the audience.

There may be, however, another way of removing the difficulty which might arise if the experts were thought to be simply more sensitive recipients. Here the theory of our excursus may help. In this pattern the outside position of the experts is palpable, even in the mode they listen to a speech. So, just as one does not have to believe an argumentation in order to understand it, one's attention does not have to be distracted from the meaning of a sentence in order to perceive its rhythm and pleasing sound.¹⁹⁰ In other words, for the experts rhythm and euphony (the main characteristics of which are, broadly speaking, to make clear the structure of a thought, mark its completeness and so suggest the beauty of order),¹⁹¹ does not function as a means of persuasion. If we bear in mind this difference it could even be admitted that beyond a very far point their manner of listening might be more sophisticated.¹⁹²

The problem looks different in the *Brutus*. In the case of V. Visellius Varro an expert not only apprehends his merits more clearly than the vulgar audience, but he is the only one to be able to apprehend them. It is interesting, however, that Cicero himself calls attention to the contradiction implied with his previous theory, and thinking of the experts he speaks, emphatically, solely of himself: *in quo* <sc. Varrone> *fateor volgi iudicium a iudicio meo dissensisse*.¹⁹³ There is a touch of provocation or deliberate negligence in this sentence, especially if we take into account that in what follows he shows no willingness at all to reconcile the two statements.

But what is it exactly that caused unpopularity for Varro but won the approval of Cicero? His style was so rapid and concise that he became obscure for those who were not able to follow him, that is, for the masses. This obscurity, therefore, was not result of indistinct and vague thoughts or his incapacity to express his ideas; on the contrary, it was due to the exceptional exactness of his words (*idcirco obscura, quia peracuta*, to which corresponds: *neque verbis aptiorem cito alium dixerim*) and to the clarity and speed of his sentences (*rapida et celeritate caecata oratio*, to which corresponds: *neque sententiis crebriorem* <sc. *alium dixerim*>).

Varro, thus, is a victim of his own virtues, because he does not seem to attempt intentionally to be barely comprehensible or enigmatic. He does not appear to put

¹⁸⁹ NISBET (1965) 46–7.

¹⁹⁰ For an interesting story on how even the experts can be deceived by rhythm see Sen. *Contr.* 7, 4, 10.

¹⁹¹ T. ZIELINSKI: Cicero im Wandel der Jahrhunderte (3rd ed., Leipzig 1912) on the periodical style.

¹⁹² As it is implied in his statements that some faults are recognized *even by imperiti* (*Br.* 320 and *Or.* 209).

¹⁹³ *Br.* 264.

forward intellectual riddles to those who are able to read them.¹⁹⁴ and we should not forget his legal expertise that could have also added to his fascinating failure.¹⁹⁵ And there is one more, I think intentional and provocative, contradiction in his praise of Varro. In his vocabulary, just as in almost every ancient rhetorician's, *obscuritas* is a fault and not a virtue.¹⁹⁶ But why, then, did Cicero oppose this theory with which he toiled through 19 paragraphs, even clashing with the traditional oratorical values he accepted? To express a kind of piety towards his *consobrinus* might have had a role in doing this as a personal pretext.¹⁹⁷ My surmise is that, in the eyes of Cicero, Varro served as an example of how an orator might make the mistake of pleasing only the experts. His fault, unintentionally emerging from his virtues, can be contrasted with the error of those who deliberately indulged in adopting a misconceived ideal of the Attic style.

Admittedly, this comparison is not developed or even suggested explicitly by Cicero. Yet because of the openly pronounced self-contradiction which Cicero does not try to eliminate this passage seems to evoke an interpretation of "hidden" meaning in any way; reticence also has its own power of expression.

V. 7

Although the preference for the artistic value of a speech to its seemingly accidental reception might have been unheard before, we can find an apparent tendency already in the *De oratore* to make clear that a speech is meant for the *imperiti*.¹⁹⁸ The possibility of two kinds of evaluation is patent but they are not set against each other firmly.

There were two major factors which compelled him to think over the question, as far as I can see, in a much more comprehensive manner. The first one was the criticism by which his oratorical achievement was faulted from a technical point of view. In this respect, it does not matter who were or were not Atticists, who were certainly his loudest and most confident rivals, because what matters is that even Brutus expressed his dislike of some fundamental characteristics of Ciceronian oratory. Cicero turned to the history of oratory to confirm that popularity was always hand in hand with artistic excellence, provided the people's taste was sound. If they diverged (as in the case of Galba and Laelius) there was always a special explanation for it. An inclination to prove this thesis through historical facts can be repeatedly felt in the excursus itself and it is a main motif in the narrative, while he tried to offer a purely theoretical solution as well.

¹⁹⁴ Cf. Q. VIII 2. 18–24.

¹⁹⁵ *Br.* 264.

¹⁹⁶ E.g. in connection with *narratio* (*brevitas* ... *saepe obest vel maxime in narrando*, ... *quod obscuritatem adfert*, *De or.* 2. 326); with *ordo et Latinitas* (*De or.* 3. 50); *translatio* (*De or.* 3. 167); *motus animi* (*De or.* 3. 50); cf. also *Or.* 30 (*obscuras abditasque sententias, quod est in oratione civili ritium vel maximum*).

¹⁹⁷ DOUGLAS (1966) ad loc.

¹⁹⁸ See the passages quoted in note 184.

It was due to the enforced silence of words, *iudiciorum vastitas et fori*¹⁹⁹ that he saw the question from a wider perspective. This disturbing experience must have made him realize that the role of the lay audience was much more basic in an oration than had been thought before. They could not be thought of as an accidental circumstance whose reaction does not change the absolute value of a speech. The lay audience is as essential a constituent as the case itself, and to be effective among them is the first step by which an orator's skills are to be judged. That seems to be the essence of the excursus in *Brutus* 183—200.

Budapest

¹⁹⁹ *Br.* 21.

BEOBSACHTUNGEN ZUM AMBIVALENTE DENKEN BEI PS.LONGINUS IN SEINEM BUCH ΠΕΡΙ ΥΨΟΥΣ*

Das Buch ΠΕΡΙ ΥΨΟΥΣ von Ps.Longinus ist als ein Zeugnis der antiken rhetorischen Schultheorien in seiner spezifischen Eingenart immer wieder eingehend behandelt worden, wobei die bahnbrechende Untersuchung von Winfried Bühler¹ die Forschung der folgenden Jahre wesentlich bestimmt hat.² Dieser Untersuchungsaspekt soll hier jedenfalls nicht weiter verfolgt werden. Auch die Frage, wie maßgeblich sich Ps.Longinus' Buch auf die Geschichte der abendländischen Ästhetik ausgewirkt hat, soll hier außer acht bleiben. Vielmehr geht es darum, der Denkstruktur des freilich nur fragmentarisch überlieferten Büchleins zu folgen.

Seit Aristoteles, dem Vater der abendländischen Wissenschaftsgeschichte, ist man gewohnt, jede Art logischen Denkens einem bestimmten Rahmen, einem System zuzuordnen, innerhalb dessen es sich zu entfalten und zu bewähren hat. Es führt dann zu Ergebnissen, die in den Prämissen, die das System begründen, schon im Keim enthalten sind. Wenn man aber dem System gleichsam die Steine verschiebt, indem man die Prämissen modifiziert oder gar an ihnen zu rütteln versucht, kommt es zu Rissen im Gebäude, so daß die Ergebnisse des Denkens ihre Eindeutigkeit verlieren oder gar zu Paradoxen führen.

Hegel hat diese Schwierigkeit dadurch gelöst, daß er das antithetische Denken begründet und legalisiert hat, indem er von vornherein schon mit der Möglichkeit rechnete, daß der Gegenstand seines Denkens u. U. auch vor anderen als nur systemimmanenten Aspekten sich zu bewähren habe. Er führte so das von der sokratischen Philosophie begründete dialektische Denken weiter. Wir haben es also bei Ps.Longinus auch mit einem in diesem Sinne modernen, ambivalenten Denker zu tun, der die Welt nicht durch die Brille eines geschlossenen Systems betrachtet,

* Die wichtigsten Gedanken dieses Artikels hat der Verf. in Graz am 12. 1. 1992 am Institut für Klassische Philologie als Gastvortrag zusammengefaßt. Er möchte sich bei dieser Gelegenheit bei seinen Grazer Kollegen, den Herren Professoren Pötscher und Schwarz, für die ehrenvolle Einladung und für die überaus freundliche Aufnahme und Gastlichkeit nochmals sehr herzlich bedanken.

¹ W. BÜHLER, Beiträge zur Erklärung der Schrift „Vom Erhabenen“, Göttingen, 1964.

² Die wichtigste Forschungsliteratur zu diesem Thema ist zusammengestellt von O. SCHÖNBERGER, Longinus, Vom Erhabenen, Stuttgart 1988, S. 131 – 134. In jüngster Zeit vgl. H.-J. HORN, Philosophische Grundlagen der Dichtererklärung in der Schrift „Vom Erhabenen“, Grazer Beiträge, 1990, 187 – 205. HORN'S Versuch gilt der Deutung des philosophischen Hintergrundes, indem er die wichtigsten literaturkritischen Grundlagen der Schrift in ihrer topologischen Abfolge deutlich macht. Darüber hinaus bleibt noch hinzuweisen auf D. A. RUSSEL, „Longinus“, On the Sublime, edited with Introduction and Commentary, Oxford 1964, weil er jedem, der sich mit Ps.Longinus beschäftigt, viele wichtige Hinweise auf Parallelstellen bequem an die Hand gibt.

sondern sie als solche in all ihrer Vielfalt der Erscheinungsformen beobachtet und auf diese Weise natürlich zu ambivalenten Ergebnissen kommt. Im folgenden sollen einige Beispiele dafür angeführt werden:

Der Gegenstand des Autors ist das „Erhabene“, wofür er in seinem Buch eine Reihe von unterschiedlichsten sprachlichen Formulierungen gebraucht, so als sei die von ihm gemeinte Erscheinung viel zu komplex, als daß sie mit einem einzigen Begriff auch nur annähernd zu fassen sei. Und schon im ersten Kapitel begegnet man einer erstaunlichen Feststellung. Der Autor nähert sich der Definition des Erhabenen, indem er zunächst generell seine Wirkung auf die Zuhörerschaft — oder die Leserschaft — betrachtet. Nachdem er zunächst sowohl die Dichter (ποιηταί) als auch die übrigen Schriftsteller (bedeutende Historiker und Rhetoriker heißen bei ihm μέγιστοι συγγραφείς) in gleicher Weise in seine generellen Forderungen einbezogen hat, schließt er I.4 in lakonischer Art die erstaunliche Feststellung an: οὐ γὰρ εἰς πειθῶ τοὺς ἀκροωμένους ἀλλ' εἰς ἑκστασιν ἄγει τὰ ὑπερφυᾶ πάντα δέ γε σὺν ἐκπλήξει τοῦ πιθανοῦ καὶ τοῦ πρὸς χάριν αἰεὶ κρατεῖ τὸ θαυμάσιον. εἶγε τὸ μὲν πιθανὸν ὡς τὰ πολλὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, ταῦτα δὲ δυναστείαν καὶ βίαν ἄμαχον προσφέροντα παντὸς ἐπάνω τοῦ ἀκροωμένου καθίσταται. Das Erhabene, welches er hier mit ὑπερφυᾶ bezeichnet, ein Ausdruck, der schon auf Außergewöhnliches, Über- oder Unnatürliches vorausweist, soll den Hörer oder Leser nicht zur πειθῶ führen, sondern soll ihn in den Zustand der ἑκστασις versetzen. Mit anderen Worten: nicht der rationale Argumentationshorizont wird angesprochen, sondern der Sinn für das Wunderbar-Ekstatische, für das Enthusiastische soll durch das Erhabene geweckt werden und jene Begeisterung auslösen, die mit größerer Gewalt vom Hörer oder vom Leser Besitz ergreift als jedes rationale Argument (δυναστεία und βία ἄμαχος), und soll ihn in jenen Ausnahmezustand versetzen, der ihn das Wunderbare erleben läßt und dazu nicht den mühsamen Weg über rationales Erkennen und Argumentieren nötig hat.

Und dementsprechend ist der sich daran anschließende Gedanke zu verstehen: καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐμπειρίαν τῆς εὐρέσεως καὶ τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων τάξιν καὶ οἰκονομίαν οὐκ ἐξ ἑνὸς οὐδ' ἐκ δυεῖν. ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ὅλου τῶν λόγων ὕφους μόλις ἐκφαινομένην ὁρῶμεν. ὕψος δέ που καιρίως ἐξενεχθὲν τὰ τε πράγματα δίκην σκηπτοῦ πάντα διεφόρησεν καὶ τὴν τοῦ ῥήτορος εὐθὺς ἀθρόαν ἐνεδείξατο δύναμιν. Mit der ἐμπειρία τῆς εὐρέσεως ist offenbar das gemeint, was wir heute unter Textverständnis oder Textinterpretation verstehen, ein Unterfangen, das auch schon zur Zeit unseres Autors ein mühseliger Prozeß akkurater Analyse war, und der Ausdruck ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ὅλου τῶν λόγων ὕφους zeigt, daß man auch damals schon im Text eine Art Gewebe sah, das in mühevoller Kleinarbeit entschlüsselt werden mußte, um es in seinen Vorder- und seinen Hintergründen zu verstehen. Das Erhabene hingegen liegt gleichsam jenseits rationaler Analyse, es erleuchtet einen Text wie der Blitz den Himmel und führt in einem einzigen Augenblick zum unmittelbaren Texterlebnis, jenseits eines mühevollen Ringens um ein Textverständnis, und zwar dadurch, daß der Leser oder Hörer in eben jene „Ekstase“ versetzt wird, von der eingangs die Rede war.

Im zweiten Kapitel wird ein anderes Gegensatzpaar miteinander in Beziehung gesetzt: die Natur (φύσις) und die Kunst (τέχνη). Es ist im Grunde das alte Thema

des sogenannten sokratischen Intellektualismus, der im moralischen Bereich die Frage nach der Lehrbarkeit der Tugend, d. h. des gerechten Handelns stellte. Hier bei Ps. Longinus wird die Frage nach der Lehrbarkeit der hohen Kunst des Erhabenen gestellt, und der Autor wendet sich entschieden gegen die Vertreter der These, daß allein schon eine natürliche Begabung dazu ausreiche, erhabene Leistungen in seinem Sinn hervorzubringen. Schon in seiner Eigenschaft als Rhetoriklehrer, als den man ihn wohl anzusehen hat, konnte er wohl nicht gut dieser Meinung zustimmen, und so argumentiert er damit, daß die φύσις, d. h. die natürliche Begabung, zwar vorhanden sein müsse, daß man sie aber gleichsam zu kultivieren, zu veredeln habe durch die Kunst, die τέχνη, indem man sie je nach Bedarf zügeln oder anspornen muß: δὲ γὰρ αὐτοῖς ὡς κέντρον πολλάκις οὕτω δὲ καὶ χαλινοῦ. Denn es sei letzten Endes nicht ungefährlich, die Natur so ganz ohne τέχνη, d. h. ohne rationale Kontrolle, walten zu lassen: καὶ ὡς ἐπικινδυνότερα αὐτὰ ἐφ' αὐτῶν δίχα ἐπιστήμης ἀστήρικτα καὶ ἀνερμάτιστα ἐαθέντα τὰ μεγάλα, ἐπὶ μόνῃ τῇ φορᾷ καὶ ἁμαθεὶ τόλμῃ λειπόμενα. Dabei argumentiert er so, daß er auch im Wesen der Natur ein kalkulierendes rationales Element zu finden glaubt (2. 2): ὅτι ἡ φύσις . . . οὐκ εἰκαῖόν τι κακὸν παντὸς ἀμέθοδον εἶναι φιλεῖ. So schließt er in dieser Frage mit einem Kompromiß, ein Resultat seines „ambivalenten Denkens“, das beiden Teilen Rechnung trägt, eine Haltung, die das rationale Wesen einer methodisch orientierten Natur voraussetzt, womit auch der rationale Lernprozeß im Umgang mit dem Wort seine Rechtfertigung erfährt.³ Diese seine Grundsatzposition läßt sich über das ganze Buch hin verfolgen. Und die rhetorische Wissenschaft erweist sich als eine solche, die Sporn (κέντρον) und Zügel (χαλινός) braucht, um das „Erhabene“ zu erreichen. Dabei stützt er sich auf die Autorität eines Zitates von Demonsthenes, wonach der glückliche Zufall (εὐτυχία) Sache der Natur sei, die der Kunst hingegen rationale Überlegung (εὐβουλία): ὡς ἡ μὲν φύσις τῆς εὐτυχίας τάξιν ἐπέχει, ἡ τέχνη δὲ τῆς εὐβουλίας. Danach brechen die Handschriften ab, und man muß von einer größeren Lücke von etwa 4 Seiten ausgehen.

In den folgenden Kapiteln (3 – 5) wendet sich der Autor den Fehlern zu, die bei dem Versuch, das Erhabene darzustellen, gewöhnlich zu beobachten sind.⁴ Der Reihe nach zählt er die folgenden Abarten des Erhabenen auf: das Schwülstige (τὸ οἰδοῦν), das Kindische (μειρακιῶδες), das in einer Art schülerhaften Beflissenheit liegt, die gelehrt erscheinen will, ohne es zu sein, und deshalb frostig wirkt (ὡς σχολαστικὴ νόησις ὑπὸ περιεργίας λήγουσα εἰς ψυχρότητα 3, 4), und als die dritte Verfehlung im Bestreben nach dem erhabenen Ausdruck nennt der Autor das παρένθυρον, das unzeitgemäße Pathos, die Begeisterung an der falschen Stelle; gemeint ist offenbar ein schulmäßiges, gleichsam eingelerntes, künstliches Pathos.

³ So taucht dieses Wechselverhältnis von Kunst und Natur etwa im Kapitel 17 wieder auf, wo der Autor vor allem bei Gerichtsreden und Anklageschriften gegen hochgestellte Persönlichkeiten den dringenden Rat erteilt, dafür zu sorgen, daß die σχήματα der rhetorischen Kunst als solche nicht zu erkennen sind, sondern vielmehr den Charakter der Natürlichkeit annehmen: διόπερ καὶ τότε ἄριστον δοκεῖ τὸ σχῆμα, ὅταν αὐτὸ τοῦτο διαλανθάνει ὅτι σχῆμά ἐστιν.

⁴ Vgl. dazu R. PHILIPPSON, Zu ΠΕΡΙ ΥΨΟΥΣ, Rhein. Mus. 1925, 267 – 279, der sich vor allem auch der Frage nach den falschen Arten des Erhabenen widmet, wie sie in Kap. 3 – 5 aufgezählt werden.

das den Hörern oder Lesern eine Leidenschaft vorführt, die davon in keiner Weise berührt werden.⁵ Ps.Longinus bringt es auf die Formel: Begeisterte posieren vor Nicht-Begeisterten (ἐξεστηκότες πρὸς οὐκ ἐξεστηκότας).

Im Kapitel 5 nennt der Autor den eigentlichen Grund für alle diese Verfehlungen: τὸ περὶ τὰς νοήσεις καινόσπουδον, das Bestreben, unter allen Umständen originelle, d.h. neuartige Gedanken vorzustellen, oder Originalität um jeden Preis.

Es lohnt sich diese Aufzählung von Irrwegen im Hinblick auf das große Ziel, das Erhabene darzustellen, die der Autor der Schrift hier vorlegt, mit seiner Aussage im Kapitel 33 zu vergleichen. Dort kommt der Autor auch auf gewisse Fehler zu sprechen, die er aber eher positiv wertet. Um die Unterschiedlichkeit dieser beiden Kategorien von Verfehlungen (Irrtum und Fehler) deutlich zu machen, empfiehlt es sich, zunächst dem Begriff des ἡ τῶν λόγων κρίσις nachzugehen, wie er in Kapitel 6.1 erstmals begegnet. Es sei erlaubt, zu diesem Zweck eine Erklärung von Sextus Empiricus (adv. mathem. I,79) heranzuziehen, der seine Unterscheidung zwischen zwei verschiedenen Arten von Kritikern deutlich macht. Es heißt da: διαφέρειν τὸν κριτικὸν τοῦ γραμματικοῦ· καὶ τὸν μὲν κριτικὸν πάσης, φησί, δεῖ λογικῆς ἐπιστήμης ἐμπειρον εἶναι, τὸν δὲ γραμματικὸν ἀπλῶς γλωσσῶν ἐξηγητικὸν καὶ προσωδίας ἀποδοτικὸν καὶ τῶν τούτοις παραπλησίων εἰδήμονα. Hier wird der bloße Grammatiker dem literarischen Kritiker gegenübergestellt. Dem grammatischen Kritiker ist es nur um die sprachliche Richtigkeit im Sinne des grammatisch richtigen Sprachgebrauchs zu tun, mit allen dazugehörigen phonetischen Zeichen und Formen. Demgegenüber steht die lebenslange Erfahrung des literarischen Kritikers, der allein das Erhabene vom Nicht-Erhabenen zu unterscheiden vermag, und auf den bezieht sich offenbar Ps.Longins Satz in 6.1: ἡ γὰρ τῶν λόγων κρίσις πολλῆς ἐστὶ πείρας τελευταῖον ἐπιγένημα.

Im Kapitel 33 spricht der Autor davon, daß große Begabungen, große Naturen selten frei von Fehlern sind. Es heißt da: ἐγὼ δ' οἶδα μὲν, ὥς αἱ ὑπερμεγέθεις φύσεις ἥκιστα καθαραί· τὸ γὰρ ἐν παντὶ ἀκριβὲς κίνδυνος μικρότητος, ἐν δὲ τοῖς μεγέθεσιν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἄγαν πλούτοις, εἶναι τι χρὴ καὶ παρολιγορούμενον· μήποτε δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἀναγκαῖον ᾗ, τὸ τὰς μὲν ταπεινὰς καὶ μέσας φύσεις διὰ τὸ μηδαμῇ παρακινδυνεύειν μηδὲ ἐφίεσθαι τῶν ἄκρων ἀναμαρτήτους ὥς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ ἀσφαλεστέρας διαμένειν, τὰ δὲ μεγάλα ἐπισφαλῆ δι' αὐτὸ γίνεσθαι τὸ μέγεθος. Die allzugroße Genauigkeit in allem birgt die Gefahr, im Kleinen, im Unbedeutenden steckenzubleiben, während bei großen, bedeutenden d. h. hier erhabenen Unternehmungen schon das eine oder andere vernachlässigt werden kann (παρολιγορούμενον). Es müsse zwar nicht so sein, aber in der Regel sei dies das Schicksal der kleineren oder mittleren Begabungen; eben weil sie nichts riskieren, den Gipfel wahrer Größe nie erreichen, weil sie den sicheren Boden der bloßen Richtigkeit nie verlassen, die darin besteht, eben keine Fehler zu machen, scheitern sie daran, das wirklich Bedeutende, das Erhabene, darzustellen. Die wahre Größe hingegen ist aufgrund ihrer Größe viel eher der Gefahr ausgesetzt, kleine Fehler zu machen. Hier geht es offenbar um den Unterschied zwischen Irrtum und Fehler: Irrtümer – oder

⁵ Ein solches Darstellungsmodell kennzeichnet treffend die Komödie, die der Autor allerdings nicht ernst nimmt.

auch Irrwege — sind immer auf ein System bezogen. Das waren die oben kritisierten lächerlichen Versuche, das Erhabene darzustellen — wohingegen Fehler innerhalb eines akzeptierten Systems unterlaufen können. Dahinter steht latent eine Kritik des Perfektionismus, der seine ganze Konzentration darauf richtet, keinen system-immanenten Fehler zu begehen, und dem deshalb keine Kraft bleibt, das wirklich Große, das Erhabene, kreativ zu entwickeln und darzustellen.

In diesem Zusammenhang ist auch der Begriff des ἀδρεπήβολον zu sehen, offenbar eine Sprachschöpfung des Autors, eine Zusammensetzung von ἀδρός = dicht oder konzentriert, ἔπη = Wörter, und βόλον, ein von βάλλειν abgeleitetes „Werfen“, also das, was der Mensch an zutreffenden, an treffenden Worten aus dem Mund wirft.⁶ Es ist damit offenbar die schöpferische Kraft gemeint, in der Konfrontation zwischen Welt und Sprache eben jene Worte zu finden, die nötig sind, um das Erhabene in Form und Inhalt auszudrücken.

Robert Philippson hat in der oben zitierten Arbeit bereits den sekundären Charakter der sogenannten λέξεως σχήματα in der Rhetorik durchblicken lassen, und in der Tat ist das primäre Element das wechselseitige Spannungsverhältnis, das zwischen ἔννοιαι und λόγοι besteht (vgl. 9,1). Mit anderen Worten: Ehe die σχήματα λέξεως überhaupt Anwendung finden können, muß der entsprechende zur Sprache gewordene Gedanke erst gefunden werden.⁷ Und deshalb nennt der Autor in 8,1 diese schöpferische Fähigkeit, die den Weg über das Erkennen zum Gedanken und schließlich zum adäquaten sprachlichen Ausdruck führt (τὸ περὶ τὰς νοήσεις ἀδρεπήβολον), das πρῶτον und das κράτιστον.

Unmittelbar darauf folgt dann die Gegenüberstellung von νόησις und λέξις in 8,1: ἡ τε ποῖα τῶν σχημάτων πλάσις, δις δὲ που ταῦτα, τὰ μὲν νοήσεως, θάτερα δὲ λέξεως.

Bereits im Kapitel 7 wurde vom Autor die ästhetische Kategorie des Erhabenen in ethischer Hinsicht durch die Kategorie der μεγαλοφυχία ergänzt, ohne die auch die ästhetische Leistung zunichte würde. Dabei ging es ihm vor allem um die Wirkung, die das Erhabene auf den Leser oder Hörer ausübt als ein Zeichen für seine Echtheit. Er beschreibt in diesem Zusammenhang die Leistung, die eine solche vom Erhabenen angerührte Seele vollbringt. Es ist die Leistung einer „re-creatio“ im wörtlichsten Sinn, von der im Kapitel 7,2 berichtet wird.

Eine solch genuine Rezeption des Erhabenen, bei der der Rezipient im Erleben des erhabenen Werkes dieses gleichsam in seiner Seele noch einmal neu erschafft (ἡ ψυχὴ . . . αὐτὴ γενήσασα ὅπερ ἤκουσεν.) ist natürlich nur denen möglich, die ihrerseits auch die geistigen und seelischen Voraussetzungen dazu mitbringen, d. h.

⁶ Man ist deutlich an GÜNTER EICH'S Spätwerk „Gesammelte Maulwürfe“ (Frankfurt 1978) erinnert, wobei diese Tiere bei ihm die Sprache, oder die Worte bedeuten, die das „Maul“ der Menschen auswirft. Allerdings handelt es sich bei ihm nicht um das gesprochene, sondern um das geschriebene Wort, und demgemäß lautet auch der erste Satz: „Was ich schreibe, sind Maulwürfe . . .“

⁷ Vgl. dazu Kapitel 15, 1, wo der Autor die Phantasie, die Vorstellungskraft (φαντασία), die von einigen auch εἰδωλοποιία genannt wird, als treibende, kreative Kraft sieht, die dem Gedanken (ἐννόημα) zum Wort (λόγος) verhilft: καλεῖται μὲν γὰρ κοινῶς φαντασία πᾶν τὸ ὁπωσοῦν ἐννόημα γεννητικὸν λόγου παριστάμενον.

die ἔμφορες und ἔμπειροι λόγων sind und darüber hinaus auch die ethische Qualität der μεγαλοφροσύνη besitzen (Kap. 7,3).⁸

Im Kapitel 9 wird das moralisch-ethische Element des Erhabenen noch deutlicher, noch klarer formuliert, wenn es im dritten Abschnitt programmatisch heißt: ὕψος μεγαλοφροσύνης ἀπήχημα, wo das Erhabene geradezu als der Widerhall einer großen Gesinnung bezeichnet wird.

Was der Autor unter dieser ethischen Forderung verstanden hat, erfährt der Leser zu Beginn des 7. Kapitels: Wonach alle Welt strebe, Reichtum, Ehre, Ruhm und Macht (πλοῦτοι, τιμαί, δόξαι, τυραννίδες), diese „Güter“ sich zwar jederzeit schaffen zu können, aber ihren Besitz letztlich zu verachten – das sei die eigentliche Haltung eines μεγαλόφρων ἀνὴρ, eines Mannes mit großen Gedanken. In 7.1 heißt es: θαυμάζουσι γοῦν τῶν ἐχόντων αὐτά (scil. πλοῦτοι, τιμαί, δόξαι, τυραννίδες) μᾶλλον τοὺς δυναμένους ἔχειν καὶ διὰ μεγαλοψυχίαν ὑπεροπῶντας.

Ambivalentes Denken zeigt sich auch in der Art, wie der Autor der Schrift über die homerische Dichtung urteilt. Die Ilias repräsentiert für ihn das Ideal des Erhabenen, die große heroische Dichtung, in der die Götter ihre Übermenschlichkeit unter Beweis stellen und ihren Schritt gleichsam ins Weite setzen. Als Beispiel dafür führt Ps.Longinus etwa Il. E. 770 – 772 an, jene Stelle, die davon Zeugnis gibt, daß die Rosse der Göttinnen in einem Sprung den Horizont erreichen, d.h. so weit springen können, wie das Auge des Spähers reicht (9.5):

ὄσπον δ' ἡρωειδὲς ἀνὴρ ἶδεν ὀφθαλμοῖσιν,
ἥμενος ἐν σκοπιῇ, λεύσσω ἐπὶ οἶνοπα πόντον,
τόσπον ἐπιθρώσκουσι θεῶν ὕψηλές ἵπποι.

Allerdings kann der Autor sich im Anschluß an dieses Zitat dann doch einen leicht ironischen Kommentar zu dieser Stelle nicht verkneifen, indem er daran zu zweifeln wagt, ob die Götterpferde bei einem zweiten Sprung dieser Art in dieser Welt überhaupt noch irgendeinen Boden unter die Füße bekämen (9.5). Seine Belegstellen aus der Ilias, die das Erhabene und Heroische dieser Dichtung aufzeigen sollen, sind denn auch aus dem Zusammenhang herausgelöste Zusammenfügungen von Versen aus den verschiedensten Büchern, die beim Naiven, d. h. in diesem Fall bei dem Leser, der seinen Homer nicht im Kopfe hat, den Eindruck erwecken, daß es sich bei der zitierten Stelle um ein zusammenhängendes Textstück handelt. In Wahrheit hat der Autor mitunter aber bis zu drei verschiedene Iliasstellen so geschickt ausgewählt und zusammengefügt, daß sie sich als ein zusammenhängendes Textstück lesen lassen.⁹

In der Odyssee hingegen sieht Ps.Longinus die Dekadenz einer „Altersdichtung“, die märchenhafte Züge enthalte und die eher individuelle Charakterdarstel-

⁸ Man denkt hier unwillkürlich an Pindar, Pyth II. 72, γένοι' ὅλος ἔσσι μαθόν. Bei Ps.Longinus soll die das Erhabene nachvollziehende Seele selbst zu dem werden, was sie gehört hat, bei Pindar soll Hieron, an den die Ode gerichtet ist, zur Einsicht kommen, indem er erkennt, wohin die Hybris führt, und wer er ist, nämlich ein Sterblicher.

⁹ So ist das Homerzitat in 9, 6 kontaminiert aus Il. XXI. 388, V. 750 und XX. 61 – 65 und das in 9, 8 aus XIII. 8, XX. 60 und XIII. 19, 27 – 29.

lungen zu bieten habe, wie sie typisch für das Alter und überhaupt wohl für jede Spätzeit sei. Der Autor vergleicht diese Art der Dichtung mit der Komödie, der es seiner Meinung nach vor allem um derartige Charakterzeichnungen zu tun sei. Im Kapitel 9,15 heißt es am Ende der Odyssee: ὥς ἡ ἀπακμή τοῦ πάθους ἐν τοῖς μεγάλοις συγγραφεῦσι καὶ ποιηταῖς εἰς ἡθὺς ἐκλύεται. τοιαῦτα γάρ που τὰ περὶ τὴν τοῦ Ὀδυσσεὺς ἠθικῶς αὐτῷ βιολογούμενα οἰκίαν, οἶονεῖ κωμῳδία τίς ἐστὶν ἡθολογούμενη.

Das eklektische Verfahren im Zitieren von Iliasversen hat natürlich seinen Grund darin, daß der Autor seine These der Erhabenheit der Ilias unter Beweis stellen will. So vermeidet er es tunlichst, komisch wirkende, burleske Szenen zu zitieren wie etwa die Thersites-Szene am Anfang der Ilias oder auch die berühmte Διὸς ἀπάτη-Szene.

Ganz besonders aber hat ihm das Abendland zu danken, daß er im 10. Kapitel seiner Schrift uns das unvergleichliche Liebesgedicht Sapphos überliefert, dem er auch eine kongeniale Interpretation beifügt, die hier nicht weiter erörtert werden soll.

Das Kapitel 15 ist unter dem grundsätzlichen Thema „Phantasie“ (vgl. Anm.7) vor allem dem Phänomen der griechischen Tragödie gewidmet, wenngleich sich am Ende des Abschnittes auch noch eine kurze Bemerkung zur Bedeutung und Funktion der Phantasie in der Rhetorik (ῥητορικὴ φαντασία) findet, die der dichterischen Phantasie gegenüberstehen soll. Von den vielen Zitaten aus griechischen Tragödien, die der Autor für das Gelingen anführt, im sprachlichen Ausdruck in seinem Sinne Erhabenes darzustellen, sei hier jenes kurze Euripidesfragment zitiert und in seiner ambivalenten Hintergründigkeit vorgeführt, das in den TGF bei Nauck unter der Nummer 935 publiziert ist:

ἀλλ', ὦ φίλιπποι Τρῶες.

Von Ps.Longinus werden diese Worte der Cassandra zugeschrieben, und man geht sicher nicht fehl in der allgemeinen Annahme, daß sie aus dem Alexandros stammen, jenem am Vorabend der sizilianischen Expedition verfaßten Stück, dem ersten Drama jener Trilogie, auf welches dann der Palamedes und die Troerinnen folgten. Gesprochen wurden diese vier Worte von Cassandra offenbar, nachdem ihre Warnung vor dem hölzernen Pferd ungehört verhallt war und sie das gedankliche Fazit dieser ihrer Vergeblichkeit zieht, indem sie die Pferdeliebe der Trojaner als eigentliche Ursache für ihren Untergang erkennt, eine Liebe also, die zum Tode führt.

Neben dem ästhetischen und ethischen Aspekt findet sich in der Schrift vom Erhabenen auch noch der politische Aspekt im Kapitel 44, dem letzten des Buches.¹⁰ Das Kapitel ist als Frage und Antwort strukturiert, ein nicht näher bezeichneter Philosoph vertritt seine These vom Niedergang der rhetorischen Kunst und der allgemeinen Sprachkultur (ein beliebter Topos der Zeit), wobei er zu bedenken

¹⁰ Zur Problematik dieses Kapitels vgl. man neuerdings J. BAUSE, Περὶ ὕψους Kapitel 44. Rhein. Mus. 1980, 258–266.

gibt, daß diese Qualitäten sich eigentlich gerade in einer Demokratie voll entfalten sollten. Damit ist dem Autor die Möglichkeit gegeben, sich zu dieser Frage selbst zu äußern.

Es hat den Anschein, als würde Ps. Longinus seine im Kapitel 36 vorgeschlagene Erzählstruktur hier in diesem letzten Kapitel selbst exemplifizieren wollen, eine Darstellungsweise, die dadurch an Spannung und Intensität gewinnt, daß sie in Form eines fingierten Frage-und-Antwort-Spiels, einer *πεῦσις* und einer *ἐρώτησις*, vorgebracht wird und so den Eindruck einer gewissen Spontaneität vermittelt.

Dieser letzte Abschnitt des Buches hat immer wieder die Interpreten interessiert, und es gibt vor allem topologische Untersuchungen, welche sich damit beruhigen, die einzelnen hier geäußerten Gedanken zum Thema „Demokratie“ oder auch zum „rhetorischen Verfall“ der Gegenwart auf ihren Ursprung zurückzuverfolgen und sie zu topologisieren (vgl. etwa die unter Anmerkung 10 zitierte Arbeit). Die eigentliche Aussage des Autors kommt darüber zu kurz, und es soll hier versucht werden, ihr nachzuspüren.

Der eigentliche Schlüsselbegriff in der fingierten Rede des Philosophen (Kapitel 44.1 — 5) ist die ambivalente Bedeutung des Wortes Freiheit (*ἐλευθερία*), ein Wort, das in dieser Rede zweimal vorkommt, aber in einem jeweils anderen semantischen Kontext steht. In 44.2 ist der *ἐλευθερία*-Begriff in politischer Weise auf dem Hintergrund einer demokratischen Ordnung gesehen und bezeichnet den freien Wettbewerb in einer derartigen Gesellschaft. Als die treibenden Kräfte solcher Aktivitäten werden der Konkurrenzkampf und der von öffentlicher Anerkennung gekrönte, persönliche Erfolg, *ἡ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἔρις* und *ἡ περὶ τὰ πρωτεῖα φιλοτιμία* betrachtet: *θρέψαι τε γάρ φησιν ἱκανῆ τὰ φρονήματα τῶν μεγαλοφρόνων ἢ ἐλευθερία καὶ ἐπελπίσαι καὶ ἅμα διελθεῖν τὸ πρόθυμον τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἔριδος καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰ πρωτεῖα φιλοτιμίας*.

Jeder hat in einer solchen Gesellschaftsordnung, die auf demokratischer Freiheit basiert, von Jugend auf gelernt (*παιδομαθεῖς* 44,3), den etablierten Werten und Zielvorstellungen konventionellen Verhaltens (*τοῖς . . . ἔθει καὶ ἐπιτηδεύμασιν*) nachzueifern, die der Autor überraschenderweise hier bereits als „gerechtfertigte Sklaverei“ (*δικαία δουλεία*) bezeichnet. Die Erklärung dafür wird die antwortende Stellungnahme des Autors bringen.

Dem Begriff der politischen Freiheit, der die Menschen im Banne der Konvention hält und sie zu Objekten einer „gerechtfertigten“ — weil als gerecht betrachteten — Sklaverei macht, steht andererseits der moralphilosophische Begriff einer Freiheit gegenüber (*λέγω ἐλευθερίαν*) mit dem leider vernachlässigten Postulat, sich des „schönsten und kreativsten Stromes der Sprache“ zu erfreuen (*ἄγευστοι καλλίστου καὶ γονιμωτάτου λόγων νάματος*), um wahrhaft frei zu werden; aber der Rhetor in einer solchen nur politischen Freiheitsgesellschaft macht sich selbst zum Sklaven (*ρήτορα . . . γίνεσθαι δοῦλον*), weil seine Rede die eigentliche Qualität der Größe verliert (*ἀπαρρησίαστος*) und so ins Gefängnis konventioneller Werte gerät (*ἔμψρουρον ὑπὸ συνηθείας*): selbst begabte Rednernaturen stellen ihr Wort nur noch in den Dienst ihres persönlichen Vorteils, den zu erreichen sie sich durch Lügen, mit anderen Worten durch Schmeicheleien, versprechen (*κόλακες ἐκβαίνομεν μεγαλοφρεῖς*).

Daß der Verlust eben dieser moralphilosophischen Freiheit gemeint ist, und daß die bloße politische, d. h. die durch eine Demokratie garantierte Freiheit als eine potentielle Sklaverei erscheint, wird auch noch unterstrichen durch ein Homerizitat, das den nächsten Paragraphen (44,5) eröffnet: ἤμισυ γάρ τ' ἀρετῆς ἀποαίνονται δούλιον ἡμᾶρ.¹¹ Es handelt sich hierbei um die verkürzte Fassung einer Odyssee-Stelle (Q. 322 f.). Der fingierte Philosoph will offenbar deutlich machen, daß unter den gegenwärtigen Umständen nur jener Teil der ἀρετῇ noch vorhanden ist, der den Erfolg, also die tüchtige Leistung ausmacht, jener andere, moralphilosophische ist auf dem Altar der bloßen Leistung und der ihr dienenden Schmeichelei zum Opfer gebracht worden: die παρρησία, d. h. die ungebrochene Beziehung zwischen Denken und Sprache, ist dem kalkulierten Sprach- und Wortgebrauch gewichen (εὐθὺς γὰρ ἀναζεῖ τὸ ἀπαρρησίαστον καὶ οἷον ἔμφρουρον ὑπὸ συνηθείας ἀεὶ κεκονδυλισμένον).

Um noch bildlich seine Gesellschaftskritik zu unterstreichen, schließt der fingierte Philosoph mit einem vergleichenden Hinweis auf das Zwergenvolk der Pygmäen, deren Wuchs in seiner Vorstellung durch das Einzwängen ihrer Körper in enge Käfige auf unnatürliche Weise künstlich am natürlichen Wachstum gehindert wurde, so daß sie nicht nur körperlich, sondern auch geistig-seelisch verkrüppeln.

In der zweiten Hälfte des Kapitels (44, 6ff.) ergreift der Autor selbst, Ps. Longinus, das Wort zu einer Entgegnung, die im Grunde eine vertiefende Weiterführung dessen darstellt, was der Philosoph in seiner Rede bereits angesprochen hatte. Der fiktive Sprecher hatte seine Kritik auf die Gegenwart beschränkt und durchblicken lassen, daß es früher anders, also besser gewesen sei: Jede These vom Verfall setzt die Vorstellung von der guten alten Zeit voraus. Ps. Longinus beginnt seine Antwort und weiterführende Stellungnahme mit der Feststellung, daß es für den Menschen eigentümlich sei, immer nur die Gegenwart zu tadeln (τὸ καταμέμψεσθαι ἀεὶ τὰ παρόντα). In einer genaueren Prüfung dessen, was man den Weltfrieden (ἡ τῆς οἰκουμένης εἰρήνη) zu nennen pflegt, kommt er zu dem Schluß, daß jenseits politischer Ereignisse der eigentliche Krieg endlos im Innern des Menschen tobt unter den Wünschen und Begierden, denen die Seele des Menschen ausgesetzt ist und die sie beherrschen. Darin sieht Ps. Longinus die eigentliche Sklaverei, die auch und gerade in einer gesellschaftspolitischen Freiheit erhalten bleibt, wie sie eine Demokratie zu garantieren scheint. Dann gibt er ein anschauliches Bild von der Hierarchie und vom Stammbaum der Begierden, wie man sie ähnlich in Platons *Staat* (560 C-d und 575 A-D) findet, ein Buch, das unser Autor offensichtlich gründlich studiert hat, ein Gedanke, wie er in abgewandelter Form in den moralphilosophischen Abhandlungen der Folgezeit immer wieder auftaucht (das meint offenbar der präpositionelle Ausdruck: κατὰ τοὺς σοφούς in 44, 7):

¹¹ Es handelt sich hier um die vom Autor verkürzte Form einer Odyssee-Stelle (p 322 f.), die erklärt, warum der Hund des Odysseus keine Leistungen mehr wie früher erbringt, nachdem er seinen Herrn verloren hat. Das Wort ἀρετῇ hat ja in der Sprache Homers noch die Bedeutung von praktischem Nutzen, von einer Leistung, deren Moral gerade im Gelingen einer Tat selbst liegt. Für Ps. Longinus, einen Autor der Spätzeit, dürfte die Semantik dieses Wort sicher auch noch eine moralphilosophische Komponente enthalten.

ἐπιθυμῖαι = πάθη: φιλοχρηματία → φιληδονία → φιλαργυρία

πλοῦτος

πολυτέλεια

ἀλαζονεία

τύφος

τρυφή

ὕβρις

παρανομία

ἀναισχυντία

Im darauffolgenden 8. Abschnitt des Kapitels zieht der Autor die Konsequenzen aus dieser Beobachtung: Die Menschen, die in der Knechtschaft ihrer Begierden und Leidenschaften wie in einem Kerker gefangen sind, verlieren den Sinn für das wahrhaft Große und Unsterbliche, denn alle ihre Wünsche sind auf vergängliche Dinge gerichtet, wie sie selbst auch sterblich sind. Hier wird die negative Definition des Erhabenen deutlich: Das Nicht-Erhabene ist das dem Irdischen Verhaftete.

Im 9. Abschnitt dieses Schlußkapitels rundet sich der Gedankenkreis, indem der Autor auf jenen Begriff zu sprechen kommt, dessen Ambivalenz in der ersten Rede des Philosophen bereits angeklungen war: die wahre und die scheinbare Freiheit (ἐλευθερία). Auch Ps. Longinus greift nach einem konkreten Beispiel, um seine These zu erläutern, er exemplifiziert seine Kritik am Beispielspiel des bestochenen Richters, der in seinen Entscheidungen über Recht und Unrecht nicht mehr frei ist (οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ κρίσει μὲν τις δεκασθεὶς οὐκ ἂν ἐπὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ καλῶν ἐλεύθερος καὶ ὑγιὲς ἂν κριτὴς γένοιτο), am Beispiel des Erbschleichers, der nur auf den Tod seines reichen Anverwandten lauert, und am Beispiel derer, die um reichen Gewinnes willen ihre Seelen verkaufen (τὸ δ' ἐκ τοῦ παντὸς κερδαίνειν ὠνούμεθα τῆς ψυχῆς ἕκαστος. . . ἡνδραποδισμένοι. . .). Dann stellt er die verzweifelte Frage, wo in dieser durch Leidenschaften und Begierden verpesteten und versklavten Gesellschaft sich noch eine unabhängige Instanz findet, die wirklich frei darüber entscheiden kann, was groß und ewig ist. (ἄρα δὴ ἐν τῇ τοσαύτῃ λοιμικῇ τοῦ βίου διαφθορᾷ δοκοῦμεν ἔτι ἐλεύθερόν τινα κριτὴν τῶν μεγάλων ἢ διηκόντων πρὸς τὸν αἰῶνα κἀδέκαστον ἀπολελεῖσθαι καὶ μὴ καταρχαιρεσιάζεσθαι πρὸς τῆς τοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν ἐπιθυμίας;) So stellt sich dem Autor im nächsten Abschnitt (44, 10) die kritische Frage, ob es mit der bloßen politischen Freiheit in einer Demokratie getan ist, ob der Mensch nicht vielmehr — aufgrund seiner Abhängigkeit von seinen Leidenschaften und seiner seelischen Versklavung durch die Begierden — gerade im politischen Bereich eine moralphilosophische Führungsinstanz braucht, die ihn erst wahrhaft frei macht, indem sie ihm die Herrschaft über sich selbst im Sinne der platonischen ἐγκράτεια ermöglicht. Aber offenbar zweifelt der Autor daran, daß der Mensch die äußere, demokratische Freiheit von sich aus in eine innere Befreiung umzusetzen vermag.¹²

¹² Man ist hier deutlich an die platonische Idee vom Philosophen-König aus dem „Staat“ erinnert, aber man assoziiert hier auch die Ambivalenz des ἐρις-Begriffes, wie sie seit Hesiod dem abendländischen Denken vertraut ist (Hesiod, Op. 11–29).

Und Ps. Longinus schließt seine Rede mit dem Hinweis darauf, daß Begriffe wie ζῆλος (Wetteifer) und τιμή (Ehre) nur dann als genuine Erscheinungen anzuerkennen sind, wenn sie auf das Ziel eines gemeinsamen Nutzens (ἀξίας ὠφελείας) gerichtet sind, sonst wird aus ihnen nur das Streben nach persönlichen Lob- (ἐπαινος) oder Lusterlebnissen (ἡδονή). In 44, 11 heißt es: ὅλως δὲ δαπανῶν ἔφην εἶναι τῶν νῦν γεννωμένων φύσεων τὴν ῥαθυμίαν, ἢ πλὴν ὀλίγων πάντες ἐγκαταβιοῦμεν, οὐκ ἄλλως πονοῦντες ἢ ἀναλαμβάνοντες εἰ μὴ ἐπαινοῦ καὶ ἡδονῆς ἕνεκα, ἀλλὰ μὴ τῆς ζήλου καὶ τιμῆς ἀξίας ποτὲ ὠφελείας.

Schlußbemerkung: Es hat sich an einigen Beispielen gezeigt, daß Ps. Longinus in seinem Buch „Über das Erhabene“ mit seinem Denken nicht *einem* festen System verpflichtet bleibt, sondern sich offen hält für viele Aspekte der Welt und des Lebens. Und so kommt er immer wieder zu scheinbar paradoxen Resultaten und Feststellungen, die sich an der offensichtlichen Diskrepanz entzünden zwischen dem, was die Menschen wollen, und dem, was sie eigentlich sollten, um nicht nur ihren eigenen Vorteil zu wahren, sondern vor allem auch das Wohl der Gesellschaft, in der sie leben. So fanden sich die Gegensatzpaare Ratio–Ekstase (πειθῶ/ἔκστασις), Natur–Kunst, (φύσις/τέχνη), Irrtum–Fehler (ἁμαρτία in zwei Bedeutungen), Gedanke–Wort (ἔννοια/λόγος), Freiheit–Sklaverei (ἐλευθερία/δουλεία), die — in der Analyse des Autors — keineswegs bloße Gegensätze bleiben, sondern in enger Beziehung, Verschränkung und Wechselwirkung verbunden sind. Das eben macht ihre Ambivalenz aus. So gesehen handelt es sich bei Ps. Longinus — wer immer er auch gewesen sein mag — um einen modernen Denker, wie ihn unser Zeitalter hervorgebracht haben könnte.

Turku

RHETORICAL NARRATION AND THE LITERARY NOVELLA

(PETRONIUS' *SATYRICON* 61-62)DIS MANIBUS J. P. SULLIVAN
VIRI DOCTI DICENDI PERITI

1. In my paper I aim to explore the structure of Petronius' werewolf novella. Other researchers have already clarified the fundamental questions.¹ They have collected and interpreted the elements and motives of the werewolf story in pagan and Christian literature,² examined its place and role in the structure of the *Satyricon*,³ and dealt with the textual problems found in the original Latin text of this novella.⁴ As far as I know, nobody has dealt with the structure of this novella; however, research into this topic can contribute to the better understanding of Petronius' art and the general structure of the *Satyricon*.

In my analysis I use the term "story" to signify the basic plot that is compulsory in every version of the story in question, e.g., in a werewolf story, one or more human beings turn into wolf; then after a time they turn back into human beings. This basic story always has a structure according to the *ordo naturalis*. Under the term "novella", I understand the single elaboration which gives the story a new structure according to the *ordo artificialis* on the level of *dispositio* and puts it in a new linguistic form along with a new function (*finis*).

2. The werewolf topic is very old and prevalent in ancient literature. As M. Schuster states, the first occurrence of the werewolf tale is to be found in Herodotus, who wrote about the people of Neuroi, all of whom become werewolves

¹ See the commentaries: L. FRIEDLAENDER, *Petronii Cena Trimalchionis* (Leipzig 1906) ad loc.; W. B. SEDGWICK, *Cena Trimalchionis*, 2nd ed. (Oxford 1950) ad loc.; E. PARATORE, *Il Satyricon di Petronio. II. Commento* (Florence 1933) ad loc.; P. PERROCHAT, *Pétrone, Le festin de Trimalcion*, 3rd ed. (Paris 1962) ad loc.; E. T. SAGE and B. B. GILLELAND, *Petronius, The Satyricon* (New York 1982) ad loc.

² M. SCHUSTER, "Der Werwolf und die Hexen", *Wiener Studien* 48 (1930) 149-178; D. M. KRATZ, "Fictus lupus. The Werewolf in Christian Thought," *Classical Folia* 30 (1976) 57-79.

³ G. N. SANDY, "Petronius and the Tradition of the Interpolated Narrative," *TAPA* 101 (1970) 463-476.

⁴ In the Latin text of Niceros' novella there are textual problems, especially in two sentences. The first sentence reads as follows in MÜLLER's edition (München 1961): *si quid ab illa petii, numquam mihi negatum; fecit assem, semissem habui; <quicquid habui> in illius sinum demandavi* (61.8). According to J. REVAY the reading of *Codex Traguriensis* is better if we punctuate it as follows: *si quid ab illa petii, numquam mihi negatum fecit; assem, semissem habui, in illius sinum demandavi*. The second place reads as follows in Müller's edition †*matauitatau*†. J. REVAY suggests the reading: *mactavi vi tota*, "Emendationum Petronianarum specimen," *EPhK* 40 (1916) 163-168. REVAY's suggestions seem to suit well the original context. On the first sentence see J. DELZ, *Gnomon* 34 (1962) 682; *MH* 34 (1977) 141. On the second see S. M. MILLER, "Werewolves and 'Ghost Words' in Petronius: Matauta tau," *CP* 37 (1942) 319-321; H. D. RANKIN, "On Petronius 62.9," *CP* 86 (1958) 501; K. F. ROSE, "Petronius 62.9 again," *CP* 62 (1967) 259.

once a year for some days (4, 105).⁵ Virgil writes in his Eclogue 8 that Moeris turned into a wolf frequently (98–99).⁶

About hundred years later, Pomponius Mela (Chor. 2, 14–15) and Pliny the Elder mention the werewolf story. According to Pliny the Elder, the werewolf story was very current among simple people: “We are bound to pronounce with confidence that the story of men being turned into wolves and restored to themselves again is false—or else we must believe all the tales that the experience of so many centuries has taught us to be fabulous; nevertheless we will indicate the origin of the popular belief, which is so firmly rooted that it classes werewolves among persons under a curse” (Nat. Hist. 8, 80–81). According to Pliny “the origin of the popular belief” can be explained by the lies of Greek authors: *mirum est quo procedat Graeca credulitas! nullum tam inpudens mendacium est, ut teste careat* (8, 82). Pliny is mistaken because the historians and archaeologists—A. Alföldi, E. Richardson, I. Krauskopf—demonstrated that the wolf and werewolf had played a great part in the Roman and Etruscan religion from the very outset.⁷ Pliny’s statement that “the popular belief classes werewolves among persons under a curse” is to be found in Petronius’ werewolf story, also, in a popular form: “I realized he was a werewolf and afterwards I couldn’t have taken a bite of bread in his company, not if you killed me for it.”⁸ All this shows that by the middle of the first century A. D., werewolves had become a popular literary topic which suggests, too, that the Satyricon can be dated to this time.⁹

3. Petronius’ werewolf novella is told by Nicerus, an ex-slave, at Trimalchio’s request. I cite this novella in J. P. Sullivan’s translation because perhaps it is the best English translation and answers my purpose, i.e., it can illustrate the style and the structure of the Latin original:

“When I was still a slave, we were living down a narrow street—Gavilla owns the house now—and there as heaven would have it. I fell in love with the wife of Terentius the innkeeper.

“You all used to know Melissa from Tarentum, an absolute peach to look at. But honest to god, it wasn’t her body or just sex that made care for her, it was more because she had such a nice nature. If I asked her for anything, it was never refused.

⁵ M. SCHUSTER, *op. cit.* 149.

⁶ Verg. *Ecl.* 8.96–97: *his ego saepe lupum fieri et se condere silvis / Moerim vidi.*

⁷ A. ALFÖLDI, La louve du Capitole. Quelques remarques sur son mythe à Rome et chez les Étrusques. In: *Hommage à la Mémoire de Jérôme Carcopino*, 1977, 1–11; E. RICHARDSON, “The Wolf in the West,” *The Journal of the Walter Art Gallery* 36 (1977) 91–101; I. KRAUSKOPF, Todesdämonen und Totengötter im vorhellenistischen Etrurien. Firenze 1987, 20 ff. To these papers J. Gy. Szilágyi called my attention; here I express my sincere thanks to him. I cite Pliny in RACKHAM’s English translation: Pliny, *Natural History*. Volume III. By H. M. A. RACKHAM (London 1967) 59. On the problems of Pliny’s text see Plin L’Ancien. *Histoire naturelle*. VIII. Texte établi, traduit et commenté par E. ERNOUT (Paris 1952) 129–131.

⁸ In my paper I cite Nicerus’ werewolf novella on the basis of the following English translation: *Petronius, The Satyricon and Seneca, The Apocolocyntosis*. Revised edition. Translated with introduction and notes by J. P. SULLIVAN (Penguin Books 1986) 76–77.

⁹ On the date of the Satyricon see J. P. SULLIVAN, *The Satyricon of Petronius. A Literary Study* (London 1968) 21–33; P. B. CORBETT, *Petronius* (New York 1970) 13–29; K. F. C. ROSE, *The Date and Author of the Satyricon* (Lugduni Batavorum 1971) 20ff.

If I had a penny or halfpenny, I gave it to her to look after and she never let me down.

"One day her husband died out at the villa. So I did my best by hook or by crook to get to her. After all, you know, a friend in need is a friend indeed.

"Luckily the master had gone off to Capua to look after some odds and ends. I seized my chance and I talked a guest of ours into walking with me as far as the fifth milestone. He was a soldier as it happened, and as brave as hell. About cock-crow we shag off, and the moon was shining like noontime. We get to where the tombs are and my chap starts counting the stars. Then just as I looked back at my mate, he stripped off and laid all his clothes by the side of the road. My heart was in my mouth, I stood there like a corpse. Anyway, he pissed a ring round his clothes and suddenly turned into a wolf; he started howling and rushed off into the woods.

"At first I didn't know where I was; then I went up to collect his clothes—but they'd turned to stone. If ever a man was dead with fright, it was me. But I pulled out my sword, and I fairly slaughtered the early morning shadows till I arrived at my girl's villa.

"I got into the house and I practically gasped my last, the sweat was pouring down my crotch, my eyes were blank and staring—I could hardly get over it. It came as a surprise to my poor Melissa to find I'd walked over so late.

"If you'd come a bit earlier, she said, at least you could've helped us. A wolf got into the grounds and tore into all the livestock—it was like a bloody shambles. But he didn't have the last laugh, even though he got away. Our slave here put a spear right through his neck.

"I couldn't close my eyes again after I heard this. But when it was broad daylight I rushed off home like the innkeeper after the robbery. And when I came to the spot where his clothes had turned to stone, I found nothing but bloodstains. However, when I got home, my soldier friend was lying in bed like a great ox with the doctor seeing to his neck. I realized he was a werewolf and afterwards I couldn't have taken a bite of bread in his company, not if you killed me for it. If some people think differently about this, that's up to them. But me—if I'm telling a lie may all your guardian spirits damn me!" (Sat. 61–62).

In this werewolf novella, there are two areas of folk origin. The first is a complex of patterns which are to be found in other werewolf stories; the second is the original vulgar Latin language of the story. Let us consider the first.

The soldier was "as brave as hell" (*fortis tamquam Orcus*).¹⁰ The man who was a werewolf had to be very strong because he had a connection with the other world. They started about "cock-crow" (*circa gallicina*), that is, between midnight and the first cock-crow because, at that time, the border between this world and the other world ceases to exist. The soldier turned into a wolf in a place where there were tombs. These places are near to demonic other world. The soldier stripped off and laid all his clothes by the side of the road: strip is a condition of turning into a wolf. He laid all his clothes by the side of the road, and he pissed a ring round them, that

¹⁰ The Latin text of Niceros' novella I cite on the basis of MÜLLER's edition (München 1961).

is, he drew a magic circle which has two functions. First, it will make it possible for him to turn into a wolf; secondly, it will cause his clothes to turn to stone (*illa autem lapidea facta sunt*), that is, in this way he prevented their being stolen, because if a werewolf wants to turn into a man again, he must find his former clothes. Finally, the wolf was wounded (*collum eius traiecit*). The wounding stopped the magic power, and the werewolf turned back into his original human form.¹¹

The language of the story is in vulgar Latin.¹² It is full of barbarisms, solecisms, and vulgar phrases, e.g., *fefellit*, *apocolamus*; *persuadeo hospitem* instead of *hospiti*; *nobis adiutasses* instead of *nos*, etc. Many of his vulgar phrases are *hapax legomena*, e.g., *per scrutum per ocream* — “by hook or by crook”; *scruta scita* — “odds and ends”; *per bifurcum* — “down my crotch” etc. Niceros knows that he cannot speak correctly. He is embarrassed because there are cultured men in the company, such as the rhetorician Agamemnon, Encolpius, Giton and Ascyltos. He says therefore: “Well, just for fun — though I’m worried about those schoolteachers there in case they laugh at me.”

Niceros’ language reflects very well his lack of culture, his world view, and his scale of values. When he says that he fell in love with Melissa, the wife of Terentius, he speaks about the motives of his love for Melissa: “It wasn’t her body or just sex that made me care for her; it was more because she had such a nice nature. If I asked her for anything, it was never refused. If I had a penny or halfpenny, I gave it to her to look after and she never let me down.” That is, the main motive of his love to Melissa was money; and it is natural because the ex-slaves in the *Cena Trimalchionis* speak always about money and wealth, for them it is the highest good. Therefore, P. B. Corbett seems to be only partly correct when he writes about Petronius: “He shows human nature at work, particularly in obedience to its strongest impulse, sexual desire”.¹³ It is true perhaps in the case of Encolpius, Giton, Ascyltos and Eumolpus, but not in the case of Trimalchio and his guests. The scale of values which is mirrored in Niceros’ words is his own, but the way of saying it belongs to Petronius. Researchers have revealed that there is a link between the *Satyricon* and Plato’s *Symposium*,¹⁴ e.g., *Habinas* is a parody of *Alcibiades*.¹⁵ Niceros’ concept of love—in my opinion—reminds us of *Phaedrus*’ *Eros* story. Namely, *Phaedrus*, in the *Symposium*, says that love makes people better: it makes them do good deeds; the lover is ready to serve the loved person (178c–180b). The love relationship between Niceros and Melissa is similar. Melissa’s character is good, therefore Niceros, too, becomes better: When Melissa is in trouble, he runs to her because “a friend in need is a friend indeed”. This refined parody means that, in this folk story, the writer Petronius is present, too. His presence can be seen best in the structure of the story.

¹¹ On the folk elements and motifs of the werewolf story see M. SCHUSTER, *op. cit.* 156–164.

¹² On the language of this story see the commentaries cited in note 1.

¹³ P. B. CORBETT, *op. cit.* 139.

¹⁴ E. COURTNEY, “Parody and Literary Allusion in Menippean Satire,” *Philologus* 106 (1962) 67.

¹⁵ A. CAMERON, “Petronius and Plato,” *CQ* 19 (1969) 367–370.

4. It is a prominent fact that rhetoric plays a major role in the *Satyricon*, e.g., the first extant part criticizes the contemporary teaching of rhetoric.¹⁶ Not only Agamemnon the rhetorician but all the characters of the *Satyricon* speak in their own language as real rhetors. According to Aristotle, "A well-constructed plot, . . . , cannot either begin or end at any point one likes".¹⁷ The werewolf novella of Niceros is a well-rounded whole, which—in accordance with Aristotle's principle—consists of three parts, a beginning, a middle, and an end.

The first part begins with a survey of the circumstances: Niceros was still a slave when he fell in love with Melissa, the wife of Terentius. One day her husband died and he did his best to go to her. In the second part Niceros tells us how he could go to Melissa. He went with a soldier; and when they arrived at the tombs, the soldier turned into a wolf. Niceros, terrified, ran to the house of Melissa. In the third part, in Melissa's house, he is informed that a wolf had attacked the livestock, and been wounded by a slave. He had an evil presentiment, rushed off home, and found the soldier lying in bed. A doctor was examining his neck. So he realized the soldier was a werewolf.

Everybody was amazed when Niceros finished the story, that is, everybody believed it. Why? Because Petronius had Niceros tell it according to the rules of rhetorical narration. According to the *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, the narration (i.e., the statement of facts, the second part of a discourse) "should have three qualities: brevity, clarity, and plausibility"¹⁸ (1,9,14).

"We shall be able to make the narration brief if we begin it at the place at which we need to begin; . . . if our narration is summary and not detailed; if we carry it forward, not to the furthest point, but to the point to which we need to go" (1,9,14). Now, Niceros tells his story very briefly. He speaks only about the events which are basic to the plot. He does not say anything about how the soldier arrived at the house, or what happened with Melissa afterwards.

"Narration will be clear if we set forth the facts in the precise order in which they occurred, observing their actual or probable sequence and chronology" (1,9,15). Petronius observes these rules very carefully, i.e., the setting is clear. The story begins after midnight and it ends in the morning. As the time passes, so the place of the plot changes: at Niceros, on the way to Melissa's, at Melissa's, on the way home, and finally in Niceros' house.

"Our narration will have plausibility if it answers the requirements of the usual, the expected, and the natural; if account is strictly kept of the length of time, the standing of the persons involved, the motives in the planning, and the advantages offered by the scene of action. . . . If the matter is true, all these precautions must none the less be observed in the narration, for often the truth cannot gain credence otherwise. And if the matter is fictitious, these measures will have to be observed all the more scrupulously" (1,6,16). Niceros' story is obviously fictitious,

¹⁶ Cf. J. P. SULLIVAN, *The Satyricon of Petronius. A Literary Study* 161–165.

¹⁷ Aristotle, *Poetics*. Translated by I. BYWATER (New York 1951) 1450b 30.

¹⁸ I cite the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* in the translation of H. Caplan: *Ad. C. Herennium De ratione dicendi (Rhetorica ad Herennium)* with an English translation by H. CAPLAN (London 1964).

therefore Petronius designed the narration of the plot very carefully in order to have plausibility. Petronius had Niceros tell the story on three levels.

In the first part of the story all the circumstances are realistic and verisimilar. We know who Niceros and Melissa were that time, where they lived, what their standing was, what the main motive of their love was and so on.

In the second, that is, in the central part, the plot becomes complicated at three levels. At the level of reality: The master of Niceros went off to Capua, so he could go to Melissa's, and so on. At the supernatural level: The soldier suddenly turned into a wolf, started howling and rushed off into the woods, and so on. On the subjective level: Remarks of Niceros on the happenings, on his feelings: "My heart was in my mouth, I stood there like a corpse." ... "If a man was dead with fright, it was me", and so on.

In the third part the events are again at the level of reality, as in the first part: Melissa was surprised that Niceros had walked over so late. A wolf had gotten into the grounds, a slave had wounded it. On his way home Niceros found nothing but bloodstains. When he got home, the soldier was in bed, and a doctor was examining his neck, so he had to realize that the soldier was a werewolf. He buttresses this fact on the subjective level: "If some people think differently about this, that's up to them. But me—if I'm telling a lie may all your guardian spirits damn me."

All this means that Niceros' story starts with *reality* and arrives at *reality*, therefore it is easy to believe it. The clear logic of the plot contributes a lot to the plausibility, as well. On the basis of this logic the audience had to realize along with the story-teller that the wounded soldier must be a werewolf.¹⁹

5. Finally we have to consider the place and function of this werewolf novella in the structure of the *Satyricon*. At the end of the last century E. Klebs stated that it is Priapus' wrath which assures the unity of the *Satyricon* structure.²⁰ The main characters escape the wrath of Priapus and in the meantime they have various adventures. K. Kerényi took over this statement, and defended it against Révay's opinion²¹ according to which "The *Satyricon* is a series of loosely connected episodes containing three main characters (Encolpius, Ascyltos and Giton, or Encolpius, Eumolpus and Giton) and which are united only by the chronological order of the

¹⁹ All this means that Niceros' werewolf novella is well told. Some earlier researchers have realized this, e.g., G. BAGNANI writes: "He tells admirably a couple of excellent ghost stories, invaluable documents for the historian of folklore. . . .". *The Satyricon of Petronius*. The translation by W. BURNABY revised for the present edition, with an introduction by G. BAGNANI (New York 1964) Intr. VII.; E. T. SAGE appreciates it as follows: "In the story of the werewolf Petronius has put into the mouth of Niceros a tale which meets every requirement of the short story, as the art of recounting them is taught to-day. . . . Yet experience or Petronius has given his story, not the discursiveness one expects from such a man, but a condensation in which every word is effective and necessary", *op. cit.* 222. I wanted to show that Petronius has given this story "the condensation" according to the rule of rhetorical narration. Therefore I cannot accept the opinion of B. B. GILLELAND who, wanting to confute SAGE's statement writes: "This story has been praised for its lack of discursiveness. It must be condemned for its brevity, which allows but few logical connections between events and little motivation of character", *op. cit.* 231. The suggestion of GILLELAND "that the adventure of Niceros contains a parody of Aeneas in the underworld" does not entail that the story is bad or "foolish".

²⁰ E. KLEBS, "Zur Komposition von Petronius' *Satirae*," *Philologus* 47 (1889) 623ff.

²¹ KERÉNYI K., "Dr. Révay József: Petronius és kora," *EPH* 51 (1927) 116-122.

events and the identity of the narrator. . . . Petronius seems to be led by one point of view in the disposition of his material: to be always fresh, lively, varied and highly amusing."²² The newest researches seem to support Révay's opinion. L. Callebat assigns an important role to the interpolated narratives and to Fortuna and the flight in the plot of the *Satyricon*.²³ According to K. Hubbard the loosely connected parts of the *Satyricon* always have a central seed which is surrounded by similar incidents; i.e., the *Satyricon* has a ring composition.²⁴

On the basis of such a structure, we can regard the werewolf novella as an organic part of the *Satyricon* in the same way as the other interpolated stories and poems. Niceros tells this story at Trimalchio's request in the middle of the dinner, when the guests already had related all the news and gossip, and when they had drunk a lot and therefore they wanted only to enjoy themselves. Soon afterwards the company is already so drunk that when Habinas the funeral undertaker arrives, Trimalchio begins to speak about his own funeral and he enters into the spirit of his role to such an extent that he performs his own funeral in a way which strikes the reader as the height of tastelessness.

From all this we can infer that the literary genre of the *Satyricon* is rather complex: Petronius molded it from the elements of satire, comedy, Atellana, mime, novel and folklore. From the complexity of the genre issues perhaps the looseness of the plot of the *Satyricon*.²⁵ All these elements—as P. B. Corbett states—"overlap and intermingle in the course of the narrative, but all are discernible",²⁶ nevertheless Petronius combined them with refined rhetorical skill.

6. To sum up, I would like to stress that, although there are folklore motifs in Niceros' werewolf novella and its language is vulgar, nevertheless its structure is composed according to the rules of rhetoric. As the rhetorical knowledge of Petronius is reliable, so the folk elements are reliable and original, too. Such folk stories as Niceros' werewolf story and Trimalchio's ghost story were told in ancient Rome by the so-called *circulatores*, itinerant, professional story-tellers.²⁷ Petronius must have known the *circulatores*, e.g., Habinas boasts about one of his slaves whom he had sent to the *circulatores* to learn (68,5). In summary, Niceros' werewolf novella was composed by Petronius to fulfil three functions: (a) as a *novella conviviale* it amuses guests at the dinner-party of Trimalchio; (b) as a speech delivered by the ex-slave Niceros it is a characterization of the narrator himself; and (c) as a parody it alludes to Plato's Symposium.

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²² Dr. RÉVAY J., *Petronius és kora* (Budapest 1927) 78.

²³ L. COLLEBAT, "Structures narratives et modes de représentation dans le *Satyricon* de Pétrone," *REL* 52 (1974) 281–303.

²⁴ T. K. HUBBART, "The Narrative Architecture of Petronius' *Satyricon*," *AC* 55 (1986) 190–212.

²⁵ On the complex genre of the *Satyricon* see J. P. SULLIVAN, *The Satyricon of Petronius. A Literary Study* 81–91, 115ff; R. BECK, "The *Satyricon*: Satire, Narrator and Antecedents," *MH* 39 (1982) 206–214; F. JONES, "The Narrator and the Narrative of the *Satyricon*," *Latomus* 46 (1987) 810–819.

²⁶ P. B. CORBETT, *op. cit.* 37.

²⁷ On this topic see C. SALLES, "*Assem para et accipe aureum fabulam*," *Latomus* 40 (1981) 3–20.

PHILOPONEAN ACCOUNTS ON *PHANTASIA*

Before starting to address this issue, the title itself may require some clarification. Since Hayduck's taciturn remarks, the consensus has been to ascribe the commentary on *De Anima* III (*in DA* III), edited as by Philoponus in Vol. XV of *CAG*, to Stephanus, an Alexandrian Neoplatonist who was invited to Constantinople around 610 and summoned professor, or perhaps rector, at the new-founded Imperial Academy.¹ However, these arguments seem to be shaky and this paper shall also display that the notion of *phantasia* in *De Intellectu* and *in DA* I–II, both held to be genuine works of Philoponus, is fairly similar to that of *in DA* III or, on occasions, complementary. But, since the attribution of *in DA* III to Philoponus is doubtful, although the thoughts conveyed in this work on *phantasia* are not in discord with those in *De Intellectu* and *in DA* I–II, the title may rightly suggest that in all these commentaries we are dealing with, directly or indirectly, the doctrines of Philoponus.

My goal is twofold here; first to examine the different sorts of *phantasia* mentioned in our texts and establish their link and hierarchy and, this being done, to say some words on its working and content. Whilst by no means pretending to be an exhaustive treatment of the material, this paper may reveal some aspects of the notion and put it in the broader context of late Alexandrian theory of perception.²

¹ HAYDUCK's arguments have been enumerated in *CAG* XV, p. V. The main work on Stephanus of Alexandria is still H. USENER, 'De Stephano Alexandrino', in his *Kleine Schriften*. Bd. III (Leipzig, 1914), 247–323, but see also R. VANCOURT, *Les derniers commentateurs Alexandrins d'Aristote. L'école d'Olympiodore. Étienne d'Alexandrie*. (Lille, 1941) and L. G. WESTERINK, *Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy*. (Amsterdam, 1962), pp. XXIV–XXV, reprinted in R. SORABJI (ed.), *Aristotle Transformed*. (London, 1990), 325–349, esp. pp. 340–1. A possible connection between him and contemporary Jacobite theology has been depicted by K.-H. UTHEMANN, 'Stephanos von Alexandrien und die Konversion des Jakobiten Probos, des späteren Metropolitens von Chalkedon', in C. LAGA, J. A. MUNIZ and L. VAN ROMPAY (eds.), *After Chalcedon. Studies in Theology and Church History. Offered to Professor Albert van Roey for His Seventieth Birthday*. (Leuven, 1985), 381–399. For an attempt to identify the Stephani mentioned by early Byzantine sources, including the author of *in DA* III, see W. WOLSKA-COŃUS, 'Stéphanos d'Athènes et Stéphanos d'Alexandrie. Essai d'identification et de biographie', in *REB* 47 (1989), 5–89. Her method has been doubted by M. ROUCHE, 'The Definitions of Philosophy and a New Fragment of Stephanus the Philosopher', in *JÖB* 40 (1990), 129–145. For Philoponus' life and activity see K. VERRYCKEN, 'The Development of Philoponus' Thought and Its Chronology', in R. SORABJI (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 233–275, and R. SORABJI, 'John Philoponus', in R. SORABJI (ed.), *Philoponus and the Rejection of Aristotelian Science*. (London, 1987), 1–41.

² The *In DA* I–II and III are cited in the edition of M. HAYDUCK (*CAG* CV), references to *De Intellectu* (henceforth *De Int.*) are to page and line of G. VERBEKE, *Jean Philopon. Commentaire sur le De*

I

Not surprisingly, divisions of *phantasia* occur for the most part at *in DA* III since Aristotle himself too treats it, for the most part, in *De Anima* III 3. The author of the commentary first divides *phantasia* into two kinds: recollecting (ἀναμνηστική) and learnt (διδασκτική);³ this latter is what irrational animals can have if they are endowed with the capacity at all. It is due to this sort of *phantasia* that parrots are said to be able to learn and imitate human utterances. As regards recollecting *phantasia*, we may at first surmise that by the adjective ἀναμνηστική, the author hints at something distinctively human but a glimpse at Diogenes Laertius who claims that according to Plato some animals apprehend the similarity,⁴ and at Nemesius of Emesa who says that according to Aristotle the transition between humans and irrational animals is gradual and therefore some animals possess a certain psychical comprehension,⁵ may persuade us to avoid taking too rashly any sides as yet on such questions. Recollection and reason may not bear so closely upon one another. For the moment, let it be sufficient to note that Aristotle, so says the commentator, denies recollecting *phantasia* to these animals, for whatever reasons.⁶

A little later on, we hear of two new kinds: *phantasia* may be either voluntary (ἐκούσιος) or involuntary (ἀκούσιος).⁷ While the former is in our power, the latter takes its object from the *phantasmata*, that is, in the last resort, from what are perceptible. Voluntary *phantasia* can transform features of existing things into the shape (ἀνάπλασμα) of what does not actually exist and in this way it can, for example, form the idea of horse-centaur out of the marks of bull and horse.⁸ More

Anima d'Aristote. Traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke. Édition critique avec une introduction sur la psychologie de Philopon. (Louvain/Paris, 1966). I cite this text except where following the emendations of F. BOSSIER and W. CHARLTON in: *Philoponus. On Aristotle on the Intellect*. (London, 1991). The fragments of the Greek version of *De Intellectu* have been collected and edited by S. VAN RIET, 'Fragments de l'original grec du "De Intellectu" de Philopon dans une compilation de Sophonias', in *RPhL* 63 (1967), 5–40. For a short and very useful overview of Philoponus' concept of *phantasia*, see G. WATSON, *Phantasia in Classical Thought*. (Galway, 1988), 129–131, who takes in the *in DA* III to be by Stephanus, and W. CHARLTON, *op. cit.*, pp. 13–16.

³ 495.25–9.

⁴ D.L. III 15: πᾶσι τοῖς ζώοις ἔμφυτός ἐστιν ἡ ὁμοιότητος θεωρία. Text by H. S. LONG. Unlike him, I was unable to identify this passage as from *Phd.* 96b and *Parm.* 129 seq. The *Theaetetus* 185a-e may help here better.

⁵ *De Nat. Hom.* 4, 13–4. Morani: οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἀθρόως κατεσκεύασεν, ἀλλὰ πρότερον καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις φυσικὰς τινὰς συνέσεις.

⁶ It would be futile to look through the *De Anima* for ἀναμνηστική φαντασία. Neither here nor elsewhere does Aristotle make any mention of such a capacity. The commentator faithfully follows the Neoplatonist custom of attributing to the predecessors concepts and views not to be found in their works. For this procedure, see H. J. BLUMENTHAL, 'Neoplatonic Interpretations of Aristotle on *Phantasia*', in: *Review of Metaphysics* XXXI (1977), 242–257, 'Neoplatonic Elements in the *De Anima* commentaries', in: *Phronesis* XXI (1976), 64–87, newly published with an appendix in R. SORABJ (ed.), *Aristotle Transformed*. (London, 1990), 305–325; and 'Some Platonist Readings of Aristotle', in: *PCPhS* n.s. 27 (1981), 1–16.

⁷ 497.21 ff.

⁸ See 493.7–10 where ἀναπλαττομένος classifies the εἰδωλοποιός in *De Anima* 427b19. The wording recalls Philoponus' *De Aeternitate Mundi contra Proclum* 291.17: φαντασίας ἀνάπλασμα μὲν ὁ ὁδός; and 292.10: ... ἐν τῇ φαντασίᾳ ἀνέπλασεν. Cf. *in DA* I, 6.1: III, 503.31–32, 507.35–508.7.

interesting is involuntary *phantasia*. If there is such a capacity then I cannot fancy what I want. Rather it contains, or is taken to be the same as, a single discriminating power in virtue of which I can imagine the false as false and the true as true, and it is thanks to this capacity that the false is discriminated from the true. This distinction may be witness to the influence of Plotinus, who postulated two sorts of *phantasia*, one is attached to the lower, the other to the higher part of the soul,⁹ although the presence of a discriminating or judging faculty (κριτική δύναμις) in the involuntary *phantasia* indicates that the separation of rational and non-rational parts of the soul here did not turn out perfectly.¹⁰ The author suggests that in order to imagine something true as true or something false as false, we need a faculty which has to bear some mark of rationality. But such an ability is not exclusive to *phantasia*; it falls to opinion and perception as well.¹¹ This assumption is not refuted by another passage where he speaks of one of these two *phantasiai* as only receiving the forms and working like a receptacle (δοχεῖον) along with the other 'picturing' (ἀναζωγραφοῦσα) out of these forms whatever it wants to, which is why it is deceptive and fallible.¹² Here the former is directed to the particular perceptibles and works like a sort of perception, having its objects in the outer world.¹³ This distinction does not seem to be exactly the same as the one above; it is indeed a vestige of Plotinian views, which cannot be said of the former.

The most detailed distinguishing of *phantasiai* is found in the *theoria* where the commentator analyses the components of movement and connects *phantasia* with desire (ὀρεξις) by saying that desire is adjunct to *phantasia* or perhaps conditional upon it.¹⁴ According to him, *phantasia* has two main kinds: deliberating (βουλευτική) and concomitant (σύστοιχος) to perception;¹⁵ again, this latter can be separated into confused (συγκεχυμένη) or not confused (ἀσύγχυτος), in turn subdivided into learnt (διδασκή) and not learnt or what cannot be learnt (ἀδίδακτος). As can be guessed, deliberating *phantasia* is peculiar to humans. Worms or grubs are said to have confused *phantasia* because their routes lack regularity, or, for the same reason, *phantasia* inhabits them only indeterminately (ἀορίστως).¹⁶ Dogs and par-

⁹ As has been pointed out by H. J. BLUMENTHAL, 'Neoplatonic Interpretations of Aristotle on *Phantasia*', in: *Review of Metaphysics* XXXI (1977), p. 255. For a detailed account of *phantasia* in Plotinus, see his *Plotinus' Psychology. His Doctrines of the Embodied Soul*. (Den Haag, 1971), pp. 80–99, and J. DILLON, 'Plotinus and the Transcendental Imagination', in: J. P. MACKEY (ed.), *Religious Imagination*. (Edinburgh, 1986), 55–65. On the reception of his doctrine in the later Neoplatonists, see H. J. BLUMENTHAL, 'Plotinus in Later Platonism', in H. J. BLUMENTHAL and R. A. MARRAS (eds.), *Neoplatonism and Early Christian Thought. Essays in Honour of A. H. Armstrong*. (London, 1981), 212–223, esp. pp. 216–217.

¹⁰ 497.27–29.

¹¹ 497.29–300: καὶ ἡ δόξα δὲ καὶ ἡ αἰσθησις οὕτω διακρίνει ψεῦδος ἀπ' ἀληθείας, τῷ γινώσκειν ὥς ἐστι τὰ πράγματα.

¹² 509.16–23.

¹³ 509.14, 19–20.

¹⁴ 589.30–590.5, cf. also 240.7–9, 261.3–4, and especially 592.2 ff. where the lemma is *De Anima* 433b28: ὀρεκτικὸν δὲ οὐκ ἄνευ φαντασίας. The commentator adds right away: καλῶς τοῦτο εἶπεν. ἀνάγκη γάρ τὸ ὀρεγόμενον φαντασθὲν τὸ ὀρεκτὸν ὀρεχθῆναι.

¹⁵ At 592.25 it is called conjoined (σύσυχος) with perception.

¹⁶ 592.25–29, cf. 388.28–29.

rots are endowed with learnt *phantasia* in contrast to ants and spiders as the *phantasia* these animals called zoophytes (ζωόφυτα) possess is not learnt. Spiders need not acquire any skill to be capable of spinning webs since this ability is given them by nature and is due to the sense of touch.¹⁷ As the borderline between animals and plants is drawn by Aristotle at the zoophytes, a view accepted by several Neoplatonists, we may infer that this division of *phantasia* is intended to cover all sorts of animals: every animal is taken to be endowed with this blessed capacity, in various ways.¹⁸

Besides, in a section of *in DA* II treating the sense of hearing, mention is made of a certain indicative (σημαντική) *phantasia*.¹⁹ Philoponus considers voice (φωνή) to be distinguished from noise (νόφος) by the fact that voice is accompanied with this sort of *phantasia*. Whereas noise has nothing to do with any sort of intention, or if it has it is no longer called noise, voice comes into being as a result of wish or impulse (ὁρμή) in the living being to indicate something and for this reason it is associated with *phantasia*.²⁰ This something to be indicated is the thought and here we are told that the final cause of voice is the indication of thoughts or concepts.²¹ As a consequence, voice is closely linked to human utterance.²² This sort of *phantasia* may have been introduced to point to the role the imaginative faculty plays in human discourse, which consists in formulating thoughts in the soul before they are expressed or verbalised.²³

All that is left is to set about connecting these various divisions and designating a place proper to each *phantasia* within this framework. In most cases, this allocation seems to be a matter of course. To begin with indicative *phantasia*, we read that cough (βήξ), dissociated from *phantasia* and considered involuntary, differs even in this respect from voice which is thus to be taken voluntary.²⁴ But since, as the context suggests, it is probably this *phantasia* that makes noise voluntary, it may be obvious to infer that here voluntariness is to be predicated primarily of *phantasia*. On the other hand, voluntary *phantasia* too can be related to the deliberating one as both are distinctively human and both are fallible; in deliberating *phantasia*, fallibility is reliably implied by the connection with opinion

¹⁷ 590.5. in 240.11—15 συγκεχυμένη φαντασία is called ἀμυδρότατον, cf. also 498.31—499.1. 500.13. 592.29. At 254.25—29, we are told that sponges are capable of touching though they do not have *phantasia*. In order to emphasize the separatedness of perception from *phantasia*, this place is also referred to by K. VERRYCKEN, *God en wereld in de wijsbegeerte van Ioannes Philoponus. De overgang van een Alexandrijns-Neoplatonische naar een christelijke scheppingsleer*. Diss. (Leuven, 1985), 280.

¹⁸ *De Partibus Animalium* 648a32 ff., Dexippus, in *Cat.* 49.16. For this reference I am indebted to Frans de Haas.

¹⁹ 375.19—20. 379.5—6. This capacity may owe its name Aristotle who defines voice as some indicative noise at *De Anima* II 8. 420b32—33.

²⁰ 379.9—10: ἡ φωνὴ κατὰ ὁρμὴν τινὰ τοῦ ζώου γίνεται πρὸς τὸ σημαίνει τι. διὸ καὶ μετὰ φαντασίας. Later on, at 379.35—37, he defines voice as: ζώου νόφος διὰ τῶν φωνητικῶν μορίων μετὰ φαντασίας γινόμενος, φαντασίας δηλονότι ἔνεκα τοῦ σημαίνει τι. (Cf. also 381.18—22).

²¹ 379.35—37: ... ἡ σημασία τῶν νοημάτων. (Cf. in *An. Post.* 43.1 where Philoponus employs σημασία as referring to definition (τὸ τί ἐστι)).

²² 375.26 ff. λέξις, esp. 33—34: ἐξ ἧς (scil. λέξεως) ἡ τῶν λεγομένων σημαίνεται ἔννοια.

²³ For an antecedent of this notion see Porphyry, *De Abst.* III 2, 188.21—4 NUCK, pointed out by G. WATSON, *op. cit.*, p. 106.

²⁴ 379.32—33.

(δόξα)²⁵ though how this link is made is not clarified here. But that does not put an end to this matter. We have to take note of some discrepancies as well. For one thing, whereas deliberating *phantasia* is held to be capable of making a single common *phantasma* out of many particular *phantasmata*,²⁶ the example involves the point that its function is not to produce fanciful pictures from parts of what exists in reality, but, rather, with the help of images, to underline and support intention or choice (προαίρεσις).²⁷ For another thing, reason may also attend on deliberating *phantasia*, even if one of the strictly textual evidences for this assumption is uncertain.²⁸ Moreover, marked off from non-rational *phantasia*, this surely has to be rational. Nevertheless, I do not think that these differences would make it right to say that we are dealing with two entirely different capacities. In doing so we would be turning a blind eye to the fact that the way in which they operate is clearly identical: that is, composing a single unit, an image or, as it is called elsewhere, a compound (σύνθημα),²⁹ out of the various parts which belong to various entities. It is true, of course, that voluntary *phantasia* performs its part arbitrarily; it is responsible for creating of an unreal world, the world of imagination, and as such it may correspond to our notion of creative imagination. In all likelihood, this query may be resolved most satisfactorily by taking these *phantasiai* as aspects of one and the same capacity that fashions one image out of many. Indicative *phantasia* belongs also to this group for it is not only voluntary but based on convention as well. Even the cough is qualified as voice if it is done according to convention (κατὰ συνθήκην), in order that one who happens to cough can indicate something in this manner.³⁰ To reinforce this bond, Philoponus suggests that this *phantasia* attends choice since the latter is said to precede any human noise like cough provided that the noise is produced for a certain purpose, that is for alluding to something else.³¹ Furthermore, short of further evidence, we have to content ourselves with conjecturing that involuntary *phantasia* is intimately connected to what is concomitant to perception. Both constitute one of the two branches of the primary division of *phantasia*, and are granted not only to humans but to non-rational animals as well. Their role in the process of 'imagination' is subservient or, rather, passive. Involuntary *phantasia* operates like a receptacle for forms and the one considered as conjoined to perception is identified with non-rational *phantasia* insofar as, in contrast to its deliberating counterpart, it is incapable of fashioning a single common *phantasma*.³² Given that learnt *phantasia* is used in the same sense

²⁵ 593.4 - 5.

²⁶ 592.36 - 593.4.

²⁷ 592.14 - 19, 593.2 - 3.

²⁸ I hazard the guess the clause πρὸς τοῦτο γὰρ ἀποδοτέον τὸν λόγον at 592.36 has been inserted by a later hand and, by putting it into brackets, HAYDUCK too may be siding with me. In addition, one could wonder if λόγος here means really reason and not, say, line of thought. The other evidence is found in 593.3 - 4.

²⁹ For σύνθημα see 508.6.

³⁰ 379.33 - 35.

³¹ 379.38 - 380.1

³² 593.3 - 4. Although, at *in An. Post.* 439.2 - 3, Philoponus ranks *phantasia* among rational faculties, I think he is speaking here only of the human *phantasia* which is involved in scientific activity.

throughout the whole third book of *CAG* XV, an assumption which is supported by the example of parrots, we can now turn to recollecting *phantasia*. But since this notion occurs only twice in our text and receives no further explication, the appropriate way of expounding it must be to examine the recollection itself. This examination, in turn, will lead us towards the question of how *phantasia* works and what its content is.

Following, then, not only Plato but some earlier Neoplatonists as well, Philoponus takes for granted that learning (μάθησις) is in fact recollection.³³ To explain this view he borrows the notion of ἔνυλον εἶδος that is clearly of Aristotelian origin.³⁴ Some *logoi* of these forms are transcendent (ἐξηρημένοι) and found in the creative intellect (δημιουργικὸς νοῦς), and these are considered archetypes and productive while the others are possessed by our soul and held to be images of first beings as well as cognitive of sensible things. Of the *logoi* in our soul, those that are without parts and unextended are in the rational part, whereas the extended (διαστατοί) ones are stored in the *phantasia*. In particular the geometer needs them when measuring distance or studying geometrical figures. For this reason, it is rightly said that the substance of soul is fullness of forms.³⁵ But if so, there is no obstacle to connecting, and even perhaps to identifying, learning and recollection, all the more because recollection is considered as the way to achieve common notions (κοινὴ ἔννοια) that are evidently general.³⁶ At the same time, however, he dissents from his predecessors in reducing recollection to memory and so depriving it of any direct reference to the ideas.³⁷ And it is here that he finds room to investigate recollection and to hint at recollecting *phantasia*. According to his view, recollection starts from the soul and extends to the ensouled body. The problem which occupies Philoponus in this section is how to speak of soul as the starting-point for recollection. Certainly we must beware of falling into the trap of admitting that the soul is capable of performing it in its own right. Instead, this activity has to be conceived as starting from the *pneuma*, the seat of soul, and making a way opposite to perception. Namely, this sets out from the perceptibles and terminates

³³ 58.22: 142.9. 12. The thesis was canonized by Plato in *Meno* 81c9–d5, and in *Phaedo* 72e5, 75e5–7. It was restated also by Iamblichus *apud* Olympiodorum in *Phaedonem* 65.13–15, 78.9–13 NORVIN, the first is labelled as Iamblichus in *Phaed.* Fr. 3 by J. M. DILLON, *Iamblichi Chalcidensis In Platonis Dialogos Commentariorum Fragmenta*, (Leiden, 1973), 86, for the second see DILLON's commentary in *op. cit.*, pp. 241–242. By the way, according to Iamblichus *apud* Ps.-Philoponum in *DA* III, 533.33–34, Aristotle too had recollection in mind when speaking of learning. Plutarchus of Athens *apud* Ps.-Philoponum in *DA* III, 518.23–24 says that learning in proper sense is nothing but recollection.

³⁴ 58.7–24. Aristotle has ἔνυλος λόγος in *De Anima* I 1, 403a25, but see Philoponus in *DA* I, 58.9. ἔνυλον εἶδος may be Peripatetic coinage, cf. Alexander of Aphrodisias, *De Anima* 16.2, 18.10.

³⁵ 58.22: τὼν εἰδῶν ἔστι πλήρωμα. This claim is not rejected in other passages (56.28, 126.32) either where we are told that it is the intellect that is called so, because in the course of emanation the substance of soul may in a sense remain 'above', in the intellect. For this scheme in the intellect, see Damascius, *De Principiis* Vol. II, 163.3–10 WESTERINK-COMBÈS.

³⁶ 34.4–19.

³⁷ 158.5–34. For a Neoplatonist precursor of this view, see Proclus, in *Tim.* I 300.28–301.3 DIEHL, who, when distinguishing two sorts of discovery (εὑρεσις), asserts that the lower proceeds from secondary entities by means of recollection (ἀπὸ τῶν δευτέρων κατὰ ἀνάμνησιν ὁδεύουσα). To the fact that these secondary entities may be the sensible things we find allusion in *op. cit.* 300.24–28.

in the *pneuma* where the capacity for perception and discrimination is lodged. But recollection begins just here. The reason why this discussion is set going may be to point to the perceptual base of this faculty and thus, even if not demonstratively, to dissent from Plato himself who seems to dismiss this condition in the *Phaedo*.³⁸ In his account, interspersed with Aristotelian and Stoic terms, Philoponus describes recollection as discovering (εὑρεσις) *phantasma* when it comes into being in the *pneuma*. *Phantasmata*, or images, are established where the perceiving part of soul settles (ἵδρυνται). The source of recollection is the residuum (ἐγκατάλειμμα) that is called *phantasma* and has resulted from the grasping (ἀντίληψις) of perceptibles.³⁹ When the soul again apprehends (ἐπιβάλλουσα) the *phantasma* which it had before, that is nothing else but the imprint (τύπος) which came into being previously in the *pneuma*, it then recollects this imprint as well as the sensing organ through which it perceived that. For this reason, during this process, the pneumatical body achieves the same disposition (συνδιατίθεται) as the sensing organ is in, that is it becomes the ultimate sensing organ.⁴⁰ Up to this point, to accuse Philoponus of inconsistency would surely be unjustified—the line of his thought is perhaps all too clear—but a further remark sets us thinking. For he adds that in some cases there is no need for the sensing organs to be involved in recollection immediately.⁴¹ They can be at rest too and this time it is enough if we are aware (ἐννοήσαντες) of the fact that it is through these organs that we can grasp imprints. Why, then, did Philoponus feel it urgent to modify his explanation? One reason may be that recollection would indeed be just an offshoot of sense-perception had it always to be attended by the activity of some sensing organ. Although what the author here names ἀνάμνησις is, no doubt, the remembering, in blurring the boundaries between these faculties he need not to bear in mind what Plato said about recollection, an appropriate account of the way in which memory works has to allow that remembering can be achieved without dependence on the senses.⁴² On the other hand, if memory is only concomitant to perception, one could wonder if, e.g., how

³⁸ 74a9–12, c1–5, cf. *Philebus* 34b1–c2.

³⁹ For the Stoic provenance of τύπος see G. VERBEKE, *op. cit.*, pp. LIII–LIV, and, with useful reservations, W. CHARLTON, *op. cit.*, p. 14. The role of ἐγκατάλειμμα in *phantasia* was strongly emphasized also by Alexander of Aphrodisias in his *De Anima* 68.4–11, 27; 68.31–69.3; 69.15–17; 70.4–16, 19–25. For the Stoic and Epicurean origin of this term, see R. B. TODD, 'Lexicographical Notes on Alexander of Aphrodisias' Philosophical Terminology', in *Glotta* 52 (1974), 207–215.

⁴⁰ Elsewhere, this kind of body is considered as the vehicle (ὄχημα) of the soul (17.20) and receiving all psychical capacities (164.11–12). This problem has been touched in G. VERBEKE, 'Levels of Human Thinking in Philoponus', in C. LAGA, J. A. MUNITZ and L. VAN ROMPAY (eds.), *op. cit.* pp. 451–470, esp. p. 458. See also 481.20–26.

⁴¹ Literally: 'moving along with recollection' which translates συγκινηθήσεται τῇ ἀναμνήσει at 158.32, and implies co-operation.

⁴² Philoponus here owes a great debt to Aristotle, who in *De Memoria* 2, 451a21–b5, 543a4–14 distinguishes memory and recollection and says that only man shares in the capacity for recollecting (453a9–10) but he does not take it as a way to the knowledge of the ideas. Cf. 1, 450a10–13, 22–25, 32–33; 2, 453a14–25. Philoponus must have been acquainted with this work even if he did not mention it at all. For further explanation, see R. SORABJI, *Aristotle on Memory*. (Providence, 1972), 35–46 and notes *ad loc.* and W. D. ROSS, *Aristotle, Parva Naturalia. A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary*. (Oxford, 1955), notes *ad loc.*

our sight is working when we remember something which happens to be yellow so that during this time our eyes are closed. And where do the pictures come from which we see when we are dreaming?⁴³ Until we acknowledge that memory is capable of operating even when the senses are at rest, this problem cries for a solution. What follows from this for the recollecting *phantasia*? What is obvious at a first glance is that it is to be assigned neither to the group represented by voluntary and deliberating *phantasia* nor among involuntary and concomitant *phantasiai*. While to insist upon a hard-and-fast distinction between recollecting *phantasia* and the others grouped into those two classes would be an exaggeration, still it has to be established that this capacity is separated from the former class by the fact that sometimes it is capable of only working simultaneously with sense-perception, and is separated from the latter insofar as it is indisputably not receptive and, perhaps even for this reason, may be associated with a certain intellectual activity. This feature may be the decisive one. By returning to the example of geometer we can get some impression of how this capacity works. Geometrical objects are of course in a sense extended and abstract; the equilateral triangle as such does not exist among sensible things. Nevertheless we can attain them with the help of this *phantasia*, and this way is as what follows: Many sense-images (αἰσθημα) ensuing from perception are gathered in the *phantasia* and constitute a memory-image (μνήμη). Hence it is to be inferred that memory-images are collected also in *phantasia*.⁴⁴ In the next step, experience (ἐμπειρία) and knowledge appear when a great number of memory-images has been assembled (συναθροισθεῖσα) in the soul, and this is what leads to the general concept or abstract figure.⁴⁵ For this reason, it may be clear that the main task of this *phantasia* is to connect images to emmattered forms via extended *logoi* and, in this way, to ensure the transition between these realms. To support this thesis, Philoponus quotes a passage of *De Anima* vigorously exploited by several Neoplatonists, in which Aristotle asserts that there is no object thought (νόημα) without image.⁴⁶ This effort to connect them proves to be all the easier as the images themselves have been already shaped (ἔσχηματισμένα).⁴⁷ As the author of *in DA* III claims, the intellect too gazes at images by means of *phantasia* and it also comes to know the emmattered forms by inserting *phantasia*.⁴⁸ This capacity, then, performs two disparate but compatible

⁴³ To take these examples I was encouraged by 252.28–32 but the author of *in DA* III puts it more explicitly in 496.11–15, 499.14–22, and, concerning dreams, in 486.34–487.5.

⁴⁴ In adjoining memory to *phantasia*, Philoponus gets great support from *De Mem.* 1, 450a22–25, where these activities are said to belong to the same part of the soul.

⁴⁵ *In An. Post.* 437.17–27. For a related account of the link between objects of mathematics, or of sciences in general (μαθήματα), and *phantasmata*, see *in DA* III, 563.15–20, cf. *De Int.* 23.40–41, 61.82–62.86 (see n. 84 at p. 78 CHARLTON-BOSSIER), 62.95–96.

⁴⁶ *De Anima* III 8, 432a12. Philoponus cites him in 45.22–24. At *in DA* III, 569.11–13 we read that, in contrast to perception, *phantasia* concerns forms. Cf. also *De Anima* I 1, 403a8–9; III 7, 431a14–17, *De Mem.* 1, 449b31–450a1.

⁴⁷ 239.10.

⁴⁸ 569.5–6: ὁργάνῳ τῇ φαντασίᾳ. 546.30–31: τὸ δὲ ἔνυλον εἶδος οἶδεν ὁ νοῦς οὐκέτι καθ' ἑαυτόν, ἀλλὰ διὰ μέσης τῆς φαντασίας. This latter statement apparently contradicts what we are told at 587–24 but the context suggests that the author is speaking of the emmattered forms of which the extended λόγοι are coming into the *phantasia*. Cf. 550.24–32, and for a similar view see *De Int.* 85.87.

functions, the one is to form images out of percepts by associating one to another and so is at the bottom of memory, the other is to transmit these memory-images towards the upper parts of the soul. Subsequently, recollecting *phantasia* is akin to voluntary and deliberating *phantasia*, and therefore it may seem to be distinctively human: however, because of its connection to memory attention must be paid to another possible attribution. Some non-rational animals such as bees and ants are said to have *phantasia* because they are not going to and fro but moving always on the same paths.⁴⁹ To have constant routes, however, requires memory (and, one could add, recollecting *phantasia* too) which then produces memory-images. As a consequence, recollecting *phantasia* in its entirety must belong to humans, but one of its functions we can ascribe to non-rational animals too. It seems that this particular capacity mirrors the overall structure of *phantasia* on a small scale, and it is exposed to the same objections and questions as well.⁵⁰

II

The appropriate examination of the way *phantasia* works compels us to rely chiefly on the *in DA* III again though, of course, there is important additional material to be found in both *in DA* I–II and *De Int.* Instead of discussing these works separately, I shall dwell on the *in DA* III in the hope of being able to throw light upon the similarities and overlaps between these texts.

It was a commonplace in later Neoplatonism that, as a capacity which belongs to the cogitative (γνωστικός) part of non-rational soul, *phantasia* mediates between rational and non-rational souls.⁵¹ Furthermore, Philoponus concurs with his contemporaries also by identifying *phantasia* with passible intellect (νοῦς παθητικός). It is intellect because of possessing the object of knowledge within itself, grasping it by simple intuition; that is apprehending it not by constructive reasoning, and it is passible as knowing by means of imprints and not without forms or shapes (ἀσχηματιστως).⁵² Furthermore, its working is nearly alike the act of the senses insofar as it receives imprints (*impressio*) of the perceptibles through sense and

⁴⁹ 240.11–12, 258.32–35, 495.20–23, 511.28–29, 590.3.

⁵⁰ RICHARD SORABJI suggested to me that recollecting *phantasia* is very akin to belief-type reason (δοξαστικός λόγος) in Albinus(?), *Did.* ch. 4, and Priscianus, *Metaphrasis* 19.10–13. This kind of reason discriminates the full range of properties, like honey, with the aid of perception. Although I do not think that Philoponus and the author of *in DA* III were prepared to employ the term δόξα in treating *phantasia*, even if the task of these capacities is similar, I conjecture that the link between these notions is to be found in Hermias, *in Phaedr.*, 263.9–10 COUVREUR, where mention is made of a certain φανταστική έννοια that must be conceptual, closely connected to perception and, at the same time, fallible.

⁵¹ Beside Philoponus, *in DA* I, 5.35, 18.36–37, see also *in DA* III, 487.27–28; Damascius, *in Phaedonem* I, 78.3–5, II, 130.3–5 WESTERINK; *in Philebum* 156.5–10, 158.1–10 WESTERINK; Simplicius(?), *in DA* 208.12–19, 215.30–32; Olympiodorus, *in Gorg.* 71.20 WESTERINK; and Hermias, *in Phaedr.* 19.24 COUVREUR.

⁵² *In DA* i, 6.1–4: νοῦν μὲν ὡς ἔχουσιν τὸν γνωστὸν καὶ ἀπλὴ προσβολὴ . . . ἐπιβάλλουσιν καὶ οὐ διὰ κατασκευῆς . . . Cf. *in DA* I, 11.9–10; *De Int.* 13.3, 61.73–74, 106.28–29; *in DA* III, 490.22–23. The identification in Philoponus has been discussed by G. WATSON, *op. cit.*, p. 130, and W.

discriminates among them just as the sense does when receiving imprints and then discriminating (*iudicans*) among them.⁵³ For this reason, some remarks were needed to distinguish these faculties. The main difference concerning their way of functioning is that *phantasia* contains the source of knowledge in itself and by taking imprints of perceptible objects from sense in shapes them within itself.⁵⁴ This description fits in well with the definition given in the third book. According to this, *phantasia* is a capacity that, by inserting sense, receives perceptible forms.⁵⁵

What sets this account apart from those offered by other contemporary, and not only contemporary, Neoplatonists is the striving to connect *phantasia* to common sensation (*κοινή αἴσθησις*). This connection turned out to be almost an identification where these capacities are said to be identical, according to their definition at least. For, similarly to *phantasia*, common sensation too is defined as a capacity receiving perceptible forms by inserting sense.⁵⁶ But if so, how could we avoid the danger of merging them into one another? The remedy suggested by the author some lines later is not quite persuasive. His opinion is that while common sensation receives forms which come solely from particular senses, *phantasia* takes them through both particular senses and common sensation.⁵⁷ One may perfectly well suppose that there is no difference between the case when *phantasia* apprehends a white thing and when common sensation does so. Most plausibly the author arrived at this interpretation from the study of *De Memoria* where Aristotle claims that image is an affection of common sensation though it is not certain that he would have been keen to follow his commentator in this matter.⁵⁸ Anyway, this question calls for investigation that I shall not pursue now as it requires thorough examination of common sensation and sense-perception, which is not my intention here. Instead I wish to discuss the status of *phantasma* and to inquire about its relation to imprint and residuum. Relying upon the evidence to be found here, we could form a judgement on the working of *phantasia* though it must be kept very much to the fore that the notion we derived in this way covers just human *phantasia* but to apply it to other animals would be overgenerous, since they are not endowed with *phantasia* in its entirety.

The obvious place to begin is by observing that the word 'τύπος' is used at least in three senses in these commentaries. Apart from its ordinary meaning, a direct result of sense-perception in the sense organ, we meet imprint as being applied to signal how *phantasia* is connected to the upper realms. As a leading

CHARLTON, *op. cit.*, p. 15. The full story of this denomination has been followed by H. J. BLUMENTHAL, 'Nous Pathetikos in Later Greek Philosophy', in: H. J. BLUMENTHAL and H. ROBINSON (eds.), *Aristotle and the Later Tradition*. (Oxford, 1991), 191–207. For the term 'passible' I am indebted to M. Woods through BLUMENTHAL'S paper referred to in this note, p. 193.

⁵³ *De Int.* 96.80–82.

⁵⁴ *In DA* I. 5.34–6.10.

⁵⁵ 507.16–17: φαντασία ἐστὶ δύναμις δεκτικὴ διὰ μέσης αἰσθήσεως τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἰδῶν. (cf. 508.16–17, 512.20).

⁵⁶ 507.20–21: καὶ ἡ κοινὴ γὰρ αἴσθησις δύναμις ἐστὶ δεκτικὴ τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἰδῶν διὰ μέσης αἰσθήσεως.

⁵⁷ 507.27–31.

⁵⁸ 450a10–1: καὶ τὸ φάντασμα τῆς κοινῆς αἰσθήσεως πάθος ἐστίν.

authority, Plutarchus of Athens is cited who holds that *phantasia* is of twofold nature for it is able both to assemble the divided percepts into a single image and to remould (ἀναμάττεται) the simple (ἀπλοῦν) and, if it can so be called, the unitary (ἐνιαῖον) mark of divine beings into various imprints and shapes (μορφαί).⁵⁹ Here 'τύπος' clearly signifies *phantasma* and not a copy of sense-perception. Elsewhere in the third book, where the difference of *phantasia* from perception is dealt with, the author confronts us with a very different set of arguments. To elucidate one of them he thinks the following striking sample will suffice.⁶⁰ New-born babies are said to suck all breasts, even the one made of stone, because they lack imprints. It takes them some time to acquire imprints and so to be capable of recognizing the breasts of their own mother. This evidence shows, I think, that 'τύπος' purports in this context more than a simple percept, since we cannot assume that babies do not perceive at all, however young they may be. They have all the necessary capacities and these are at work. Rather, this term refers to a constant remnant, a trace which is left in the sense organ even when perception ceased, but at the same time it cannot be identical with the *phantasma* resulted from the contact of *phantasia* with the divine domain.

Let us return for a moment to the Philoponean doctrine of recollection.⁶¹ There we meet the same triadic scheme. Of course, mention is made of imprints as data of perception, of residuum produced through the repetition of imprints of the same kind and through their leaving trace in the pneuma or pneumatical body, and of image that is actually nothing else but the residuum when *phantasia* begins to remodel it and the product of this activity.

Such an order of the contents in *phantasia* has, however, some implications. For these Alexandrian authors *phantasia* works separately from perception since it is not impressed in respect of perceptibles, that is it is not touched directly by them, as the new imprints do not dim the previous ones, but receives the *logoi* of perceptibles alone.⁶² And this thesis entails the incorporeality of this capacity as well.⁶³ It is again Plutarchus of Athens who is cited approvingly when describing the mechanism of perception and *phantasia*. According to him, the sense attaches (προσβάλλειν) the thing to be perceived, receives its form (εἶδος) and retains (κατέχει) it. This form is then attached by *phantasia* and transformed into image.⁶⁴

⁵⁹ 515.12–29.

⁶⁰ 494.30–34. For an excellent account on the content of *phantasia* see A. SHEPPARD, 'Phantasia and Mental Images: Neoplatonist Interpretations of *De Anima*, 3.3', in: H. J. BLUMENTHAL and H. ROBINSON (eds.), *op. cit.* 165–173, esp. pp. 170–173. She thinks the author of *in DA* III understands *phantasia* as interpreting the data of perception without recourse to mental images. Nevertheless, she accepts some exceptions (493.9–10, 496.10 ff., 499.12 ff.) that are, it seems to me, not unimportant.

⁶¹ 158.5–34, cf. note 36.

⁶² 508.17–19: μὴ νόμιζε ὅτι [ἡ φαντασία] τυποῦται πρὸς τὰ αἰσθητά, ἐπεὶ ἡφανίζοντο ἂν οἱ πρῶτοι τύποι ἐκ τῶν δευτέρων, ἄλλα μόνον τοὺς λόγους δέχεται. Cf. *in DA* I, 13.24; III, 492.13–14.

⁶³ The process whereby Aristotle's theory of perception was interpreted in a less material terms among his ancient commentators has been discussed by R. SORABJI, 'From Aristotle to Brentano: The Development of the Concept of Intentionality', in H. J. BLUMENTHAL and H. ROBINSON (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 227–261. For the concept of the incorporeality of senses in Philoponus see also G. VERBEKE in: C. LAGA, J. A. MUNIZ and L. VAN ROMPAY (eds.), *op. cit.* p. 547.

⁶⁴ 512.10–12. Image translates φαντασία that here stands for, I conjecture, φάντασμα.

Moreover, this fabric too may highlight why incidental perceptibles are said to be stored in the *phantasia*.⁶⁵ Slightly in distinction from Aristotle, both Philoponus and the author of *in DA* III think of incidental perceptibles as being divided into two kinds.⁶⁶ One is the substance (οὐσία) that appears as a bundle or collection of percepts in the sensing-organ, and then in the *phantasia*, and it is apprehended after all by the intellect; the other consists of the sense-data which are not proper to a given sense, e.g. when we perceive the sweet by means of sight. Without trying to explain in detail how incidental perception runs, it is plain that *phantasia* plays in this process the role of a recollecting faculty by fashioning one image, shall we say, the image of Socrates, out of several disordered percepts or imprints. Because of its power to arrange different data of perception, *phantasia* too is associated with recognition of common perceptibles (κοινὰ αἰσθητά).⁶⁷ Furthermore, this structure may be responsible for its partless (ἀμερής) existence, a view which is exemplified by both authors in the same way: *phantasia* does not comprehend the running Socrates by distinguishing Socrates from running but as single whole.⁶⁸

It seems that this is the core of the late Alexandrian theory of *phantasia* as well, for what Olympiodorus says in those of his works that are available to us does not differ from this doctrine on crucial points. The only divergence, though barely accentual, is that he takes over, and strongly insists on, the view held by earlier Neoplatonists that *phantasia* is an impediment to our intellect, a veil that conceals the truth.⁶⁹ He likens it to a sophist who tricks out and shapes what does not exist in reality.⁷⁰ It is for this reason that this capacity contributes to producing myths.⁷¹ It shapes imprints unknown to the soul, sets forms, magnitudes, and even bodies, over incorporeal entities: this clearly alludes to its activity concerning geometry.⁷² Moreover, we meet the conclusion, not drawn but obvious also in Ps.-Philoponus, that learnt *phantasia* plays an important role in training and habituating un-rational animals.⁷³

Finally, to return to where I started from, the evidence enumerated in this paper might make it justified to speak of a Philoponean doctrine of *phantasia*. There remains the hope that my attempt to point to the doctrinal similarities and doubles has been persuasive.

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⁶⁵ 513.29–31: καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ [*scil.* φαντασίᾳ] γὰρ ἐστὶ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἰσθητά.

⁶⁶ *In DA* II, 312.27–37, 318.27–28; III, 458.5–8, 509.22–32, 514.9–11.

⁶⁷ 316.25–35. At 318.23 we are told that place (τόπος) belongs to common perceptibles, a strange view that is worthy of thorough examination.

⁶⁸ *In DA* III, 562.28–30. *De Int.* 117.11–12.

⁶⁹ *In Phaed.* 6.1.11; 6.2.1–4 WESTERINK. For this attitude as being shared by several Neoplatonists, see G. WATSON, *op. cit.*, pp. 96–133.

⁷⁰ *In Alc.* 61.12–13 WESTERINK: τὰ μὴ ὄντα σοφίζομένη καὶ ἀναπλάττουσα.

⁷¹ *In Gorg.* 237.14–18, 239.19–25.

⁷² *In Alc.* 51.13–15.

⁷³ *In Phaed.* 8.2.7–9.

THE SYSTEM OF RHETORIC AND ITS TEACHING IN ANTIQUITY*

The achievements of the ancient Greeks in literature, philosophy and science are unsurpassable. Then main cause of this great success is to be found in the fact that the art of speaking has always been taught in ancient Greece. My paper aims at clarifying the development of this teaching process which led finally to the formation of rhetoric as an independent discipline and a main subject of ancient higher education. Then I would like to examine what the rhetorical system consisted of, and how it was taught in antiquity. Finally I will raise the question of whether the instructional methods of classical rhetoric can be used for improving our own speech and composition instruction.

1. It is a surprising fact that speech was already taught in the time of the Trojan war. Homer tells us that Achilles had been taught both speaking well and fighting well. Phoenix says the following words to Achilles: "You were a mere lad, with no experience of the hazards of war, nor of debate, where people make their mark. It was to teach you all these things, to make a speaker of you and a man of action."¹ We do not know how this teaching ran its course. G. Kennedy suggests as follows: "Perhaps this was mainly a process of listening to older speakers and, like an oral bard, acquiring formulae, themes, maxims, and stock topics such as myths and historical examples, perhaps also denunciations and oaths, all of which are the ancestors of the commonplaces of later oratory."²

But on the basis of our sources it is also clear, that to be taught to speak well has been the privilege of few people on the highest level of the social scale. Hesiod, e.g. names oratory the gift of the Muses, and according to him it is a gift and property of kings.³ Over the course of time, however, more and more frequently there are marks of rhetorical practice. E.g. there is a legal procedure in Aeschylus' *Eumenides*, in which Athene functions as a magistrate. Orestes' defence based on probability which became the basis of the rhetorical argument, as opposed to the scientific argument.⁴

All this means that the fifth century B.C. is a landmark in the history of the teaching of speaking. The form of government changed from oligarchy to democ-

* This lecture was delivered in 1990 at Millersville University in Pennsylvania in a refresher course for instructors of Latin.

¹ Homer: *The Iliad*. Translated by E. V. Rieu. Penguin Books 1950, 9.442 ff.

² G. KENNEDY: *The Art of Persuasion in Greece*. Princeton 1963, 36.

³ Hesiod: *Theogony* 81 ff.

⁴ G. KENNEDY: *op. cit.* 40–41.

racy. A mass of people got the opportunity to take part in public affairs, in the life of the community, that is the city-state. And speech making became even more important than earlier, because the Greek society relied on oral expression. "The political system operated through the direct speech of the citizens among themselves and to their magistrates, and of the magistrates to their administrative assistant."⁵ The tyrants were expelled from the cities of Greece and Sicily, and everybody could seek his truth with the help of speech. This movement had two consequences. More and more people wanted to speak better, i.e. wanted to learn to speak better, therefore more and more cultivated people began to teach speaking. On the other hand—as Cicero writes⁶—because of the democracy the lawsuits increased in number, too, instead of single magistrate large juries began to function, which made it possible to present the cause in continuous and coherent presentation.

In order to make the proceedings more efficient, the juridical rhetoric was born in Sicily, its parents being Corax and Tisias. The former developed a tripartite scheme of oratory to help citizens speak in courts: introduction, narration and conclusion. The latter added the argument. Their student, Gorgias enriched their system of rhetoric with the style, the propriety and the probability. So a new art or discipline was invented. It was highly esteemed and taught by the sophists,⁷ e.g. Gorgias, Protagoras. But the big success of this new art raised the antipathy of such philosophers as Socrates and Plato,⁸ and this led to the big debate between the philosophers and rhetoricians about the concept, function and morality of rhetoric. This quarrel contributed considerably to the definition of rhetoric.

Finally the rhetoricians won in the sense that the philosophers were forced to acknowledge that rhetoric is an independent art, and what is more, Plato himself outlined the foundations of a reliable rhetoric in his dialogue "Phaedrus", and it was Aristotle who created the first scholarly rhetoric on the basis of philosophy. The system of rhetoric, too, was further developed by such masters as Theophrastus, and in the second century B.C. by Hermagoras of Temnos. In the meantime the schools of rhetoric have prospered on the model of Isocrates' school.⁹ M. L. Clarke is right when he writes: "Rhetoric was safe so long as the Athenian democracy lasted, and when the Athenian democracy declined it was too well established to fade with the society that nurtured its growth."¹⁰

These words of Clarke are very true, for the rhetoric not only did not fade, but conquered Rome, too, from the beginning of the second century B.C. In the comedies of Plautus the clever slaves speak as well as any cultivated rhetor. In those of Terence the rhetorical teaching of the Greeks presents itself in many instances.¹¹

⁵ G. KENNEDY: *op. cit.* 4.

⁶ Cicero: Brutus 45–46.

⁷ Cp. H. J. MARROU: *A History of Education in Antiquity*. Translated by G. LAMB. New York 1956. 52–54.

⁸ Cp. S. LISSEING: *Rhetoric and Philosophy in Conflict*. The Hague 1976, 7–17.

⁹ Cp. H. J. MARROU: *op. cit.* 79–91; S. LISSEING: *op. cit.* 18–25.

¹⁰ M. L. CLARKE: *Rhetoric at Rome*. London 1966, 4.

¹¹ Terence: *The Brothers*. Edited with translation and notes by G. S. GRATWICK. Warminster, Wiltshire 1987, 21 ff.

It is reasonable to assume that in these first decades of the century the teachers of rhetoric were exclusively Greeks, and that the rhetorical studies were pursued "under the guidance of private tutors at home".¹² The influence of the Greek tutors grew so much by 161 B.C., that they became dangerous for the traditional Roman moral. Therefore a decree of the senate suddenly expelled them from Rome. But this decree changed nothing. It can be proven by the fact that Cato the Elder himself, who was a great enemy of the Greek influence, wrote an encyclopaedia for his son with rhetoric in it.¹³ All this means that among the upper classes in Rome rhetoric became widespread, and so three distinct grades of education were established, corresponding to our elementary, secondary and university standards.

By the turn of the century the first independent works on rhetoric were published, e.g. that of Marcus Antonius. Some years later, in the eighties, the first systematic rhetoric in Latin, "Rhetoric to Herennius" was written, after which came Cicero's work "On Invention". From this time on, many rhetorical textbooks were written by Cicero and other Roman authors. Finally, at the end of the first century A.D. Quintilian published the greatest and most systematic rhetoric of antiquity under the title "Institutio oratoria". In this work ancient classical rhetoric reached its culmination.

2. To present the whole system of ancient rhetoric is an important task because in our days, when Greek and Latin language are pushed into the background in secondary education, there are many erroneous and inaccurate opinions about classical rhetoric. Many people think that rhetoric equals skilful meaningless speaking, glossing over and concealing the truth. Even cultivated men, when they hear the phrase "classical rhetoric" think—in the best of cases—of some sort of stylistics.

To improve these erroneous opinions, let us take a look first at the ancient definitions of rhetoric. According to our sources Tisias and the Gorgias defined rhetoric as follows: "rhetoric is the artificer of persuasion".¹⁴ Quintilian criticizes the definition of Gorgias and others saying: "But even this definition is not sufficiently comprehensive, since others besides orators persuade by speaking or lead others to the conclusion desired, as for example harlots, flatterers and seducers. On the other hand the orator is not always engaged on persuasion, so that sometimes persuasion is not his special object."¹⁵ After having criticized many definitions, he approves that of Chrysippus and Cleanthes: rhetoric is the "science of speaking rightly" (*scientia recte dicendi*). He gives reasons for this definition in this way: "For if rhetoric is the science of speaking well, its end and highest aim is to speak well." As it is clear out of this reason, Quintilian changed a little bit on the definition of Cleanthes. Indeed, he again defines it saying: "rhetoric is the science of speaking well" (*rhetorice esse bene dicendi scientiam*).¹⁶

¹² St. F. BONNER: Education in Ancient Rome. Berkeley and Los Angeles 1977, 65.

¹³ G. KENNEDY: The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World. Princeton, New Jersey 1972, 55.

¹⁴ Plato: Gorgias 452e9 ff.

¹⁵ The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian with an English translation by H. E. BUTLER. London New York 1920, 2,15,11.

¹⁶ Quintilian 2,15,38.

This definition is perfect for it is free of all those faults which caused rhetoric to be blamed by Socrates and Plato, namely that rhetoric only aims at persuading, and that dishonest people can use it, too. On the other hand, this definition is also very modern. The real trouble is, however, that in our days only a few scholars know it. E.g. in the work "A New Classical Rhetoric" published in 1980 we can read the following statement: "One frequently given definition of the term has been the art of persuasion. However, in recent years this tidy explanation of the word's meaning has fallen afoul of the skeptical questions of critics who asked whether rhetoric was not at least in part a science, as opposed to an art, and whether the term should be limited to persuasiveness only."¹⁷ What the the modern critics find wanting in rhetoric, it already had been improved by Quintilian. On the other hand, the statement of Quintilian that the "orator is not always engaged in persuasion", but sometimes only describes the things, is very similar to that of J. L. Austin who says in his speech-act theory that some utterances are descriptions, therefore constative, and some are uttered not to describe, but to do things, therefore performative.¹⁸

Ancient rhetoric established its system out of the combination of four big topics: the tasks of the orators, the parts of the speech, the kinds of speeches, and finally the legal procedure of the cases. Let us examine these topics separately.

The orator, in order to create an effective speech, had to fulfil five tasks: invention, arrangement, style, delivery and memory.

The invention (*inventio*) means in a narrow sense the collection of material in a concrete case, and the determination of the resolution of a case. In wider sense it means one part of rhetorical theory and its description.

The arrangement (*dispositio*) means in a narrow sense the placement of the invented material into a logical order to create an effective speech, i.e. making of the general sketch or outline of the speech, or as we say today, the structure of the speech. In a wider sense, it means the theory of the parts of the speech.

The style (*elocutio*) means in a narrow sense the drafting and wording of the invented and arranged material of the case fulfilled by the orator. But in a broader sense, it means the theory of style: what is an effective style, which are the kinds of style, and which are the virtues of style, i.e. the figures of speech.

The delivery (*pronuntiatio*) means in a narrow sense the manner of speaking. It was an important task in antiquity because the lawyer spoke by heart, and the speeches were rather long. In a wider sense, naturally, it means the theory of delivery, i.e. how should the orator deliver the different parts of a speech.

The memory (*memoria*) means in a narrow sense the learning of the speech by heart. In a broader sense it means the theory of mnemonics, i.e. what natural memory means and how can it be developed.

The second big topic is the theory of the part of the speeches. As we have seen, this topic was invented first in the rhetorical theory by Corax. Finally the common

¹⁷ R. L. KINDRICK – L. R. OLPIN – F. M. PATTERSON: A New Classical Rhetoric. Dubuque, Iowa 1980. IX.

¹⁸ J. L. AUSTIN: How to Do Things with Words. Edited by J. O. URMSON. Oxford University Press, New York 1970. 1 – 7.

opinion was settled on six parts of the speech: introduction or opening (*exordium*), narration or statement of facts (*narratio*), division or partition (*divisio, partitio*), argument (*confirmatio*), refutation (*confutatio*), and finally the conclusion (*conclusio, peroratio*).

The function of the introduction is to make the listeners attentive, ready to learn and well disposed. The main function of the narration was the straightforward exposition of the facts of the case. It had to be brief, clear and plausible. The third part of the speech, the division, was brief, therefore sometimes it is named proposition. In the division the speaker first stated what points were agreed between himself and the other side and what he was going to say. There followed the argument or confirmation which contained the most important part of the speech. It was treated with great elaboration and was based on material proofs and logical analysis. The refutation was the denial of the opponent's arguments. In general, in this part were treated the various types of faulty argument. The last part of the speech was the conclusion. It was divided into three sections: recapitulation, the arousing of indignation, and finally, the appeals of pity.

The first two big topics, i.e. the task of the orator and the parts of the speech were combined with the kinds of speeches. Aristotle distinguished three kinds of speeches, or oratory: judicial, deliberative, and epideictic. Later they became a standard part of traditional rhetoric. Aristotle's three kinds of oratory correspond to the three kinds of hearers. If the hearer is a judge he will judge what has been done. This kind of speech is the judicial oratory. If the hearer is a member of the assembly, "he decides about future events".¹⁹ This kind of speech is the deliberative. If the hearer is an observer, he decides merely on the orators skill, and he is most interested in the existing condition. This kind of speech is epideictic. The judicial speaker either attacks or defends somebody. The deliberative speaker urges the listeners either to do or not to do something. The epideictic or ceremonial speaker either praises or censures somebody. "Each kind has its distinctive concern: judicial with the just, deliberative with the expedient, and epideictic with the honorable."²⁰

The legal procedure of the cause had a big influence on the above described three parts of rhetoric and modified them. Hermagoras paid a great attention to forensic or judicial oratory and he developed a system of basic types of cases, which he called *staseis*, and which the Romans translated as *constitutio* or *status*. S. F. Bonner briefly and clearly summarizes them, therefore I cite him: "the *stasis* was the 'stand' taken as a result of the conflicting allegations of prosecutor and defendant, the 'set-up' of the case. If the defendant denied the charge outright, the question became one of conjecture - did he commit the crime or not? (*stochasmos, status* or *constitutio coniecturalis*). If he admitted the act but declared that it was not the same as that with which he was charged the question became one of definition (*horos, status definitivus, constitutio definitiva*). If he admitted the act, but declared

¹⁹ Aristotle: Rhetoric 1358b, 4 - 5. Translated by W. RHYS ROBERTS. New York 1954.

²⁰ G. KENNEDY: The Art of Persuasion . . . 87.

that he was justified in committing it, the question became one of the quality (*poiotes*, *status generalis* or *constitutio iuridicialis*). Finally, if he admitted the act, but declared that it could not be dealt with by the court before which he was summoned, the question became one of *competence* (*metalepsis*, later *metastasis*, *status translativus*).²¹

Out of the combination of the above treated four big topics the coherent and complete system of ancient rhetoric had been developed. This system is a complex one because to the judicial oratory the dialectic and psychology were attached, to the deliberative—the politics, to the epideictic—the ethics, and finally to the legal process of the cause—the law.

3. It is an instructive question, how was the rhetoric taught in antiquity? Some modern authors's opinion is that it was taught dryly and rigorously. M. L. Clarke writes as follows: "Rhetorical theory was taught dogmatically from dry textbooks abounding in technical terms."²² Quintilian, too, says that there were many bad teachers of rhetoric, therefore he advised the parents to take the best teachers of rhetoric.²³ The bad teachers had the pupils memorize short textbooks, and they thought that they had fulfilled the task of the teacher. The students, too, should not think "their education complete when they have mastered one of the small textbooks of which so many are in circulation".²⁴

But there are data which indicate that there were good teachers, too. The author of "Rhetoric to Herennius" writes in the preface of the first book: "Theory without continuous practice in speaking is of little avail; . . . the precepts of theory here offered ought to be applied in practice."²⁵ Out of the epilogue of the fourth book it is clear, that he practiced the rules of rhetoric with his student Herennius, and they enjoyed it very much, that is, he taught the rhetoric interestingly enough.

Cicero, too, in his work "Partitions of Oratory",²⁶ written for his son, expounds the rules of rhetoric in an interesting way. His son puts him questions, and he answers them. In such a way they learn and practice the whole system of rhetoric. In this age the students of rhetoric went out to the Forum to attend good orators in real cases. In this age the custom of the *declamatio*, that is the academical exercise on a purely imaginary theme, was introduced into the teaching of rhetoric. Its introduction was useful because it was in harmony with the real forensic practice. But this situation changed in the time of Principate. The rhetoric was forced back to the classroom, therefore the declamation became very important in the teaching of rhetoric: it was the only form of rhetorical practice.²⁷

Quintilian was not only a great rhetorician, but a great educator, too. In the second book of "Institutio oratoria" he describes how to teach rhetoric. He divides the curriculum of rhetoric roughly into three phases:

²¹ S. F. BONNER: *Roman Declamation*. Liverpool 1969, 12–13.

²² M. L. CLARKE: *Rhetoric at Rome* 7.

²³ Quintilian 2.3.1–4.

²⁴ Quintilian 2.13.15.

²⁵ *Rhetorica* and *Herennium* 1.1. Translated by H. CAPLAN. London 1968.

²⁶ Cf. Cicero: *Partitiones Oratoriae* 1.1.

²⁷ Cf. G. KENNEDY: *The Art of Rhetoric* . . . 302–304; 312–322.

a) When the boy graduates to the *rhetor*, he does not abandon the exercises learned at the *grammaticus*. Thus there is a direct link to early training. The composition becomes more complex. He first has to summarize the plots of tragedies and comedies, and begin to analyze the legendary and historical narrations. Besides he studies the speeches of others reading them aloud. Quintilian highlights that the pupils have to read "the best authors"²⁸: Cicero and Livy from the very beginning. On the model of these authors the pupils begin to discuss such commonplaces: "Which is preferable, town or country life?"; "Which deserves the greatest praise, the lawyer or the soldier?"²⁹

b) In the second phase, besides the practice, i.e. exercises the pupils begin to learn the rhetorical theory attached and adapted to the exercises. On this stage the *rhetor* provides speech outlines ready for treatment and "suitable to their respective powers".³⁰ But sometime they should be left entirely to their own devices. In such a way they will be capable of effort and originality.³¹

c) Finally the pupils come to the culmination of all this preparation, to the declamation: the fictitious court case (*controversiae*) and deliberative case (*suasoriae*). In this case the students have to prepare an appropriate speech to resolve a concrete problem. This was a hard work for them, because they had to learn this speech by heart and present it before an audience which consisted of parents, relatives and friends.³²

Persius tells us in one of his Satires, that for him this type of declamation had been horrible.³³ According to Quintilian it is bad if the students often are forced to deliver such speeches before an audience. He writes: "They should not be forced to commit all their own compositions to memory and to deliver them on an appointed day, as is at present the custom. This practice is especially popular with the boys' fathers."³⁴

In general it is said that the subject matter of these declamation was beyond all probability because the rhetoricians wanted the speeches to be interesting. Seneca the Elder left a big collection of such themes, and there are a lot of topics which—according to my opinion—are not only instructive but of vital importance, e.g. The Vestal's Verse (*Versus virginis Vestalis*): "A Vestal virgin wrote the following verse: How happy married women are! O, may I die if marriage is not sweet. She is accused of unchastity." (*Virgo Vestalis scripsit hunc versum: Felices nuptae! moriar nisi nubere dulce est. rea est incesti.*) The root of the charge is as follows: *O te omni subpicio dignam cui quicquam sacerdotio felicius est! 'Dulce est': quam expressa vox, quam ex imis visceribus emissa non expertae tantum sed delectatae. Incesta est*

²⁸ Quintilian 2,5,19.

²⁹ Quintilian 2,4,24.

³⁰ Quintilian 2,6,5.

³¹ Quintilian 2,6,6.

³² Cp. Quintilian: On the Early Education of the Citizen-Orator. *Institutio Oratoria*. Book I, and Book II, Chapters One Through Ten. Translated by J. S. WATSON. Edited, With Introduction and Notes, by J. J. McRHEE. Indianapolis, New York, Kansas City 1965. XI XX.

³³ Persius 3,44–47.

³⁴ Quintilian 2,7,1.

etiam sine stupro quae cupit stuprum. The argument of the defendant is very modern: *Incesti damnari nulla potest nisi cuius violatum corpus est. Quid, tu putas poetas quae sentiunt scribere? Vixit modeste, castigate; non cultus in illa luxuriosior, non conversatio cum viris licentiosior; unum crimen eius vobis confiteor: ingenium habet.* In the words of the defendant there is to find the basic question of the freedom of poetry and speech. The same problem is expounded by Catullus in poem 16.³⁵ The good rhetoricians emphasized always that the topics of the declamations should be true to life, e.g. Quintilian writes: "The subject chosen for themes should, therefore, be as true to life as possible."³⁶

4. The art of rhetoric was highly esteemed from ancient Greece and Rome until late in the nineteenth century, occupying a prominent position in curriculum. Even in the eighteenth century the "new British rhetoric" opened a new epoch in the rhetorical theory. Toward the end of the nineteenth century it became disdained and was no longer taught. The rhetorical theory of twentieth century is rich and varied. Such great theoreticians of modern rhetoric as I. A. Richards, A. K. Burke, R. M. Weaver, Ch. Perelman and the "Rhétorique générale" from Liège explicitly developed the topics of ancient rhetoric further. According to A. Professor Kibédi Varga: "rhetoric is the best and scientifically most responsible instrument for the analysis of literary text".³⁷ Even such linguistical theory as that of J. L. Austin, which seems to have nothing to do with ancient rhetoric is very near to Quintilian's concept of rhetoric. R. W. Dasenbrock is right, on the one hand, when he writes about Austin: "In some ways, his work reflects a strong continuity with classical notions of discourse", but on the other hand, he is wrong, when he continues as follows: "in some ways, it reflects a sharp break".³⁸ Namely, Quintilian's definition of rhetoric as the "science of speaking well" and his justification of the definition, i.e. that the orator not only persuades, but sometimes describes, teaches, is very close to the thought of Austin that the sentences are both performative and constative.

According to D. Ehninger: "If the classical rhetoric may be characterized as 'grammatical' and the 'new British' rhetoric of the eighteenth century as 'psychological' the rhetoric of our third period may best be described as 'social' or 'sociological'. For while as a system contemporary rhetoric is unusually complex and embraces many specialized strands of interest, all of these strands find unity in the fact that at bottom they view rhetoric as an instrument of understanding and improving human relations".³⁹ All this means that every rhetoric has a grammatical structure

³⁵ *Controversiae* 6.8. The Elder Seneca: Declamations. Translated by M. WINTERBOTTOM. Cambridge, Massachusetts 1974, Vol. I, p. 523. Concerning Catullus' 16 see T. ADAMIK, On the Aesthetics of the Short Poems of Catullus (*Carm.* 16). *Annales Univ. Scient. Budapest. Sectio Classica* 5-6 (1977-1978) 115-127.

³⁶ Quintilian 2.9.4.

³⁷ Cited by S. LJSSELING *op. cit.* 3.

³⁸ R. W. DASENBROCK: J. L. Austin and the Articulation of a New Rhetoric. *College Composition and Communication*, 38 (1987) 303.

³⁹ D. EHNINGER: On Systems of Rhetoric. *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 1 (1968) 137.

—as M. McGuire highlights⁴⁰—, and it is natural since the task of rhetoric is to generate an effective speech, and the speech is the object of grammar. This grammatical structure of rhetoric, however, is modified by the social relations and institutions, i.e. by the political, judicial, and ethical thinking of a given age and society. It means that beside the grammatical structure, rhetoric has a social structure, too, and these two structures are interwoven. Consequently, the grammatical structure of rhetoric existed in every age, but in the new British rhetoric it was a little bit drawn into the background by the psychological structure, and in our age—by the sociological structure.

In the rehabilitation of classical rhetoric the researchers of ancient Rhetoric —e.g. G. Kennedy, J. J. Murphy, M. Fuhrmann and others⁴¹—played a big role because they expounded the system of ancient and medieval rhetoric in reliable works. The importance of their activity is rightly evaluated by R. L. Enos: “Thus, research in classical rhetoric served two important objectives: a grounding for oral and written expression, and the foundation for a humanistic education.”⁴² In such a phase of the development it is hoped that the system of classical rhetoric and its methods of teaching will be utilized at last in schools, too, for improving speech and composition instruction because it can contribute immensely to language awareness.

Budapest

⁴⁰ M. MCGUIRE: The Structure of Rhetoric. *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 15 (1982) 149–169.

⁴¹ M. FUHRMANN: *Die antike Rhetorik*. Artemis Verlag, München und Zürich 1987².

⁴² R. L. ENOS: The Classical Tradition(s) of Rhetoric. *College Composition and Communication* 38 (1987) 286.

THE SEAL WITH UNINTELLIGIBLE SCRIPT OF THE FOROUGHI COLLECTION

R. N. FRYE
SEPTUAGENARIO

In his excellent publication of the Sasanian seals in the Foroughi Collection,¹ Professor R. N. Frye described a remarkable specimen (Fig. 1) in the following way: "Writing only, in unintelligible script. Flat grey stone, 10 × 5, ht. 15."² Examining the published photo of the seal, one can state that its legend consists of two parts: to the right 3 lines written in cursive Pahlavi alphabet can be observed while to the left 2 lines written in a script of runic character may be suspected.

Numbered from above, line 1 of the Pahlavi legend represents without doubt the schematic, simplified, slightly deformed form of the word *GDH*, the logogram for MP *farr* 'royal splendour, glory'. The rudimentary remnants of *GD* in form of two short vertical strokes starting upwards from the horizontal body of the word can still be recognized. The *H* also appears in a rudimentary form as a circle filled up fully, joined to the right with *GD* while from its left part a horizontal stroke starts at the end of which a short stroke is protruding downwards.

The reading of line 2 does not cause any difficulty: it clearly consists of the 3 joined letters 'h'/h_n. Line 3 can also easily be read: it contains 3 characters, one written separately and two joined. The separate letter can be read as *z* while the two joined ones may be identified as *yk*. Thus, the reading of the whole legend will be the following: line 1 *GDH* 2 *h_n* 3 *zyk*.

This inscription obviously consists of a personal name: *zyk* (*Zīg), a title *h_n* (*xaxan) and the word *GDH* (*farr* 'royal splendour, glory'). This interpretation



Fig. 1. The inscriptions of the seal. Drawing after CH Part III. Vol. VI. Portfolio II. Plate XXXIII. Fig. 20

¹ Corpus Inscriptionum Iranicarum. Part III. Vol. VI. Portfolio II. Sasanian Seals in the Collection of Mohsen Foroughi. Edited by R. N. Frye. London 1971. Plate XXXIII. Fig. 20.

² R. N. Frye: op. cit. Description of Plates.

reveals several striking phenomena of the legend all at once. First of all, this word order is unusual in Middle Persian. The customary word order would be *Zig xaxan GDH*. One could read, of course, the inscription upwards from below. Thus, we can arrive at the usual MP word order but in this case we have to assume a writing practice which is alien from Middle Persian.

The other striking phenomenon of the legend is the spelling *hḥn* representing apparently the Old Turkic title *qaγan*. The usual Middle Persian form of Old Turkic *qaγan* is, however, *h'k'n*³ to be interpreted as *xagan* or *xayan* being the most exact transcription possible of the Old Turkic word. The spelling *hḥn* reminds the Sogdian form of this title, viz. *γ'γ'n* to be interpreted as *xayan*, being similarly the most exact transcription possible of Old Turkic *qaγan*. As Sogdian *γ* also had the phonetic value *χ* and the indication of the vowels in Sogdian orthography more frequently occurs than in Pahlavi, transcribing the Sogdian spelling into Pahlavi, a scribe not acquainted equally well with both Sogdian and Pahlavi orthography, could arrive at the Pahlavi transcription *hḥn* instead of the correct Pahlavi form *h'k'n* inasmuch as he interpreted the Sogdian spelling *γ'γ'n* as *χ'χ'n*. Obviously, both phenomena, the inverse word order and the unusual transcription of the Old Turkic title *qaγan*, require an explanation and at the same time they could throw light on the historical circumstances of the preparation of the seal.

A further peculiarity of the seal is the legend written in a script of runic character. At first sight, one can identify 3 runic letters, viz. ¹*b*, ²*b* and *ük/kü*. The form of these signs clearly proves their belonging to the Orkhon-Yenisey runic alphabet. The other 3 characters have no parallels in the Orkhon-Yenisey alphabet. However, if one recognizes that these striking letter forms came into being by the clumsiness of the craftsman who engraved (perhaps on account of his ignorance of the runic script) the characters too near one to another on the surface of the seal (Fig. 2) and also reproduced the auxiliary ground lines of the draft, then these unintelligible letters can also be identified.



Fig. 2. Analytic drawing of the runic inscription of the seal

³ Šahristānīhā i Ērān, ch. 9.

⁴ Cf. D. D. Vasil'ev: Корпус тюркских рунических памятников бассейна Енисея. Leningrad 1983, p. 12. Table of runic characters ¹*b*/20, *ük*/3, ²*η*/2. As concerns ²*k*, the same form of this letter occurs in runic inscriptions from Aymırlıy, from Burgenland (Austria) and Battonya (Hungary), the two latter being of Avar origin (cf. J. Harmatta: AntTan 30 (1983) 25 [Battonya], 31 (1984) 112 [Aymırlıy] 32 [1985–86] 25 [Burgenland]).

Numbering the lines from below upwards according to the practice of the Türk runic script, we can read in line 1 after ¹*b* the letters *iq/qi* and *š/s*, in line 2 (from right to left) *iq/qi* and ¹*y*, afterwards ²*k* and ⁰*η*. Thus, the reading of the whole text will run as follows:

line 1 ¹*b* *qi* *š/s*: ²*b*
2 *qi* ¹*y* ²*k* ⁰*η* *kü*

As concerns the form of the letters, ¹*b*, ²*k*, ⁰*η* and *kü* reveal characteristic features of the Yenisey runic script or of its variants (Fig. 3) used on the territory of the Western Türk Empire.⁴ This fact clearly speaks for the Western Türk origin of the runic legend of the seal.

	Seal	O-Y	Avar
¹ <i>b</i>	↷	↷ Y	
² <i>b</i>	⋈	⋈ Y	
¹ <i>y</i>	ᐅ	ᐅ	ᐅ Bu
² <i>k</i>	⋈	⋈ A	⋈B ⋈Bu
<i>kü</i>	⋈	⋈ Y	
¹ <i>η</i>	γ	γ Y	
<i>qi</i>	◁	◁	
<i>š</i>	^	^ Y	

Fig. 3. Comparative table of the runic characters. Abbreviations: O — Orkhon, Y — Yenisey, A — Aymırlıy, B — Battonya, Bu — Burgenland

The interpretation of the runic inscription does not encounter any serious difficulty. The text can be vocalized in the following way:

line 1 *b²qi²š²b*
2 *qi²y¹k²η⁰kü*

The first word may be the gerund of the Old Turkic verb *baq-* 'follow with attention'⁵ formed with the suffix *-i*. The following three words *eš* 'companion', *eb* 'house, family', *qi²y* 'village, suburb'⁶ represent indefinite case having the function of an undetermined object. The next item *ük* can be taken for the imperative 2nd

⁵ Древнетюркский словарь. (In the followings DTS.) Leningrad 1969. 81.

⁶ DTS 184, 162, 440.

person of the verb *ük-* 'accumulate, gather'⁷, *kü* is the well-known Old Turkic word meaning 'reputation, renown, fame'⁸, *oŋ* 'true, veritable'⁹ is the attribute of *kü*, and the whole phrase *oŋ kü* can again be regarded as an undetermined object in indefinite case. Thus the whole text can be interpreted as follows: "Being attentive to companion, to house, to settlement, acquire veritable renown!"

Obviously, this text represents the principles in short form of correct royal behaviour by which the ruler can acquire true reputation among his subjects. Both the title *qayan* and the Western Türk character of the runic script and the Old Turkic text speak in favour of the assumption that we have to do with the seal of a Western Türk *qayan* whose name is given by the Middle Persian legend of the seal in the form *zyk* (**Zığ*). There can be hardly any doubt that *Zig qayan* should be identified with *Shih-kuei qayan* of the Chinese sources (Sui-shu, T'ang-shu). The Chinese transcription *Shih-kuei* 射置. Ancient Chinese *dž'äk-g'jwi*, points to an Old Turkic prototype **Jig*. The difference between the two forms *Zig* and *Jig* can also be ascribed to the intermediary role of Sogdian in which Western Türk initial *ǰ-*, being absent from Sogdian phonemic system, was replaced by Sogdian *z-*.

According to the Chiu T'ang-shu *Shih-kuei qayan* "was the first who enlarged the territory (of the Western Türk Empire). Eastwards, he advanced up to the *Chin-shan* (Altai), westwards, he advanced up to the sea. To the west of *Yü-mên* (-*kuan*) all the diverse kingdoms were his subjects".¹⁰ During his reign lasting from 611 A.D. to 619 A.D., *Jig qayan* sent an army to the aid of the Hephthalites who were his vassals and waged war against Sasanian Iran in 616–617 A.D. The Türk army won a great victory over the Persians and advanced up to Rey and Isfahan.

Very likely, the preparation of the bilingual seal of *Jig qayan* can be brought into connection with his temporary occupation of Persian territories. The administration of Iranian territories required the use of written documents and their authentication by seal. Thus, the seal of *Jig qayan* was probably prepared in order to certify the orders issued by the Türk officials in the name of the *qayan*, i.e. the Western Türks adopted the Persian administrative system on the occupied Iranian territories. It follows that this specimen was not the personal seal of *Jig qayan* himself—in this case it should have been of much greater size and of better quality and also provided with the *qayan*'s portrait—but it may have been an "administrative" seal used by his officers. In any case, the seal gives clear evidence for the intention of the Western Türks to make arrangements for a lasting occupation of Persian territories. Thus, it permits an interesting insight into the obscure history of Western Türk–Persian relations in the first decades of the VIIth century A.D. Scholarly research may be really grateful to Professor Frye for the inclusion of this seal into his publication.

⁷ DTS 623.

⁸ DTS 322.

⁹ DTS 367.

¹⁰ E. Chavannes: Documents sur les Tou-kiue (Tures) occidentaux.² Paris 23–24.

APPENDIX

There exists one evidence more for the military success of the Western Türk army in Iran in 616–617 A.D. This is the silver medal in the Collection of P. Quaroni¹¹ the obverse of which shows a king to right, bearing a winged mural crown. The legend to the left of the bust of the king runs as follows: *GDH 'pzwñ zyk*,¹² while the legend to the right is the following: *MLK''ñ MLK'*. The whole text can be interpreted in the following way: "Glory, growth! Zig King of Kings". The medal portrays Zig *qayan* as a Sasanian *šāhān šāh* and was obviously minted to commemorate his victory over the Persians.

Budapest

¹¹ Published by R. Göbl: *Medaillen des islamischen Mittelalters und ihr Formenkreis*. *Litterae Numismaticae Vindobonensis* 3 (1987) 276 foll. Plate 39, Fig. 2.

¹² Göbl l. c. could not read the name of the king and erroneously dated the medal, anonymous in his opinion, from Islamic times.

CRITICA

Les Humanistes et l'Antiquité Grecque, édité par MITCHIKO ISHIGAMI-IAGOL-NITZER, Paris, Editions du CNRS 1989

«Umanesimo» è una parola che usiamo volentieri, nelle nostre considerazioni storiche ed erudite e nei riferimenti politico-culturali dell'attualità. Ma cosa significa in realtà «Umanesimo»? Per approfondire un concetto tanto essenziale per la nostra civiltà, quanto oggi incredibilmente vago e nebuloso, appare preziosa una raccolta di studi pubblicata recentemente dal Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique di Parigi.

Si tratta di una densa raccolta di interventi — ognuno centrato su di un preciso aspetto dell'«Umanesimo» — elaborati da studiosi di formazione diversa e raccolti nel corso di vari seminari, tenuti presso l'Institut de Recherche et d'Histoire des Textes di Parigi, tra il 1982 e il 1987. Specialisti di storia dei testi e di storia delle idee, appartenenti ai più diversi istituti scientifici e centri di ricerca, ma tutti operanti tra Antichità, Umanesimo e Rinascimento, ci offrono così nuove chiavi per la comprensione del fenomeno «Umanesimo». Può essere subito interessante notare come negli studiosi contemporanei dell'Umanesimo si perpetuino attitudini tipicamente umanistiche: in questa raccolta di studi è infatti auspicato e praticato un rigoroso studio dei testi, per risalire direttamente alle fonti; oppure la collaborazione tra le varie sezioni del sapere fa sì che si occupino dello stesso fenomeno — il Rinascimento — studiosi di civiltà greca, latina, ebraica, araba, o di araldica, informatica, paleografia: e dunque con uno spirito apertamente «rinascimentale»; infine, dopo ogni contributo, viene riportato anche il successivo dibattito, quasi a testimoniare nostalgie o reminiscenze di dialoghi platonici...

Il volume si propone nel suo complesso di ricostruire i testi e le idee degli antichi Greci, che hanno potuto ispirare gli umanisti. L'indagine sulla genesi ed il significato della parola «Umanesimo» va subito al nocciolo della questione (J. C. Margolin): numerosi problemi, lessicali, semantici e storici si incontrano nella definizione del concetto. L'Umanesimo è una filosofia senza tempo e sempre attuale, che esalta la «dignitas hominis», oppure è una categoria storica, riferibile solo al culto dell'antico degli eruditi del Rinascimento? La vivacità del dibattito tra un'applicazione storica ed una transtorica del concetto di «humanitas» sottolinea così l'alternativa tra un'attitudine filosofica ed un'abitudine filologica: tra chi riconosce alle «humanae litterae» una semplice questione di stile, e chi vi introduce piuttosto una filosofia dell'uomo. In definitiva, pur tra i sempre doverosi scrupoli filologici ed una lucida consapevolezza dei problemi (per esempio, quando sorge l'idea di un Umanesimo cristiano?), lo studioso non rinuncia ad elevarsi dal contesto storico: il concetto di Umanesimo si rivela allora interdisciplinare, perchè appartiene nello stesso tempo alla filologia ed alla storia delle idee.

Diversi interventi si preoccupano poi di ricostruire i componenti culturali dell'Umanesimo.

L'importanza delle tradizioni esoteriche ed ermetiche nel Rinascimento, così sensibile alla nozione di corrispondenza tra microcosmo e macrocosmo, viene così ribadita, indagando i rapporti tra la cultura egizia e la filosofia greca: rapporti chiariti dalla figura di Ermete Trismegisto (J. Paramelle).

Allo stesso modo è chiaramente messo in evidenza come la maturazione dell'uomo occidentale passi attraverso il pensiero mitico e poetico degli antichi filosofi greci: tutto viene dai presocratici misteriosi. La metafora del flusso universale eracleo rivive nelle pagine degli umanisti, significativamente interessati al parallelismo pensiero-parola, ed ai geroglifici egizi (C. Ramnoux).

Altrettanto significativa appare l'irruzione dello Scetticismo antico negli scritti del Rinascimento e nella tradizione umanistica cinquecentesca (A. Tournon), e gli studiosi si sono preoccupati di verificare la fedeltà all'originale dell'immagine scettica sfruttata dagli umanisti. L'avventura del paradosso comunque contaminò il Rinascimento: la messa in discussione di ogni scienza poteva servire sia per sbarazzarsi del sistema particolare della filosofia aristotelica, sia per ribadire l'autorità della Rivelazione. Ma ritornava anche l'antica contraddizione: come essere rigidamente scettici, senza snaturare il senso dello scetticismo? Visto che anche il dubbio è di per sé un'asserzione... e perde così esso stesso la sua forza corrosiva. Lo scetticismo cinquecentesco appare così non più filosofico, ma piuttosto un messaggio antidogmatico e paradossale, magari per insinuare poi un eccesso di senso. Lo scetticismo greco, intento

a sottolineare l'imperfezione dei sensi e la relatività della conoscenza, ha svolto indubbiamente un ruolo importante nella formazione dello spirito critico dell'Umanesimo, e nel libro viene studiato il caso di alcuni umanisti francesi cinquecenteschi: Sanchez, Montaigne, Charron (M. Ishigami-Iagolnitzer). Il dubbio scettico era utilizzato contro il dogmatismo scolastico e le certezze del passato: ma gli umanisti andavano oltre il puro scetticismo, radicandosi con questo nella modernità, e preparando così i futuri empirismi e positivismi razionali. Essi aspiravano infatti a fondare, oltre i residui del passato, una nuova scienza e una nuova morale, perché la debolezza umana permetteva comunque, grazie ai nuovi metodi empirici e razionali di ricerca, la scoperta di verità relative.

Fondamentali conclusioni possono trarsi dall'analisi del concetto di «dignità umana», intrecciato significativamente al tema della Fortuna, così come esso si presenta negli scritti dei pensatori fiorentini del Rinascimento (A. Rochon).

Viene infatti in evidenza la distinzione tra il primo Umanesimo, classicamente disinvoltato nell'esaltare la vita attiva (matrimonio, famiglia, lavoro, ricchezza), pur sempre in una prospettiva religiosa, ed una seconda fase dell'Umanesimo, nella quale viene sempre più sopravvalutata la vita contemplativa: l'evasione dal mondo, la liberazione dai sensi, per l'elevazione dell'anima fino alla luce di Dio. Dall'entusiasmo dei primi umanisti (Giannozzo Manetti, Leon Battista Alberti, Coluccio Salutati) progressivamente si scivola nell'inquietudine spirituale neoplatonica (Pico della Mirandola, Marsilio Ficino): dai trattati sulla famiglia fino all'aperta condanna della vita attiva del «fuge negotia», in un itinerario interessantissimo da ripercorrere. Tanto più che sembra coincidere con il passaggio dal regime oligarchico a quello autoritario. Il tema della dignità umana, intrecciato al rapporto Virtù-Fortuna, sottolinea la differenza: dall'esaltazione della dignità e della libertà creatrice dell'uomo, dove il saggio domina le stelle, si passa alla contemplazione di un destino cui sottrarsi, ma che non si spera più di poter cambiare, mentre la dignità dell'uomo è fondata sulla struttura del mondo e sulla sua capacità di esserne copula. Tutto questo sia detto, tenendo sempre conto delle inevitabili differenze tra i vari autori: per esempio Pico, nutrito di testi orientali e cabala, non esita a fondare la dignità dell'uomo sulla sua libertà di crearsi. Si arriva infine alle evasioni poetiche di Poliziano, interessato unicamente alla gloria terrestre, ma comunque fondatore del metodo filologico e storico-scientifico, per il quale la dignità dell'uomo si basa sull'esercizio della parola: da Adamo si giunge così ad Orfeo.

Il rapporto tra l'individuo e la Fortuna torna nelle considerazioni sul Decamerone (A. Fontes-Baratto). Il mondo boccacesco non ha più trascendenza o grandi questioni politiche, ma solo una grande curiosità e disponibilità verso il mondo, che si traduce poi in una tecnica narrativa aperta a tutti i generi. La fortuna provoca le trame delle novelle, ma condiziona anche l'evasione della «brigata»: fuori Firenze, e nel piacere del racconto. Boccaccio si impegna così ad organizzare il non senso delle vicende dentro la «cornice» della narrazione. La crisi della società urbana ha come sfondo l'implacabile economia delle passioni e degli istinti: è la forza del Desiderio, che può essere solo riconosciuta e gestita, ma mai annullata o modificata. Mentre tensioni irrisolte si instaurano tra morale mercantile e codice aristocratico.

La ricostruzione di una dialettica delle relazioni intellettuali tra Francia e Italia all'alba del Rinascimento rievoca il tema della «Translatio Studii»: dall'Egitto ad Atene, a Roma, a Parigi (G. Ouy). Oltre l'ammirazione reciproca o la fede nell'universalità della cultura, polemiche e rivalità culturali franco-italiane si riflettono nei manoscritti umanistici.

Viene poi indagato il ruolo degli umanisti francesi nella riscoperta degli autori classici (E. Ornato), e comunque ricostruita una tradizione medievale dei testi dell'Antichità. Sorge così inevitabile il dibattito sulla consistenza dell'Umanesimo francese. Per esempio viene ricostruito il contesto storico e l'opera di Laurent de Premierfait, come commentatore di testi classici (C. Bozzolo).

Occasione di fertili riflessioni è lo studio sulla fortuna di Plutarco nell'Umanesimo (R. Aulotte): i suoi eroi, espressione perfetta dell'uomo antico, hanno avuto un'influenza profonda sul nuovo tipo di umanità che si andava imponendo. In Francia e in Italia Plutarco ha favorito la nascita di un «Umanesimo umanizzato», capace di tener conto della permanente natura umana e delle variabili storiche e geografiche. Un Umanesimo capace di rispondere alle domande che l'uomo pone su se stesso o sul suo destino: il male, la vita delle anime dopo la morte, la religione. La sua influenza ha avuto così una molteplicità di direzioni, e si è prolungata a suscitare ammiratori fino ai tempi di Napoleone. Gli uomini del Cinquecento attingevano alla sua enciclopedia storica e morale: e così oggi si possono ricostruire gli scritti più tradotti e popolarizzati nell'epoca. Nei tempi agitati delle guerre civili, gli umanisti francesi ammiravano gli eroi antichi, mentre più tardi dalle «Vite» si è passati a leggere di più le «Opere morali», dopo l'eroe si cercava l'onest'uomo.

Anche la fortuna di Eschilo nel Rinascimento è stata oggetto di studio (M. Mund-Dopchie): o piuttosto la sua sfortuna, tale, se comparata agli altri tragici greci, molto più letti. I motivi vanno ricercati nel carattere estraneo del suo lirismo misterioso, e nell'oscurità della lingua, pur affascinante.

Ma sono soprattutto le teorie letterarie di Aristotele che privilegiavano i drammi di Sofocle e di Euripide, mentre trascuravano Eschilo troppo marcato dal pensiero arcaico. Così sorse il pregiudizio rinascimentale di un Eschilo, padre della tragedia, precursore di Sofocle e di Euripide, ma la cui imperfezione preparava la perfezione dei suoi successori.

I falsi autori antichi nella tradizione umanista testimoniano poi la funzione intellettuale e collettiva del falso, e come potevano essere favorevoli per i falsari le condizioni nell'età del Rinascimento (R. Crahay).

Ma il Rinascimento non era soltanto l'epoca della rinascita della cultura antica: esso proponeva anche un'inedita antropologia culturale. Lo studio dell'immaginario nel Cinquecento apre così nuovi orizzonti all'indagine storica (C. G. Dubois). Il Cinquecento francese infatti si pone tra Rinascimento italiano, Manierismo e Barocco. Dopo la definizione di immaginario mimetico, immaginario fantastico ed immaginario simbolico, sono ricostruite le costanti con le quali è presentata l'«imagination» nel Cinquecento. Essa, lungi dal significare evasione o fuga, è come un'energia, che permette la realizzazione di un voler-essere e la trasformazione del reale. L'attività immaginativa inoltre produce una «coniunctio oppositorum». L'immaginazione poetica come il «mercurius» nell'atanor degli alchimisti avvicina realtà lontane, per dar loro nuovi significati, così come la sostanza «spirito» associa maschile e femminile, zolfo e mercurio. L'«imagination» è così una forza di sintesi che realizza «alleanze», ad esprimere le affinità profonde della natura. Essa è l'intuizione dell'amore panico degli esseri e dei segni: forza copulativa e procreativa.

Nella ricostruzione di una logica dell'immaginario, il progetto di rappresentazione appare così tra le ambizioni fondamentali del Cinquecento francese. Le tecniche di riproduzione instaurano nuove relazioni del soggetto con gli oggetti: relazioni immaginarie di tipo mimetico, fusionale, poetico e semiotico. Dalla semplice reiterazione si arriva fino alla volontà mimetica a alla identificazione del soggetto con il suo oggetto. In generale è sottolineato il ruolo dell'immaginazione, capace di operare la sintesi dei vari ricettori sensoriali, e di instaurare una dialettica tra soggetto ed oggetto, tra percezione del reale e accoglienza delle apparenze.

Anche se non si possono riassumere con un simbolo globale le varie manifestazioni cinquecentesche dell'immaginario, si può considerare il Classicismo francese come una forma francese di Barocco meridionale e di Puritanismo nordico. Esso si rivela così un vero e proprio laboratorio di idee, preparatore delle sintesi future.

Si può indagare anche il ruolo dell'Antichità nello sviluppo del «libero pensiero»: e per esempio considerare l'influenza di Luciano di Samosata nella Francia cinquecentesca (C. Lauvergnat-Gagnière). Ed infatti Luciano di Samosata, definito «il Voltaire dell'Antichità», è talora considerato all'origine delle correnti di pensiero ateiste, razionaliste, od in genere antenate del libertinismo. Luciano satireggia contro gli pseudo-filosofi, che rifiutano il vero sapere, per rispettare ciecamente la tradizione e le loro opinioni, e sono poi incapaci di coniugare i loro precetti e la loro vita. Ispirandosi a lui, vari simpatizzanti per le idee nuove come Erasmo o Moro denunciavano la corruzione di alcuni uomini di Chiesa. Luciano si presenta così come tanti altri autori antichi: pagani ma sublimi, come Livio, Cicerone, Tucidide o Platone, comunque utili alla formazione dell'uomo. L'accusa di empietà che viene rivolta a Luciano risale in realtà alla «querelle» tra Erasmo e Lutero sul libero arbitrio (1525).

Viene svolta poi una precisa indagine sull'editoria rinascimentale, visto che la stampa si rivelò presto un mezzo fondamentale per la trasmissione delle nuove idee (C. Vecce). A Venezia, dal 1495, Aldo Manuzio, grande editore umanista, pubblicava autori greci, muovendosi tra logica di mercato ed interventi pedagogici. Un momento della storia delle scoperte dei manoscritti è stato anzi proprio suggerito e stimolato da Aldo. Lo stesso Erasmo, in visita ad Aldo, rimase affascinato dalla sua ricerca ed edizione di fonti manoscritte. Con la collaborazione di Sannazaro e Pontano si avviava così il nuovo metodo filologico della collazione e correzione dei manoscritti.

Nel precisare la nozione di Umanesimo, diviene inevitabile chiedersi: quando comincia l'Umanesimo greco? (J. Kecskenéti.) Se per Umanesimo si intende antropocentrismo, la risposta è: con Socrate. Ma in realtà la riflessione sull'uomo comincia prima, e precisamente all'inizio del sesto secolo a. C. quando i primi pensatori greci, dopo essersi interrogati sul principio dell'universo, indirizzarono la loro indagine direttamente sull'uomo. Ed ognuno di questi approcci può essere considerato come punto di partenza di una riflessione umanista, più tardi nuovamente avviata da Socrate. Si ripercorre così il pensiero di Omero, di Senofane di Colofone, di Eraclito, di Parmenide, di Democrito: il loro però è un antropocentrismo pessimista, perchè sono comunque sottolineati i limiti del sapere umano. I sofisti invece hanno la tendenza opposta. Il loro ottimismo pedagogico ha fede che tutto si possa insegnare: la virtù è nell'abilità retorica e l'uomo diviene criterio assoluto e misura di tutte le cose. Si può dire che la storia dell'Umanesimo inizia quando per la prima volta viene formulato il principio dell'uguaglianza degli uomini, con i sofisti Ippia e Antifone. Gli uomini appaiono così uguali per natura e differenti per convenzione: ma si reintroduce allora la nozione di una verità indipendente dall'apprezzamento umano. Così all'origine

dell'Umanesimo si pone proprio il dubbio sulla capacità dell'uomo di conoscere e scoprire l'apparenza. Ancora una volta le origini del pensiero critico scientifico occidentale vanno ricercate nei presocratici.

L'affascinante pensiero di Nicola da Cusa viene ricostruito attraverso la lettura dei suoi dialoghi (M. de Gandillac). La verità, intravista e insegnata dai pensatori di tutti i tempi, si rivela progressivamente, perchè si tratta di un sapere innato, anche se nascosto da illusioni e presunzioni della falsa scienza. La dotta ignoranza di Cusano sembra evocare l'ironia socratica, nella denuncia dei falsi saperi, per ritornare al punto zero della conoscenza. L'uomo semplice e senza pregiudizi, che ha letto il libro divino della natura e non quelli umani delle biblioteche, appare migliore dei falsi sapienti. Per esempio i professori aristotelici non capiscono la coincidenza degli opposti: del resto gli spiriti legati all'autorità dell'abitudine muoiono, piuttosto di rinunciare alle loro opinioni.

Sono ricostruiti anche gli interessi di Erasmo per Platone (J. Chomarat): l'umanista sfoglia volentieri le *Leggi*, il *Convito*, il *Teeteto*, e assume dal filosofo greco i tratti più congeniali alla sua personalità. Infine è ricordato come la variazione e trasmissione delle opere — per esempio la tradizione dei testi di Platone e Aristotele dall'Antichità al Rinascimento — cambiano secondo le circostanze storiche (J. Irigoin).

Come risulta evidente, si tratta di una raccolta di saggi vivace e densa di fertili osservazioni. Forse, come accennavamo all'inizio, la cosa che più sorprende piacevolmente è la diffusione di uno «spirito umanistico» anche tra i suoi eruditi indagatori, disponibili oggetti di una trasformazione creativa, ancora possibile, a distanza di secoli. Abituati a studiare trapianti di idee e riscoperte di autori, gli studiosi dell'Umanesimo sembrano godere di una più profonda «capacità mimetica» di identificazione nei confronti dell'oggetto del loro studio. Robert Aulotte, dopo aver scrupolosamente indagato sulla fortuna di Plutarco nell'Umanesimo, confessa candidamente che la sera, anche lui, rilegge le «Vite». E si augura che, in un mondo sempre più disumanizzato, si riesca ancora ad ascoltare la voce così umana dell'umanista Plutarco. L'attualità del concetto di «humanitas», la sua possibile applicazione transtorica, bastano da sole a giustificare le più infaticabili ricerche filologiche. Del resto sulla copertina del libro troviamo il ritratto dell'umanista ed editore veneziano Aldo Manuzio, quasi a suggerire una continuità di passione e di ricerca.

Questo ci appare in definitiva il maggiore merito di questo volume: quello di insinuare il fondamentale sospetto — umanistico — che la ricerca appassionata delle fonti antiche si possa adattare ai problemi dell'attualità.

Roma

A. SCAFI

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